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Thesis Abstract 
 
Western intellectual property frameworks have at least one feature in common: 
performers are less protected than authors. This situation knows many justifications, 
although all but one have been dismissed by the literature: performers are simply 
less creative than authors. As a result, the legal protection covering their work has 
been proportionally reduced compared to that of their authorial peers. This thesis 
investigates this phenomenon that it calls the 'author-performer divide'. It uncovers 
the culturally-rooted principles and legal reasoning that policy-makers and judges of 
Australia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States have developed to 
create in the legal narrative a hierarchy between authors and performers. It reveals 
that those intellectual property systems, though continuously reformed, still contain 
outdated conceptions of creativity based on the belief in ex nihilo creation and over-
intellectualised representations of the creative process. Those two precepts 
combined have led legal discourse to portray performers as their authors' puppets, 
thus underserving of authorship themselves. This thesis reviews arguments raised 
against improving the performers' regime to challenge the preconception of 
performers as uncreative agents and questions the divide it supports. To this end, it 
seeks to update the representations of creativity currently conveyed in the law by 
drawing on the findings of other academic disciplines such as creativity research, 
performance theories as well as music, theatre and dance studies. This comparative 
inter-disciplinary study aims to move current legal debates on performers' rights 
away from the recurring themes and repeated arguments in the scholarship such as 
issues of fixation or of competing claims, all of which have made conversations 
stagnate. By including disciplines beyond the law, this analysis seeks to advance the 
legal literature on the question of performers' intellectual property protection and shift 
thinking about performative forms of creativity. 
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Introduction 
 
I write opinions to be published in textbooks.
1
 
– Alex Kozinski J, 2015 
 
The title of this thesis could have been ‘Why Justice Kozinski was right in Garcia v 
Google’, when the American judge granted full copyright protection to an actress 
who had ‘only’ performed in a short video clip.2 Indeed, the present work sides with 
Kozinski J3 despite the array of criticism his position triggered amongst practitioners 
and scholars in 2014,4 and again in 2015.5 This analysis unfolds the socio-cultural 
phenomena at play behind the jurisprudence of the ninth circuit court of appeal. It 
argues that Kozinski J did make good law with “bad facts” unlike what current legal 
scholarship holds,6 and that the impression of error in judgement is in fact the result 
of long-standing biases towards particular understandings of creativity which should 
no longer be guiding contemporary models of intellectual property law.  
                                                          
1
 Alex Kozinski, Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal of the United States, ‘IP and Advocacy’ (The Sir 
Hugh Laddie Lecture given at the UCL Institute for Brand and Innovation Law, London, 24 June 2015). 
2
 Garcia v Google Inc, 743 F 3d 1258 (9
th
 Cir 2014) 1263. 
3
 Garcia v Google Inc, 743 F 3d 1258 (9
th
 Cir 2014). 
4
 See the reaction of the scholarship: Christopher Newman, Christopher Sprigman and Jennifer Granick, Brief of 
Amici Curiae Professors of Intellectual Property Law in Support of Google, Inc. and Youtube, LLC in Garcia v 
Google, Inc and Youtube, LLC before the ninth circuit court of appeal Case No. CV-12-8315-MWF (April 14, 
2014) ; Venkat Balasubramani and Erik Goldman, Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Professors in Support Of 
Appellees Google, Inc. and Youtube, Llc, No xx, in Garcia v Google, Inc and Youtube, LLC before the ninth 
circuit court of appeal Case No. CV-12-8315-MWF (November 25, 2014). See also, Paul Heald, ‘Ninth Circuit 
Screws up Copyright Law to Save a Fatwa-Endangered Plaintiff’ (Copyright for Authors blog) 
<http://copyrightforauthors.wordpress.com/2014/04/28/ninth-circuit-screws-up-copyright-law-to-save-a-fatwa-
endangered-plaintiff/> accessed 10 March 2016; Jacob Victor, ‘Garcia v Google and a “Related Rights” 
Alternative to Copyright in Acting Performances’ [2014] The Yale Law Journal Forum 80, 81; Rebecca 
Tushnet, ‘Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied’ (2013) 60 Journal Copyright Society 
of the USA 209, 238; Rebecca Tushnet, ‘My Long, Sad Garcia v Google Post’ (Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B)log) 
<http://tushnet.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/my-long-sad-garcia-v-google-post.html> accessed 10 March 2016. See 
also, for a contradicting opinion coming from a neighbour circuit: Conrad v AM Community Credit Union, 750 
F3d 634 (7th Cir 2014). 
5
 See the majority decision in Garcia v Google Inc, 786 F3d 733 (9th Cir 2015) 743. 
6
 n 4 ; Carr McClellan, ‘Ninth Circuit Makes Bad Copyright Law from Bad Facts’ (Carr McClelland Law Blog, 
2014) <http://www.carrmcclellan.com/ninth-circuit-makes-bad-copyright-law-from-bad-facts/> accessed 10 
March 2016.  
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Similar prejudices towards originality, authorship and performances have also 
influenced the framework of other national systems, this is why this discussion 
extends its scope beyond the perimeters of the United States (US) to include the 
jurisdictions of Australia, France and the United Kingdom (UK). The following 
introduction outlines the skeleton argument of this thesis and details the 
methodology used. 
 
I. Research project 
Performers are perceived as less creative than authors and have consequently 
received less legal protection than their authorial counterparts. The correlation 
between lack of creativity and lack of protection affecting performing artists has 
been, and still is, underlying many western intellectual property frameworks. 
Conscious or not, explicit or not, it has contributed to building a divide between 
authors and performers, whereby the latter shall not be rewarded with the same 
rights as former for they fail to display the modicum of creativity with which authors’ 
rights7 are concerned.  
The divide anchored in and by the law resisted decades of reforms of intellectual 
property rights and centuries of socio-economic, cultural and technological changes. 
Scholars and practitioners who have dedicated their work to studying or engaging 
with performative practices have called for a rehabilitation of performances as a 
valuable component of western cultural narratives, equal to authors’ input. Although 
this consensus was reached across all performance-oriented disciplines since the 
                                                          
7
 Understood broadly as encompassing both authors’ rights (droit d’auteur) and copyright. 
13 
 
1960s,8 the laws of Australia, France, the UK and the US are yet to update their 
standards as far as their protection of performing artists is concerned.  
In light of these factors, this thesis questions why the body of law set to support 
innovation and creativity holds on to a divide regarded as archaic by those working in 
the very same fields the regulatory framework is designed to stimulate. What justifies 
not only the existence but also the keeping alive of the author-performer divide in 
current western intellectual property frameworks? Are legal frameworks incapable of 
conceiving a paradigm where both groups of artists receive equal protection? Is the 
divide a reflection of deeper cultural beliefs embedded in western understandings of 
creativity, authorship or performership? If so, what are they and to what extent have 
they stamped their mark policy-makers’ or judges’ reasoning? 
Performers’ rights have received little attention from the legal scholarship in 
comparison to copyright or authors’ rights. Fundamental and theoretical critical 
thinking is what this field of intellectual property law lacks most cruelly. The majority 
of the scholarship on the question focuses on detailing the complex web of rights 
performers are eligible for or affected by,9 but few of those discussions centre on 
explaining the legal gap separating authors from performers10 or what the societal 
                                                          
8
 An aesthetical shift later labelled the ‘performative turn’ occurred in the sixties. Such “turn” recognised the 
value of performance for itself, independent from the underlying work’s meaning and quality. This point is 
further discussed in Chapter 2 text to note 483. 
9
 See for example, Richard Arnold, Performers’ Rights (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 240-266; Owen 
Morgan, International Protection of Performers’ Rights (Hart Publishing 2002); Michel Vivant, Nathalie 
Mallet-Poujol and Jean-Michel Brugière, Quels Droits Pour Les Artistes Du Spectacle (Dalloz; 2009); Sam 
Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights - The Berne Convention and 
Beyond (volume I) (Oxford University Press 2006). 
10
 See for instance, Arnold (n 9) 241 para 9.03; Robert Homburg, Le Droit d’Interprétation Des Acteurs et Des 
Artistes Exécutants (Receuil Sirey 1930) 9-15 ; Paul Olagnier, Le Droit Des Artistes Interprètes et Exécutants 
(Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1937) 9-22. 
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and cultural changes driving their legal protection were.11 This thesis aims to fill this 
gap. 
This is not to say that research dedicated to authors’ rights is irrelevant to this 
discussion. To the contrary, it is contended that studies on the historical evolution of 
performers’ rights have much to learn from academic work undertaken in the context 
of copyright understood broadly. Many of the arguments made in the present 
analysis draw on critiques emerging from this particular literature such as 
postmodern deconstructions of authorship, to explore their full potential.12 As a 
result, beside the task of completing the state of legal scholarship in performers’ 
rights, this thesis aims to reconnect the underlying theory of this area of intellectual 
property with its sister discipline: copyright law.13  
Building on previous research, this thesis uncovers three culturally-rooted principles 
which have been used in various declinations to ground the author-performer divide 
in legal discourses formed by case law and policies. The first one identifies the 
influence of the ex nihilo creation doctrine on the perceptions of performers as lesser 
artists. The second stresses the process of intellectualisation of the subject-matter 
protected by authors’ rights which by way of automatic reflex lead to the 
disembodiment of performances, a phenomenon which forms the third theoretical 
pillar of the author-performer divide.  
Each one of those grounding principles is further explored in one of the six chapters 
composing this thesis. Chapter One contextualises the present discussion within the 
current literature and policy-making of Australia, France, the UK and the United 
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 Arnold (n 9) 3-5. 
12
 This point is further discussed in text to note 496, Chapter 2.  
13
 The phrase ‘copyright laws’ is understood broadly as including civil forms of protection for authors often 
referred to as authors’ rights and not copyright. 
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States. It reviews the arguments opposed to improving performers’ protection that 
keep coming around when envisaging the reform of their rights. This preliminary 
chapter concludes by dismissing them all but one: performers’ perceived lack of 
creativity. This statement thus becomes the thread running through this thesis as 
well as the premise it aims to challenge. Chapter Two defines the boundaries of the 
author-performer divide in its various declinations under the above listed national 
laws as well as international and regional agreements. The next three consecutive 
chapters are then dedicated to explaining the existence and maintaining of the divide 
through reforms, social and technological evolutions. Beginning with the concept of 
ex nihilo creation, Chapter Three focuses on the impact such doctrine had on legal 
narratives and points to places where the belief that true creativity, thus creativity 
worthy of legal authorship, occurs from nothing was key in refusing copyright 
protection to performers. Chapter Four underlines the fact that legal narrative has 
heavily intellectualised the type of creativity protected by copyright which by the 
same token excluded the work of performers who are portrayed as artists using their 
body rather than their mind. Chapter Five builds on the fourth chapter by stressing 
the inherent ‘disembodiment’ of performances operated by the courts in order to 
reassert the logic and legitimacy of the author-performer divide. This chapter draws 
on the findings of other disciplines to set the socio-cultural context in which the law 
performs.14 This interdisciplinary approach also highlights discrepancies between 
current and contemporary understandings of creativity, authorship and performership 
and the outdated model pursued by legal discourses. Finally, Chapter Six concludes 
this analysis by suggesting various ways in which current national frameworks could 
be amended in order to improve the protection of performing artists, and thereby 
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erase, or at least soften, the author-performer divide. The Conclusion briefly reviews 
the areas where more research could be undertaken in order to better or further the 
present investigation.  
It is important to note at this point that this analysis excludes improvisations from its 
study of performers’ protection. Improvising performers form a particular sub-
category of performers which tend to have been more easily accepted in the class of 
authors than their non-improvising peers.15 Indeed, the act of improvisation is a 
concept which has been at times regarded as akin to authorial composition unlike 
‘plain’ performances.16 This is because the absence of underlying material to 
interpret has facilitated the application of the ex nihilo doctrine.17 To an extent, the 
special treatment received by improvisations from judges or policy-makers had a 
negative influence on the regime applicable to regular performances. Indeed, legal 
narratives masked their bias against performers and thereby reinforced the 
illusionary relevance of its paradigm by emphasising, in the process of improvising, 
the presence of characteristics traditionally associated with authoring. For this 
reason, improvisations have been left out of the scope of this work. This is not to say 
that their mention and understanding by judges and policy-makers will not feature in 
this argumentation but that their reference will be limited to the hypotheses where 
they were used to reassert the grounding principles of the author-divide. This is 
notably the case of the doctrine of ex nihilo creation discussed in Chapter Three.18  
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 text to n 281, Chapter 3. 
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 text to n 280, Chapter 3.  
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Furthermore, this thesis is not by any means a plea for the implementation of more 
intellectual property rights, nor will it engage with this particular discussion. 
Subsequent contentions holding that performers deserve to receive full copyright 
protection are motivated by the wish to see the author-performer divide disappear 
rather than the belief that more intellectual property rights are necessary. Whether 
this result is achieved by adding performers to the list of recipients of copyright, or 
lowering authors’ legal protection for it to match that of performers is considered 
equally suitable for the purpose of this analysis. This discussion only focuses on 
raising performers’ regimes rather than levelling down that of authors. This option 
seems to be more realistic than the alternative given the evolution of copyright laws, 
and it is also the only hypothesis the literature, policy-makers and judges have 
envisaged thus far.  
 
II. Methodology  
This thesis pursued two different methodological approaches to build its 
argumentation: interdisciplinary perspectives and the qualitative comparative 
analysis of statutory framework and statutes. Both routes shall be explained in turn.  
 
A. Interdisciplinary research  
Theoretical bridges between performers and authors’ rights are not the only 
connections the thesis wishes to build. Its critical approach has been much informed 
and influenced by interdisciplinary perspectives inviting disciplines beyond the law to 
discuss key concepts of its argumentation such as creativity, authorship and the role 
of performances or performers. To this end, the fields of theatre, drama and music 
18 
 
studies, performance theories as well as creativity research have come into play to 
construct a multi-faceted image of contemporary understandings of those concepts, 
as accurately as possible. This list of disciplines does not pretend to be exhaustive, 
nor could this analysis capture the full depth of their position on creativity, authorship 
or performership. Authors and examples were selected for their relevance to the 
present discussion as well as their accessibility by lay-audiences such as the legal 
readership. The overall aim of this interdisciplinary approach was to compare the 
mutation of those concepts within relevant fields to the ones conveyed in legal 
narratives. Eventually, through this process gaps and/or patterns would be identified 
across two sets of discourses which should talk to one another: cultural and legal.19  
Undertaking interdisciplinary work for the purpose of completing a doctoral thesis in 
law was a challenging but fruitful experience.20 Whilst interdisciplinary work raised 
questions with regard to supervision, time constraints, scope of research, and 
publication platforms it certainly allowed this work to question aspects of the 
intellectual property paradigms which seems to have gone unchallenged, if not 
unnoticed, until now. In order to ensure the correct use of each discipline’s literature, 
the findings of this thesis were presented to different specialist audiences at 
conferences in each field so as to collect feedback from relevant experts.21 
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 One could argue that legal narratives are part of cultural discourses, but for the purpose of explaining the 
methodology followed by this analysis, the two are separated. 
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 This methodology was very much motivated by the author’s involvement with the InVisible Difference 
project which intersects the fields of dance, law and disability studies. The project is funded by the British Arts 
and Humanities Research Council - grant number: AH/J006491/1. For more details on the project, see its 
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B. Qualitative Comparative analysis 
The presence of the author-performer divide and the principles supporting it were 
uncovered thanks to a comparative qualitative analysis of the legal narratives. The 
subsequent paragraphs detail the process followed and the ways jurisdictions were 
elected in the scope of this investigation.  
1. Defining ‘legal narratives’ 
The phrase ‘legal narrative’ and ‘legal discourse’ refer to the corpus of writing formed 
by the combination of judicial decisions, statutory dispositions and parliamentary 
debates. The selection of these sources was driven by the wish to feature discourses 
stemming from the judiciary as well as executive and parliamentary authors. Judicial 
references primarily gathered decisions, reported or not, and occasionally opinions 
published separately. Sources coming from executive and parliamentary branches 
are mainly composed of past and current intellectual property statutes, the relevant 
regional and international conventions, parliamentary debates and reports 
commissioned by governments or the international community. The phrases of ‘legal 
narratives’ or ‘legal discourses’ thus defined for the purpose of this thesis do not 
include the legal literature and scholarship though they were included in this thesis 
on other accounts.  
2. Data collection 
The thesis included in its scope of investigation the jurisdictions of Australia, France, 
the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States.22 It also refers to the regulatory 
instruments emanating from the international community and the European Union 
(EU) in so much as they have shaped domestic frameworks.  
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a) Selection of jurisdictions 
The above listed countries were selected with the objective of representing western 
intellectual property systems as fairly as possible within the time and word 
constraints placed upon the research by the format of doctoral theses. All countries 
are regarded as belonging to western societies and were added to this comparative 
study for different reasons. 
Australia was selected in order to include a jurisdiction located in the southern 
hemisphere though bearing strong ties to the British copyright framework due to its 
colonial history with the UK. Australia was also picked because it is described by 
experts as a jurisdiction at the crossroads between the UK, the US as well as the 
EU.23 It seemed relevant to study which elements of each one of those foreign 
systems Australian laws decided to retain in its own framework, whose 
independence from the UK is still fairly recent.24  
France was included in the scope of this analysis for its ‘civilist’ tradition and take on 
the protection of authors (droit d’auteur) and performers (droit des artistes 
interprètes). The French intellectual property system in many ways differs from its 
common-law counterparts. Those differences are both methodological, as the 
French legislator introduced a code dedicated to intellectual property law, and 
substantial. Indeed, the courts and governments of the hexagon have developed 
doctrines applicable to authors and performers which remain unique to its national 
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 Mark Davison, Ann Monotti and Leanne Wiseman, Australian Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 4, 16-7. Davidson points to the fact that although the European Union’s regulation of 
intellectual property influences the development of Australian law to a degree, the former’s impact on British 
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continued to apply until the introduction of the 1968 Australian Copyright Act. See, Davison et al (n 23) 191.  
21 
 
laws.25 Although often set apart from its common-law equivalents, the continental 
jurisdiction is far from functioning in a closed environment. To the contrary, this 
thesis shall point to places where regional copyright laws were in part shaped by the 
doctrines emanating from French intellectual property laws, in areas essential to its 
argumentation.26 In order to facilitate the reader’s access to key French resources, 
extracts of relevant cases and documentation have been translated into English 
language. All translations are the author’s own, except for the dispositions of the 
Intellectual Property Law Code whose official translation into English is supplied by 
the French parliament.27  
The primary research of this thesis was undertaken in the UK (University of Exeter) 
and funded by the British Arts and Humanities Research Council, two practical 
elements which justified the inclusion of the jurisdiction in its scope. Beside these 
factors, it seemed relevant to have feature in the study of so-called western 
intellectual property framework another European jurisdiction from a non-civil law 
background.  
Finally, the research extensively engages with the American federal system of 
intellectual property law provided under Title 17 of the US Constitution. This 
jurisdiction was included in the perimeter of this project for at least two reasons. 
First, the weight carried by its creative industries on a global scale increases the 
stakes involved in its intellectual property protection. Considering this, it seemed 
essential to include the US in this analysis given that its primary aim was to paint an 
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 See for example the depth of the French moral right doctrine protecting authors, the quasi-absence of fixation 
condition, categorisation requirement for copyright works and the existence of a legal categorisation of 
performers enforced by the Courts. All those aspects are detailed in subsequent developments.  
26
 See for instance the doctrine of imprint of the author’s personality which permeated through the European 
jurisprudence starting with the Infopaq decision. See text to n 234, Chapter 4.  
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 Translated versions of the French Intellectual Property Code can be found here : 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=14082> accessed 10 March 2016.  
22 
 
accurate portrayal of performers’ protection from a western legal stand point. 
Excluding this jurisdiction would have somewhat crippled its findings given the 
importance the US hold on the international scene both commercially and legally. 
Second, shortly after this research project began, two contradicting cases were 
litigated by the ninth and seventh circuit courts of appeal on the very question of 
performers’ protection. The decisions, respectively the Garcia28 and Banana Lady29 
cases, brought back the status of performers within the wider web of intellectual 
property rights to the centre stage of legal debates. The combination of those 
reasons justified the inclusion of the US in this analysis.  
b) Selection of cases  
Cases in each jurisdiction were selected to create a sample of decisions 
representative of the jurisdiction’s stance in intellectual property law within a specific 
timeframe. A total of six hundred and forty nine cases were included in this 
qualitative analysis. This breakdown of cases per jurisdiction was done as follows: 
ninety three Australian cases, one hundred and eighty nine French decisions, one 
hundred and forty seven British cases, one hundred and sixty nine American 
decisions, and forty nine cases coming from the Court of Justice of the European 
Union including its jurisprudence as the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities.30 The number of cases per country varies significantly for various 
reasons. The slightly lower number of Australian cases reflects the difficulty the 
author experienced in accessing these resources from the UK (University of Exeter) 
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 Garcia v Google (2014) (n 3) ; Garcia v Google (2015) (n 5). 
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 Conrad v AM Community Credit Union (n 4). 
30
 This analysis uses the abbreviation CoJ to refer to both the Court of Justice of the European Union and to the 
Court of the European Communities. It must be noted that two cases from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) were included in this analysis even though the institution sits outside the jurisdiction of the European 
Union which form the perimeter of the research at the regional level. Those additions are the result of frequent 
references in British cases and scholarship to those two decisions. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has 
otherwise not been embedded in the present argumentation. 
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during the stage of her primary research. This pitfall was later accommodated by 
accession to online databases during fieldwork undertaken at the British Institute of 
Advanced Studies and later at the US Library of Congress.  
The jurisdiction of France is represented by a larger number of cases due to the 
structure of its judicial system and decision reporting methods. Cases are 
significantly shorter than the decisions published by the other common-law courts 
included in this analysis. The shortest decision listed in this thesis is nine-lines long31 
whilst the longest reaches two pages. As the aim of gathering cases was to study the 
narrative emanating from courts on questions of creativity, authorship and 
performership, increasing the number of cases was necessary to mitigate the 
shortness of French cases. A large portion of the selected cases are located 
between 1980 and 2015. This was caused by the fact that the digitalisation of cases 
was only made more consistent towards the beginning of the 1980s by publishers. 
Before then, only key cases were reported and later made available online.  
American decisions form the largest volume of case law because of geo-political 
structure of the country and its jurisdictional system. Only federal courts decisions 
were included in the scope of this analysis because it focused on federal American 
copyright law, as opposed to state copyright laws. More precisely, three courts were 
selected: the US Supreme Court, the seventh and the ninth circuit courts of appeal. 
The last two courts were picked for their recent jurisprudence performers’ 
protection.32 The analysis included, on rare occasions, decisions from other circuits, 
notably the court of appeal of the second circuit. Those decisions were included in 
                                                          
31
 Cass, 1ère civ, 12 juillet 2001, n° 99-16.180: Bulletin 2001 I N° 221 p. 139. 
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 Garcia v Google (2014) (n 3); Conrad v AM Community Credit Union (n 4). 
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this analysis whenever they formed a precedent often cited in the jurisprudence of 
the seventh and ninth circuit in decisions discussing performers’ legal privileges.  
Setting aside the US, each jurisdiction is represented by decisions from first, second 
and last instances courts.33 The proportion of cases belonging to each tier was 
conditioned by questions of thematic and temporal relevance. The analysis 
concentrated on case law reported from the 1960s until nowadays. 1960 was picked 
as departure point for this data collection because the first international convention 
introducing performers’ rights was introduced shortly after in 1961.34 Moreover this 
period also coincided with the ‘performative turn’ which occurred across disciplines 
studying performative practices and art forms.35 Finally, fifty years’ worth of 
jurisprudence provided enough material to undertake a sound qualitative analysis.  
Decisions located outside of this bracket were included if they were reported as 
authorities in the field of copyright or performers’ rights, and/or if they have been 
cited by key cases or by more than five decisions situated within the specified 
timeline. Due to time constraints, not all decisions published since 1960 were 
included in this data set. The list was narrowed down by selecting cases dealing with 
relevant themes and points of law and/or referenced in the literature as having been 
cited by subsequent decisions.36 Experience proved that judges seemed more 
inclined to engage with questions of creativity, authorship and performership in 
cases where they were asked to stretch the traditional scope of intellectual property 
laws by parties. This often occurred in cases involving issues of co-authorship as 
well as the protection of unconventional items requiring judges to re-assess 
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 Except for the United States as the analysis focused on federal intellectual property laws.  
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 1961 Rome Convention, Art. 7.  
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 The ‘performative turn’ is later discussed in more details in text to n 483, Chapter 2.  
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 As for American decisions, no ninth and seventh circuit court of appeal decisions reported registering less 
than four hundred and fifty citations - subsequent decisions and publications combined - due to the volume of 
case law produced by those courts.  
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preceding authorities and the requirements of originality, fixation and categorisation 
from new angles.  
c) Selection of policy documents 
In addition to cases, this analysis included past and current statutory regulations, 
reports commissioned by governments and parliamentary debates, a list of which is 
provided in the bibliography. 
3. Data Analysis 
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the legal narrative thus collected was 
examined on a qualitative basis. The aim of this study was to analyse the ways in 
which policy-makers and judges perceived the work of authors and performers, what 
they understood as pertaining to authoring and performing, and why one could not or 
should not be taken for the other. This work is by no mean quantitative. Although it 
did involve a large data set, its objective was purely qualitative and mostly 
exploratory. To this end, the data composed of legal decisions, statutes and policy 
documents was processed through the piece of software program ‘Nvivo’ which 
facilitated the highlighting of trends and patterns within the set. Nvivo is most 
commonly known for its support of interview analysis, but was equally useful in 
examining case law since this thesis’s agenda remained in line with what Nvivo is 
designed to achieve: studying discourses.  
Qualitative methodologies bear pitfalls37 which are ultimately transferred to findings 
uncovered by them, and to which the present research is no exception. The main 
inevitable shortcoming of this method is the risk of subjectivity and bias in the 
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selection and interpretation of narratives used to shape arguments.38 This risk 
increases whenever the data collection is performed by only one analysis as it is the 
case with this work. To address this issue, numerous quotes of the primary sources 
used were inserted in the body of this thesis to allow the reader to confirm the 
veracity of the arguments and interpretation by his/herself.  
Though imperfect, this methodology proved nevertheless very effective in 
highlighting the existence of underlying patterns in the decision-making of judges 
and policy-makers within the scope of this research. It is also submitted that no other 
methods (e.g. economic analyses, quantitative approaches) would have been able to 
fulfil this particular goal.39 For this reason, it is contended that the risk of subjectivity 
involved in qualitative studies of discourses is an inevitable cost incurred by scholarly 
work pursing this methodology but does not negate its relevance or value.40  
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Chapter One  
Identified obstacles to performers’ protection 
 
Players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers […] [their work] perishes in the 
instant of its production […].1 
 
Adam Smith, 1776 
 
 
The gap in protection between authors and performers2 has many tentative 
justifications. All have been dismissed by the literature3 but one: performers are not 
worthy of the same level of protection because they are not as creative as authors.4 
As mentioned in introductory comments, this thesis aims to analyse but most 
importantly challenge both the divide and the premise which supports it. Before 
doing so, it seems essential to first evaluate succinctly the other reasons behind 
performers’ lesser protection as they form the context in which our main discussion 
sits.  
Arguments against the improvement of performers’ legal protection can be divided 
into three theoretical categories: economic, legal and cultural. This classification is 
more permeable than it presents itself as many of the points considered below are 
interdependent. However this approach offers clarity in a discussion which has been 
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 Adam Smith, The Wealth of the Nations (first published 1961, edn Hayes Barton Press - The Originals, 1776) 
221. 
2
 The divide between authors and performers is further discussed in Chapter 2..  
3
 Richard Arnold, Performers’ Rights (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 8-11. 
4
 This situation was also considered to be a simple ‘historical anachronism’ in Judy Kim, ‘The Performers’ 
Plight in Sound Recordings - Unique to the US: A Comparative Study of the Development of Performers” 
Rights in the United States, England, and France’ (1986) 10 Columbia VLA Journal of Law and the Arts 453, at 
461.  
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complicated by the number of threads pulled into it by stakeholders and 
commentators.5  
 
I. Sharing the copyright cake  
For many, reforms in favour of performers’ rights have been largely stalled because 
of the potential negative economic impact those new prerogatives could have on 
existing rights such as copyright.6 According to this reasoning, granting performers 
an additional claim on the same creative product will increase its costs of production 
and commercialisation thereby diminishing financial returns of other right holders. 
Having to cater for a greater number of recipients, the ‘copyright cake’ would have to 
be divided into small pieces.7 This is how and why copyright holders’ fear would 
have driven authors’, producers’, publishers’ and broadcasters’ lobby to weaken 
performers’ position in law.8 The same economic concerns were relayed in reports 
commissioned by policy-makers to inform reforms of intellectual property law.9 In his 
report to the Senate, the French Member of Parliament Charles Jolibois commented:  
[N]neighbouring’s rights [here performers’ rights] would undeniably harm the 
interests protected by authors’ rights. This would be unacceptable. Very 
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 Some have commented that the reason behind performers’ protection remains “unclear”, Kim (n 4) 459; 
Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘“Pretend-y Rights” On the Insanely Complicated New Regime for Performers’ Rights in 
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Parliament Charles Jolibois in the Jolibois Report No 212 (n 7) 28. See for the UK, the Gregory Report, Cmnd 
8662, para 176. See for the US, the Ruttenberg Report (n 13).  
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concretely, this danger will be materialised every time the use of a work will 
require the payment of an additional fee pursuant to the introduction of 
performers’ rights. This will naturally result in diminishing the remuneration of 
the author at stake or in a general decrease of the volume of creative works 
used, impacting then the remuneration of all authors.10 
 
Approximately forty years before him, the delegates of the 1948 Brussels 
Conference held similar contentions when they concluded that “[i]n all honesty, it is 
thus impossible to contend that performers’ rights would not impact the returns 
received by authors so long that it is proven that the fee owed to performers can be 
included in the price paid by buyers”.11 
This representation of the market knows as many critics as it has supporters.12 An 
independent report commissioned by the US Copyright Office led the 1978 Hearings 
on the Performance Rights in Sound records13 to conclude that “on the basis of 
statistical analysis, the payment of royalties [to performers] is unlikely to cause 
serious disruption within the broadcasting industry”.14 It goes on explaining that 
“there are arguments aplenty to the contrary, but there is no hard evidence to 
support them”,15 reiterating that “[t]here is no hard economic evidence in the record 
to support arguments that a performance royalty would disrupt the broadcasting 
industry, adversely affect programming, and drive marginal stations out of 
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 Jolibois Report No 212 (n 7) 28. Author’s translation, see Appendix 1 for original text.  
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business”.16 The report acknowledged that “[this question] has been the single most 
difficult issue to assess accurately, because the arguments have consisted of 
polemics rather than facts.”17 A large part of the more recent scholarship concurs 
with this position and contends that the market is elastic enough to accommodate for 
the implementation of increased performers’ rights.18  
Economic arguments scored equal points on each side, for and against the 
introduction or improvement of performers’ legal protection. Therefore, it seems 
pertinent to explore the other grounds covered by sceptics arguing against 
performers’ augmented rights.19  
 
 
II. Legal uncertainties  
A number of objections to performers’ protection have emerged in the legal 
scholarship. Each one will be considered in turn, however it must be noted that 
objections specific to the legal structures of jurisdictions under study have not been 
included in this overview.20 The aim of this chapter is to underscore shared patterns 
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co 435 F2d 711 (9
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 Cir 1955) 665. 
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in law-makers’ reluctance to adopt performers’ rights across the selected national 
frameworks. To this end, systemic singularities have been set aside.  
 
A. Definition anxiety  
Concerns regarding the definition of performers and performances are legitimate. 
Reading the literature of performance studies on the question, one might get 
somewhat anxious at the idea of applying intellectual property rights to “a performing 
mode of behaviour that may characterise any activity”.21 This rather vague definition 
of the term ‘performance’ acknowledges the fact that the term is “inclusive” 22 so 
much so that it becomes “extremely difficult […] to define”,23 even for the specialist 
scholarship. Described as an event24 consisting of the “bodily co-presence of actors 
and spectators”25 by some, others have referred to performances as the “ritualised 
behaviour conditioned/permeated by play”26 or the “activity done by an individual or a 
group in the presence of or for another individual or group [excluding] some activities 
legitimately called play, games, sports and rituals”.27 Despite the difficulty in grasping 
                                                          
21
 Erving Goffman, the Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) cited in Richard Schechner, Performance 
Theory (Routledge 2003) 22. Schechner explains: “From one point of view – clearly stated by Erving Goffman 
in the Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) - performing can be defined as “a performing mode of 
behaviour that may characterise any activity. Thus performance is a “quality” that occurs in any situation rather 
than a fenced-off genre” (22). 
22
 Schechner (n 21) xvii. 
23
 ibid 22. 
24
 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Routledge Introduction to Theatre and Performance Studies (Routledge 2014) 41 
25
 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance - A New Aesthetics (Routledge 2008) 32; 
Fischer-Lichte The Routledge Introduction (n 24) 19.  
26
 Schechner (n 21) 99. Scheschner carries on commenting: “The more ‘freely’ a species plays, the more likely 
performance, theatre, scripts, and drama are to emerge in connection with ritualized behaviour. Some animals, 
such as bees and ants, are rich in ritualized behaviour but absolutely bereft of play.” (99) “[I]t is only in the 
primates that play and ritual coincide, mix, combine; it is only in humans and closely related species that the 
aesthetic sense is consciously developed. Art may be considered a specific coordination of play and ritual.”(99-
100). 
27
 Schechner (n 21) 22. Little relief to a lawyer’s man would be brought by the theorist’s ‘narrow’ definition of 
the term: “[P]erforming can be defined as “a performing mode of behaviour that may characterise any activity. 
[…] However, in this writing I mean something more limited: a performance is an activity done by an individual 
or a group in the presence of or for another individual or group. I recognise that some activities legitimately 
called play, games, sports and rituals would be excluded from my definition. My definition is further 
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the malleable contour of performances, performers’ rights have been introduced into 
our intellectual property frameworks as early, or late, as 1961 with the Rome 
Convention.28 Therefore, it seems as though western jurisdictions have somehow 
managed to tackle the issue of definition and overcome this first obstacle.  
Both ‘performers’ themselves and ‘performances’ are now subject to legal 
definitions.29 The latter vary in their wording but were harmonised in their 
substance.30 In the Rome Convention, the international community agreed that 
‘performers’ would refer to “actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons 
who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic 
works”.31 The Convention’s disposition found an unhidden echo in the French 
legislation which characterises performers as the “persons who act, sing, deliver, 
declaim, play in or otherwise perform literary or artistic works, variety, circus or 
puppet acts.”32 Tackling terminological issues on both fronts, the Australian 1968 
Copyright Act33 offers a definition of performance as well as performers. The Act 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
complicated by the fact that game theory applies both to performance and non-performance activities. However 
[…] I thought it best to centre my definition of performance on certain acknowledged qualities of live theatre, 
the most stable being the audience-performer interaction. Even where audiences do not exist as such – some 
happenings, rituals and play- the function of the audience persists: part of the performing group watches – is 
meant to watch – other parts of the performing group; or, as in some rituals, the implied audience is God, or 
some transcendent Other(s).”  
28
 1961 Rome Convention, Art. 4 and 7. 
29
 Though not without complexity, on this see Michel Vivant, Nathalie Mallet-Poujol and Jean-Michel Brugière, 
Quels Droits Pour Les Artistes Du Spectacle (Dalloz 2009) 7-8.  
30
 This harmonisation may know slight variation. Whilst Australia and France regard the musical conductor, the 
question is yet to be clarified by the Courts in the UK and the US. See Section 191B of the Australian Copyright 
Act 1968 as for Australia, and TGI Paris, 10 janvier 1990, n° [XTGIP100190X]: D. 1991, 206, note Edelman; 
Dalloz 1991, somm. Comm. 99, obs Colombet; RIDA, juillet 1990,368. 
31
 1961 Rome Convention, Art. 3. 
32
 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, Intellectual Property Code later referred to as IPC (France), Article L121-
1, (official translation). The disposition opens with one limit to the definition of the performers: by naming 
auxiliary performers as non-performers. The full definition of performers therefore reads as “[s]ave ancillary 
performers, considered such by professional practice, performers shall be those persons who act, sing, deliver, 
declaim, play in or otherwise perform literary or artistic works, variety, circus or puppet acts” (official 
translation). The classification of performing artists into sub-categories is discussed further in Chapter 2, see text 
to note 282. 
33
 As Amended by Act No 31, 2014.  
33 
 
provides that “performance consists of sounds”34 and that a live performance is “a 
performance (including improvisation) of a dramatic work, or part of such a work, 
including such a performance given with the use of the puppets, […] of a musical 
work […], the reading, recitation or delivery of a literary work […] or the recitation or 
delivery of an improvised literary work, or a performance of dance, or a performance 
of a circus act or a variety act or any act or any similar presentation or show, a 
performance of an expression of folklore; being a live performance whether in the 
presence of an audience or otherwise”.35 Under the same statute, Australian law 
considers performers to be the “person[s] who contributed to the sounds of the 
performance”.36 More conservative in its approach, the British Parliament opted for a 
less ambitious definition mirroring the dispositions applicable to authors when it 
specified that the word “performance” was to be defined as “a dramatic performance 
(which includes dance and mime), a musical performance, a reading or recitation of 
a literary work and a performance of a variety act or any similar presentation”.37 
American federal intellectual property laws do not offer any specific terminology for 
the words ‘performances’ or ‘performers’ in the context of performers’ rights as the 
country does not provide federal protection for those artists.38  
                                                          
34
 1968 Copyright Act (Australia), s. 189.  
35
 1968 Copyright Act (Australia), s. 22(7), see also s. 248. The act expressly excludes the following acts from 
the scope of performances eligible to performers’ rights: “(a) certain performances by teachers and students in 
the course of educational instruction; (b) a reading, recital or delivery of any item of news and information; (c) a 
performance of a sporting activity; (d) a participation in a performance as a member of an audience.” (s. 248(2)). 
36
 The 1968 Copyright Act (Australia) the definition of performer in time and space by adding a second prong to 
the definition: “performer in a performance (a) means person who contributed to the sounds of the performance; 
and (b) in relation to a performance that occurs outside Australia, does not include a person who is not a 
qualified person at the time of the performance. The Australia 1968 Copyright Act also specifies that the 
conductor is regarded as a performer as per Section 191B which reads as “If a performance of a musical work is 
conducted by a conductor, then the sounds of the performance are to be treated as having been made by the 
conductor (as well as by the persons who actually made those sounds).” 
37
 Copyright, Designs and Patent Acts of 1988, Section 180 (2) (a) to (d). The Act will be later referred as 
CDPA 1988.  
38
 Title 17 of the US Code only provides right for the unauthorised fixation of live performances and the 
trafficking of their musical and video recordings following the implementation of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This change was enacted in 1994 by the Public Law 103-465 of December 8.  
34 
 
 
Despite the narrow and knit definitions of ‘performances’ adopted by legal 
frameworks, one may still worry that its application in practice will not be as clear-cut 
as it is presented on paper. Consequently, one may fear that the courts would be left 
flooded with claims foreign to the objectives of intellectual property laws, driven by 
parties interested in benefitting from their valuable protection.39 The following have 
been placed in this category of undesirable claimants: athletes,40 TV presenters,41 
members of parliaments,42 victims of revenge porn and sex tapes,43 weathermen,44 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
There are no performers’ rights at the federal level in this country, the judicial development of non-intellectual 
property rights and remedies at the state are the closest legal instruments to performers’ rights American artists 
can rely on. The US are signatory to the more recent Beijing Treaty 2012 but it is yet to be ratified. Arnold (n 3) 
352.  
In the US, performers’ protection is achieved through non-intellectual property law mechanisms, see also, 
Sheldon Halpern and Phillip Johnson, Harmonising Copyright Law and Dealing with Dissonance - A 
Framework for Convergence of US and EU Law (Edward Elgar 2014) 163. This point is discussed further in 
Chapter 2 text to note 1 and 20.  
For sake of completeness, it must be noted that the American constitutional Copyright Clause does envisage the 
definition of the word “performance” but only in its application to copyright. The concept of public 
performances is indeed dealt with as one of the alternative ways to publish or display a work in public. In this 
context, Paragraph 101, Title 17 of the US Copyright Code specifies that “To perform or display the work 
“publicly” means (1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place; or (2) to transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, 
by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.  
39
 Arnold refers to this argument as the “floodgates argument” according to which allowing performers to obtain 
rights on the ground of intellectual property will allow all sorts of claims on the same basis which are foreign to 
the core of this field of law. Arnold (n 3) 10-1. 
40
 Arnold uses the example of athletes to illustrate the ‘floodgate’ arguments against the protection of 
performers. On this points he wonders whether “it would be such a bad thing if sportsmen were to be protected 
in the same way” as performers. Arnold (n 3) 11. The US and Australia are the jurisdictions presenting the 
largest volume of case law on this question involving athletes or equivalent. This can be explained by the fact 
that performers’ protection is achieved through the implementation of a patchwork of rights relying notably on 
tort and the right of publicity or protection of personality, which is too available to sportsmen. This muddling up 
is thus not applicable to their intellectual property of performers but to the availability of protective mechanisms 
also shared with other categories of professionals and individuals. US: Baltimore Orioles, Inc v Major League 
Baseball Players Ass'n 805 F2d 663(7th Cir 1986); 61 Rad Reg 2d (P & F) 543 (7th Cir 1986); 55 USLW 2250 
(7th Cir 1986); 231 USPQ 673 (7th Cir 1986); 1986 Corp L Dec P 26,024 (7th Cir 1986); 13 Media L Rep 1625 
(7th Cir 1986); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness v Electronic Arts Inc, 724 F3d 1268 ((9th Cir 
2013); Australia: Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty Ltd (1958) 1a IPR 620. This case concerned a couple of 
ball room dancers. It must be noted that since then, performers’ rights have been introduced in Australia, 
although not with the clarity one would hope for. See Weatherall (n 5) 172. 
41
 France: Paris, 10 février 2010, Samourai films SARL c/ Even Media SA, n° 08/02748: inédit; US: White v 
Samsung Electronics America, Inc, 971 F 2d 1395 (9th Cir 1992); 989 F 2d 1512 (9th Cir 1993 - Dissenting 
opinion).  
42
 See comments made by MP Graham Page in HC Deb., 5
th
 Series, Vol 679 (1963) col. 896, 897. 
43
 Rebecca Tushnet, ‘Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied’ (2013) 60 Journal 
Copyright Society of the USA 209, 238-9. 
44
 See comments made by MP Leslie Hale in in HC Deb., 5
th
 Series, Vol 679 (1963) col. 896, 898. 
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journalists as well as individuals appearing in documentaries45 or participants of TV 
reality shows46 - to only name a few.47 Questions were also raised in relation to 
artists such as orchestra conductors48 or musicians using computers to perform.49 
Although their practices are close to the core of intellectual property law, they remain 
on the outskirts of traditional definitions of performances. This concern can be 
addressed by referring to the fact that the point raised a rather small volume of 
litigation in Australia, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).50 
The number of disputes on the issue is by far surpassed by the quantity of claims 
dedicated to defining the subject-matter protected by copyright laws. If not greater, 
an equal degree of difficulty was faced by the courts on this front,51 yet this issue has 
not prevented the scope of copyright protection from growing continuously.52 This 
                                                          
45
 France: Cass, 1ère civ, 13 novembre 2008, n° 06-16.278, « Etre et avoir »: JCP 2009, N 25, 30 §3 obs. Caron 
(the central character filmed at work for the purpose of a documentary cannot be considered a performer as he 
does play a role but executes his professional function); US: Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, 433 
US 562 (Supreme Court 1977). In this last case, the claim from the circus artist was accepted, his performance 
had been inserted a news clip reporting on the event.  
46
 France: Cass, 1ère civ, 24 avril 2013, n° 11-19.901: Bull. 2013, I, n° 83. Participants in the French remake of 
the TV show ‘Temptation Island’ argued in court that they acted as performers in the show. The Supreme Court 
rejected this position arguing that their duties on the set did not involve interpreting a role at any point, that on 
the contrary, the participants had received the instructions to be and stay themselves and react to situation as 
they normally would. This activity cannot be regarded as performing a literary or artistic work, or improvising.  
47
 See comments made by LJ Mancroft in HL Deb 05 February 1963 vol 246 cc 512, 515. To this list the 
Australian Copyright Act adds teachers, students and members of the audience intervening during a 
performance (see n 35). 
48
 In France, the orchestra conductor is regarded as a performer even though he does not directly contribute to 
the performance by playing an instrument, see TGI Paris, 10 janvier 1990, n° [XTGIP100190X]: D. 1991, 206, 
note Edelman; Dalloz 1991, somm. Comm. 99, obs Colombet; RIDA, juillet 1990,368. In Australia, Section 
191B of the 1968 Copyright Act explicitly includes the conductor in the category of protected performers.  
49
 France: Paris, 3 mai 2006, n° 05/01400, « Ph. Chany »: D. 2007 jurispr. P 2653 note Edelman et Levinas; 
RTCom. 2007, 104 obs. Paullaud-Dullian.  
50
 Arnold (n 3) 11. This point was confirmed by the qualitative analysis of case law involving basis this 
research. See, Introduction text to note 28. For a list of the cases included this analysis see the Table of Cases. 
The jurisdiction of France would the only exception to this rule but its particular situation can be explained by 
the fact that the law enforces subcategories within the definition of performers with different sets attributed to 
each. As a result, French Courts witness a larger volume of litigation over the classification within the categories 
of performers which combines both intellectual property law and employment law. This point is further 
discussed in Chapter 2 text to note 282.  
51
 It is argued that less harmonisation is present between the subject-matter protected in the context of copyright 
than in the context of performers’ rights. The attempt of the CoJ to bring into line the national copyright on the 
questions of originality and potentially categorisation has left courts and commentators perplex as to its effective 
impact. For more on the lack of harmonisation between national and EU copyright laws see text to Annex 1.  
52
 The scope and duration of copyright has been continuously extended amongst all jurisdictions since the early 
twentieth century. The scope of copyright was progressively extended to include literary, artistic, dramatic 
works, as well as films, broadcasts (France: Acts dated of the 13
th
 and 19
th
 of January 1791, of the 19
th
 and 24
th
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second objection to performers’ legal protection caused by anxiety of unclear 
definitions is thus rationally unjustified.  
 
B. Fearing “legal millefeuilles”53  
One of the most common legal objections to the introduction of additional 
performers’ rights is the fear that such changes will create an overly complicated 
layering of rights over the same creative production. Orchestras are the most 
common illustration of this problem.54 If every performer involved in a fifty-piece 
ensemble was able to control the future uses of their performance in addition to the 
rights already placed in the hands of composers, sound recorders and broadcasters, 
“copyright would explode”.55 More recently, the ninth circuit court of appeal affirmed 
that “[t]reating every acting performance as an independent work would not only be a 
logistical and financial nightmare, it would turn cast of thousands into a new mantra: 
copyright of thousands” when commenting on cinematographic works.56 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1793, of the 11
th
 March 1957 No 57-298, of the 10
th
 May 1994 No 94-361; UK: 1911, 1956 and 1988 Copyright 
Acts; in Australia: 1912 Copyright Act, 1968 and 2006 Copyright Amendment Acts; In the US: 1909 and 1976 
US Copyright Act ). The duration increased from 14 years running from the registration of the work with the 
competent authority to the lifetime of the author plus seventy years throughout the course of the same period of 
time (the Council directive No 93/98/ECC was implemented in 1996 and 1997 in the UK and in France 
respectively, bringing the protection to seventy years after the death of the author; similar changes were 
introduced in Australia by the 2006 Copyright Amendment Act and in the US by the 1998 Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act). See, Robert Homburg, Le Droit d’Interprétation Des Acteurs et Des Artistes 
Exécutants (Receuil Sirey 1930) 4. 
53
 The term “legal millefeuilles” was first used in the context of copyright by Laddie J. in IPC Media Ltd v 
Highbury Leisure Publishing Ltd [2004] EWHC 1967 (Ch) at 22: “That copyright is not a legal millefeuilles 
with layers of different artistic copyrights. There is only one artistic copyright asserted for each cover and 
article, namely that in the cover or article as a whole.” This concept was re-used by Blackburne J. in Coffey v 
Warner Chappell Music Ltd and others [2005] All ER (D) 329 [2005] EWHC 449 (Ch) at 10.  
54
 Arnold (n 3) 9. 
55
 In Janky v Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F3d 356 (7th Cir 2011) 363. In this case, the 
Bench commented on joint-authorship claims.  
56
 Garcia v Google Inc, 786 F 3d 733 (9
th
 Cir 2015) 743. 
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This argument suggests that existing and newly added rights would be emptied of 
their substance because of the “legal morass”57 such a large volume of claims would 
generate, making “Swiss cheese of copyrights”.58 Clashes of interests would lead to 
poor management of the work and defeat the aim of intellectual property laws. As a 
result, for the sake of the good administration of intellectual property rights, policy-
makers ought to limit the number of legitimate claims attached to one work.59  
In the Blackmail case,60 McCardie J clearly explained that this fear was the implicit 
reason behind the British Parliament’s refusal to protect performers with a civil cause 
for action:  
Upon considering the Act, I come to the conclusion that the Legislature did 
not, by any inadvertence, omit to give a right of property to the performers, but 
that they deliberately so worded the Act as to preclude any notion that a right 
of property was conferred. Nothing would have been easier than to create a 
right of property if such was the wish of Parliament. The Act, however, is most 
significant alike in its wording and in its omissions. I can see good reason for 
not giving performers a right of property. It happens that here the orchestra 
was 20 in number, of whom the performers whom I named were five. But 
often an orchestra (e.g., at the Albert Hall or Queen’s Hall) consists of over 
100 performers. If the plaintiffs here are correct in saying that each of the five 
performers had a right of property in his performance, it would follow that the 
same right would exist if the orchestra was over 100. I am satisfied that 
Parliament foresaw what I have just stated, and intended that it should not, be 
permitted that 100 performers or more should in the position to bring 100 High 
Court actions. Moreover, if rights of property had been given by the Act of 
1925 it might be difficult to reconcile such rights with those of owners of the 
copyright of a piece performed. It seems clear that Parliament was aware of 
the difficulties of the matter, and that it therefore intentionally and for good 
cause ensured that the wording of the Act should give no property to the 
performers.61  
 
                                                          
57
 Garcia v Google Inc, 786 F 3d 733 (9
th
 Cir 2015), 742. 
58
 ibid. See also, Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, ‘Performers’ Rights: Options for Reform’ (Report to the 
Interdepartmental Committee 1995) 6. 
59
 Garcia v Google Inc, 786 F 3d 733 (9
th
 Cir 2015) 743: “filming group scenes like a public parade, or the 1963 
March on Washington, would pose a huge burden if each of the thousands of marchers could claim an 
independent copyright”. 
60
 Musical Performers' Protection Association Ltd v British International Pictures Ltd (1930) 46 TLR 485. 
61
 ibid, 488. Also cited in see for example, Apple Corps Ltd. and Others v Lingasong Ltd. and Another [1977] 
FSR 345, 349. 
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Although this objection seems fair, it has been considered an exaggeration of the 
reality62 and could also be criticised for ignoring the equally complex ‘layering of 
rights’63 currently enforced by copyright laws.64 Indeed, the dispositions applicable to 
copyright in all the jurisdictions under study, without exception, allow for prerogatives 
in the nature of copyright to overlap one another and collide with each other. This 
layering of rights is embedded at the core of all copyright frameworks, yet has never 
challenged their legitimacy.  
The theoretical mental picture that one would like to take of copyright depicts the 
author’s property interest in his work very simply: one author creates one work, 
giving rise to one copyright. As a result, one work is covered by one right owned by 
one person (the author).65 It can be visually summarised as follows: 
 
Figure 1: Unitary representation of copyright 
 
                                                          
62
 This argument was dismissed in the Gregory Report, see Henri Gregory, ‘Report of the Copyright Committee’ 
(1952) 61, para 172. See also, Richard Arnold, Performers’ Rights (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 9; 
options to manage the introduction of new rights without emptying the substance of existing ones have been 
enforced and can be sought. See for example, the work of Sherman and Bently in Performers’ Rights (n 58) 6. 
One of those solutions has been the collective management of rights, see Arnold (n 3) 9, 121-8. See also, 
comments made in Chapter 6, text note 175. 
63
 The phrase ‘layering of rights’ refers to the co-existence of at least two potentially competing interests over 
the same object (creative product) within the connection between authors and their works, also broadly defined 
as the chain of copyright titles. In Moran v London Records Ltd, Manion J refers to the ‘chain of titles’ to reject 
Moran’s (the performer) copyright claim over the contested work. Moran v London Records Ltd, 827 F2d 180 
(7th Cir 1987) at 182, para 2. 
64
 Commenting on Australian copyright law, Sherman and Bently describe it as a “labyrinth pf regulations” in 
Sherman and Bently in Performers’ Rights (n 58) 6. 
65
 Paul Olagnier points to the individualistic nature of authors’ rights as an obstacle to performers’ equal 
protection in Le Droit Des Artistes Interprètes et Exécutants (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 
1937) 57-8, 134-5. 
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This representation is the one implicitly described by McCardie J in the Blackmail 
case66 when he bases the layering of rights as the reason behind refusing 
performers’ property right. This simplistic representation of the chain of copyright title 
is inaccurate on all three levels: the author, the work and the right itself.  
First, a multiplicity of claims already occurs every time that more than one artist is 
involved in the creative process to the extent of being considered co-authors of the 
piece. Although copyright laws tend to limit this possibility to very specific types of 
collaboration,67 they all provide for the possibility of joint-authorship and ownership68 
of the work. By the same token, the core of the copyright system finds itself affected 
by duplicated rights and potentially competing interests. In this hypothesis, the law 
needs now to deal with at least two authors managing one right over one work.69 
This first level of layering of rights can be graphically represented as follows:  
                                                          
66
 Musical Performers' Protection Association Ltd v British International Pictures Ltd (1930) 46 TLR 485, 488 
67
 See text to Annex 2.  
68
 Australia: Copyright Act 1968, Division 9 s. 78 to 83 (b); France: IPC, Art. L 113-1 to L 113-3, joint work is 
translated as “oeuvre de collaboration”; UK: CDPA 1988, s. 9(4) and s. 10(1) to 10 (3); US: US Code, Title 17 
Para 101.  
69
 Australia: Copyright Act 1968, Division 9 s. 78 to 83 (b); France: IPC, Art. L 113-1 to L 113-3, joint work is 
translated as “oeuvre de collaboration”; UK: CDPA 1988, s. 9(4) and s. 10(1) to 10 (3); US: US Code, Title 17 
Para 101. See for a critique of joint ownership and ownership in the context of copyright: Joseph Taubman, 
‘Joint Authorship and Co-Ownership in American Copyright Law’ (1956) 31 New York University Law 
Review 1246; Scott Brophy, ‘Joint Authorship Under the Copyright Law’ (1994) 16 Hastings Comm/Ent L. J. 
451; Melissa Doblin, ‘Joint Authorship and Collaborative Artwork Created through Social Media’ (2011) 39 
AIPLA Q. J. 535.  
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Figure 2: Shared ownership 
 
Second, multiple claims can rise from the creation of derivative works,70 collective 
works71 or complex creative productions whose component can be independently 
copyrighted.72 Despite the fact that judges strive to avoid the construction of “legal 
millefeuilles”73 in copyright, the phenomenon of layering precedes their efforts. 
Taking the example of derivative works, their authors enjoy an independent copyright 
                                                          
70
 The term ‘derivative work’ refers to the same type of creative productions in each jurisdiction under study but 
has not received the same care in terms of definition from all legislators. Whilst the French IPC and American 
Copyright Act both specify in their provisions that derivative works are “work[s] based upon pre-existing 
works” (US Code, Title 17 para 101; IPC, Art. L 113-2), the Australian and British Copyright Acts offer no 
definition. The jurisprudence does recognise their existence but the courts seem to have refrained from using the 
terminology. Only, on rare occasions has the phrase been used. See for example, in Australia: CBS Records 
Australia Ltd v Telmak Teleproducts (Aust) Ltd 27 [1987] ; Bently L and Sherman B, Intellectual Property Law 
(4th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 112. See also, text to Annex 3 for the regulation of derivative works for 
each jurisdiction. 
71
 See Annex 4 for the statutory definition of collective works for each jurisdiction.  
72
 The copyright protection of sound recordings, broadcasts and films bring at the core of the copyrightable 
subject-matter the notion of layering as the multiplicity of copyright works embedded in one creative venture is 
inherent to the nature of those works. See also, France: Cass, 1ère civ, 6 mai 1997, n° 95-11.284: Bull. 1997 I N 
145, p. 97; RIDA 1997 N 174, p. 231 Obs. Kéréver; D. 1998, p. 80 (the character of a cartoon may receive an 
independent copyright protection separate from the rest of the comic book; it is held that whenever the creation 
of cartoon character is not the fruit of a joint-work, its creator may use the character in other productions 
without obtaining the consent of his collaborations); UK: Redwood Music Ltd v B Feldman & Co Ltd [1981] 
RPC 337, 338 (the music and the lyrics of a song may obtain separate copyrights); Hayes v Phonogram Ltd and 
others [2002] EWHC 2062 (Ch) para 60 (the rap lyrics and music of a song are distinct works protected 
independently, despite the rhythmic influence the lyrics may have on the music). 
73
 Laddie J. in IPC Media Ltd v Highbury Leisure Publishing Ltd [2004] EWHC 1967 (Ch) 22: “That copyright 
is not a legal millefeuilles with layers of different artistic copyrights. There is only one artistic copyright 
asserted for each cover and article, namely that in the cover or article as a whole.” This concept was re-used by 
Blackburne J. in Coffey v Warner Chappell Music Ltd [2005] All ER (D) 329 [2005] EWHC 449 (Ch) at 10.  
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protection whilst remaining bound by the rights protecting the author whose piece is 
being re-used. Although the second (derivative) work is copyrightable, it may still be 
found infringing the copyright of the protected work it revisits. The jurisprudence of 
Australia, France, the UK and the US could not be clearer on this point of law.74  
This second level of layering can be visually modelled as follows:  
 
Figure 3: Composite and derivative works 
 
Finally, a third level of layering occurs at the very core of the copyright system. 
Going back to the statutory definition of ‘copyright’, the law describes the term as 
referring to a bundle of rights. Even though the word is used in the singular, 
copyright is constituted of a myriad of sub-rights.75 Gathered under the umbrella term 
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 See text to Annex 5 for jurisprudence confirming the original author’s claim over derivative works.  
75
 Australia: 1968 Copyright Act, s. 31 counts no less than seven sub-rights covered by the copyright vested in 
literary, dramatic and musical works (s. 31(1) (a) (c) and (d)) and three in the context of artistic works (s. 31 (1) 
(b)), excluding the dispositions on moral rights provided under s. 499 (paternity) and 503 (integrity).  
42 
 
of copyright are the rights to copy the work, to communicate the work in public, to 
lend a copy of the work; to perform the work in public; or again to make an 
adaptation of the work, to only name a few. Commenting on rental rights, the Court 
of Justice (CoJ) negatively referred to this phenomenon as a ‘mosaic of problems’ to 
which it was asked to add a further piece.76  
Each one of those sub-rights can be transferred separately.77 In the hypothesis 
where an artist, or copyright-holder, wishes to assign their various rights to different 
individuals on their own terms, the chain of titles granted would behave exactly as 
would the hundred proprietary rights granted to the hundred musicians playing in 
McCardie J’s orchestra at the Albert Hall.78 Indeed, this last, but not least, layer of 
competing copyright claims bears the same flaws identified by the British judge in the 
context of performers’ right. This situation can be visually represented as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
France: IPC, Art. L 122-1 to L 122-4, Art. L 122-6 (specific to computer programs). The rights generally cover 
the right of performance and reproduction (Art. L 122-1) which comprises a non-exhaustive list of over ten sub 
rights. In addition to those, the IPC grants four moral rights to authors under Art. L121-1 to L 121-4. UK: 
CDPA 1988, s. 16 (1) to (4). Similarly to Australia, these dispositions count at least six sub-rights for 
copyrightable works, in addition to moral rights (s. 77, 80 and 85). US: US Code, Title 17 para 16 (1) to (6). 
Moral rights of a much more limited scope than in the other jurisdictions are provided under para 106 A.  
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 C-61/97 Foreningen af Danske Videogramdistributorer v Laserdisken [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1297: “This Court 
has thus been asked by the national court to add a further piece to the mosaic of problems surrounding rental 
right—understood as the right to make a creative work incorporated in a material object available for use for a 
limited period of time—which is one of the rights conferred on any copyright holder”.  
77
 Australia: Copyright Act 1968, s. 196 (1) to (4) “Copyright is a personal property and, subject to  this section, 
is transmissible by assignment, by will and by devolution by operation of law”.  
France: IPC, Art. L 131-1 to L 131-3, Art L 131-4 reads: “Assignment by the author of the rights in his work 
may be total or partial.” UK: CDPA 1988, s. 90 (1) to 44), s. 90 (1) reads: Copyright is transmissible by 
assignment, by testamentary disposition or by operation of law, as personal or moveable property. US: US 
Code, Title 17 para 201 (d) (1) and (2) provides that “ the ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole 
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as 
personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession”.  
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 Musical Performers' Protection Association Ltd v British International Pictures Ltd (1930) 46 TLR 485, 488. 
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Figure 4: Subrights and divided claims 
 
This third level of layering gains in complexity when the French doctrine of moral 
rights is factored into the equation. Whilst the author is free to transfer any of the 
sub-rights she owns to the recipients of her choice, she remains eternally entitled to 
control certain aspects of the work by virtue of her portfolio of droit moraux (moral 
rights).79 Consequently, the transfer of her proprietary prerogatives to third parties, 
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 In France, the doctrine comprises four different rights: the right of paternity, integrity, disclosure and 
withdrawal. IPC, Art L 121-1 to L 121-2.  
In the Australia and the UK, only two rights of this doctrine have been introduced in their domestic copyright 
framework: the right of paternity and integrity. Australia: 1968 Copyright Act, s. 499 and s. 503 (respectively); 
UK: CDPA 1988, s. 77 and 80 (respectively). The US offer the most limited implementation of the doctrine of 
the jurisdictions under study as only visual artists can claim damages on the grounds of the moral rights of 
integrity and paternity, see US Code Title 17, para 106A (dispositions introduced by the Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990 (title VI of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128, 
enacted December 1, 1990). The Courts are indeed careful for other concepts of the copyright law not to be 
converted in the disguised moral rights: Weinstein v University of Illinois 811 F2d 1091 (7th Cir 1987) FN3. On 
the doctrine of moral rights see, Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett, Moral Rights (Sweet and Maxwell 2010) 41, 
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does not entirely extinguish her entitlement over the work. Instead of replacing one 
claimant by another, such transfer multiplies the number of claimants as the moral 
rights attached to the work continues to rest with the author.80  
To conclude on this point it must be noted that further layering of rights takes place 
beyond the realm of copyright. Indeed, in all jurisdictions the possibility of combining 
copyright protection with other rights pertinent to intellectual property is available. 
The presence of authors’ rights does not exclude the bestowal of trade mark, 
patent81 and design rights82 when the same object meets their criteria.83  
In light of these observations, it is submitted that the web of claims that copyright 
dispositions have created is no less complex or layered than provisions protective of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
67, 79, 365, 637, 857; Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers: An International and 
Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press 2006) 104, 165, 285-7, 389, 475, 569. Maree Sainsbury, Moral 
Rights and Their Application in Australia (The Federation Press 2003) 68-94.  
80
 French law has made moral rights unassignable, see IPC, Art L. 121-4. The civil country has adopted a 
dualistic view of the doctrine allow for economic rights and moral rights to be managed independently from one 
another. This considerably strengthen the enforcement of the doctrine as authors are able retain their moral 
claims on the moral whilst monetising the work by transferring their economic prerogatives. A monist take on 
the doctrine prescribes that economic and moral rights should not be separated in order to safeguard the interest 
of the author as his economic rights are serves the same personal and intellectual gains as moral rights do. This 
position has been the framework underlying moral rights in German. On this see Davies and Garnett (n 79) 24-
7. Andreas Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (Edward 
Elgar 2011) 66-7.  
 When introducing moral rights in their system, Australia, the UK and the US have not opted for this solution 
preferring those rights to be transferable and limited to duration of economic rights. See, Australia: 1968 
Copyright Act, s. 499 and s. 503; UK: CDPA 1988, s. 77 and 80; US Code Title 17, para 106A.  
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 France: Paris, 25 janvier 2006, n° 04/18300: D. 2006 jurispr. P 580 obs. Daleau; JCP E 2006, 1386 note 
Caron (the fact that perfumes may be patented is no obstacle to its protection by copyright). If rights can be 
cumulated, remedies for the same infringement cannot: TGI Paris, 4 juin 2008, n° 05/06811 (Mia Frye case: a 
performer cannot claim damages on the basis of both performers’ rights and right to one’s image); US: 
American Dental Ass'n v Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F3d 977 (7th Cir 1997) 980. In this case, the Court 
stated “[a]n article with intertwined artistic and utilitarian ingredients may be eligible for a design patent, or the 
artistic elements may be trade dress protected by the Lanham Act or state law”. 
82
 The Recital 8 to the European Directive 98/71/EC explicitly states that “in the absence of harmonisation of 
copyright law, it is important to establish the principle of cumulation of protection under specific registered 
design protection law and under copyright law, whilst leaving Member States free to establish the extent of 
copyright protection and the conditions under which such protection is conferred”. This was confirmed by the 
Court of Justice in C-168/09 Flos SpA v Semeraro Casa e Famiglia SpA [2011] ECDR 8, [2011] RPC 10, 
[2011] EUECJ C-168/09 para 8 and 66. In this case the court ruled that: “the legal protection of designs must be 
interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which excludes from copyright protection in that 
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 The analysis limits itself to illustrations pertinent to copyright laws as this particular sphere of intellectual 
property is relevant to its argument. See developments on the author-performer divide in text to note 332, 
Chapter 2.  
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performers’ interests. The multiplicity of titles and the risk of competing rights were 
embedded at the core of the legal concept of authorship the moment legislators 
opted for a copyright covering all future uses of the work and allowed the assignment 
of those sub-rights independently from one another. Therefore, it seems somewhat 
short-sighted or hypocritical for law-makers or commentators to oppose the ‘legal 
millefeuille’ argument to performing artists, when no effort has been made to 
disentangle the current web of copyrights which continues to grow.84  
 
C. Fixating on fixation 
A third range of legal arguments centre on the necessity for protected works to be 
fixed to enter the territory of intellectual property laws.85 Performances’ lack of 
materiality is one of the main arguments against their protection by intellectual 
property law.86 By emphasising the embodied87 and event-like nature of 
performances,88 modern theories have made them all the more resistant to the idea 
of fixation. Performances are described as events, ephemeral and transient in 
essence, thus unable to be captured.89 This logic refuses the assimilation of 
performances to ‘works of art’ or artistic ‘artefacts’ with fixed contours.90 As a 
framework essentially turned towards the material and the fixed, this lack of 
tangibility was considered to be one of the reasons why the legal narrative was, and 
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 The fixation issue is at the crossroads of both economic and legal considerations on the work of performers. 
Adam Smith considered that performances’ lack of materiality rendered their value nil. He writes: “players, 
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 Arnold (n 3) 9. 
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 ibid. 
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 Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power (n 25) 75; Fischer-Lichte Introduction to Theatre and 
Performance Studies (n 24) 22-6. 
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 Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power (n 25) 75. 
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still is, reluctant to protect performances. This approach gave birth to many 
derivative arguments which will be considered in turn.  
(1) Protecting performers should not be dismissed on the basis that performance 
specialists themselves reject the analogy between performance and ‘work of art’.91 It 
may be beguiling to summarise copyright frameworks as the bodies of law regulating 
the dissemination of works of arts, but this representation would be as deceitful as it 
is outdated.  
Although the analogy between ‘copyright work’ and ‘work of art’ was made by some 
legislators in earlier copyright legislation, this narrow view of the protected subject-
matter has since been widened. In Mazer v Stein,92 Reed J reminds us that: 
The successive acts, the legislative history of the 1909 Act and the practice of 
the Copyright Office unite to show that "works of art' and "reproductions of 
works of art" are terms that were intended by Congress to include the 
authority to copyright these statuettes. Individual perception of the beautiful is 
too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art. As a standard we 
can hardly do better than the words of the present Regulation, § 
202.8, supra, naming the things that appertain to the arts. They must be 
original, that is, the author's tangible expression of his ideas […]. Such 
expression, whether meticulously delineating the model or mental image or 
conveying the meaning by modernistic form or color, is copyrightable. What 
cases there are confirm this coverage of the statute.93 
 
Indeed, the notions of ‘works of art’ and ‘protectable works’ are not, or no longer are, 
synonymous, far from it.94 If all traditional works of art are generally protectable 
under copyright laws, not all works protectable by law are works of art. For instance, 
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 Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power (n 25) 75. 
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 347 US 201 (Supreme Court 1954). 
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 ibid, 213-4, citations omitted.  
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 Although it seems that sometimes the term does creep in judges’ narrative: LJ Walker and Collins states that 
“[i]t would not accord with the normal use of language to apply the term “sculpture” to a 20th century military 
helmet used in the making of a film, whether it was the real thing or a replica made in different material, 
however great its contribution to the artistic effect of the finished film. The argument for applying the term to an 
Imperial Stormtrooper helmet is stronger, because of the imagination that went into the concept of the sinister 
cloned soldiers dressed in uniform white armour. But it was the Star Wars film that was the work of art that Mr 
Lucas and his companies created. The helmet was utilitarian in the sense that it was an element in the process of 
production of the film”, in Lucasfilm Ltd & Ors v Ainsworth & Anor [2011] UKSC 39, para 44. 
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databases and computer software95 are eligible to copyright protection on part with 
paintings, books, dramatic or choreographic works are. The legal concept of 
‘protectable work’ is a more malleable notion than the concept of ‘work of art’. The 
category of protectable works is flexible enough to be extended to creative products 
policy-makers adjudge necessary to protect even though they cannot be assimilated 
to the traditional definition of creative artefacts. Thus the lack of semantic between 
‘performances’ and ‘works of art’ should not preclude the association of the former 
with the concept of protectable material.  
 (2) Copyright laws have been criticised for favouring the protection of products over 
that of creative processes; various elements composing current copyright 
frameworks would support this claim of product-centrism.96 Such bias is another 
factor fuelling the fixation anxiety underlying the debate on performers’ rights. It is 
also consistent with the western cultural belief97 according to which creativity resides 
entirely in the finished product, being the embodiment of the artist’s creative idea, 
and not in the making process.98 
Although the phrase of ‘work’99 or ‘work of the mind’,100 could refer to both products 
and processes, the statutory definitions and lists of protectable works provided by 
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 Commenting on computer software, Canby J admitted that the court “recognize[s] that "some works are closer 
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copyright laws clearly target products rather than processes.101 Sherman and Bently 
identify the 1911 Act as the tipping point where the British102 copyright framework 
moved away from considering the creative process when assessing the scope of 
copyright protection, to only focus on the work.103 Nowadays, the same logic 
transpires through the modern mutations of this piece of legislation dating back to 
the early twentieth century. Indeed, no matter how creative a process may be, the 
courts will only take into consideration the originality embodied in the work. This 
position resulted in refusing to grant copyright protection to artists who practice the 
art of “creative copying”104 also known as “extreme copying”105 and to individuals 
who employed their skills to restoring pieces of art.106 Because these practices result 
in replicating a product which has already been designed, these efforts are regarded 
as unoriginal for copyright purposes, and are thus left unprotected. No matter how 
skilful and ingenious the process may be, the product remains the non-copyrightable 
copy of an existing piece.107  
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These remarks highlight how the copyright legal framework gradually closed the door 
to the protection of creative processes. This position might explain legislators’ 
reluctance to envisage the listing of performances as protectable works since their 
essence cannot be easily aligned with the product-centrism displayed by copyright 
narratives since 1911. Modern understandings of performances would concur with 
this position as they too, stress the fact that performances are events (processes) 
rather than artefacts (products).108 If copyright only protects tangible products, 
copyrighting performances would be a gross misunderstanding of the latter’s nature. 
It is thus submitted that performers’ rights could not be levelled up to substance of 
copyright without re-thinking and re-writing its narrative surrounding creativity and 
originality.  
 (3) Beyond the question of nomenclature separating ‘performances’ from ‘works of 
art’ and ‘creative processes’ from ‘creative products’, one more legal obstacle is 
opposed to performers: the fixation condition. The lack of tangible contours ultimately 
triggers a lack of fixation. Judges and policy-makers109 considered interpretations too 
“fleeting”110 or “ethereal”111 to be considered as copyright works.  
Not only are performances naturally intangible but their essence resists the notion of 
fixation, for reasons explained above.112 Placing itself on the other end of that 
spectrum, the law requires steady definitions of subject-matter, claims and claimants 
to function. Accepting to legally protect performances for what they are, ever-
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evolving experiences,113 would require the possibility for rights to slide along with the 
undetermined contours of an object whose substance is constantly re-invented.114 
This would end in the precarious situation where stakeholders and judges would be 
incapable of clearly distinguishing what is protected from what is left available for the 
public to access and use, or so goes the argument. It is true that a similar risk of 
uncertainty was present in the context of authorial works but that such issue was 
resolved by requiring authors to fix their work to obtain protection.115 This solution 
was easily met by artists whose creative process already involved the making of a 
material object, as acts of creation and fixation would coincide.116 Performing 
however, does not result in any tangible production. Commentators saw in this 
resistance to materiality an irremediable flaw of performers’ practice since the 
fixation condition is implemented to ensure the sound functioning and management 
of the intellectual property rights.117 Ironically perhaps, nearly everything surrounding 
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the performance can be subject to copyright but not the performance itself. 
Decors,118 make-up items,119 costumes120 and other accessories121 used for the 
production of performance are all elements fully protectable by law.  
The fixation issue becomes less convincing now that video and audio technologies 
allow a form of fixation of performative pieces at low cost.122 Against that argument, 
some have argued that recording technologies remain unable to fix or replicate the 
perfect image of performances since the latter are unable to be materialised without 
losing their event-based character. It is true that no record of a performance will be 
able to recreate it in its entirety to the public who has not experienced it live. Their 
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transient nature prevent their capture no matter how advanced the technology may 
be.123  
In response to this point, one may suggest that fixation for the purpose of copyright 
and fixation for creative purposes are two means with different objectives. Therefore, 
the expectations of the law would not be as high those of artists’ when considering 
the degree with which the essence of their work ought to be faithfully captured. 
Indeed, intellectual property laws do not necessitate the essence of works to be fixed 
in their entirety to function. The requirement of fixation is a practical condition aiming 
to ease litigation procedures and the management of evidence in case of dispute. 
Therefore, the law would not seek the perfect material copy of a performance but the 
existence of an object which judges, parties and juries would be able to reference 
during proceedings or negotiations. Copyright laws would only expect such fixation 
to record the performance’s substantial elements such as the tone, musicality or 
rhythm of the vocalist, the body movements, voice and overall embodiment of the 
actor. It is not disputed that most recording methods would certainly struggle to 
convey the other facets of performances such as their three-dimensional aspect or 
their effect on the audience. They would be equally unable to re-create the ‘feedback 
loop’ between performers and the audience, another central feature of the 
performing arts.124 Yet it is submitted that encapsulating the main components of the 
performance, as suggested above, would suffice to identify performers’ creative input 
in the work they interpret, and in turn, ascertain where the originality of the written 
material ends and theirs begins. This approach to fixation is purely instrumentalist 
but does accommodate the possibility for performances to be protected by 
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intellectual property law without being held back by their apparent lack of 
tangibility.125 
In light of these remarks, the opposition between tangible authorial works and 
intangible performances begins to appear as more of a theoretical illusion than a 
reality of intellectual property frameworks. The subsequent paragraphs further 
challenge the superficial opposition between material copyright works and immaterial 
performances. Various elements and historical evolutions of intellectual property 
laws have made authorial works less tangible than portrayed so far.  
First of all, not all copyright frameworks require a high level of tangibility to confer 
protection. In France for instance, copyright works only need to be perceptible to 
meet the legal standard of fixation.126 Perfumes are thus protectable even though 
their substance is highly immaterial.127 Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where the 
fixation condition holds a higher threshold, judges have been prone to grant 
copyright protection to intangible elements such as electric impulses. 
In the Australian case of Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd,128 Fox J 
explains that the protected subject-matter is the sequences of electrical impulses 
contained in the silicon chips (also referred to as ROMs) and not the silicon chips 
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themselves, when commenting on source codes in computer programs.129 As a 
result, silicon chips made of a different shape and structure but commanding the 
same sequences of electric impulses as a previous copyrighted source code are 
infringing copies of that code. He states:  
In my opinion, the programs contained in the Wombat ROMs and EPROM are 
reproductions of the programs contained in the Apple II ROMs, namely, 
Applesoft Object and Autostart Object. […] The Wombat ROMs and EPROM 
embody the same arrangements of electrical impulses as the Applesoft's 
programs in object code. The code is constituted by the arrangement of 
impulses. The silicon chips represent the material form in which the codes are 
embodied. The code may be ascertained from the chips by having their 
contents (ie the programs) reproduced by the computer in a written form. 
Whichever means of storage is adopted, each is in a material form. Hence the 
Wombat ROMs and EPROM constitute a reproduction in a material form of 
both Applesoft Object and Autostart Object. As the object codes in the 
Applesoft ROMs have been reproduced in the Wombat ROMs and EPROM, 
there has been a reproduction of the adaptations of the two programs in 
source code.130 
 
It is clear that what is protected by the law is not the chip itself but the arrangement 
of electric impulses it generates. The chip happens to be a form of fixation of the 
code or of the impulse but is neither its perfect nor its only material image.  
Similary, in Wihtol v Wells,131 the American court recognised that “out of the arts, 
music [was] perhaps the least tangible”,132 yet the immaterial essence of musical 
                                                          
129
 Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1984) 53 ALR 225, 232: “Programs in source code must 
therefore be converted into sequences of electrical impulses. This is achieved by the use of a computer (a PROM 
programmer) which is equipped with an "assembler" or "compilation program". A source program's mnemonics 
are typed into the computer. Each keystroke generates a series of electrical impulses which the assembler will 
recognize and convert into impulses which detail each step of the program. The sequences so produced are said 
to express the program in "object" or "machine readable code". Assembler programs operate in a relatively 
standard manner, so that programs in a particular source code (eg Applesoft Basic) comprising the same terms 
will produce object codes made up of the same sequences. Both "Applesoft" and "Autostart" were converted 
into object code in this way. Initially, representations of these sequences of electrical impulses were stored on a 
magnetic disc or tape. Later, they were regenerated, transferred to silicon chips contained in the ROMs, and 
stored or retained there.”  
130
 ibid, 263-4. 
131
 231 F2d 550 (7th Cir 1956); 109 U.S.P.Q. 200 (7th Cir 1956). 
132
 Wihtol v Wells, 231 F2d 550 (7th Cir 1956) 552. Full citation: “Of all the arts, music is perhaps the least 
tangible. Music is expressed by tonal and rhythmic effects. People can enjoy music without a technical 
understanding or education, but to make music available, someone must write it. To make a song available, 
someone must bring the notes and words together.” Before that, the American Supreme Court had also pointed 
55 
 
works did not prevent its coverage by copyright law.133  
 
This acceptance of the work’s intangible essence is in line with the principle that the 
subject-matter protected by copyright and designated as being the ‘copyright work’ is 
not limited by the boundaries of its fixed version.134 First of all, it is commonly 
accepted that the copyright work exists before it is reduced to a tangible material 
form.135 In Norowzian v Arks Ltd,136 Rattee J commented:  
In my judgment a film per se cannot be a dramatic work within the meaning of 
the 1988 Act. It can, on the other hand, be a recording of a dramatic work for 
the purpose of section 3(2) of the 1988 Act. The dramatic work is something 
that exists apart from the film, even if the film is the only form in which it is 
recorded.137 
 
A similar position was held by the court in Hadley v Kemp:138  
[T]he proposition that copyright does not exist in a musical work until it is first 
reduced to a material form does not mean that the musical work does not 
exist until it is first reduced to a material form. Quite the contrary: the Act 
assumes that a work may exist before it is reduced to material form.139  
 
It can be concluded that although copyright protection requires fixation, the existence 
of the work does not.140 Authorial works exist before the fixation occurs despite the 
fact their substance is intangible. Once the work is fixed, copyright rises and protects 
it retrospectively. 
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In Hadley v Kemp,141 the court went even further by holding that that the work exists 
in the author’s mind before it is made perceptible by the outside world:  
In my judgment a song devised by Mr Kemp and worked up by him in his own 
mind to the developed stage at which he presented it to the band was already 
a musical work. Further, at that stage he was undoubtedly the sole author of 
it.142 
 
A comparable position was held in Australia by Wilcox J when litigating a dispute 
over images contained in a video game:  
The visual images depicted in these video games did exist before the game 
was played. They existed in the minds of their creators and the drawings and 
models they made.143  
 
Here, the Court goes a step further in dematerialising the work as they acknowledge 
its (legal) existence before it is even perceptible by senses and the outside world. It 
seems as though common law copyright accepts the mere thought of the work as 
being the work itself. Even in France, where the fixation condition is not a 
requirement for the copyright protection nor for the existence of the work, the courts 
demand authors’ ‘works of the mind’ to be at least perceptible by the senses – sight, 
hearing, smell – to attract intellectual property rights.144 Compared to the standard of 
materiality displayed in those decisions, performances’ intangibility can hardly be 
considered an obstacle to their protection by intellectual property laws.  
 
Going further, the law also recognises that the work, and the rights attached to it, 
survive the disappearance of its fixed version. In the British case Metix (UK) Limited 
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v GH Maughan (Plastics) Limited,145 Laddie J received the argument according to 
which “[a] sculpture made from ice is no less a sculpture because it may melt as 
soon as the temperature rises”.146 The judge thereby confirmed that the fixation 
condition is not one of permanence. This also suggests that the work can be 
ephemerally fixed and yet protected by the law, the rights conferred to the creative 
piece surviving the loss of its material form.147  
Tying this point back to earlier comments on the need of materiality for litigation 
purposes, it seems as though the courts were able to cope with the absence of 
original tangible works to rely on during infringement proceedings. Confirming this 
contention, in Lucas v Williams & Sons148 the British Court heard an infringement 
case even though the original of the painting at stake in the dispute could not be 
produced in evidence by the claimant. Instead, a replica in the form of an engraving 
was registered as evidence and admitted by the bench despite the protest of the 
defending counsel. Collins J reported: 
The plaintiff did not produce the original painting by Mr. Marcus Stone, but he 
produced an engraving of it belonging to himself, which he said was made by 
a well-known engraver under Mr. Marcus Stone's immediate supervision, and 
was an exact copy of the original painting. He also produced the photograph 
sold by the, defendants, and said that it was a bad photograph taken direct 
from the engraving. […] 
Objection was taken by the defendants' counsel to the admissibility of this 
evidence, and Collins, J., ruled that it was admissible.149 
 
In France, a similar position was held by the Court of Cassation a century later in a 
dispute opposing Alexander Glazunov’s wife to the famous theatre ‘Le Grand 
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Theatre des Champs Elysées’.150 Borodine had composed and orchestrated the 
opera Prince Igor but died before completing the piece. After his death, Rimsky-
Korsakov and Glazunov undertook to edit and finish Borodine’s work. No musical 
scores or material rendition of Borodine’s work were available to Guslanov and 
Rimsky-Korsakov when they produced the opera. Nevertheless, the two composers 
had the opportunity to encounter Borodine’s creation when it was played to them 
during private performances organised by the late musician. The question asked to 
the Court was whether the edited and completed opera was a joint work composed 
by Rimsky-Korsakov, Glazunov and Borodine or whether Borodine’s creative mark 
on the overall piece was such that it should any claims of co-ownership. Even though 
there was no objective evidence available to the Bench to assess the substantial 
similarity between the disputed segments of the opera to Borodine’s earlier 
compositions, the judges litigated the case in favour of the second claim, i.e. 
Borodine’s sole-authorship. They concluded that “Rimsky-Korsakov and Glazunov 
integrated in their work without modification musical compositions Borodine had 
performed in front of a small group of listeners who had kept those segments safe 
and intact in their memory, so much so his work did come into being”.151 The Court 
based this evidence on Rimsky-Korsakov’s diary published under the title Diary of 
my life:  
But, considering that, the Court of Appeal admitted on the basis of the 
evidence presented in ‘The Diary of my Life’ written by Rimsk-Korsakov that 
‘Glory to the beautiful Sun, ‘Dance of the Polovtsian Maidens’, ‘No sleep, no 
rest for my tormented soul’, the recital of Vladimir’s song, and Kontschkovna 
and Vladimir’s leitmotivs, as well as the final chorus had been completed and 
orchestrated by Borodine and that Rinsky-Korsakov and Glazunov had later 
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decided to achieve his musical work to make its publication possible.152 
 
Finally, the scope of copyright infringement also confirms the intangibility of authorial 
works. Since the early ages of copyright, it was agreed that the legal protection 
conferred to authors went beyond the physical boundaries of the work so that uses 
of the work which would not otherwise amount to literal copying would still be 
prohibited. As a result, individuals would neither be allowed to copy the physical 
pages of a copyrighted book nor the style and expression in which the book 
describes the adventures and characters it contains - without the writer’s consent. 
For instance, translations, adaptations,153 imitations or re-creations of works without 
their authors’ consent were counted in this category of non-literal infringing acts.154 
Authors’ rights thus protect the material form of the work as well as its immaterial 
content.155  
Many illustrations of this position can be found in the jurisprudence of all the 
jurisdictions under study. Indirect copying has been regarded as infringing the work it 
imitates156 even when the medium of expression has changed157 or the result was 
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achieved through reverse engineering.158 This extension of protection to the 
intangible profile of the copyright work also explains why creative or extreme copying 
is considered a form of infringement.159 This confirms that the rights conferred by 
copyright are attached to an intangible substance even though the rights themselves 
require some level of fixation throughout the life of the work to arise.  
Jonathan Griffiths argues that the lack of intangibility of the copyright work is the 
result of a dematerialisation movement affecting contemporary copyright law. 
Building on Sherman and Bently’s theory developed in The Making Modern of 
Intellectual Property,160 Griffiths holds that the narrative of European copyright law 
has progressively moved away from concrete understandings of the concepts of 
‘works’ and ‘originality’ to adopt standards more and more dematerialised.161 The 
recent Infopaq jurisprudence162 is described to have stepped away from a 
materialised and categorised approach to copyrightable matters by targeting the 
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protection of the ‘author’s own intellectual input’163 and the ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’164 rather than material renderings of creativity.165  
Comparing this ‘dematerialised’ approach to the patterns identified in early copyright 
law by Bently and Sherman,166 it seems as though the CoJ went back to the model 
of copyright implemented by the British intellectual property framework before the 
introduction of the 1911 Copyright Act.167 Prior to 1911,168 the courts designed an ad 
hoc protection of works targeting the ‘mental labour’ embodied in the work produced 
by the individuals.169 The act of creation was conceived as a process triggered and 
controlled by the author’s mind.170 During this pre-modern era, the protected subject-
matter included intangible processes, and the scope of copyright was defined on a 
case-by-case basis.171 The codification of intellectual property law introduced by the 
1911 Copyright Act172 rationalised this casuistic approach and came to focus on the 
work rather than the process. This new era enforced a renewed model of copyright 
turned towards one material aspect of creativity: the creative work. The law no longer 
protects the creative process which leads to the production of a tangible object, but 
focuses on the tangible object itself, as the full and absolute embodiment of the 
author’s creativity. During this evolution, the law lost track of the performative aspect 
of creation to only focus on the characteristics of the work.173 The modern model 
moved from an abstract and dynamic approach to copyright works to adopt a static 
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and material conception.174 With the Infopaq jurisprudence, the CoJ might have gone 
back to an earlier model of copyright as known in the UK by reviving an open-ended 
take on the definition of the protectable subject-matter which depends on the way 
creative decisions were made by the author rather than on the sole assessment of 
the work itself.175 
 
 
D. Property orthodoxy  
Authors’ and related rights are economically driven and largely modelled on and 
around the concept of property.176 Copyright laws have achieved the feat of making 
intangible creations tangible by utilising the concept of property rights.177 The 
analogy of property interests and the legal bond connecting the author to his work 
enabled the transfer of intellectual creations like traditional goods.178 Consequently, 
copyright has been rightfully described as an act of “propertisation”179 and 
“commodification”.180  
For this reason, extending the scope of intellectual property to new subject-matters 
automatically triggers a form of reification to which performances would be no 
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exception. The performance itself lies in the acting, singing, delivery, declaiming, 
playing, recitating, and so forth, of an underlying work.181 This activity is 
communicated through the performer’s body which thereby becomes an integral part 
of the performance, directly or indirectly contributing to its substance.182 As a result, 
performances could not be protected by full property rights without indirectly reifying 
performing bodies. The question is whether the performing body can be subject to 
property claims like any other items referenced in the portfolio of intellectual property 
laws. Are there any legal principles resisting its commodification? 
This issue is the least discussed of all the obstacles erected against performers’ 
intellectual property protection.183 Despite the number of disputes involving the legal 
property of performances, there is no straightforward answer to be found in the 
jurisprudence of Australia, France, the UK or the US. When approached, the 
question was barely touched upon and rather confusingly handled. Instead, it was 
either bypassed or muddled with discussions on fixation184 and originality 
conditions185 pertinent to copyright laws. Unfortunately, the legal scholarship is 
equally silent on the question.186  
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The Garcia case187 is one of the few decisions flirting with the issue. Dissenting in 
the decision, Smith J argued that copyright protection could never be granted to 
performers because their input is limited to the lending of their body, face or voice: 
Her creativity came in the form of facial expression, body movement, and 
voice. Similarly, a singer’s voice is her personal mobilization of words and 
musical notes to a fluid sound. Inflection, intonation, pronunciation, and pitch 
are the vocalist’s creative contributions. Yet, this circuit has determined that 
such, though perhaps creative, is too personal to be fixed.188 
According to Smith J, performances cannot be protected because their creativity 
essentially lies within their body, making them too ‘personal’:  
Garcia does not clearly have a copyright interest in her acting performance, 
because her acting performance is not a work, she is not an author, and her 
acting performance is too personal to be fixed.189 
 
The dissenting opinion makes direct references to the earlier landmark case of 
Midler v Ford which also concluded that performers could not be granted full property 
rights because the essence of their work was too ‘personal’ to be subject to 
intellectual property rights. In this case, the Court held that: 
Copyright protects original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression. A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not "fixed." What 
is put forward as protectible here is more personal than any work of 
authorship.190  
 
One can only regret the vagueness of the argument developed by the ninth circuit 
judges.191 It offers no guidance, neither practical nor theoretical, in understanding 
why the performing body is too ‘personal’ to be protected by property rights.192 
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An alternative interpretation of this phrase would argue that the courts were not 
objecting to the commodification of performances – a consequence of its 
copyrightability - but underlined their lack of originality – a condition of its 
copyrightability. According to this logic, the body would be too ‘personal’ to be 
considered original because it is a biological given.193 Unlike the clay in the sculptor’s 
hand, the performing body is not moulded or shaped by the performer. The human 
body seems to be treated like facts and information194 are in copyright, i.e. not 
original enough to be protected.195  
Nevertheless, other areas of law may provide useful insights regarding the possibility 
of legally reifying the body in the context of performances. These threads would 
widen the scope of this investigation on different counts. One of those threads is 
concerned with rights attached to the performing body but explores legal 
prerogatives situated outside the field of intellectual property law (1). The other 
thread returns to intellectual property rights but departs from the performing body, to 
focus on the human body involved in creative works more generally (2). Despite the 
slight side steps these two new lines of investigation take, their interaction with either 
the performing body or intellectual property frameworks makes them research 
avenues worth delving into.  
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(1) Instruments protective of performers located outside the field of intellectual 
property laws have already introduced a degree of commodification of the performing 
body. The right to one’s name,196 image,197 likeness,198 personality or persona,199 
publicity200 as well as the protection against voice misappropriation201 or passing 
off202 have all been successful mechanisms available to artists to control the use of 
their performance once materialised. This patchwork-like protection confirms that 
elements of the performing body can be reified on specific occasions.  
Although those rights are not intellectual property rights per se, they certainly behave 
like ones as far as the propertisation of the subject-matter is concerned. In Zacchini v 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting,203 the US Supreme Court went as far as to align the 
aim of publicity rights with those of copyright, granting the performer involved in the 
case, as petitioner, the same privilege copyright would:  
The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to 
the economic value of that performance. As the Ohio court recognized, this 
act is the product of petitioner's own talents and energy, the end result of 
much time, effort, and expense. Much of its economic value lies in the "right of 
exclusive control over the publicity given to his performance"; if the public can 
see the act free on television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair. 
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The effect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to preventing 
petitioner from charging an admission fee. The rationale for [protecting the 
right of publicity] is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by 
the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get 
free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which 
he would normally pay. Moreover, the broadcast of petitioner's entire 
performance, unlike the unauthorized use of another's name for purposes of 
trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press, goes to the heart 
of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an entertainer. 204  
 
The court referred to the need to protect performers’ financial returns for the “time, 
effort and expense”205 they have invested in their work as being the “strongest case 
for a right of publicity”.206 The association between such right and the protection of 
the performer’s skills and labour invested in the performance bears a striking 
resemblance with the objectives of authors’ rights.207 Even though references to full 
property claims are absent, this narrative still reifies the body by suggesting that both 
ranges of rights achieve the same result for the same purpose.  
 
In France too, the same phenomenon of commodification of the performing body has 
been implemented by similar legal instruments found outside the circle of intellectual 
property rights. This allowance of reification is all the more surprising that the 
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continental jurisprudence is known for religiously protecting the sanctity of the human 
body from commercial agendas.208  
Yet, the civil judges made it clear that the rationale behind the enforcement of those 
alternative rights protecting performers was economic. In 2008, the Court of 
Cassation reaffirmed that the right to one’s image was a proprietary right (‘droit 
patrimonial’).209 The Court held that the appeal judges had rightfully concluded that 
“a model owns an economic right in her image, which is the exclusive right to profit 
from its value and to control the circumstances of its commercialisation”.210 The 
Bench carried on explaining that “if such right can be legally be assigned by contract, 
the subject-matter assigned must be accurately identified so that the exploitation of 
the rights transferred is precisely defined with regard to its duration and geographical 
exploitation.”211 Here, the Court was careful not to amalgamate accurately identified 
and narrowly identified. Indeed, the contract which authorises the commercialisation 
of one’s image in “any form, manner, for any purposes, anywhere in the world for a 
renewable period of fifteen years”212 complies with this requirement of accuracy. The 
scope of transfer can be both broad and accurately delineated, thereby leaving 
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performers carte blanche to assign elements in their persona to third parties for 
commercial purposes.  
Furthering this phenomenon of reification, French judges also rely on independent 
experts to estimate the value of performers’ body parts in order to determine the 
fairness of their remuneration. This was notably the case in the Uncle Ben’s dispute 
brought before the Versailles Court of Appeal in 2008.213 In this case, the actor who 
had lent his voice to the character ‘Uncle Ben’ for the production of a short 
advertising video clip, filed proceedings for his commission to be re-assessed 
proportionally to the economic value of his input, i.e. his voice. Relying on the 
expert’s evaluation, the Court sided with the actor:  
According to the expert’s report (preliminary report dated 30 November 2005) 
the basic daily commission rate of an actor hired to record his voice for the 
purpose of an advertising video clip was in the region of 4,500 francs (686,02 
euros) in 1992; this sum includes the rights to use the voice for a period of 
one year starting from the first communication of the record to the public, but 
can also be raised whenever the popularity of the performer or specific 
aspects of the voice increases its value. The expert, who adjudged that the 
voice of [the claimant] was stereotypical and flattering, so much so that the 
public could be sensitive to it, concluded that such an increase would apply 
with a multiplying factor ranging from 1.5 to 4.214 
 
From these observations, it is clear that the performing body can be subject to 
commercialisation as any other ordinary good so much so that, like them, its value 
can be objectively assessed. There is no doubt that those legal vehicles enforced to 
protect performers’ interests outside the boundaries of intellectual property law have 
permitted the commodification of the performing body.215  
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(1) If intellectual property narratives remain silent on the question of reifying the 
performing body in particular, vivid debates took place discussing the legality of 
copyrighting works displayed on the human body more generally. This discussion 
was triggered by the litigation involving tattoos which blossomed across jurisdictions 
in the last three decades. However, the involvement of the human body in the cases 
of tattoos and performances is different. With the former, the human body fulfils the 
more passive role of canvass for artist whilst it is an integral composing element of 
the latter. Moreover, whilst the work of tattoo artists is often fixed on other 
individuals’ skin, performances always involve the artist’s own body. Even though, 
the human body executes two different functions in those scenarii, the legal issues 
rising from the art of tattooing remains relevant. Indeed, the litigation of those cases 
places the discussion in the relevant area of law, intellectual property law, applied to 
the relevant subject-matter, the human body. This line of investigation reveals a 
series of expectable collisions between the consequences of intellectual property 
laws and the moral values formalised by human rights’ frameworks, inter alia.  
Regardless of any artistic context, the human body cannot be reduced to a 
consumable commodity because it is no ordinary object. This moral value finds its 
echo in the legal principle of inalienability of the human body and right to physical 
integrity.216 In 1972, the French Court of Cassation regarded the contract by which 
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an underage actress was required to be tattooed a representation of the Eiffel tower 
on her posterior for the purpose of a film as “immoral and illegal”.217 The contract had 
also required the actress to have the tattoo surgically removed and for it to be 
auctioned afterwards.  
Despite its fundamental nature, the principle has been encroached by various legal 
mechanisms in the context of artistic productions.218 To only refer to those relevant 
to intellectual-property-related matters, the above discussed rights to one’s image, to 
control one’s likeness, of personality or persona, to protection against voice 
appropriation are all instruments enforced by the law which allow the body to be 
reified and made profitable by their biological ‘holders’ or owners, for want of a better 
word.219  
Besides this conflict with the principle of physical integrity, copyrighting elements of 
the human body face another fundamental contradiction with the freedom of 
movement and right to self-determination this time. Indeed, intellectual property 
rights allow artists to control the use, commercial exploitation and integrity of their 
work. It those were to be applied to human bodies, the fundamental rights of the 
individuals who lend their skin to the expression of those artists would likely clash 
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with such property interests. This conflict of rights is the crux of the copyright 
litigation on tattoos.220  
The problem presents itself as follows: if a tattoo artist was to receive copyright for 
the tattoo she drew on her client’s skin, her client would have to respect the rights 
the artist owns over the work he carries on his own skin. In practice, this would 
prevent the client from taking pictures of himself whenever the photographs would 
reveal the tattoo designed by the artist, without her consent. Similarly, any actions 
taken to modify or remove the tattoo from his skin could be prohibited by the artist.221 
In this scenario, the conflict between the authors’ rights and the client’s freedom of 
movement and right to self-determination is evident.222 Commenting on this, Nimmer 
writes: “[h]opefully, any court presented with such an obscene claim would dismiss it 
summarily, if on no other basis than the constitutional prohibition on involuntary 
servitude and other badges of slavery”.223 
To mitigate Nimmer’s position, it must be noted that such collision between authors’ 
and individuals’ interests would not occur systematically. Indeed, every time the artist 
would use her own body as platform for her work, the clash between copyright and 
human rights vanishes as authors’ and subjects’ interests line up. Alternatively, every 
time the client has the copyright of his tattoo transferred to him, such clash also 
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disappears.224 Finally, the opportunities of litigation could be limited to commercial 
uses so that the incidental reproduction of the tattoo by the client or other third 
parties would not amount to copyright infringement.  
This last option was the solution adopted by the Paris Tribunal in a decision dating 
back to 1996.225 The dispute opposed the author (Jean-Phillipe Daures) of a tattoo 
designed for the famous Belgian singer Johnny Halliday and the companies who had 
reproduced it on merchandising (Polygram and Western Passion). The artist filed for 
copyright infringement for the reproduction of the design of his tattoo. The Court 
sided with the claimant and adjudged his tattoo eligible to copyright protection even 
though it was only materialised on Johnny Halliday’s body at the time:226  
Considering that both parties conclude that Jean-Phillippe Daures is the 
author of the design tattooed on the arm of the artist Johnny Halliday in 
September 1992;  
Considering that this design inspired from the Native American culture 
embodies the head of an eagle above a feather crossing the design 
horizontally and bearing a coin engraved with the stylised image of a bird;  
Considering that the design is a work of the mind whose originality is not 
challenged;  
Considering that Jean-Phillippe Daures is entitled to act on the grounds of this 
authors’ rights; […]227 
This decision was confirmed on appeal two years later.228 It empasised the 
distinction between cases of infringing reproductions and reproductions of secondary 
importance:  
Considering that the design of Jean-Phillip Daures tattooed on the right arm of 
Johnny Halliday can be regarded as an attribute of the singer’s personality 
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and as such be freely commercialised by [the defendant], as previously 
indicated by the judges, the photograph of Johnny Halliday from which the 
tattoo would be “necessarily visible but remained of a secondary importance”; 
However, considering that this is not so in the case presented before us as 
[the defendants] did not reproduce a photograph of the singer from which the 
tattoo would be visible but the design of the tattoo Jean-Phillip Daures created 
as author and onto which the singer has no right.229  
Those decisions confirm the possibility for the body to become artists’ medium of 
expression as far as France is concerned. In the US, on the occasion of the more 
recent case of Whitmill and Warner Bros,230 US district Judge Perry also welcomed 
the possibility to copyright one’s tattooed skin: 
[the claimant had] a strong likelihood of success in his claim. [… and that] [o]f 
course tattoos can be copyrighted. I don't think there is any reasonable 
dispute about that.231 
Make-up designs are the closest types of work to tattoos British Courts litigated in.232 
In Merchandising Corporation of America v Harpbond,233 also known as the Adam 
Ant case, the Court refused to grant copyright protection to the makeup drawn on the 
musician’s face, on the basis that it did not satisfy the fixation condition: 
 A painting must be on a surface. If there were a painting in this case it must 
be the make-up marks plus the second plaintiff's face. If the marks were taken 
off the face, there could not be a painting.234 […] I had mentioned to Mr. 
Wilson in the course of argument that a painting must be on a surface of 
some kind. The surface upon which the startling make-up was put was Mr. 
Goddard's face and, if there were a painting, it must be the marks plus Mr. 
Goddard's face.235 
 Once again, the fixation requirement was used to by-pass assessing the legality of 
reifying the human body.  
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In light of those remarks, it is concluded that the human body, although generally 
cast aside proprietary rights for public policy purposes,236 has been subject to 
commodification by both intellectual property and non-intellectual property 
mechanisms when involved in artistic practices, performative or not. This conclusion 
thus removes the last legal obstacle placed between performers and full proprietary 
rights.  
 
 
III. Law as cultural product: from social to legal segregation of performers 
 
For neither courts nor policy-makers have acknowledged the presence of other 
factors or rational arguments legitimizing the author-performer divide beyond those 
already ruled out in this chapter, this analysis is forced to look for a justification 
somewhere else.237 Since all economic and legal arguments against performers’ 
augmented rights have been dismissed, only one logical impediment remains: the 
cultural belief according to which performers are less creative than authors, and 
therefore less deserving, or worthy, of protection.  
This line of investigation inevitably ties the discussion with the historical and 
sociological developments of the notions of creativity, authorship and performership. 
To an extent, this was acknowledged by Arnold J in his introductory comments to 
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around authorship, creativity and authorship do not account for the influence of other undisclosed or unreported 
factors such as institutional politics or lobbying pressures which may have swayed policy-makers when 
designing the author-performer divide. Because those external factors cannot be corroborated with tangible 
evidence, this thesis focuses on the arguments that courts and legislative bodies did adopt when writing the 
divide in statutes, reports or judicial decisions.  
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Performer’s Rights238 where he stresses that ‘law is cultural product’.239 The British 
judge underscores the reflection of the changes in the social and economic status of 
performers in the law protecting them.240 After briefly retracing the history of 
performers’ position within western societies from the Ancient Greece to modern 
times, he notes that the introduction of performer-oriented measures, though weak, 
coincided with the rise of the star-system.241  
In many ways, the present research furthers this thinking and aims to identify the 
deeper cultural rationale underlying performers’ diminished legal status in the 
jurisdictions of Australia, France, the UK and the US. It contends that deeper cultural 
underpinnings continue to bar the advancement of their rights and full completion of 
their legal protection. Those deeper reasons will be referred to as ‘cultural beliefs’, a 
terminology242 used by specialists of creativity research.243 It is argued that those 
beliefs are integral to the conception of creativity and authorship western narratives 
have construed and later enforced through their respective intellectual property laws.  
Indeed, intellectual property laws have enforced, consciously or not, a scale dividing 
the range of artists into various categories. The next chapter is dedicated to drawing 
the lines of this categorisation which places authors at its top and performers at its 
bottom. This sliding scale of rights moves from author-geniuses244 down to craftsmen 
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 Arnold (n 3) 3. 
239
 ibid, 3. 
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 ibid, 3-5. 
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 ibid, 4-5. This point is further discussed in Chapter 2, see text to note 332. 
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 Sawyer Explaining Creativity (n 98) 12; Keith Sawyer Western Cultural Model of Creativity (n 98) 2027.  
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 Creativity research is now an established academic field which grew out of the wish to rationally explain 
creativity. It was first driven by scientists and psychologists before embracing an interdisciplinary approach. 
Sawyer Explaining Creativity (n 98) 3-4; Keith Sawyer, ‘The Interdisciplinary Study of Creativity in 
Performance’ (1998) 11 Creativity Research Journal 11.  
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 The phrase ‘author-genius’ was coined by the scholarship who challenged the romantic aesthetics relayed by 
intellectual property law. See for instance: Martha Woodmansee, ‘The Genius and the Copyright : Economic 
and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author” (1984) 17 Eighteenth Century Studies 425; Isabelle 
Alexander, ‘The Genius and the Labourer: Authorship in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth- Century Copyright Law’ 
in Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis and Jane C Ginsburg (eds), Copyright and Piracy - interdisciplinary critique 
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to finally consider performers. It is submitted that this ‘hierarchisation’ reflects the 
value and creativity legal narratives perceived in the various artistic practices which 
form our culture.245  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Cambridge University Press 2010); Brent Salter, ‘Taming the Trojan Horse: An Australian Perspective of 
Dramatic Authorship’ (2009) 56 Copyright Society USA 789,794; Ruth Towse, ‘The Singer or the Song ? 
Developments in Performers’ Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural Economist’ (2004) 3 Review of Law 
and Economics 745,746. Rahmatian mitigates the validity of associating the figure of the author-genius with 
romantic aesthetic in the context of copyright see Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (n 80) 156.  
245
 Except for the caveat stressed in note 237.  
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Chapter Two 
The author-performer divide 
 
But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought
1
 
 George Orwell, 1968 
 
National and international intellectual property laws have at least one feature in 
common: performers receive fewer rights than authors. This phenomenon is referred 
to as the author-performer divide. Introduced by policy-makers, the divide went on to 
be faithfully complied with, if not furthered, by the courts who refused to read in 
author-oriented dispositions the possibility to protect performing artists with equal 
rights. Although the divide appears to be deeply entrenched in the judicial narrative, 
the latter seems to have poked holes in this legal wall separating authors from 
performers over time.  
 
I. Writing the divide: the part of legislators 
This section defines the boundaries and depth of the divide opposing authors to 
performers. It concludes by emphasising that such distinction was enforced as a 
result of careful thinking on policy-makers’ part.  
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 George Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language’ in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angos (eds), The collected 
essays, journalism and letters of George Orwell (vol 4, 1st edn Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich 1968) 137 
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A. The divide in law 
National, regional and international legislators wrote a divide impacting both the form 
and the substance of performers’ rights. The whole regime applicable to performing 
artists was designed to be of a lesser nature than their authorial equivalents, an 
agenda which also tainted the terminology employed in describing performers’ rights.  
1. Segregating nomenclature of rights 
The divide is first performed by a careful nomenclature of rights designed to 
segregate performers from authors. This formal separation was applied on different 
levels. Initially, performers’ protection was absent from intellectual property 
frameworks. Until the 1960s, performing artists could only rely on non-intellectual 
property mechanisms to protect their name, image, likeness, personality or persona, 
publicity as well their voice against misappropriation or passing off.2 In France, 
similar provisions were used by performing artists, but early case law focused on 
building up protection in relation to employment law3 rather than tort or intellectual 
property.4  
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 text to note 196, Chapter 1.  
3
 Cass. civ, 29 juin 1922: DP 1922, 1, 125.  
4
 The study of French jurisprudence revealed that performers dominantly rely on mechanisms pertinent to 
intellectual property and employment laws to protect their interests. Very rarely, would cases be primarily based 
on alternative instruments such as unfair competition or right to one’s privacy. See for some of the rare 
examples, TGI Paris, 4 juin 2008, n° 05/06811 (In this case the Court awards the dancer damages for breach of 
the right of image but rejected her claim based on performers’ rights declaring that the two protection cannot be 
cumulated); Cass, 1ère civ, 24 septembre 2009, n° 08-11.112 « Jacky Boy Music »: Bull. 2009, I, n° 184; D. 
2009 act. Jurispr. P2486, note Dalleau (the French supreme court held that the use of a performer’s image on the 
cover of a record when neither the use of the photograph nor that of the record was authorised breaches the 
artist’s right to image which bears its own economic value). Even in those two decisions, the right to one’s 
image was not the main claim, both plaintiffs had based their pretention on performers’ rights as well. Later, the 
moral right doctrine was extended to cover performers’ professional reputation as well as their performances. 
See, Paris, 4eme Ch, 18 décembre 1989: D. 1991. p100 (in order to estimate whether the performers’ right of 
integrity was breached, the judge examined whether the diffusion of the cinematographic work at stake in the 
form of a television program instead of film was harmful to the comedians’ professional reputation and career). 
On that basis, was judged to be harmful to one’s reputation the unauthorised distribution of poor quality audio 
records as well as the broadcasting of a television programme where the lighting and make-up of the presenter 
had been neglected. Cass, 1ère civ, 24 septembre 2009, n° 08-11.112 « Jacky Boy Music »: Bull. 2009, I, n° 
184; D. 2009 act. Jurispr. P2486, note Dalleau; Paris, 10 février 2010, Samourai films SARL c/ Even Media SA, 
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Although diverse, this patchwork-like protection was not tailored to protect 
performers’ interests in their interpretations in the same manner intellectual property 
rights shelter authorial works. This portfolio of rights left, and still leaves, loopholes in 
performers’ protection whenever the use of the performance or performers’ image 
did not coincide within a common field of business,5 did not misrepresent the 
consumers on the products’ or services’ origins,6 or whenever it did not invade a 
proprietary right or goodwill materialised in the performance or performer’s image.7 
This array of non-intellectual property rights would also fail to protect performances 
when they were used without encroaching one’s right to privacy.8  
In the US, judges were careful that common-law and tort law mechanisms were not 
diverted from their original purpose to simulate proprietary interests in performers’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
n° 08/02748 : inédit. See also, Charles Jolibois, ‘Rapport No 212 Fait Au Nom de La Commission Spéciale Sur 
Le Projet de Loi Adopté Par l’Assemblée National Relatif Aux Droits D'auteur et Aux Droits Des Artistes-
Interprètes, Des Producteurs de Phonogrammes et de Vidéogrammes et Des Entreprises de Communication 
audiovisuelle’, vol Tome I (1985) 29, later refered to as the ‘Jolibois Report No 2012’. 
5
 Australia : This condition was loosened to accept ‘remote’ commonality of activities in Henderson v Radio 
Corporation Pty in order to cover performers’ interests, see Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty Ltd (1958) 1a 
IPR 620,627-8 (passing off admitted by the court, there must be a common line of business even remote): at 
628: There must be a common field of activity. There must be use of the plaintiff's name in relation to some 
matter within that field in such fashion as to give rise to risk of confusion with respect to the plaintiff's 
connection with the goods in question. There must be an invasion of the proprietary right of the plaintiff and a 
tangible and real risk of damage ensuing therefrom. UK: McVulloh v Lewis A May (Produce Distributors) Ltd 
(1947) 65 RPC 68 (use of a performer’s name, Uncle Mac, for breakfast cereals); Wombles Ltd v Wombles Skips 
Ltd [1975] FSR 488; Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd [1977] FSR 62; Metix (UK) Limited and Another v G.H. 
Maughan (Plastics) Limited and Another [1997] FSR 718; Stringfellow v McCain Foods (GB) Ltd [1984] RPC 
501. 
6
 ibid. Without a common line of business, consumers are unlikely to be under the impression that the products 
or services are associated with the performer. Richard Arnold, Performers’ Rights (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2008) 295-6. 
7
 Those three conditions are the main conditions for passing off proceedings in the UK and Australia. Australia 
has loosened condition of common business activities for this mechanism to be extended to performers more 
easily, however the other conditions still hold. For instance, without evidence of fraud, no damages can be 
awarded only injunctions, which constitute a marked difference between this remedy and what copyright offers 
to authors. See, Hogan & Anor v Koala Dundee Pty Ltd & Ors [1998] FCA 540 23. English Courts have now 
come close to the Australian doctrine on passing off to protect performers but the law has not changed on this 
point. See, Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd [1991] FSR 145.  
8
 In all its declinations (i.e. right to one’s image, persona, publicity, name and so forth) UK: Campbell v MGV 
Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 3 A.C. 457; US: Laws v Sony Music Entertainment Inc, 448 F 3d 1134 (9th Cir 
2006). Only under very specific and limited circumstances, will a claim based on the right to one’s right to 
image be successful, see for instance : Toney v L'Oreal USA Inc, 406 F3d 905 (7th Cir 2005), 2005 Copr L Dec 
P 28, 984 (7th Cir 2005). 
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work.9 Similarly, the British Courts made clear that parties were not to read a civil 
cause for action in the criminal provisions10 sanctioning the bootleg of unauthorised 
recorded performances, at a time when the latter were the only form of protection 
available to performers.11  
Those rights never granted performing artists with complete proprietary interests in 
their interpretations and left them without a full control over their work both before 
and after its materialisation.  
a) Joining the neighbourhood 
It is only during the 1960s that performers’ rights entered the realm of intellectual 
property laws as neighbours of copyright. Internationally, the Rome Convention was 
the first instrument of this reform but remained a rather timid step in the right 
direction. Indeed, whilst all the key players of the international music and film 
industries were signatory to the Convention, its introduction triggered little 
improvement for performers at the national level. The UK judged that the criminal 
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 Even when conditions of non-intellectual property law mechanisms are verified, those mechanisms can still be 
defeated by the author’s copyright. See in the US, an example of the pre-emption doctrine: Sinatra v The 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber co 435 F2d 711 (9
th
 Cir 1970) 721; Midler v Ford 1988 849 F2d 460 (9th Cir 1988); 
Laws v Sony Music Entertainment Inc, 448 F 3d 1134 (9th Cir 2006). For a description of similar situations in 
Australia and the UK respectively, see Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘“Pretend-Y Rights” On the Insanely Complicated 
New Regime for Performers’ Rights in Australia, and How Australian Performers Got Gypped’, New Directions 
in Copyright Law, Vol. II (Edward Elgar Press 2005) 176-7; Arnold (n 6) 294-307. 
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 See the 1925 Dramatic and Musical Performers’ Protection Act, the 1958 Dramatic and Musical Performers’ 
Protection Act( 6 & 7 Eliz 2 Ch 44) and later the 1963 and 1972 Performers’ Protection Acts (respectively, c.53 
and c. 32); Arnold (n 6) 17-8, 20,24-6. 
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 The particular point was subject to a saga of judicial decisions in the UK. See: Musical Performers' 
Protection Association Ltd v British International Pictures Ltd (1930) 46 TLR 485 (refusing to recognise a civil 
cause for action under the 1925 Act); Apple Corps Ltd and Others v Lingasong Ltd and Another [1977] FSR 
345 (idem under the 1958-72 Acts); Island Records Ltd v Corkindale Court of Appeal [1978] Ch 122 (a civil 
cause of action is recognised on the basis of the breach on the statutory provisions protecting performers); 
Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No.2) [1982] AC 173 (rejects the idea that a civil cause of action is 
available to performers on the basis on the criminal provisions); Warner Bros. Records Inc and Others v Parr 
[1982] FSR 383 (confirms the Island records decisions); RCA Corporation and Another v Pollard [1982] 1 
WLR 979; [1982] 2 All ER 468 (sides with the position held in the Lonrho case); Ekland v Scripglow Limited 
[1982] FSR 431 (accepts the perfomers’ civil cause for action); Silly Wizard Ltd v Shaughnessy, El Fakir, 
Perkings, Lefevre, Goldberg & Co Ltd [1983] S.L.T. 367 (idem); RCA Corporation and RCA Limited v Pollard 
[1983] Ch 135 (idem, overturns the first instance’s decision); Shelley v Cunane [1983] FSR 390 (idem). See 
also, Arnold (n 6) 26-35.  
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protection it enforced at the time met the international standard set by the 
Convention, so no further rights were introduced.12 In France, it took over twenty 
years for the government to ratify the international agreement. Long parliamentary 
debates13 resulted in the voting of the Act of the 3rd of July 1985.14 The Act 
introduced both economic and moral rights for performers, articulating also their 
position at the crossroads between intellectual property and employment laws.15 
Soon after the Law of 1985, British policies caught up with the continental jurisdiction 
with the introduction of the Copyright, Patents and Designs Act in 1988.16 The 1988 
Act introduced for the first time in the UK civil remedies for the breach of performers’ 
rights, despite the reluctance of the Whitford Committee.17 
At the same time, the situation of performers caught the attention of the Commission 
of the European Communities who formulated their concerns in the Green Paper on 
Copyright and the Challenge of Technology.18 The legal base for protection known in 
France and the UK was confirmed and reinforced during the following decade under 
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 At the time, Australia was still under the control of British intellectual property laws. It is only in 1969 that 
performers in Australia will receive their first protective instrument as far as intellectual property is concerned. 
This change in law was enacted by the Copyright Amendment Act 1989 (Cth), which introduced Part XIA into 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
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 Jolibois Report No 212 (n 4) 25. Before then, performers’ protection was driven by the courts. The first 
legislative move to protect performers was made on the grounds of employment law and took the form of the 
Law of December 26, 1969 No 69-1185 (JORF p 17371), now codified under Art L 762-1 and L 762-2 of the 
French Employment Law Code (code du travail). Again, this reform was prompted by a judicial construction of 
performing artists’ right from the angle of labour law. See, Cass. civ, 29 juin 1922 : DP 1922, 1, 125. 
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 Act No 85-660 on the protection of authors, performing artists, phonograms and film producers and 
enterprises of audio-visual communication. Author’s translation - the original title reads : « Loi 85-660 relative 
aux droits d’auteur et aux droits des artistes-interprètes, des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes 
et des entreprises de communication audiovisuelle ».  
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 Since 1969, performers are presumed to producers’ employees whenever they sign a peforming contract. See, 
Employment Law Code, Art 762-1 and L 7121-3 (Code du travail). See Law of December 26, 1969 No 69-
1186, JO30 dec 1969 p 12732. JCP 1970 III 22 ; Michel Vivant, Nathalie Mallet-Poujol and Jean-Michel 
Brugière, Quels Droits Pour Les Artistes Du Spectacle (Dalloz 2009) 20-1. 
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 Later referred to as CDPA 1988. 
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 The report was opposed to granting performers copyright in their performance but was inclined to make 
available to them civil remedies such as injunctions or damages. John Whitford, ‘Report on Copyright and 
Designs Law’ (1977) Cmdn 6723, para 409 and 412, later referred to as the ‘Whitford Report’. Patricia Leopold, 
‘The Whitford Committee Report on Copyrights and Designs Law’ (2011) 8 Modern Law Review 685, 690; 
Arnold (n 6) 35. 
18
 ‘Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of the New’, vol COM (1988) para 2.5.2, later referred to as the 
‘1988 Green Paper’. 
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the authority of the European Commission who aimed, inter alia, at harmonising 
performers’ rights across European territories. The Commission’s efforts resulted in 
the introduction of a series of directives which started with the Rental and Lending 
Rights Directive in 1992.19  
Despite numerous attempts, this change in the European legislation was not 
paralleled in the American federal framework.20 The US never introduced performers’ 
rights at the federal level judging that the Congress was not granted those powers by 
the Constitution as its authority was constrained its authority to authors’ rights.21 It 
limited itself to prohibiting the making of unauthorised records of live performances 
as a result of the 1994 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.22  
At the international level, the World Trade Organisation23 made the next most 
significant contribution to performers’ protection since the Rome Convention.24 It took 
the form of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
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 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of November 19, 192 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, [1992] OJ L77 20PO). It was followed by the Satellite 
Broadcasting Directive (Council Directive93/83/EEC of September 27,1993 on the co-ordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable transmission, 
[1993] OJL248.15), the Term Directive (Council Directive 93/98/EEC) of October 29,1993 harmonising the 
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 ‘Performance Rights in Sound Recordings (95th Congress, 2d Session Committee Print No 15)’ (1978) 31-2, 
later referred to as the ‘1978 Committee Report’.  
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 Most of the debate focused on the argument that the Congress intends to protect with copyright works fixed 
‘in writings’ and that performances cannot be regarded as such. Although this reasoning is hardly tenable now 
with the development of recording technologies and the accession of sound recorders to copyright (see 
Goldstein v California), the position still holds. Judith Kim, ‘The Performers’ Plight in Sound Recordings - 
Unique to the US: A Comparative Study of the Development of Performers' Rights in the US, England, and 
France’ (1986) 10 Columbia VLA Journal of Law and the Arts 453, 470-3; Goldstein v California, 412 US 546 
(Supreme Court 1973). Weatherall contends that musical performances involved in the making of sound 
recording share ownership over the record with the sound record but does not supports this claim with evidence 
based on either case law or statutes, in Weatherall (n 9) 196. This position does not seem to be shared by the 
American scholarship, see for instance, Mary LaFrance, ‘Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound 
Recordings’ (2002) 75 Cal. L. Rev 375, 392. 
22
 US Code, Title 17 s.1101 amended by the Public Law 103-465 of December 8, 1994: A of An Act To 
Implement the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Title V, subtitle A).  
23
 Later referred to as WTO. 
24
 Arnold (n 6) 41. 
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of 1994 (TRIPS) which were annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement25 forming the 
base of the organisation. The TRIPS agreements reiterated the modest substance of 
the Rome Convention26 limiting its contribution to enlarging the number of signatory 
states. Indeed, the TRIPS agreements counted one hundred and twenty fours 
contracting parties on the day of its publication in 1994, a number which still 
surpasses the contracting parties to the Rome Convention to this day.27  
It is only very recently that the international community levelled up performers’ 
protection to the standard conferred in France and the UK. The 2012 Beijing Treaty 
on Audio-visual Performances bridged the gap the 1996 WIPO Performance and 
Phonograms Treaty28 (WPPT) had left between audio-visual performers and aural 
performers, or performers involved in sound recordings.29 The WPPT had only 
focused on rights for the second category of performing artists. Twenty years later, 
the Beijing Treaty was thus dedicated to extend the same international rights to 
audio-visual performers. However, the 2012 Treaty is yet to come into force and has 
only been ratified by eleven countries as of today, none of them holding influential 
positions in the entertainment industries.30  
Compared to the evolution of authors’ rights, the development of performers’ 
protection is a slow and late phenomenon. It took over sixty years for performers’ 
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 Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organisation of April, 14 1994. 
26
 At this point, states are only binding themselves to the obligation to provide “the possibility of preventing” 
performers’ rights infringement which does not equate to prohibiting such actions. See TRIPS, Art 14(1) 
borrowing the wording of the Rome Convention Art. 7 (1).  
27
 At the time of writing (March 2016), the TRIPS agreements counted one hundred and sixty one contracting 
parties whilst the Rome Convention counts ninety one.  
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 Although the WIPO Treaty was signed on the 20
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 of December 1996, it was only entered into force on the 
20
th
 of May 2002. 
29
 1996 WPPT, Art 5 and 6. 
30
 At the time of writing (March 2016), the contracting parties having ratified the Treaty were: Botswana, China, 
Japan, Slovakia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Chile, Qatar, Moldova and Slovakia. On February 10, 
2016, the President of the United States sent a proposal to Congress with the view to ratify the Treaty. See, 
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, 
done at Beijing on June 24, 2012’ 114th Congress, 2nd session, US Government Publishing Office, 59-118 
(Washington 2016). Given the current political context, it seems unlikely that a bill will be passed before the 
end of the US President’s time in office in January 2017.  
85 
 
protection to take the form of intellectual property rights31 and more than fifty years 
on the top of that to be completed at the international level.32  
b) Name calling 
Despite the various reforms increasing the scope, substance and length of 
performers’ rights, their label as neighbours of copyright never faded.33 The 
expression literally translates the lesser substance of those rights, and although the 
phrase is present in the legal narrative of all jurisdictions under study including the 
international framework, its use was not consistent.  
The expression was first employed during the 1948 Brussels Conference for the 
revision of the Berne Convention, and was then formalised in its table of ‘wishes’.34 
The international event being held in French language, ‘droit voisins’ were the exact 
words used by the Congress in its list of ‘voeux’ (wishes), quoting the Italian jurist 
Piola Caselli.35 This first formal outing of the phrase ‘neighbouring right’ as referring 
to performers’ rights, remained its only use in the legislative narrative until the 
introduction of the French Intellectual Property Code (IPC) in 1992.36 The 
expression, although mentionned the second title of the French code, was never 
mentioned in the Law of July 1985.37 The phrase does not appear in any of the cited 
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 With the introduction of the 1961 Rome Convention and taking the development of the music and film 
industries in the 1900’s as a starting point.  
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 With the signature of the 2012 Beijing Treaty, yet to come into force. 
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 The exact expression being ‘neighbouring rights’. 
34
 ‘Documents de La Conférence de Bruxelles 5-26 Juin 1948’ (1951) 493 (under the provisions of Article 11, 
quarter nouveau), later referred to as the Brussels Conference Documents. 
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 ibid. 
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 IPC, Livre II : Droits voisins du droit d’auteur. The various acts composing French intellectual property law 
were codified by the Law of July, 1 1992 (no 92-597). (Loi relative au code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er 
juillet 1992 no 92-597). Although it must be noted that the phrase ‘neighbouring right’ was used before that by 
the Spicer committee in their report to refer to performers’ rights. See, JA Spicer, ‘Spicer Report to Consider 
What Alterations Are Desirable in The Copyright Law of the Commonwealth’ (1959) para 285, later referred to 
as the ‘Spicer Report’. 
37
 The expression was however used in the parliamentary debates and the reports which informed the passing of 
the Act. See, Charles Jolibois, ‘Rapport No 350 Fait Au Nom de La Commission Spéciale Sur Le Projet de Loi 
Adopté Par l’Assemblée National Relatif Aux Droits D'auteur et Aux Droits Des Artistes-Interprètes, Des 
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International conventions, European Directives or other domestic legislation.38 The 
Rome Convention referred to ‘performers’ rights’39 once, but otherwise used the 
more generic expression of ‘performers’ protection’.40 The European narrative seems 
to have preferred it the term of ‘related right’ to copyright;41 a formulation which is 
also present in the TRIPS agreements.42  
However, mentions of the phrase transpire in those documents. This suggests that 
the expression did underlie their provisions even though it was not explicitly 
embedded in the body of regulatory frameworks. In 1980, the Word Intellectual 
Property Office fully integrated the expression into the narrative of intellectual 
property laws when publishing its glossary “of Terms of the Law of Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights” which included performers’ rights.43 More subtle references to 
the phrase appeared in the 1996 and 2012 WIPO-administered treaties, either in 
footnote44 or in the preamble.45 At the European level, the 1988 Green Paper46 used 
the phrase to designate performers’ rights without detour, but the commission 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Producteurs de Phonogrammes et de Vidéogrammes et Des Entreprises de Communication Audiovisuelle’ 
(1985) 24, later referred to as the ‘Jolibois Report No 350’. 
38
 selected in this analysis. 
39
 Rome Convention 1961, Article 19. The British Parliament will also employ the phrase ‘performers; rights’ in 
the body of the CDPA 1988.  
40
 1968 Copyright Act, Part XIA. The 1959 Spicer Committee did refer to performers’ rights as neighbouring 
rights in inverted coma in its report. See Spicer (n 36) para 285, and 473.  
41
 See for instance, Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 OJL 346, p 28-35; Parliament and 
Council Directive 2001/29/EC 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society, OJ L 167 p 10-19; Parliament and Council Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 
December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 372 p 12-18. Arnold (n 6) 
13.  
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 1994 TRIPS, s. 1. 
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 ‘WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights’ (1980). The WIPO glossary 
was referenced by the European 1995 Green Paper. ‘Green Paper Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society’ (1995).  
44
 The title of the WPPT references the ‘WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights Questions’. Emphasis added. WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty 1996, p 13. 
45
 The preamble of the 2012 Beijing Treaty on the Protection of Audio-visual Performances refers to the 
“Resolution concerning Audiovisual Performances adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright 
and Neighboring Rights Questions on December 20, 1996”. Emphasis added.  
46
 1988 Green Paper (n 18) 10, 17, 104 Cmdn 1.5.11  
87 
 
dropped the expression by the time of its second edition in 1995.47 Finally, the 
Council Directive 93/83/EEC48 was also nicknamed the ‘Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights Directive’.49 
It appears from those documents that the intent behind referring to performers’ rights 
as ‘neighbouring rights’ was to make sure that the latter’s rationale and substance 
was not to be confused with real authors’ rights. Performers’ rights are ‘related’ or 
‘neighbouring’ but shall be taken for true copyright.50 Despite the terminological wall 
erected between performers’ and authors’ rights by policy-makers, the courts have 
shown less rigidity in their use of the lexicon.  
In the case of Hadley v Kemp, Park J refers to the “copyright in the performance” 
when listing the various protectable elements of a song.51 Although this might be a 
slip of the tongue, his comments clearly associate performers’ work (the 
performance) to copyright:  
[U]nder provisions of the copyright legislation which I will describe in Part N 
below, the self-same event of the band making the master recording brings 
into existence both kinds of copyright: the copyright in the performance of the 
song, which would vest in all the performers except that they have almost 
certainly contracted for it to be vested in the record company, and the 
copyrights (literary and musical) in the work consisting of the song, which vest 
in the composer (or the company which employs him).52 
Confusion also rises from the permuting of the following phrases: ‘performers’ rights’, 
‘performing rights’ and ‘performance rights’. ‘Performer’s rights’ has been named 
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‘performers’ copyright’,53 sub-rights of copyright have been referred to as 
‘performance rights’54 or ‘performing rights’ whilst ‘performance rights’ has also been 
associated with ‘performers’ rights’.55 This sentence in itself conveys the muddle 
caused by the inter-exchangeable uses of those phrases. In all jurisdictions under 
study, ‘performers’ rights’ refers to performing artists’ prerogatives granted by 
intellectual property law.56 Those prerogatives have rarely been confused with a 
copyright in the performance.57 Performing right almost always refers to the right to 
perform the work in public or communicate the work publicly.58 Being a sub-right of 
copyright, performing rights are therefore not to be confused with performer’s rights. 
Misunderstanding occurs when the phrase ‘performance right’ is alternatively used to 
designate performers’ rights or performing rights (i.e. sub-right of copyright). 
Replacing the use of those expressions back into their national context might clarify 
the situation. In the US, the phrase seems to be employed to refer to copyright 
prerogatives59 whilst in the UK it has been used to designate performers’ 
protection.60  
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c) Neighbours beyond copyright 
Copyright is not the only neighbour performers’ rights share a fence with. The Court 
of Justice (CoJ) pushed the boundaries of performers’ neighbourhood to reach trade 
mark law in Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH.61 According to the European 
judges, a performers’ right to consent to the fixation and commercialisation of their 
performances goes to the quality and origin of their work very much like a trade mark 
would function. The CoJ stated that:  
Performers' rights also play a role in the field of consumer protection: the 
consumer doubtless assumes that recordings made by well-known, living 
performers are not released without the performer's authorisation and that 
such persons would not jeopardise their reputation by authorising the 
distribution of low-quality recordings; that limited guarantee of quality is lost 
entirely if recordings may be distributed without the performer's consent. It 
may thus be seen that performers' rights operate in much the same way as 
trade marks, the economic significance of which was recognised by the Court 
in the Hag II case.62 
This position suggests that performers’ rights serve a hybrid purpose at the 
intersection between copyright and trade mark laws, yet without being fully 
integrated into any of those two areas.  
2. A gap in substance, a substantial gap 
 
The divide separating authors from performers goes beyond mere questions of 
rhetoric. It has created a gap in the substance of their rights, impacting both the 
scope and the duration of performers’ protection.63  
One should not be fooled by the resemblance between the wording used to describe 
authors’ and performers’ rights as their content remains starkly different.64 Some 
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scholars65 have commented that the introduction of performers’ moral rights at the 
international level by the WPPT was a reform of great significance which equated to 
bringing their legal status equal to authors’. Others see in the evolution of 
performers’ protection a progressive assimilation of performers’ rights as full 
copyright.66 Yet again on both sides, economic and moral, performers’ rights remain 
of a lesser substance and narrower scope than authorial rights. The subsequent 
paragraphs envisage the gap between authors and performers from the perspective 
of economic rights first, before moving to examining moral rights. Although the divide 
has been anchored in the law, its boundaries have been slightly blurred in places, 
softening its otherwise clear-cut edges.  
a) Economic rights 
 
As previously mentioned, authors’ rights regulate the right to reproduce the work, 
communicate it to the public, to limit unauthorised modifications of its content and 
control the association of their name when disseminated.67 Similarly, performances 
are protected against unauthorised fixation,68 communication to the public69 and 
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mutilations denigrating their integrity.70 The use of performers’ name in relation to 
their work is also subject to legal protection.71 Although authors’ and performers’ 
rights encompass akin prerogatives, using synonymous vocabulary, noticeable 
differences still persist. For instance, national legislators have not specified the sub-
rights forming performers’ protection with the same detail that they have for their 
authorial equivalent. Indeed, whilst copyright provisions non-exhaustively list at least 
six sub-rights deriving from copyright,72 performers’ protection is limited to the two 
pre-cited economic rights of protection against unauthorised fixation and 
communication to the public.73 It could be argued that those sub-rights, though not 
explicitly mentioned, remain covered by performers’ rights, was it not for the 
presence of other indicators weighting against this interpretation. 
Despite the layout of international and national instruments which project the illusion 
that authors’ and performers’ rights achieve a fairly similar standard of protection, the 
author-performer divide reveals its contours more clearly when one studies the 
substance protected by each set of rights. As explained in previous developments,74 
it was agreed since the early ages of copyright that the legal protection conferred to 
authors was not limited to the physical boundaries of their work. As a result, authors’ 
rights can be actionable beyond the narrow hypothesis of literal copying.75 In the 
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category of non-literal infringing acts translations, adaptations,76 imitations or re-
creations of works without the author’s consent were included.77 Authors’ rights thus 
protect the material form of the work as well as its immaterial content.78  
The situation with performers’ rights is different. If artists’ consent to record or use 
the recording of their interpretations is required, the performance embodied in the 
record itself is not covered by those rights. The use of the record is protected by 
performers’ rights, but the performance it conveys is not. Consequently, permission 
must be obtained from the performer (and sound recorder) for an audio or video tape 
of her interpretation to be used, but the re-acting or mimicking of her interpretation 
itself may be done freely.79 Intonation, gestures and all aspects of the embodiment 
process which compose the performance are left unprotected, whether or not it is 
fixed in recording. The protection of performances by intellectual property law is 
therefore reduced and limited to the protection of its material fixed version, the 
record, unlike authors’ rights which are extended to cover both the physical object 
and its intangible content. Only material elements of the performance may enter the 
realm of authors’ rights such as the set, costumes, photographs, the choreography 
‘behind’ the performance or the written stage directions.80  
Contemporary Australian copyright laws seem to be the only exception to what 
would otherwise be a linear and well-entrenched divide, as far as economic rights 
are concerned. Indeed, the 1968 Copyright Act, as amended, provides under Section 
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22(3A) that the “performer who contributed to the performance fixed in sound 
recording”81 is the co-owner of the copyright in the sound recording, as “maker” of 
the record. This ownership is shared with the sound recorder, is only applicable in 
the cases of the live musical performances82 whenever their work has not been 
commissioned.83 Such limitations narrow down the scope of the provision and leaves 
the situation of other performers unchanged.  
i. Forms and scopes of consent  
 
Section 22(3A) of the Australian 1968 Copyright Act is not the only twist in the 
author-performer divide that legal frameworks and their narratives have introduced. 
The rules on authors’ and performers’ consent to authorise the use of their work also 
offer an interesting change of dynamic within the divide.  
Neither the use of protected authorial works nor the fixation and communication of 
performances can be done without the artists’ consent. The legislation of all 
jurisdictions under study is very clear on this point.84 Copyright law in every 
jurisdiction requires authors to put their consent to assign their rights in writing,85 
including moral rights.86 Commenting on this condition, Kozinski J concluded that this 
requirement was guided by common sense; he writes:  
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Common sense tells us that agreements should routinely be put in writing. 
This simple practice prevents misunderstandings by spelling out the terms of 
a deal in black and white, forces parties to clarify their thinking and consider 
problems that could potentially arise, and encourages them to take their 
promises seriously because it's harder to backtrack on a written contract than 
on an oral one.87 
 
Responding to the argument according to which “[m]oviemakers do lunch, not 
contracts”,88 the ninth circuit judge added that “it doesn't have to be the Magna 
Charta; a one-line pro forma statement will do”.89 
In France, the IPC goes further by requiring that written agreements concerned with 
the transfer of copyright must specify the sub-rights assigned mentioned separately, 
and so must the field of exploitation of the assignment, its scope, purpose, place and 
duration.90 British law and case law appear to be less demanding than their 
continental counterpart.91 The 1988 CDPA does not require any of those 
specifications beyond the condition of consent in writing. This led the courts to 
consider the possibility of implied assignment in recording contracts.92 Nevertheless, 
for a contract to be interpreted as an implied assignment of copyright the House of 
Lords identified two rather strict cumulative conditions. First, it must be obvious to 
both parties (i.e. the assignors and recording company) that the rights in the 
protected work were being transferred, and second, that such assignment formed 
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the basis of the commercial relationship between the two parties so much so that it 
could not have functioned without it.93  
At the European level, the CoJ specified that express consent was required for the 
commercialisation of any physical medium embodying a copyrighted work.94 A 
decade later, in Metronome Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp GmbH the same 
court indicated that if the copyright holder’s express consent was required for the 
communication of any physical rendering of the protected work, such authorisation 
was not necessary whenever the use at stake was the repetition of the same 
economic operation. Thus the “subsequent sales of the same medium even without 
the express consent of the right holder”95 would be lawful but not “any different form 
of economic exploitation of the work such as rental of the physical medium 
purchased.”96 
Turning now to the provisions dedicated to performers’ protection, it seems has 
though the same common sense did not necessarily apply to their regime. Neither 
British97 nor American98 Copyright Acts provide any guidance with regard to the form 
performers’ authorisation must take to be legally enforceable by third parties. The 
courts of both jurisdictions concluded that an implied consent to the recording of 
one’s performance could be inferred from the artist’s presence in recording studios99 
or bearing recording devices. In Henderson v All Around the World Recordings 
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Ltd,100 Birss J accepted that performers’ consent could be given “in relation to a 
specific performance, a specific description of performances, performances generally 
and may relate to past and future performances.”101 He agrees that “although written 
consents are routinely obtained from performers in the music industry, there is 
nothing in the law which provides that the consent of performers has to be in 
writing”.102 Indeed, “[i]n principle consent could be express or implied”.103 Agreeing 
with Kozinzki J,104 the British judge reminds the parties that if obtaining consent in 
writing “makes good common sense” it is yet not required by law.105 
In Australia and France, the situation is slightly different and, in fact, diametrically 
opposed to one another. Unlike British and American copyright laws, the Australian 
statute positively allows for performers’ permission to take any form.106 On the other 
side of the spectrum, the French legislator opted for a requirement of consent made 
in writing.107 Despite the protectionism displayed by the French provisions on this 
point, a dent in this legal shield was made in the context of audio-visual 
performances to favour producers’ interests.108 In this particular context, the 
                                                          
100
 Henderson v All Around the World Recordings Ltd & Anor [2013] EWPCC 7. 
101
 ibid, para 41. 
102
 ibid, para 42. 
103
 ibid. 
104
 Effects Associates Inc v Cohen, 908 F 2d 555 (9th Cir 1990) 556-7. 
105
 Henderson v All Around the World Recordings Ltd & Anor [2013] EWPCC 7, para 42. 
106
 Australia: s. 113B. 
107
 IPC, Art. L 212-3. The Courts specified what constituted consent given in writing and what did not. For 
instance, the authorisation given in writing by an event organiser to broadcast a performer’s interpretation does 
not hold (see Paris, 16 juin 1993, n° [XP160693X] : D. 194 p 218 Edelman; D. somm. com. p. 277). The 
recording contract agreed between a producer and an event organiser authorising the reproduction of 
performances cannot amount to a legally authorised transfer of performers’ rights if the latter were not party to 
the contract (Cass, 1ère civ, 16 juillet 1992, n° 90-19.207 : Bull. 1992 civ i p 234; RIDA 1993, n 155, 177 obs. 
Kéréver). Although, implied consent to the use of the record seems to have been accepted by the Court in the 
following case: Paris, 18 janvier 2012, Société Civile De Perception Et De Distribution Des Droits Des Artistes 
Intepretes De La Musique Et De La Danse c/ L'institut National De L'audiovisuel, n° 09/29162 : inédit. 
108
 Art L 212-4 reads “The signature of a contract between the performer and a producer for the making of an 
audio-visual work shall imply the authorization to fix, reproduce and communicate to the public the 
performance of the performer. Such contract shall lay down separate remuneration for each mode of exploitation 
of the work.” IPC, Art. L 212-4. Official translation. See also, Cass, soc, 10 février 1998, n° 95-43.510: 
Légipresse 1998, No 153,III,101, note Veyssière Bull. 1998 v N° 82 p. 59. 
97 
 
recording contract binding the performer to her producer implies the former’s consent 
for her performers to be fixed and distributed for the duration of their agreement.109 
Focusing now on the scope of performing artists’ consent rather than on its form, a 
slight discord has divided British judges on this point. The question presented itself 
as follows. Does consenting to the fixation of one’s performance equate to 
authorising the communication of such record to the public? Did legislators intend to 
grant performing artists with one or two rights distinguishing between recording their 
interpretations and distributing such record? In the Mad Hat case,110 Davies J sided 
with the first option and considered that performers’ consent had to be obtained for 
the making of a recording (i.e. recording the performance) but not for the making of a 
record (i.e use of the recorded performance in a record). He stated:  
[The plaintiff’s counsel] said that consents already given were referable to 
recordings already embedded in tape or elsewhere; so that further consents 
are necessary if records are to be made in future from such tapes. It is not 
clear to me that such further consents are necessary. To make a record is not 
to make a recording. It is the making of a recording, not a record, that may not 
be made without the consent of the performer: see section 182(1).111  
 
 In Bassey v Icon Entertainment Plc,112 Vinelott J plainly rejected Davies’s distinction 
between record and recording to side with the second solution:  
While I differ from a judge with the experience of Mervyn Davies J in the field 
of copyright with great reluctance, I do not myself consider that the distinction 
between a recording and a record can be justified. Section 182 contains a 
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definition of recording as meaning in relation to performance a sound 
recording (a) made directly from the live performance or (c) made directly or 
indirectly from another recording of the performance. As the authors of 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria point out, Mervyn Davies J seems not to have 
been referred to that definition, and it is impossible in the light of it, it seems to 
me, to distinguish (as he does) between a record and a recording for the 
purposes of the Act. It may be that in everyday parlance a distinction is drawn 
between a recording as the first reduction to a permanent form of an 
evanescent performance and records made from the recording. However, for 
the purposes of the Act recording is given a wide meaning which covers 
both.113 
 
He carries on arguing that “Davies J's decision may be justified on the basis that the 
performer who gives his consent to the making of a studio recording impliedly 
consents to the making of records from it for a subsequent issue to the public”.114 
However, “in the absence of any such authority, whether express or implied, the 
making of a record to my mind clearly infringes a performer's rights.”115 He bases his 
argumentation on the fact that adjudicating otherwise would “largely defeat the rights 
conferred by the Act on a performer if, having once consented to the making of a 
recording, albeit on terms that records were not to be released unless the performer 
was satisfied with the recording, the recording could be exploited by the making of 
records from it and by the sale of the records by a third party into whose hands the 
recording had come and who could not be restrained by any contractual right from 
the exploitation of it”.116  
In the Henderson case,117 Birss J attributes the judges’ dissenting decisions to the 
diverging facts presented before them.118 Siding with the outcome of Bassey v Icon 
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Entertainment Plc,119 he admitted that the performer had consented to the fixation of 
her performance as evidenced by her presence on recording premises but that such 
conclusion remains “a long away from a finding that this consent was sufficient to 
permit [third parties] to remix or release that recording without [the performer]’s 
specific consent at a later date”.120 The same judge decided that “in the absence of 
financial terms of some kind, the existence of conscious consent would be 
unlikely”.121 The presence or absence of financial terms is not to be understood as a 
principle of law but is associated with, once again, plain “common sense” according 
to the court.122 Similar outcomes were reached by the courts in the US123 and 
France.124  
This issue was finally settled by the courts of each jurisdiction who reached a 
harmonised position. One more question was yet to be answered: does consenting 
to the issue the record of a performance to the public allow all future uses of such 
record? In other words, must performers consent to the re-use of their materialised 
interpretation or does their right vanish after being exercised once?  
In France, the answer is yes, performers’ consent must be sought every time the 
record of their performance is used for the purpose of an artistic production distinct 
from the one agreed on initially. This guiding principle is not explicitly pointed out by 
the courts, but case law seems to follow this pattern consistently. Abiding by this 
reasoning, the courts concluded that the making of a television programme by the 
same producers, out of recorded performances originally designed to compose a 
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cinematographic work required the actors’ consent a second time.125 The Court held 
that the two productions pursued different aesthetic purposes, although economically 
and legally comparable.126 The same outcome was reached with regard to the 
creation and commercialisation of a musical phonograms made out of the 
performances recorded for the purpose of a film soundtrack.127 For the latter to be 
commercialised separately from the film, performers’ consent must be sought by the 
producers before their issue to the public. Conversely, the online distribution of 
phonograms previously commercialised on the compact disk or audio-tape markets 
does not require performers’ additional consent since the destination of the 
performances was left unchanged, only their mode of dissemination was updated.128  
ii. Filling gaps with analogies 
Apart from French authorities, no decision has litigated the question at the European, 
British, Australian or American level to this date. However, one might find in 
decisions pertinent to author’s rights, clues as to the outcome one should expect. 
British courts have validated the use of analogies and comparisons between the 
substance of authors’ and performers’ rights whenever the latter lacked clarity. In 
Henderson v All Around the World Recordings Ltd,129 Birss J explained:  
[Defendant’s counsel] also submitted that the principles in Redwood v 
Chappell [1982] RPC 109 relating to inferred or implied consent, which were 
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formulated in the context of copyright, must apply by analogy to performer’s 
rights. I agree.130  
 
Applying this methodology to the conclusions drawn by the European case 
Metronom Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp GmbH,131 one could suppose that 
within jurisdictions under the authority of the CoJ, performers’ consent will be 
required every time the economic use of the recorded performances depart from the 
one authorised initially.132  
If the CoJ was to rule so, the position of the French jurisprudence might have to be 
revised to respect the European doctrine. Indeed, whilst the French doctrine follows 
a principle of ‘unity of artistic production’, the CoJ opted for a principle of ‘unity of 
economic use’. One may imagine many hypotheses where the two positions do not 
quite overlap each other depending on the CoJ’s understanding of economic use. 
For instance, could the selling of recorded performances in the form of DVDs or 
audio-CDs be considered as two different economic uses of the same records?  
b) Moral rights 
 
As explained before,133 the arrival of performers’ moral rights on the scene of 
international intellectual property was referred to as the last piece needed to bridge 
the gap separating authors from performers.134 Nonetheless, it is submitted that even 
on the grounds of moral rights, international and national regimes still fall short in 
levelling the two sets of rights. 
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 As previously explained,135 authors are conferred two to four moral rights, offering a 
right of paternity,136 integrity,137 of first publication138 and of withdrawal.139 Out of 
those four rights which compose the continental moral right doctrine,140 only the first 
two141 were enacted on common-law soils142 under the effect of international 
agreements.143 Performers’ and authors’ moral rights have indeed been harmonised, 
as far as common-law jurisdictions are concerned. This alignment is however 
diminished by the fact that authors’ moral rights are rather weakly protected in those 
countries in the first place.  
In France, where authors may benefit from a stronger protection, the author-
performer divide is maintained because the same two moral rights of integrity and 
paternity remain the only prerogatives accessible to performing artists. There is no 
right of withdrawal nor is there a right of first publication available to them.144 To 
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mitigate this point, it must be noted that the moral prerogatives authors’ and 
performers’ do have in common, do not perfectly match. Indeed, Article L 212-2 
specifies that performers’ moral right protect the integrity of their name, capacity and 
performance.145 Unlike authors’, performers’ moral right of integrity is explicitly 
oriented towards the protection of the artist’s name and reputation, benefiting from a 
greater scope than their authorial equivalents. Where many authors’ claims have 
failed to argue in court that the right of integrity to one’s work includes the protection 
of the artists’ reputation,146 the same pretentions on the basis of performers’ right 
would be successful. On this count, the protection granted to performers seems 
more generous than the one offered to authors. Yet, the former’s remains limited to 
two and not four moral rights.147  
3. Discrepancies in the duration of rights  
Not only is the scope of performers’ protection less substantial than authors’ rights 
but its duration is also shorter. Whilst authors receive copyright lasting their lifetime 
plus seventy years after their death, performers’ rights only cover fifty years from the 
end of year the performance took place,148 was communicated to the public149 or 
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fixed.150 Nevertheless, if within this first bracket of fifty years, a recording of the 
performance is released to the public, an additional term of fifty years starts the year 
following the date of the release.151 In 2011, the European Term Directive152 added 
another twenty years to this second term of protection for the benefit of 
performances fixed in sound recordings,153 amongst other additional privileges.154 In 
effect, those performances can be controlled by their right-holders for up one 
hundred and twenty years155 less two days by combining the two terms.156 The 
duration of protection for other performers remains unchanged.157  
The 2012 Beijing Treaty is the latest international reform which further extended the 
term of performers’ rights. Although, most jurisdictions were already enforcing a fifty-
year protection without discriminating between performances, there was no 
international obligation on states party to the Rome Convention, TRIPS agreements 
or WPPT to grant such protection to audio-visual performers. Article 14 of the Rome 
Convention had only required its contracting members to offer a minimum protection 
of twenty years. Later, the 1996 WPPT extended this term to fifty years but only with 
regard to live aural performances and performances fixed in phonograms.158 It has 
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taken no less than sixteen years for the international community to level the legal 
regimes for all performances granting audio-visual performing artists the same 
duration of fifty years. The Treaty is yet to be ratified by signatory legislators like 
Australia who is still distinguishing between those artists.159  
Even though this change in law made a step in the right direction by increasing the 
duration of performers’ rights, the international community did not take this 
opportunity of reform to line-up the regime of performers with that of authors. The 
foundations of the author-performer divide remain unshaken, despite numerous 
successive reforms at the national, regional and international levels. 
 
B. Intended differences 
The substantial gap established between authors’ and performers’ rights was no 
inadvertent move on the legislators’ part. On the contrary, it is the result of the 
careful expression of their intention. The reforms were informed by a series of 
reluctant reports which advocated for the divide to be not only introduced but 
maintained.160 The relegation of performers’ rights to non-intellectual property titles in 
the first place, and later, to a claim of a lesser substance was motivated by the fear 
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of diminishing authors’ legal protection. Explicit statements to this effect were 
reported during the deliberations of national and international projects of reform.161 
At the international Brussel conference held in 1948 to update the terms of the Berne 
Convention, the national representatives agreed that if performances ought to be 
protected, it could not be done within the parameters of the 1886 Convention. This 
discussion took place on and about the insertion of Article 11 quarter (nouveau).162 
The project of Article 11 quarter had been driven by the acknowledgement that 
performers required a minimum level of protection.163 It subsequently failed for lack 
of consensus on such level of protection should be. France refused the remote idea 
of embedding any form of performers’ rights in the Berne Convention, fearing that it 
would assimilate performing artists with authors, the true creators, which they are 
not. The French representatives stated that:  
The French Government continues to believe that performing artists are not 
creators of works of the mind and that the international protection they are 
owed cannot take place in the Berne Convention which is dedicated to 
protecting the works of creators of literary and artistic works.164 
 
After shifting sides during the negotiations, the UK was also party to the debate and 
held a similar position.165 Initially, the British delegation had put forward a proposal 
providing that “[w]ithout affecting authors’ rights, the performing artist will be 
protected, in the country where the performance took place, against any 
unauthorised making of records or any other similar instruments used to reproduce 
the sounds by means of which his performance of a musical or dramatic work can be 
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reproduced, whether or not such work has fallen into the public domain”.166 This 
proposition was going beyond the provisions submitted by the conference which had 
Article 11 quarter (nouveau) suggesting, with less ambition, that:  
The interpretation of a work is protected according to the conditions set by the 
national laws of each Country members of the Union, disregarding whether 
such work has fallen in the public domain or not167  
However, by the end of the Conference, the British delegation had withdrawn their 
proposal judging its own suggestion as “too vague” and “going too far”.168 No 
amendment under Article 11 quarter (nouveau) was passed but a wish to work 
towards the enactment of performers’ rights169 was voted in its place, a vote from 
which the British representatives abstained.170  
The UK kept a reserved approach towards the enforcement of performers’ protection 
until the reforms prompted by the European directives.171 The Parliament was 
adamant that criminal sanctions to performers’ right infringement satisfied the level of 
protection required by the Rome Convention. The public declarations of un-initiated 
speakers172 reveal that the gap in the nature and substance of right between authors’ 
and performers was a conscious decision. In the House of Commons, Member of 
Parliament Ronald Bell explained that:  
We mainly rely on the Copyright Act, 1956, for the regulation of copyright, a 
system under which we give to the author or producer of a work of art a kind 
of industrial property in his production. Performers, as distinct from authors, 
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are not protected in that way by the grant of a property right or copyright but 
by an Act known as the Dramatic and Musical Performers Protection Act, 
1958, which makes it a criminal offence to record or broadcast a performance 
of a performer without his written consent. 
The performer does not have a copy-right, but it is made a criminal offence to 
pirate his performance, and that, of course, puts him in a bargaining position 
in relation to broadcasting organisations or gramophone record makers so 
that he can strike his bargain by contract with them. Unless they get his 
consent by contract, they would be guilty of a criminal offence if they pirated 
his performance.173  
Those concerns repeated the contentions of the authors of the Gregory Report 
published ten years earlier.174 
In France, similar reservations on the introduction of performers’ rights were also 
present in legislative debates. In the preparation of what became the Law of July 4, 
1985, the enthusiasm of the French government was hindered by the Senate. 
Senator Charles Jolibois, head of the commission working on the elaboration of the 
bill, was highly critical of the Assembly’s wish to extend performers’ protection to 
moral rights, which were not required by the international conventions at the time. He 
commented:  
The ambition of the French project [of reform] is all the greater that it grants 
performers with moral rights, what the Rome Convention does not require. In 
short, the current bill goes way beyond what is needed to ratify the Rome 
Convention and the Government wishes to enforce the most sophisticated 
piece of legislation on the question of authors’ rights and neighbouring 
rights.175 
 
Many of the working commission’s reports stressed the need for performers’ 
protection not to be implemented at the expense of authors’ rights, emphasising the 
necessity to keep performing artists’ rights at bay from copyright.176 Jolibois’s reports 
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mentioned that performers’ protection “ought not to be built on the ruins of authors’ 
rights”.177 The French senator warned the Parliament that the “sleeping pill”178 
administered by the Rome Convention under its first Article was a mere 
“tranquilizer”179 the government repeated in the bill. Article 1 of the Rome Convention 
entitled “Safeguard of Copyright Proper” stipulated that the “[p]rotection granted 
under this Convention shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the protection of 
copyright in literary and artistic works. Consequently, no provision of this Convention 
may be interpreted as prejudicing such protection.”180 A near verbatim quote of the 
article was introduced in the 1985 Act181 and later codified under Article L 211-1. 
In the US, although performers currently benefit from a rather narrow protection at 
the federal level, their interests were passionately defended by Congress Members 
since the early 1930’s.182 Very few of those debates resulted in actual legal reforms 
but innovative solutions were presented before the federal legislators as early as 
1936. At the time, Representative Daly introduced a revision which granted 
performers with full copyright, acknowledging the full creative input those artists had 
in the record.183 Daly’s bill proposed to introduce the following disposition:  
[T]he works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall include 
all the writings of an author, whatever the mode or form of their expression, 
and all renditions and interpretations of a performer and/or an interpreter of 
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any musical, literary, dramatic work, or other compositions, whatever the 
mode or form of such renditions, performances, or interpretations.184 
 
Performances were expected to be protected once fixed185 and registered.186 Yet, 
even at a time where performing artists enjoyed what was probably the greatest 
support they would ever receive from their national governing representatives, the 
advancement of their legal situation was shortly shadowed by concerns for authors’ 
interests. Indeed, no later than a month after its presentation before the Congress, 
Representative Sirovich amended Daly’s proposal offering to make performers’ 
copyright contingent on authors’ approval as well as to constrain the opportunity to 
musical performances.187  
This episode illustrates that any step taken by policy-makers to improve performers’ 
protections is simultaneously hindered by the necessity to maintain the authority of 
authors’ rights over the realm of intellectual property laws.  
 
II. Performing the divide: the part of judges 
The divide between authors and performers was a result intended by legislators, and 
the courts made sure that their intention was respected. At times, this quest led 
judges to reach conclusions on the basis of either obscure or questionable logical 
grounds as the artificial distinction placed between authors and performers became 
more and more difficult to draw and maintain.  
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A. Interpreting the divide  
In the American judicial narrative, the intention of the Congress is often cited to 
justify the impossibility for performing artists to obtain copyright protection over their 
interpretations. In Sinatra v The Goodyear Tyre & Rubber,188 the ninth circuit court of 
appeal reminded the plaintiffs that “[t]he power to provide copyright protection for a 
limited time to the "Writings and Discoveries" of authors and inventors is one of the 
enumerated powers of Congress. […] Thus the author or composer was accorded 
copy protection, but no provision has yet been made in the Act for a performer's 
right, per se.”189 More recently, in Conrad v AM Community Credit Union,190 Posner J 
too rejected the possibility for performances to be copyrighted or copyrightable, 
directly quoting the Constitution.191  
In 1986, the seventh circuit explained that the impact of the legislative intent a little 
further by noting that if voted laws have to be respected, failed attempts to amend 
them should not be taken into consideration in any way, in Baltimore Orioles v Major 
League Baseball Association.192 After taking a rather tortuous logical pathway, the 
Court concluded that performances were not copyrightable per se.193 In the case, 
Eschbach J had first noted that even though the Congress rejected the proposition of 
the ‘Sound Recording Performance Rights Amendments’194 to grant performances 
copyright protection, this missed attempt is no indication that performances are not 
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copyrightable.195 Indeed, to judge to this issue, the Court must examine the positive 
expression of legislative intent as expressed in the law, and enforced at the time of 
the dispute. Therefore, the bench turned to the provisions of Title 17 of the US Code 
and reached the conclusion that performances could not be copyrighted because 
they failed the fixation requirement. When fixed, Eshbach J stated that the 
performance fell under the scope of the copyright of their records since “there is no 
distinction between the performance and the recording of the performance”.196 
Consequently, although there is no positive exclusion of performances from the 
scope of copyright protection, the careful application of its various requirements and 
principles rule them out as distinct copyright material.  
In Garcia v Google,197 Smith J’s based his dissenting opinion on the Congress’s 
implied but express intent not to include performances in the category of protectable 
works. He reminds the majority that:  
[The Act] differentiates a work from the performance of it. It defines “perform a 
‘work’” to mean “to recite, render, play, dance or act it”. Given this provision, it 
is difficult to understand how Congress intended to extend copyright 
protection to this acting performance. While Congress distinguishes the 
performance from the work itself, the majority blurs this line. Its position 
contemplates something very different from amalgamating independently 
copyrightable interests into a derivative work.198 
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Legislative intentions were too the crux of the saga of jurisprudence199 dividing 
British courts on the existence of a civil cause for action deriving from the criminal 
dispositions prohibiting the bootlegging of recorded performances.200 In Musical 
Performers' Protection Association v British International Pictures,201 Apple Corps v 
Lingasong202 and RCA. Corporation v Pollard203 the Courts were adamant that the 
law ought to be interpreted stricto sensu so as to respect the Parliament’s repeated 
refusal204 to introduce civil remedies for performers or their recording companies. In 
the first case, McCardie J reinforced such position stating that “[n]owhere in the 
[1925 Musical and Dramatic Performers’ Act is there] any indication of an intention to 
give the performers any “right of property” in the performance of works”.205 
Concurring with this interpretation of the law, Megarry J held in the second case that 
“there was no civil remedy under the [1925] Act and the omission of any reference to 
a civil action in the 1963 [Performers’ Protection] Act indicated that the intention of 
Parliament was that the sole protection under the Acts was to be afforded by criminal 
prosecution”.206  
Not dissimilarly, in France, the courts frequently reaffirm that neither parties nor 
judges have the authority to attribute authorship, only the law does, and by extension 
the Parliament. As a result, collaborators cannot attribute themselves authorship of a 
work if they have not met the requirements set by the law in the first place. Following 
the same principle, the ownership of the work can only be transferred by whoever is 
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legally regarded as its author. Consequently, performers could be assigned by 
contract the ownership of a work but could never be made author by way of 
agreement.207 Nevertheless, the role of the courts in the construction of the 
performers’ protection when no legislative actions was taken, painted the French 
bench as sympathetic to the cause of performers, as well as eager to re-shape the 
author-performer divide whenever the circumstances requested it. This point is 
further discussed in subsequent developments.208 
 
B. An untenable divide 
The divide is less easily followed in practice. This often put the judge in the position 
of deciding what pertains to authoring or performing,209 drawing thereby a somewhat 
artificial line between collaborating artists. 
1. Artificial lines 
 
In the UK, Hadley v Kemp210 presents itself as the landmark case on the matter. No 
clearer boundaries could have been drawn by the courts when distinguishing 
between copyrightable and non-copyrightable inputs as the one instated by Park J. 
He adjudicated that the contributions of a musician “however significant and skilful 
[…] need to be to the creation of the musical works, not to the performance or 
interpretation of them”.211 The judge proceeded to explain that:  
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[T]there is a vital distinction between composition or creation of a musical 
work on the one hand and performance or interpretation of it on the other. The 
[expert witness’s] evidence frequently stressed this point. It is certainly true 
that the members of the band sang or played in their own ways (and, in so far 
as I am able to judge, did so excellently). But these are matters of 
performance, not matters which go to the creation of a new musical work.212  
 
Here, the Court positioned itself in line with the narratives expressed through the 
British regulatory framework since the introduction of performers’ protection in 1925 
by giving the author-performer divide a practical dimension. Until then, the divide 
remained theoretical and a mere implicit suggestion from policy-makers.213  
The same ‘divide-compliant’ principle was later followed by Williamson J in 
Bamgboye v Reed,214 when she reinforced that “the contribution must be to the 
creation of the musical work, not to its performance or interpretation”. Similarly, 
Coffey v Warner Chappell Music215 also concluded that vocal performances could 
not be taken for copyrightable musical performances as their contributions are the 
fruit of interpretation rather than creation. In her singing, the performer had identified 
three elements of her input in the musical work she claims had been infringed: the 
‘voice expression’, the ‘timbre’ and the ‘syncopation of or around words’.216 All three 
of them were considered to “appertain to interpretation or performance 
characteristics by the performer […] rather than to composition” which is the 
“legitimate subject of copyright protection”.217 Therefore, unlike musical works, 
musical performances are free to be copied.218 The opposition found in legislators’ 
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commentaries between creation and interpretation as mutually exclusive concepts219 
clearly resonates in the narrative produced by the courts.220  
The American judicial narrative does not appear to have been as prone to engage 
with the dichotomy opposing creation and interpretation as much as British courts 
have.221 This rationale was never expressed by American judges in the context of a 
dispute involving performing artists, as far as the cases envisaged by this qualitative 
analysis are concerned.222 However, in a case related to glass blowing sculpting 
techniques, the seventh circuit did find itself drawing parallels between the parties’ 
creative venture and the collaboration between authors and performers to strengthen 
its reasoning.223 The dispute concerned two sculptors, one having drawn a design 
with elements to be executed by the second, a glass-blowing expert. The expert later 
claimed that he was the joint-author of the sculpture for the elements he had created 
from the design. He contended that the “change of form – here from drawing to glass 
– create[d] intellectual property rights”224 in the finished piece. Commenting on this 
argument, the judge responded rather vividly that the “[d]efendants may as well say 
that the typesetter owns a book’s copyright or that the members of an orchestra who 
play a composition using their own interpretations of the scores become the music’s 
                                                          
219
 Jolibois Report No 350 (n 37) 23-4, 29; Brussels Conference Document (n 34) 309. This opposition is further 
discussed in Chapter 3, text to note 223. 
220
 See for more example in the British jurisprudence: Beckingham v Hodgens [2002] All ER (D) para 4; 
Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins [2005] EWCA Civ 565, para 42. 
221
 According to the author’s qualitative analysis. 
222
 The case Newton v Diamond does envisage the difference between the creativity lying in the composition in 
opposition to the one lying in the composition but the case does not oppose the two, in fact it surprisingly sides 
with the argument that the interpretation is more creative than the composition. See, Newton v Diamond, 349 F 
3d 591 (9th Cir 2003) further discussed in text to note 253. 
223
 Neri v Monroe, 726 F3d 989 (7th Cir 2013). 
224
 ibid, 992. 
117 
 
authors”.225 The role and input of the performer is clearly undermined by this 
comparison with penmanship being opposed to authorship.226  
That is not to suggest that American courts have not performed the author-performer 
divide, but that circuit judges have referred to other justifications than the 
creation/interpretation dichotomy to ground their position. As if the judges of the ninth 
circuit were stating the obvious in Midler v Ford,227 the American court rejected 
performances’ protection against copyright infringement without going into the 
expense of sharing the reasoning behind its conclusion. Treating the author-
performer divide as a given which does not require justifications beside an earlier 
reference to the freedom of speech, the judges stated that:  
Moreover, federal copyright law preempts [sic] much of the area. Mere 
imitation of a recorded performance would not constitute a copyright 
infringement even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate 
another's performance as exactly as possible. It is in the context of these First 
Amendment and federal copyright distinctions that we address the present 
appeal.228  
 
In Smith J’s dissenting opinion, performances are described to fail all the conditions 
of copyright protection. He stated that the [performer] “does not clearly have a 
copyright interest in her acting performance, because her acting performance is not 
a work, she is not an author, and her acting performance is too personal to be 
fixed.”229 Later the same year, in the seventh circuit Posner J confirmed Smith’s 
position but limited his argumentation to performances’ lack of fixation to refuse 
performing artists the benefits of authors’ rights, in the Banana Lady case.230 Finally, 
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the formation en banc of the ninth circuit court sided with Smith J in the 2015 appeal 
of the decision.231 
In France, the divide between authors and performers seems to have gone beyond 
creating a divide to establish a hierarchy placing authors above performers. In 
Lindon v Boussagol,232 the Paris Tribunal held that female performers were not 
allowed to perform the lead characters of Waiting for Godot as the Irish playwright 
had expressed before his passing that he never wanted women to embody the roles. 
Here the Court accepted the estate’s claim according to which the writer’s eternal 
right of integrity had been breached by the staging of female comedians as Vladimir 
and Estragon. Even though the roles themselves where performed by the two 
actresses in their original gender, without modifying the play nor the stage directions 
left by the Irish playwright, the production was banned from continuing its tour. 
Despite the fact that the actresses’ performances were acclaimed by their peers, the 
integrity of Waiting for Godot, as envisioned by Beckett, was still regarded as having 
been breached. This reveals that the moral right doctrine not only contributes to the 
shaping of the author-performer divide233 but it also establishes a hierarchy between 
the two sets of artists, allowing the former to control the creativity of the latter to the 
extent of dictating who shall or shall not convey their work to the public.234 In this 
case, the performers’ creativity was trumped by the author’s right to control the fruit 
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of his labour. The jurisprudence is in line with the rationale behind authors’ moral 
rights which were introduced to curb performative practices taking what was 
considered as too much liberty with the works artists interpreted on stage.235  
2. Perpetuating power patterns  
 
In drawing such lines between collaborators, the legal narrative seems to have been 
influenced, and in return has reinforced, power struggles236 occurring in the working 
relationship shared by authors, directors and performers.237 This had the perverse 
effect of relaying through legal channels negative power patterns scholars as well as 
practitioners of theatre, performance and music studies attempt to abolish or at least 
recalibrate.238 
This phenomenon manifested itself very clearly in Erikson v Trinity Theatre.239 In this 
decision, the judges relied on what status parties felt they were holding, and what 
input they believed they had as evidentiary elements to deny their contribution in the 
work as authors. The court notably referred to the parties’ social status to evidence 
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their absence of intent to co-author the plays at stake in the dispute.240 It was held 
that:  
The actors did not consider themselves to be joint authors with Ms. Erickson, 
and there is no evidence that Ms. Erickson considered the actors as co-
authors of the script. Because Trinity cannot establish the requisite intent for 
Much Ado or Prairie Voices, the actors cannot be considered joint authors for 
the purposes of copyright protection.241 
 
Less explicitly, the same phenomenon occurred in Hadley v Kemp242 as the judge 
took into consideration the social position of the lead singer, Gary Kemp, within his 
group to determine his sole authorship on most of the musical works at stake in the 
dispute. From the start of the decision, the judge established that:  
The case is about the income which flowed to him (or more exactly to his 
company, Reformation) by virtue of his having been the composer. So far as 
public perception was concerned the band did not have a leader, but internally 
Gary Kemp was the most influential member.243 
 
The Paris Court of Appeal appears to have been affected by the bias of similar social 
influences in the Cocteau case of 1960.244 A dispute regarding the rights over the 
ballet ‘Le Jeune Homme et la Mort’ rose between Roger Eudes and Jean Cocteau. 
The ballet had been written by Cocteau and choreographed by Rolland Petit under 
the writer’s supervision. Eudes claimed that he was co-author of the ballet, being the 
artistic director of ‘ballets des Champs Elysées’ which collaborated in the production 
of the piece.  
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The bench agreed with the conclusions of the General Advocate who began his 
argumentation by recognising the collaborative nature of ballets, often leading to co-
authorships, yet concluded in favour of conferring all rights to Cocteau. He explained 
that:  
Granted, ballets can be, and generally are, collaborative works. However, in 
this case, except for the musical composition, Jean Cocteau appears to be 
the sole author. His universal genius in literature and arts (and notably in 
theatre, cinema and choreography to only name a few) allowed for this rather 
exceptional tour de force to occur.245 
 
Impressed by the talents and career of the famous French writer, the General 
Advocate argued for his sole authorship, which included the choreographic work. His 
reasoning was partly based on the choreographer’s deference to Cocteau:  
If there was to be an owner of the choreography, it would be Mr Roland Petit, 
and not Mr Eudes [the plaintiff]. But Mr Roland Petit has not claimed anything 
and rightly so, he very correctly realised that his role was one of a technical 
consultant, Jean Cocteau had selected him specifically for his ability to listen 
and translate his [Cocteau’s] work in the language of dance.246 
 
If this case remains an exception in the French jurisprudence on joint and co-
authorship, both Erickson v Trinity Theatre247 and Hadley v Kemp248 have been 
referred to as authorities249 on this particular point, continuing in the legal narrative 
the bias on which they are based. 
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The discretion of judges in interpreting the divide and repeating undesirable power 
struggles is reinforced by the fact that the finding of authorship is considered to be a 
point of fact and not of law, in both civil250 and common law jurisdictions.251 This 
rather small detail bears significant consequences on the outcome of cases because 
it makes its finding ineligible for appeal before higher courts, depending on domestic 
procedural rules.  
3. Blurred lines 
 
The Courts appear to have faithfully followed the author-performer divide as drawn 
by their respective statutory framework. Their doing so has not always resulted in 
desirable outcomes. The performance of such divide led to reaching complicated 
decisions252 with convoluted reasoning in order to maintain a semblance of 
legitimacy.  
Newton v Diamond253 is a good illustration of this issue. James Newton is a flute jazz 
performer whose recorded performance had been incorporated by way of musical 
sampling into a derivative work composed by the Beastie Boys. Newton had 
composed the musical work he interpreted on the record. The Beastie Boys had 
obtained Newton’s authorisation to use his performance, but the latter argued that he 
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had never transferred the copyright he held in the composition so much so that its 
sampling infringed those rights. Both the district and the appeal courts held that what 
made the record valuable was the performance of the composition but not the 
composition itself because it was too basic a succession of chords. They concluded 
that the composition was not copyrightable and that only the performance was 
covered with intellectual property rights. In the same manner Park J heavily relied on 
expert opinions to litigate the dispute before him in Hadley v Kemp,254 the American 
judges based their decision on the various, sometimes contradicting, musicologists’ 
testimonies to come to the conclusion that:  
In filtering out the unique performance elements from consideration, and 
separating them from those found in the composition, we find substantial 
assistance in the testimony of Newton's own experts. His experts reveal the 
extent to which the sound recording of "Choir" is the product of Newton's 
highly developed performance techniques, rather than the result of a generic 
rendition of the composition.255 
There not being any copyright in the composition, the flautist could not stop the 
sampling of his record because he had already licensed his rights in the 
performance. Therefore, Newton found himself having assigned the most valuable 
element of his creation, his performance, without being of aware of it. In light the 
provisions of the Copyright Act256 and the case law which has consistently rejected 
the possibility for performers to copyright their performances, the flautist had 
probably made the reasonable assumption that his interests were better protected by 
retaining the rights as author rather than as performer. Unlike many performing 
artists, Newton was in the more advantageous position of being the composer of his 
own performance, a rare opportunity where performers can cumulate both authors’ 
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and performers’ rights. Little did he know that what he assumed would be his most 
valuable asset, the copyright in his composition, would be judged worthless by the 
courts and that his real asset lied in his performer’s right. Although the decision is to 
be welcome for its acknowledgement of performers’ creativity, its outcome is 
contestable to the extent that it worsened the legal condition of author-performer who 
thought it wise to licence their copyright rather than their performers’ right according 
to previous authorities. The majority decision in the Newton case257 achieves the 
rather paradoxical feat of erasing the author-performer divide by favouring the 
protection of performance without serving the performer’s interests.  
In his dissenting opinion, Graber J held that the court was mistaken in concluding 
that the performance was not the rendition of an original musical composition, and 
he reinforced the compositional input in the performances. In doing so, he 
challenges the majority’s reading of the musicologists’ testimonies:  
The majority is simply mistaken in its assertion that Newton's experts did not 
present evidence of the qualitative value of the compositional elements of the 
sampled material sufficient to survive summary judgment. The majority is 
similarly mistaken when it says that Newton's experts failed to distinguish 
between the sound recording and the composition. To the contrary, Newton 
presented considerable expert evidence that the composition alone is 
distinctive and recognizable. […] [One of the expert witnesses] concludes that 
the score clearly indicates that the performer will simultaneously sing and 
finger specific pitches, gives a sense of the rhythm of the piece, and also 
provides the general structure of this section of the piece. Hence, in my 
opinion, the digital sample of the performance ... is clearly a realization of the 
musical score filed with the copyright office.258 
 
Because of this disjointed reading of the law and of musicologists’ opinions, the 
jazzman’s cause would have been better protected if the court had sided with a more 
conservative approach to copyright, as per Graber J’s dissenting opinion.  
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C. Judicial dissidence  
As suggested in the Newton case,259 the Courts came to pierce the veil dropped by 
the copyright framework between authors and performers.  
1. Revisiting the French revolution 
 
In France, the protection of performers was a construction of the jurisprudence which 
preceded the intervention of the government in 1985. As early as 1937,260 the 
French judicature acknowledged the need for performers to be granted protection 
even though they were not eligible to authorial prerogatives. The Seine Tribunal 
stated that: 
Considering that, indeed, even though dramatic or cinematographic cannot 
generally speaking benefit from a right over the dramatic work or film as a 
whole, apart from some exceptions, it seems fair however to grant them, as 
one would for any other artists, painters, sculptors, engravers or architects, a 
‘right’ over their personal creations, i.e. in this case, over their interpretation of 
the parts they are given which forms the sole embodiment of their art, 
perceptible by the sense or published261 
 
This decision envisaged a full harmonisation of the regime protecting authors and 
performers. It carried on explaining that performances could only be eligible to 
protection if they met the conditions of “personality” and “originality”.262 The judge 
supported the view that performances were indeed to be considered as ‘creations’ 
and pointed to the practice of performers’ names featuring in films’ credits as 
evidence that a manifestation of this implicit right already existed.263 However, the 
same year, the same tribunal refused to extend such protections to sound 
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synchronisers, rejecting the analogy between authors and performers.264 The Court 
of Cassation reaffirmed the jurisprudential construction of performers’ rights in 
France in the Furtwängler case after a series of hesitant decisions swinging between 
civil remedies and intellectual property principles.265 Although the case did not 
expressly repeal the author-performer divide, it asserted the merit of performing 
artists in obtaining the same rights as authors, reaching thereby the same de facto 
outcome. Throughout the subsequent decades, the jurisprudence of the following 
decades continued building up performers’ protection without clearly identifying the 
source of such rights. In this norme-creating process, judges borrowed principles 
pertinent to civil, intellectual property and employment laws.266 
It is only later that the veil separating performers from authors was effectively lifted 
by the French courts. In the Sorbelli case,267 the artist-performer Sorbelli was 
awarded the co-authorship of the record of his performance. The artist’s 
interpretation was materialised in photographs taken by Yoshida. The photographer 
took pictures of Sorbelli “performing” in front of the Mona Lisa in the Louvres 
museum in Paris. His interpretation consisted in posing dressed as a prostitute by 
the famous painting. Yoshida later exhibited and then sold the photographs. 
Claiming co-authorship over the photographic works before the Paris Tribunal, 
Sorbelli lost his case in the first instance on the basis that the photographs could not 
evidence the performers’ input in the work. The decision was overturned by the 
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Court of Appeal who agreed with the artist’s contention that his role had not been 
that of a passive model. The Court held that “the facts presented before us reveal 
that M. Sorbelli was not just a subject photographed by Miss Yoshida, passive 
subject which would have taken poses dictated by the photographer, but was an 
active subject”.268 The bench carried on explaining that it was “upon Sorbelli’s 
initiative and because of the existence of his creation that the photographer had 
captured elements of his creation since the shooting consisting photographing his 
portrait ‘in situation’”.269 Nevertheless, the Court did not regard the photographs as 
being the sole fruit of the performers’ input so much so that co-authorship was 
granted to each artist in lieu of sole authorship to the performer.270  
 
Improvising performers were natural candidates to copyright protection as French 
intellectual property law does not enforce a fixation condition to obtain authors’ 
rights.271 In 1995, the Court of Cassation confirmed that the jazz performer whose 
performances had been incorporated into the record of a song was the author of his 
musical performance.272 The bench held so despite the fact that the performer had 
been given the structure of the song within which he was expected to improvise his 
solo. Additionally, the musician had received the directive to execute his solo “in the 
style of Louis Armstrong”.273 Nevertheless, the improvised rendition of these 
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instructions was regarded as personal and original, a position confirmed two years 
later by the Paris Court of Appeal274 who adjudged that:  
[u]pon the consideration of the expert-witness’s report […] [the performer] 
Pierre Dutour must receive the status of author of an original personal 
creation, protectable and bearing the mark of his originality as well as of his 
own style275 
 
Performers can thus be considered as authors in the context of their performing 
practice, and the reverse is also true: authors can be regarded as performers during 
the composing process. In 2006, the Court of Appeal granted the status of performer 
to the composer who had created his works on computerised instruments and acted 
as artistic director whenever involved in acoustic recording sessions.276 In this case, 
the television producer ‘France 2’ had used original musical works co-composed by 
Philip Chany in the production of various shows, including jingles he had been 
commissioned to create for different television programs. If France 2 did not 
challenge his co-authorship of the listed works, the television production denied his 
status as performer since his compositions were created and simultaneously 
performed on a computer. The production company contended that the various 
musical compositions “were produced via the use of computer software so much so 
that no interpretation occurred, the choice of sounds and of their characteristics were 
generated at the click of a mouse, whereas, […] a performing musician in the 
meaning of Article L 212-1 of the Intellectual Property Code, can only be understood 
as the person who performs or plays musical scores using an musical instrument of 
any sort and cannot be a person who limited his contribution to giving instructions to 
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a computer for it process pre-recorded audio data.”277 In its response, the French 
Court blurred the lines between the compositional, performing and supervisory inputs 
of the musician. The judges regarded the artist as both author and performer even 
though his performance did not involve traditional instruments and might have been 
was closer to the work of conductor than that of an instrument player: 
Philippe Chany contends that, like any other composer-performer of his 
generation who writes for the television market, he is both the author of his 
music, the craftsman of their interpretations which he supervise both as 
orchestra conductor and performing musician as he plays on various 
instruments (keyboards) and synthesizer 
One cannot dismiss, a priori, the input of computer technologies neither in the 
field of creation as nor of performance, so much so that […] it appears that 
compositions were made out of pre-existing musical material the elaboration 
of a sophisticated structure by the composer, structure the latter had 
musicians played under his direction, whenever he did not do so himself. In 
any case, no matter how advanced the computer may be, it cannot replace 
the composer’s creative musical thought as it only brings a technical support 
to the works of the mind placed under the sole control of the composer, 
performing musician and artistic director throughout their making process. 278 
 
2. An environment open to original interpretations  
This softening the author-performer divide was facilitated by various parameters of 
French intellectual property law. First, it was eased by the open-ended approach to 
copyrightable material the Intellectual Property Code adopted.279 Although the same 
code provides a list of protectable works, the latter is non-exhaustive and serves as 
mere guidance for the courts.280 This approach coupled with the absence of fixation 
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requirement281 allowed judges to consider performances as authorial works so long 
that the imprint of the performer’s, now author’s, personality marked her work.  
Second, the courts could rely on other dispositions pertinent to performers’ rights so 
that their re-interpretation of the author-performer divide would be limited to a small 
group of performing artists thereby avoiding any ‘floodgate’ phenomenon.282 Indeed, 
in France the legislator differentiates between three types of performing artists: 
‘artistes-interprètes’ (performers), ‘artistes de complément’ (auxiliary performers) and 
‘mannequins’ (models). All of those artists are granted a protection stemming from 
the French Employment Law Code.283 The Code provides that performing artists, 
whether full-fledged performers, auxiliary or model are presumed to be employees 
whenever they sign a contract with a producer, entrepreneur, or agency.284 The 
performance of the contract, notably its conditions of remuneration, will be governed 
by employment laws which tend to be more protective of working individuals than 
contract law or intellectual property dispositions. Although performers are here 
assimilated to employees, the Code preserves the specificities of their position as 
artists. Because they cannot be regarded as traditional employees, the law reaffirms 
that performing artists retain their creative freedom in the exercise of their art despite 
their status of employees.285 
For models, employment law-oriented rights are the only protective mechanisms 
available to them. They receive the weaker form of protection since their input is 
seen as the most residual one of all, being constrained to the lending of one’s image 
                                                          
281
 IPC, Art L 112-1. See also, text to note 126. 
282
 On this, see text to note 39.  
283
 Employment Law Code, Art 762-1 and L 7121-3 (Code du travail).  
284
 ibid. 
285
 Employment Law Code, Art L 7123-4 (performing artists), Art L 7121-4 (models). 
131 
 
and the representations of products, situations or marketing messages.286 The 
Employment Law Code defines models as to any individual who ‘is charged of (1) 
other presenting to the public, directly or indirectly by way of reproduction of his/her 
image on any visual or audio-visual medium, a product, a service or an advertising 
message; (2) or of posing as model, with or without later use of his/her image’.287 
The regime of models also includes provisions regulating the relationship of artists 
with their agencies. One may legitimately wonder if the recent confirmation of fashion 
show as copyrightable works by the European Court of Human Rights, will lead 
French judges to consider models involved in runway walks as performers or 
auxiliary performers.288 To this date, there is no decision hinting towards this 
position.  
Similarly, auxiliary performers only benefit from the legal regime derived from the 
Employment Law Code.289 Intellectual property laws have explicitly excluded them 
from performers’ rights or any other rights within the scope of the IPC. This category 
of performing artists is not defined by any statutory definitions despite its mention in 
two different areas of law. By default, the IPC defines auxiliary performers as the 
performing artists not regarded as ‘regular’ performers (artistes-interprètes) by the 
dispositions of Article L 212-1.290 This article refers to professional conventions and 
usages to determine the distinction between performers and auxiliary performers so 
that each field, id est theatre, cinema, music and so forth, may benefit, and may 
tailor the law to their needs and traditions. This solution offers great flexibility and 
shows a welcome sense of pragmatism, yet it assumed that each field had concrete 
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and accurate definitions for what constituted a performer and what did not. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case at the time of the reform and still is not now.291 
As a result, the courts were left in charge of drawing the line between performers 
and auxiliary performers whenever those professional conventions fell short of 
providing the necessary guidance.292  
Judges relied on various professional conventions and reports in this task. The 
national collective convention applicable to performers involved in television 
productions,293 later extended to artists partaking in audio-visual productions in 
general,294 considered that the category of auxiliary performers included “artists who 
collectively recite or sing a text, extras (individuals who for staging purposes have to 
come back in camera range), [...] lighting stand-ins”.295 The 1985 Jolibois Report 
refered to a declaration of the minister of culture who, at the time, explained that the 
notions of auxiliary artists (artistes de complément) and extras had merged to 
become one in the fields of theatre and cinema.296 The Minister proceeded to explain 
that any parts involving the roles of less than thirteen lines would qualify as the part 
of an auxiliary performer.297 In the same report, auxiliary performers were described 
as those “artists whose part has an anonymous nature because they are ‘lost in the 
crowd’ and their role is quite secondary”.298  
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Working from this basis, the French judicature identified three main elements to take 
into consideration when examining the auxiliary nature of a performance. First, the 
importance of the part may suggest whether the artist is a performer or an auxiliary 
performer. If interpreting a supporting act does not necessary deprive the artist of her 
status as performer,299 bit players and extras will be considered as auxiliary artists. 
Second, judges took into account the inter-exchangeability of the performer and the 
anonymity of her performance.300 This element is linked to the third factor which 
concerns the amount of personality, or personal input, injected by the artist in her 
performances. The following paragraph further details this last point.  
 The definition of performers (artistes-interprètes), sole recipients of intellectual 
property rights, is closely linked to the understanding of auxiliary performers. As 
mentioned in previous developments,301 the IPC vaguely defines performers as the 
performing or executing artist “who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in or otherwise 
perform literary or artistic works, variety, circus or puppet acts” to the exclusion of 
auxiliary performers.302 In this category was included lyrical, dramatic, choreographic 
artists, artists involved in variety shows, musicians, cabaret performers, orchestra 
conductors, directing conductors and staging artistic directors by the Employment 
Law Code.303 As far as intellectual property provisions are concerned, the courts 
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considered that any interpretations which were original for they evidenced the input 
of their artists’ personality qualified as the work of performers (artistes-interprètes). 
Performers (artistes-interprètes) is thus the only category out of the three set out by 
the law to receive performers’ rights in addition to the protection rising from 
employment-law measures.  
The jurisprudence later came to allow a portion of artists belonging to this last 
category to access authorship, creating thereby a fourth class of performing artists. 
The categorisation would now read as follows: author-performer, performer (‘artistes-
interprètes’), auxiliary performer (‘artistes de complément’) and models. The 
existence of four and not three groups of performers remains unclear because the 
jurisprudence relied on the same criterion (i.e. the imprint of personality) to justify the 
upgrade of artists from performers (artistes-interprètes) to authors, it used to 
differentiate between performers (artistes-interprètes) and auxiliary performers 
(artistes de complement). This begs the question whether the category of performers 
(artistes-interprètes) still exists, and if so which artists or performances would qualify 
for this residual category that is more than auxiliary but less than authorial. Indeed, if 
an auxiliary artists makes an original interpretation of her role by injecting her 
personality insomuch that she turns into a ‘regular’ performer, and that a performer 
who makes an original rendition of a work by injecting here again elements of her 
personality becomes an author protected by copyright, the distinction between 
‘performers’ and ‘author-performer’ becomes difficult to grasp. The two categories 
collapse as the originality tests distinguishing performers from auxiliary performers, 
and authors from performers are essentially the same: evidencing the artist’s print of 
personality in the performance. Does it mean that all performers (artistes-interprètes) 
are authors so long that they cannot be considered auxiliary? Is there a portion of 
135 
 
performing artists which could satisfy the first originality test separating performers 
from auxiliary but yet fail the second one distinguishing between performers and 
author-performer? Those interrogations remain unanswered by either the French 
legislator or the courts. It is unclear whether the problem has been noticed at all.304 
3. British rebellion 
 
British Courts also showed some resistance against the Parliament’s consistent 
refusal to improve performers’ protection. It started with allowing civil actions to be 
taken by performers or their recording companies on the basis of the criminal 
dispositions of the Musical and Dramatic Performers Acts.305 As mentioned in 
previous paragraphs,306 although a number of courts rejected this enlargement of the 
law protecting performers, a majority of judicial decisions in its favour preceded the 
reform introduced by the 1988 CDPA.307  
Going further in developing performers’ protection, judges also came to acknowledge 
that particular creative practices, such as jamming sessions, might lead to redefining 
the author-performer divide to the extent of granting copyright to performers’ 
contribution. In Stuart v Barrett,308 the Court concluded, not without difficulty,309 that:  
Whilst the first defendant may well have composed 'bits and pieces' of the 
music before revealing what he had done, the group themselves played a 
significant and creative role in bringing the music of a song to its final form. 
The first defendant did not orchestrate his pieces; he did not write the notes 
down. Whilst he may have had the original idea, in the sense of an opening 
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phrase or of a series of notes in his head which ultimately provided the theme, 
the other members of the group themselves made important original 
contributions to the work.310  
 
In this decision, Morison J attributes this outcome to the fact that the works were 
composed during jamming sessions, which she describes as follow:  
Someone started to play and the rest joined in and improvised and improved 
the original idea. The final piece was indeed the product of the joint 
compositional skills of the members of the group present at the time.311 
Torry v Pink Floyd312 might be the British case which upsets the divide the most. In 
this case, the High Court sided with Clare Torry, the singer, in her claim of co-
authorship over the Pink Floyds’ song ‘The Great Gig in the Sky’, a claim filed thirty-
one years after it was recorded. Torry argued that her vocal technique of ‘wailing’ 
contributed to the original composition of the song, to which the judge agreed 
granting the singer half of the rights over the former hit.313  
4. An American echo 
 
A similar position was held recently in the American case Garcia v Google.314 In this 
decision, Kozinski J affirmed without detour that performances are eligible to 
copyright protection. He ruled out previous authorities on this issue, such as Midler v 
Ford,315 on the basis that those cases were never concerned with copyright but with 
rights of publicity, not attached to performances but to the bodily elements involved 
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in them, such as a singer’s voice.316 The ninth circuit judge found the actress’s 
performance original in the basis that:  
[A]n actor does far more than speak words on a page; he must live his part 
inwardly, and then ... give to his experience an external embodiment. That 
embodiment includes body language, facial expression and reactions to other 
actors and elements of a scene. Otherwise, every shmuck is an actor 
because everyone knows how to read.317  
The majority decision therefore concludes that “[a]n actor's performance, when fixed, 
is copyrightable”.318  
It must be noted that nearly forty years before the majority decision of the Garcia 
case, a judge from the second circuit had reached the same conclusion in his 
dissenting opinion.319 Though not referenced in the recent decision, Hand J too, 
sided with the argument that recording technologies had made possible the fixation 
of performers’ creative input in the musical record so much so that there was no 
obstacle barring them from obtaining copyright protection and its associated 
authorial status. Kozinski’s predecessor referred to the skills it requires to perform 
even when there are scores available to the performer. He stated:  
Musical notes are composed of a "fundamental note" with harmonics and 
overtones which do not appear on the score. There may indeed be 
instruments — e. g. percussive — which do not allow any latitude, though I 
doubt even that; but in the vast number of renditions, the performer has a 
wide choice, depending upon his gifts, and this makes his rendition pro tanto 
quite as original a "composition" as an "arrangement" or "adaptation" of the 
score itself, which § 1(b) makes copyrightable. Now that it has become 
possible to capture these contributions of the individual performer upon a 
physical object that can be made to reproduce them, there should be no doubt 
that this is within the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.320 
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The facts and outcomes of the Garcia case strikingly resemble those of a previous 
case heard by the Seine Tribunal in France fifty years before the 2014 decision.321 
This earlier case was also concerned with the dubbing of cinematographic 
interpretations not performed by the actor featuring on screen and added ex post 
facto. In the French decision, the comedian had complained that another actor had 
been hired to dub over his silent performance. In Garcia,322 the actress also 
complained about her performance being dubbed over by somebody else’s voice but 
was motivated by considerations going beyond professional or aesthetic concerns. 
Without her knowledge or consent, Garcia’s performance had been made part of the 
production of an anti-islamic video clip entitled the ‘Innocence of Muslims’. Following 
its online distribution, a fatwa323 calling for the execution of the performer was issued 
by members of the Islamic cleric. Regardless of this difference the two decisions 
remain strikingly similar as far as facts, law and legal context are concerned. Indeed, 
both cases were amongst the first judicial decisions of their respective jurisdiction to 
make an explicit connection between authors and performers to the extent of granted 
the latter the rights traditionally attributed to the former.  
Despite the resonance of the Garcia case with earlier dissenting opinions and 
judgements form other jurisdictions, the decision remains a small pocket of 
dissidence in the sea of consensus formed by other authorities which are still 
inclined to maintain the author-performer divide. Shortly after the publication of the 
decision, Posner J in a neighbour circuit decided against the Garcia case in Conrad 
v AM Credit Union.324 Although the latter decision did not formally repeal the former, 
                                                          
321
 Trib Seine, 23 avril 1937, Rigault dit Marnay c. Chaperot et Copelier : Le Droit d’Auteur, No 11 p 129. 
322
 Garcia v Google Inc, 743 F 3d 1258 (9th Cir 2014). 
323
 Opinion on a point of Islamic law. 
324
 Conrad v AM Community Credit Union, 750 F3d 634 (7th Cir 2014). Interestingly the same happened in 
France with the Seine Tribunal. See, Trib Seine, 9 novembre 1937, Marcilly et Union des artistes dramatiques 
139 
 
it evidences that Kozinski’s views on the creativity of performers are not shared by 
the doxa. The decision had been highly criticised for flirting with judicial activism. 325 
As previously mentioned,326 in 2015 the Garcia decision was overturned in appeal, 
though Kozinski J firmly maintained his position in his dissenting opinion.327 
Before the recent intervention of ninth circuit, the US’ Supreme Court had shown 
sympathy for performing artists and granted them a standard of protection nearly 
identical to that of authors by the means of the right of publicity in the Zacchini 
case.328 However, this departure from the Congress’s legislative intent was corrected 
in 1976 by the enactment of the 301 pre-emption provision,329 after which the courts 
faithfully followed their new marching orders.330 
 
The following figures give a graphic representation of the author-performer divide in 
each jurisdiction. They emphasise the difference in its contours as between each 
country.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
c. Gorochoff, Société des artistes associés et Cie Radioélectrique du Poste parisien. : Le droit d’Auteur oct. 
1940, No 10 p 118.  
325
 see n 4 in Introduction for the reaction of the scholarship.  
326
 n 5 in Introduction and accompanying text. 
327
 Garcia v Google Inc, 786 F 3d 733 (9
th
 Cir 2015) 749. 
328
 Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 US 562 (Supreme Court 1977). 
329
 US Code, Title 17 para 301. This amendment of the Code was introduced by the Public Law 94-553, made 
effective as of 1978. See also, ‘Performance Rights in Sound Recordings (95th Congress, 2d Session Committee 
Print No 15)’ (1978) 4 
330
 For example, Sinatra v The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co 435 F2d 711 (9
th
 Cir 1970) 721; Midler v Ford 
1988 849 F2d 460 (9th Cir 1988); Laws v Sony Music Entertainment Inc, 448 F 3d 1134 (9th Cir 2006). 
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Figure 5: The Author-Performer Divide As Enforced in Australia 
 
In Australia, authors receive more protection from intellectual property law than performers do. 
However, as previously mentioned, co-ownership of sound recording for musical performers involved 
in its making has been introduced, slightly twisting the divide between authors and performing artists.  
 
Figure 6: The Author-Performer Divide As Enforced in France 
 
In France, the divide between authors and performing artists has taken a different shape than in other 
jurisdictions. As explained in previous developments, the courts abolished the distinction between 
‘authoring’ and performing artists under certain circumstances. The French legislator and the courts 
have implemented a sophisticated three-tier categorisation of performers, decreasing progressively 
their protection proportionally to the estimated degree of creativity of their input.  
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Figure 7: The Author-Performer Divide As Enforced in the UK 
 
British copyright law enforces a conservative approach to the author-performer divide with an almost 
clear-straight boundary between the two groups of artists. As previously explained, the jurisprudence 
seems to have made an exception in the context of musical performers involved in jamming session, 
whereby those artists may be considered as co-composers of the work they took part in playing.  
 
 
Figure 8: The Author-Performer Divide As Enforced in the US 
 
Like in the UK, the US does not provide copyright protection for performers. There is a slight 
uncertainty as to the possibility for featured musical performers to obtain copyright over the sound 
recording but no clear consensus stems from the jurisprudence on this point.
331
  
                                                          
331
 Weatherhall (n 9) page 193,196. ; see comments made in the context of Australia on this point in Sherman 
and Bently Performers’ Rights (n 177) 25 para [4.10]. 
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III. Contextualising the divide 
 
Laws do not occur in a vacuum and intellectual property laws are no exception.332 
The subsequent developments review some of the major cultural changes which 
may have contributed to shaping the author-performer divide, besides the events 
which occurred in courtrooms, parliamentary chambers and lobbying meetings. 
Although it may not be possible to account for all influences, dominant patterns of 
thinking regarding creativity and authorship may prove useful in contextualising the 
intellectual environment in which legal frameworks were designed. 
Creativity and authorship have a co-dependent relationship in western cultures, 
arising from an interwoven historical path.333 Corresponding legal narratives explicitly 
relayed the correlation between the two concepts. The encouragement of creativity 
was made the rationale motivating the enforcement of intellectual property laws,334 at 
least on paper.335 Legal authorship was then introduced as an instrument to this 
purpose.336 Authorial works became protectable, on the condition of being 
                                                          
332
 Arnold (n 6) 3. 
333
 Rahmatian (n 140) 160. 
334
 Australia: Spicer Report (n 36) 8-9; France: Jolibois Report No 212 (n 4) 9-11. In France the introduction of 
authors’ rights was essentially driven by the wish to protect the authors’ creation, the objectives seemed more 
individualist; UK: 1709 Statute of Ann “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of 
Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned” (8 Ann c.21); 
US: US Constitution, Article I, Section 8; European Union: Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29 of May 
22,2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
[2001] OJ L167 10, Recital (4).  
335
 The Statute of Ann is often described as having been enforced to protect the interests of book traders, see 
Ronan Deazley, ‘Re-Reading Donaldson (1774) in the Twenty-First Century and Why It Matters’ (2003) 25 
European Intellectual Property Review 270.  
336
 See for example, Australia: Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1984) 53 ALR 225, 258; 
Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Commonwealth Bank Of Australia (1992) 111 ALR 671, 674; 
Hamm v Middleton [1999] FCA 0777, (1999) 44 IPR 656,658 ; US: Sony Corporation of America et al v 
Universal City Studios Inc et al , 464 US 417 (Supreme Court 1984) 432; Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F 3d 
811 (9th Cir 2003) 817; Dr Seuss Enterprises, LP v Penguin Books, 109 F 3d 1394 (9th Cir 1997) 1399; Omega 
SA v Costco Wholesale Corp, 541 F3d 982 (9th Cir 2015) 985-7; Rockford Map Publishers Inc v Directory 
Service Co of Colorado Inc, 768 F2d 145(7th Cir 1985) 148; Publications Intern. Ltd v Meredith Corp, 88 F3d 
473 (7th Cir 1996), 477-8; European Union: C-5/08 Infopaq International A S v Danske Dagblades Forening 
[2009] EUECJ C-5/08_O, para 11.  
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‘original’,337 i.e. of expressing a modicum of creativity.338 Intellectual property laws 
made of authorship and creativity, the instruments and conditions underlying each 
other’s existence. Authorship was introduced to support creativity and creativity 
(originality) was to substantiate authorship.  
Courts often acknowledge the close connection between the two concepts, although 
it is usually expressed via the intermediary of ‘originality’. In their logic, “the word 
‘original’ connotes ‘authorship’”339 and their correlation is “an obvious fact” grounded 
in the law itself.340  
The historical development of each concept in western cultures also reflects the 
intrinsic bond which ties the two notions together. The following paragraphs 
succinctly retrace this evolution to draw parallels between cultural and legal 
narratives whenever relevant. This review reveals that the law crystallised various 
                                                          
337
 Australia: 1968 Copyright Act, s. 32(1)-(3); France: IPC, Art. L. 112-4; UK: CDPA 1988, s. 1(1)(a); US: US 
Code, Title 17, para 102(a). 
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 Copyright laws enforce a low threshold of originality. See, Australia: Telstra Corporation Ltd v Desktop 
Marketing Systems Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 0612, (2001) 181 ALR 134,154 (citing British and American 
authorities); France: Cass, 1ère civ, 11 février 1997, n° 95,11.605 : Bull. 1997 I N° 56 p. 36; D. 1998 juris. P 
290; JCP G 1997, II 22973; RIDA 1997 N 173, p. 279 (the work does not have to be novel to be protected by 
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Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co Inc, 499 US 340 (Supreme Court 1991) 345; Wihtol v Wells, 231 F2d 550 
(7th Cir 1956) 553.  
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(the synopsis of TV programs for children failed to evidence originality because they were not “particularly 
imaginative nor the result of a personal creative effort”; author’s translation); Cass, som., 17 mars 2009, Société 
d’importation Leclerc c/ SONODINA, n° 07-21.517: Légifrance available at 
<http://www.legifrance.gouvfr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000020422868> accessed 10 March 2016 
(the court held in this case that although novelty may contribute to make a work original it is nevertheless not 
enough to evidence the author’s print of personality in the work). 
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 Sands And Mcdougall Pty Ltd v Robinson [1917] HCA (unreported BC1700041). 
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 Australia: Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd (2010) 264 ALR 617,625 para [21]; 
Seafolly Pty Ltd v Fewstone Pty Ltd (2014) 106 IPR 85, 120-1 para [239] and [244] ; Issac J stated that “[the 
previous argument] overlooks the obvious fact that in copyright law the two expressions, "author" and "original 
work," have always been correlative; the one connotes the other, and there is no indication in the Act that the 
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Indeed, the circumstance of reciprocal connotation is the key to the meaning of the enactment.” in Sands And 
Mcdougall Pty Ltd v Robinson [1917] HCA (unreported BC1700041); US: Scott v WKJG Inc, 376 F2d 467 (7
th
 
Cir 1967) 469, citing Wihtol v Wells, 231 F2d 550 (7th Cir 1956); 109 U.S.P.Q. 200 (7th Cir 1956). See also, 
Primary Health Care Ltd v Commissioner Of Taxation [2010] FCA 419 (2010) para 35.  
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elements of the developmental stages through which these concepts evolved. This 
analysis does not aim to offer an exhaustive account of the doctrines which framed 
the development of ‘creativity’ and ‘authorship’ in western cultures. Its objective is 
considerably more modest and the historical path taken has been edited to only 
retain periods and milestones which seemed most relevant to intellectual property 
laws. It largely follows the routes signposted by legal and creativity scholars who 
have dedicated parts of their research to similar lines of investigations, namely 
Richard Arnold,341 Andreas Rahmatian342 and Keith Sawyer.343 This analysis also 
ties in the development of ‘creativity’ and ‘authorship’ to the evolution of performers’ 
status within western societies to highlight the parallelism between the roots of our 
understanding of ‘authorship’ and ‘performances’ as mutually exclusive concepts. It 
suggests that the author-performer divide is the product of a sliding scale of creativity 
which began by opposing mankind to God without any particular consideration for 
performers. The following paragraphs describe how such scale changed over time to 
finally settle the partition of its creative/uncreative dichotomy between authors and 
performing artists.  
 
A. From Heaven to Earth 
 
‘Creativity’ has been the centre of many philosophical, theological and scientific 
debates.344 Before leading to the emergence of its own field of research,345 
                                                          
341
 Arnold (n 6). 
342
 Rahmatian (n 140). 
343
 Keith Sawyer, Explaining Creativity The Science of Human Innovation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2012).  
344
 Milton Nahm, ‘The Theological Background of the Theory of the Artist as Creator’ (1947) 8 Journal of the 
History of Ideas 363. 
345
 The field of creativity research is now mainly composed of psychologists, scientists and sociologists. See 
Erik Shiu, Creativity Research : An Inter-Disciplinary and Multi-Disciplinary Research Handbook (Routledge 
2014) 71 ; Sawyer (n 343) 4-5; Kerry Thomas and Janet Chan, Handbook of Research Creativity (Edward Elgar 
2013);  
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‘creativity’ was first a matter of philosophy and religion. Although nowadays creativity 
is often described as the “highest level of human performance”,346 there was a time 
when western cultures thought it inaccessible to human beings.  
Towards the end of the second century, a distinction emerged between creare and 
facere under the influence of the Christian thought.347 Among the different types of 
creative making, creare referred to ‘true creation’, a creation which would occur ex 
nihilo, i.e. out of nothing.348 ‘True creation’ was understood as the making of 
something from dust. Conversely, facere was described as the labour of technical 
skills employed in the making of an object out of already existing elements and 
materials. For centuries, true creation was therefore attributed to God, being the only 
intellect thought able to create ex nihilo.349 Anything that men would ‘do’ or ‘create’ 
would only be an imitation of what the divine had previously conceived and made 
available to them. If men could reach creare, they would be equal to god, an 
untenable contention in the Christian thought.350 In this logic, men were bound to be 
God’s craftsmen and imitate his creation through a lower type of artistic material 
rendering. Since human ‘creare’ was impossible, there could be no authorship 
attributable to men beyond that of god. The first divide was born. 
This conception of creativity, distinguishing between creare and facere, moved away 
from previous or competing models. From the Ancient Greek to the Stoa, earlier 
                                                          
346
 Sawyer (n 343) 3.  
347
 During the second half of the second century, the distinction between creare and facere was articulated by St 
Augustine, see Andreas Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative 
Works (Edward Elgar 2011) 163; Nahm (n 344) 363; Generally, Mitlon Nahm, The Artist as Creator (John 
Hopkins Press 1956); Paul Kristeller, “Creativity” and “Tradition”’ (1983) 44 Journal of the History of Ideas 
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 The doctrine of exnihilo creation played a central part in the development of the western understanding of 
creativity. Its impact on intellectual property narrative is further discussed in Chapter 3. 
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 Sawyer (n 343) 19-23. 
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 Gerard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 1994) 140-1, 160. The Christian position was first articulated by Theophilius of 
Antioch, in opposition to Plato’s conception. See also, Rahmatian (n 140) 162.  
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narratives never envisaged ex nihilo creation as such.351 According to Platonic352 
and Jewish353 thinking, the divine was depicted as having ordered chaotic existing 
matter in order to create a coherent and balanced universe, but not as having 
created it from nothing. 
Disseminated and preached by Christian teachings throughout the second century, 
the ex nihilo creation doctrine formed the base of the western culture and conception 
of authorship.354 It influenced the western history of arts from the Middles Ages to the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, a period during which artists were regarded as 
mere craftsmen rather than creators, and were therefore unable to pretend to 
authorship which could only be divine. This left many artefacts made during this 
period unsigned. 355  
The end of the second century was also witness to a change in the social position of 
performative arts. At the time, performances associated with light entertainment such 
as mime were overshadowed by the development of more literate theatre destined to 
private readings rather than public performances, and written by educated men such 
as Seneca.356 However, this enthusiasm for literate theatre was short-lived as 
Roman drama developed a taste for pantomime and games.357 With lower forms of 
entertainment blossoming, the social status of actors worsened.358 The profession 
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354
 Rahmatian (n 140) 162. 
355
 Sawyer (n 343) 20. 
356
 Even before that, the Roman era is also often depicted as having set back the art of theatre in inherited from 
Ancient Greece by having replaced open-air theatre by more primitive staged entertainment such as gladiating. 
See on this, William Tydeman, The Theatre in the Middle Ages: Western European Stage Conditions (c.800-
1576) (Cambridge University Press 1978) 22-5.  
357
 ibid. For this reason, the period is often held responsible for having set back the quality of western stage 
theatre. 
358
 Richard DeVoe, Christianity and the Roman Games: The Paganization of Christians by Gladiators, 
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became synonymous to poor morality and in the case of female artists, prostitution 
was assumed.359  
The rise of Christianity in the Europe of the third and fourth century fostered 
legislation stigmatising performers360 and forbidding Christians from joining the 
profession.361 The Church adopted a distrust of theatre which was once that of 
Ancient Greek philosophers who feared that mimetic arts such as acting would lead 
performers and audiences to replicate dangerous passions.362 Later, this thought 
evolved into thinking of performing as either sensual363 or simply useless by puritans 
who dreaded idleness.364 Giving in to social pressures,365 the Church came to 
change its position during the tenth century to utilise theatre to preach and teach the 
Christian thought through liturgical drama.366 At this point in time, no artists could 
pretend to authorship regardless of the art they practiced, but performers particularly 
struggled to recover their social status. The scale of creativity was understood as 
follows:  
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Figure 9: Creativity and Authorship from the Second to the Fifteenth Century (AD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the second century onwards, true creativity is sought as an activity exclusively divine. 
 
 
B. From humanism to ‘author-worship’367 
 
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the Renaissance movement triggered the 
decline of this divine conception of creativity which coincided with the rise of secular 
drama. Those changes brought to light a renewed divide between creating and 
authoring. 
1. A humanist turn  
The Enlightenment humanism was the period where the conception of men as 
“intentional creators” broke through.368 Artists moved from being inspired by God to 
being compared to the divine figure.369 George Puttenham is said to be the first 
                                                          
367
 Peter Jaszi, ‘Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?’ (2009) 12 Tulane Journal of Technology and 
Intellectual Property 105, 116.  
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 Sawyer (n 343) 21. 
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 Only the greatest visual artists or poets like Dante, Michelangelo or Leonardo Da Vinci were compared to 
God. See, Rahmatian (n 140) 163. 
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writer to use the word “create” to compare human – poetic – creation to divine 
creation in 1589.370 Artists gained independence and slowly stepped away from the 
representation of being God’s animated puppets.371 The end of the Renaissance 
movement saw the first of claims of authorship, distinct from any divine intervention. 
A new hierarchy of creative minds was endorsed.  
Artists who then became authors in their own right were still very much compared to 
craftsmen.372 The creative process was understood as a blend of skills pertaining to 
both creare and facere types of creativity.373 Both the creative process and the 
creative thought were considered as elements contributing equally to the creation of 
arts. Creativity was thought to be both intellectual and physical.  
The same period reinstated secular performative arts with the development of the 
commedia dell’arte in Italy, the Confrérie de la Passion in France and the 
Elizabethan theatre in England.374 Although performers remained social or religious 
outcasts, the profession of actors and later musicians started to make its way back in 
western societies.  
In the England of the early seventeenth century, performers as group obtained the 
same credit for their performances as writers for their plays on some occasions. For 
instance, it was not unusual for acting companies to feature on the cover of the 
publication of a play with or in lieu of the author.375 This was notably the case for 
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372
 Rahmatian (n 140) 164-5. 
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William Shakespeare and some of his now most famous pieces such as Richard II376 
or Thomas Lord Cromwell.377 At the time, the cover of plays would read “[Richard II] 
as it hath beene publikely acted by the right Honourable the Lord Chamberlaine his 
Servants” without even mentioning the playwright, William Shakespeare (1597).378 A 
little later, in 1602, William Lord Cromwell is published under both the company’s 
and the author’s names, reading:  
[William Lord Cromwell] as it hath been sundrie times pubklikely acted by the 
Right Honorable the Lord Chamberlaine his Servaunts.  
Written by W.S. 379 
It is only after this period that performing companies were dropped from the front 
page cover and that authors were the sole names left on their publications.380 As 
printing developed the position of authors or publishers became more prominent and 
gradually wrote performers’ credits off the plays. This change was endorsed in the 
legal narrative by the 1710 Statute of Ann which ignored performers’ contributions to 
literary works including theatre.381 This shift marked the beginning of a new divide 
which is not dissimilar current patterns382 of our legal frameworks:  
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Figure 10: Creativity and Authorship by the 16th Century 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the 16
th
 century, men are regarded as intentional creators alongside god. At this point, there is 
no clear distinction between the creative artist and craftsman.  
 
2. Embracing intellectual authorship 
During the eighteenth century, artists started to distance themselves from 
craftsmen.383 While intellectuals saw themselves as able to create without technical 
limitations, craftsmen were depicted as less creative because they were entangled 
by the limits of their craft.384 For craftsmen worked from a set range of aesthetical 
tools, conventions and technical skills, their work did not amount to creative 
authorship. This logic opposed the intellectual artists, the author, to the manual 
worker, the craftsman. This demarcation was evidenced by the emergence of the 
notion of “Fine Arts” which brought together music,385 poetry and the visual arts, 
leaving aside mechanical arts.386 By that point, the fine line between creativity worthy 
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of authorship and creation underserving of such title was drawn to exclude craftsmen 
from the class of authors. 
Some have identified the eighteenth century as the period during which the figure of 
the author understood as a solitary intellectual genius emerged.387 At the same time 
one of the first legislative instruments of intellectual property law is enacted in 
England.388 Both the pre-modern and modern models of copyright389 were based on 
the idea that authorial work did not emerge from manual labour but intellectual 
effort.390 Authoring was considered as the ‘labour of the mind’ as opposed to that of 
the body.391 The legal framework refused to confuse authors and craftsmen. Fine 
arts entered the scope of intellectual property law as early as 1714 in France392 and 
1862 in England.393 Craftsmanship on the other hand, had to wait until the 1911 
Copyright Act to be made copyrightable.394  
Contemporary intellectual property frameworks still bear the remnant of this author-
craftsman divide, three centuries later. Craftsmen must satisfy an additional 
condition to be rewarded with rights authors receive, which thereby limits their 
accession to copyright protection.395 Unlike their authorial equivalents, works of 
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craftsmanship must be ‘artistic’ to be copyrighted.396 This additional criterion which is 
not required of other copyrightable items suggests that not all forms of craftsmanship 
are considered worthy of protection, i.e worthy of authorship. The courts delved into 
rather complex aesthetic interrogations themselves in order to enforce the ‘artistic 
craftsmanship’ doctrine in practice.397 Long developments on the question of what 
constitutes an ‘artistic’ piece of craft and what does not have taken place before 
judges,398 leading the Bench to endorse the role of art critic,399 they are otherwise 
reluctant to hold.400 In Australia, the judicature commented that “[t]he law as to what 
is a work of artistic craftsmanship is not in a very satisfactory state”.401 The Act 
leaves it to the courts “to throw light incrementally upon the meaning and operation 
of that statutory expression”402 since the expression of ‘artistic craftsmanship’ 
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knowns no statutory definition.403 In Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International 
Pty Ltd,404 Drummon J lists ten propositions which contributed to defining the 
substance of artistic craftsmanship.405 The judge considered the “intent of the 
creator” as well as the “manifestation of pride in sound workmanship” as elements 
contributing to evidence the artistic quality of the craftsman’s work.406  
Fifteen centuries later, the aesthetic narratives on creativity and authorship appear to 
have circled back to opposing creare to facere, ex nihilo intellectual making to 
manually produced labour. Yet the bar separating the two seems to have dropped 
down another level.407 The distinction no longer opposes divine to mankind but one 
type of human creative activity to another. The same beliefs seem to underlay the 
same divide with the difference that it has now become secular: 
Figure 11: Creativity and Authorship by the 18th Century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 18
th
 century, aesthetic and legal narratives begin to emphasise the work of the intellectual 
artist so much so that craftsmen started to be relegated to the rank of uncreative individuals.  
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3. Re-cycled divide 
What was formerly regarded as godlike is now associated with the artist author 
represented as the genial intellect. Modern judicial narratives which associate 
contemporary legal authorship to the concepts of ‘origination’ seem to confirm that 
the divide has indeed slid from opposing divine to humane, to endorse an equivalent 
profane dichotomy distinguishing between authorship and craftsmanship. The 
modern author is taken for an ‘originator’ borrowing thereby godlike characteristics. 
In Walter v Lane,408 the Court held that: 
In the Oxford English Dictionary an "author" is defined as "the person who 
originates or gives existence to anything:" "an inventor, constructor, or 
founder;" "the composer or writer of a treatise or book." The Copyright Act 
does not define "author," but in a literary statute the Legislature should have 
the credit of being supposed to use words in a literary not a commercial 
sense. 409  
Although the concept of origination was not explicitly linked to authorship in this 
case, the expression got more traction in the judicial narrative of the US and 
Australia than in the UK.410 In the US, the vision of the author as ‘originator’ of the 
work was given constitutional authority by the judicature in Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
Co v Sarony:411 
An author in that sense is "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; 
maker; one who completes a work of science or literature412 
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The definition made precedent and is now prevailing over contemporary cases413 
and landmark decisions on the question of originality.414  
In Australia, the courts merged the British415 and American416 positions to form their 
own doctrine of ‘origination’. To be ‘original’ as per Australian copyright law, the work 
“must originate with the author”.417 The judges refer to the artist’s creative process as 
the ‘process of origination’ without detour.418 Designating the making process of an 
original piece, the judge held that “[t]he trial judge was entitled to find either that the 
drawings were the product of a process of origination”.419  
4. Paroxysm of Romanticism  
As mentioned above, the eighteenth century was identified as the starting point of 
the creation of the romantic author-genius as dominant figure in literature as well as 
the legal narrative.420 This has been the contention of an academic movement which 
developed in 1990s in the North-American intellectual property literature.421 This 
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school of thought is later referred to as the romantic authorship discourse or the 
author-genius critique. 
According to this movement, the author has been idealised as a lonely artist working 
in the solitude of a deteriorating environment, who is solely dedicated to the 
expression of his art. His work would be the fruit of his genius, his intellect would 
have created from nothing. This discourse criticised the copyright framework for 
seeing the author as “man who brings out of nothingness, some child of his thought, 
has rights therein which cannot belong to any other sort of property”.422 In this logic, 
the artist has a special bond with his work for he has ‘fathered it’423 by investing of 
his personality in it, which in turn falsely justified the attribution of exclusive property 
rights in the form of copyright.424  
Building on the work of Barthes425 and Foucault,426 this narrative427 was led by 
Martha Woodmansee428 and Peter Jaszi,429 amongst others.430 Their critique and 
has now rallied to its cause a significant number of scholars in the legal literature.431 
Nevertheless, not all the contentions of the author-genius discourse have reached a 
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consensus in the field.432 Rahmatian, for instance, vividly challenges the critique; in 
particular with regard to its time reference he considers “irritatingly myopic” 433 of the 
aesthetics developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth century.434 He argues that 
the theoretical construction built by the Woodmansee-Jaszi tandem435 would not 
survive a closer study of the history of art and aesthetic of the period they identified 
as being the rise of the romantic author.436  
5. Thinking performances  
Shortly after the author-figure is said to have risen, analyses of the nature of 
performances saw light. In the nineteenth century, Diderot is one of the first 
philosophers to attempt to unravel actors’ performing process.437 Although the art of 
performing had been under study438 since the Ancient Greece,439 the focus of the 
discussion was placed on the impact performances had on the community rather 
than on the relationship tying the performer to the author’s work.440  
According to the French writer, performers are to be regarded as sophisticated 
gymnasts441 or human pasteboards442 who train their bodies to express the work of 
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authors. Their work is assimilated to that of translators, converting the dialogues of a 
page into a live rendition without participating in the construction of the meaning 
conveyed.443 It is clear from his writing that beyond the execution of complicated 
skills,444 the work of performers is not creative because it is limited to channelling the 
author’s work through their body. In this logic, neither a creare nor a facere form of 
creativity takes place. Instead, a third type of artistic activity occurs, somewhere 
below craftsmanship yet above sportsmanship.445  
It is interesting to note that at the same time in France, the meaning of the word 
‘artist’ (artiste) begun to only refer to performers. Before then, the term was used to 
designate both authors (including craftsmen) and performers. From the 1780s 
onwards, the French language ceased to refer to authors as ‘artist-authors’ (artistes-
auteurs) to only be attached to performers, becoming ‘performing artists’ or ‘artist-
performer’ (artistes-interprètes).446 Reaching a linguistic dimension, the author-
performer divide was rooted in deep cultural grounds. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, neither performers nor craftsmen were seen as deserving authorial 
credentials for their work.447 
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C. Accommodating technological revolutions 
 
This situation changed with the industrial revolution which transformed the notions of 
mechanical arts and craftsmanship and narratives framing the arts,448 changes 
shortly followed by the law. Practices born out of industrial techniques, such as 
photography, came to be established art forms.449 The photographer grew from 
being a craftsman to become an artist in his own right. The law followed this 
evolution by extending legal authorship to those craft-oriented practices. In the UK, 
photographs were admitted by the court as copyrightable subject-matter as early as 
1869, even when they reproduced an existing work.450 Similarly, in 1884451 the US 
Supreme Court held that:  
Unless, therefore, photographs can be distinguished in the classification on 
this point from the maps, charts, designs, engravings, etchings, cuts, and 
other prints, it is difficult to see why Congress cannot make them the subject 
of copyright as well as the others452 
The same case also reflects the resistance to regard mechanical techniques as 
original works of authorship: 
[A]n engraving, a painting, a print, does embody the intellectual conception of 
its author, in which there is novelty, invention, originality, and therefore comes 
within the purpose of the Constitution in securing its exclusive use or sale to 
its author, while the photograph is the mere mechanical reproduction of the 
physical features or outlines of some object animate or inanimate, and 
involves no originality of thought or any novelty in the intellectual operation 
connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a picture. […] [T]he process 
is merely mechanical, with no place for novelty, invention or originality. It is 
simply the manual operation, by the use of these instruments and 
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preparations, of transferring to the plate the visible representation of some 
existing object, the accuracy of this representation being its highest merit.453  
 
The Court refused to neither deny nor endorse this description of photography:  
 
This may be true in regard to the ordinary production of a photograph, and, 
further, that in such case a copyright is no protection. On the question as thus 
stated we decide nothing.454 
 
Until the 1985 reform of French intellectual property law,455 copyright laws continued 
to exclude certain types of photographs judged to be lacking artistry. They required 
of photographers to evidence the artistic or documentary quality of their work for it to 
be protectable.456 Those artists had to prove that their work were not the mere result 
of a mechanical action457 where “the situations [they shoot] present themselves to 
[their] camera” and which are “the mere result of chance”.458 This initial defiance 
towards photographs’ originality still transpires in contemporary decisions. French 
courts still refuse to grant protection to photographs which are the mere mechanical 
result of the trigger459 and not the fruit of conscious creative decision-making.460 
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Despite this long-lasting reluctance, photographic works461 alongside films,462 
phonograms463 and broadcasts464 became protected by and rewarded with authors’ 
rights in the same manner paintings, sculptures or literary works were. More 
recently, the crafts of computer programming465 and creating video games466 joined 
the ranks of authorial practices, despite their industrial nature.  
Those recent arrivals in copyright laws – computer programs, video games, 
broadcasts, databases – have been regarded as entrepreneurial or media works467 
rather than artistic works. Although media and entrepreneurial works contribute to 
loosening the divide author-craftsman divide, or perhaps the author-entrepreneur 
divide, it is unlikely that such effect motivated the reforms. It is equally unlikely that 
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policy-makers were driven by the desire to renew modern aesthetic narratives.468 On 
the contrary, it has been contended that those works have gained protection on the 
basis of their economic weight rather than their artistic value.469 Legal reforms 
illustrate a shift in thinking about our economies and not a wish to endorse the 
renewed essence of contemporary cultural expressions. Nevertheless, those 
changes in the law indirectly affected the sanctity of legal authorship by loosening its 
exclusive association with traditional arts or ‘high-culture’. It certainly reshaped the 
divide by re-extending authorship to selected works of craftsmanship, restoring 
thereby some of its former prestige.470 
With the development of new technologies such as sound and film recording, also 
came the advent of new economic sectors which heavily relied on performers’ 
works.471 The emergence of the music and film industries boosted the social status 
of actors and musicians to give rise to the star-system.472 Performances are reaching 
mass audiences and the economic weight of the most famous artists increased their 
bargaining power to, sometimes, cast into shadow the authors they interpret on 
stage or in front of the camera473 for the first time since the sixteenth century.474 This 
new economic context forced legislators to consider the legal protection of 
performers whose work were then able to generate profits beyond the revenues 
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obtained from ticket sales of live performances.475 However, as described in previous 
developments, reforms to protect performing artists were slow to be enacted and 
improved.476 Never did they reach a full harmonisation of the regimes applicable to 
authors and performers so much so that, unlike craftsmen, performers have never 
been able to erase the divide separating them from authors.477 
D. Missing the ‘performative turn’  
At the same time performers’ social status rose, Georg Simmel considered shifting 
the boundaries separating authorship from performances.478 Although his work on 
the matter went unnoticed during his lifetime,479 the philosopher is regarded as the 
first writer480 to envisage the intrinsic creativity of performances independently from 
the authorial works they may convey.481 The German theorist moved away from 
Diderot’s classical conception despite conventions still favouring the latter at the 
time. For Simmel, acting had nothing to do with the ability of a sophisticated 
gymnast482 or a human canvas onto which the author can paint her play to the 
spectators. He described a complex ‘ménage a trois’ between the character depicted 
by the author in writing, its understanding by the performer, and the performer’s own 
personality and physicality. In his theory, an actor’s performance was the result of a 
subtle fusion of the three.  
Furthering Simmel’s work, an aesthetical shift was more clearly made in the 1960s. 
This movement was later labelled by Erika Fischer-Lichte as the “performative 
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turn”.483 This “turn” recognised the value of performance for itself, as a separate 
event distinct from the author’s written text whose dominant position in the creative 
process had been over-estimated for too long.484 It opened new ways of thinking 
about performances which became independent creative productions carrying their 
own meaning and value.485 This renewed approach to the performing stage was the 
result of progressive changes in the theatre landscape which in turn, highlighted 
performances’ ‘contextful’ nature.  
Paradoxically perhaps, it is the advent of stakeholders other than performers which 
triggered the re-evaluation of performances as an essential element in the creation 
of meaning initiated by the theatrical written text. Indeed, in the opening years of the 
twentieth century, stage directors rose as prominent figures in the field of theatre. 
Their input and role revealed that the feedback loop at play between the written text, 
actors and the audience during the performance could be influenced by the careful 
setting of the stage.486 The growing awareness of stage directions’ impact on 
performances and on the feedback loop fostered the view that the performing 
process would outgrow the underlying work. The performance began to be given a 
life of its own, emancipated from the underlying work it conveys. 
The arrival of directors thus shifted focus onto the audience’s contribution to the 
moment of performance.487 Spectators became to be understood as both a pre-
condition and a protagonist of the performing event which is itself born out of the 
feedback loop created between them and the performers, and facilitated by stage 
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directions.488 Since then, performances have been conceived as an open-ended 
process whose outcome is unpredictable, ever-changing and yet keeps to a structure 
in an autopoietic fashion.489 This understanding of performances crystallised by the 
performative turn in the 1960s is now well settled in the performing arts, though the 
degree to which audience can be enabled to contribute to the performing process is 
continuously challenged.490  
The legal narrative appears to have missed this ‘performative turn’ embraced in the 
performing arts. As described in previous developments,491 the divide separating 
authors from performers was prescribed at the heart of performers’ rights which were 
first introduced at the international level in 1961, at the same time the performative 
revolution took place in theatre and performance scholarship.492 Legislators did not 
take this opportunity of reform, nor any other coming after that, to convey the 
thinking of the most recent research in the field.493 Similarly, apart from isolated 
exceptions,494 the courts maintained a definition of performance and conception of 
creativity pertaining to philosophies dating back to the eighteenth century.495 The 
same archaic understandings of creativity once used to preclude men from 
authorship, and later craftsmen, now maintain this glass ceiling over performers: 
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Figure 12: Creativity and Authorship by the 20th Century 
 
By the 20
th
 century, many forms of craftsmanship have joined the group of authors, aesthetically 
and legally speaking. Only performers and a small portion of craftsmen are left as uncreative 
artists unworthy of authorship.  
 
 
E. The “Death of the Author”, the death of the divide? 
 
A decade after the performative turn took place in the performing art literature, 
unrelated efforts to take down conflated representations of the author were made in 
literary theory. Barthes and Foucault addressed in their work classic understandings 
of the authorial figure by reinforcing the performative nature of authorship496 and 
readership.497 The authors of the ‘Death of the Author’498 and ‘What is an author?’499 
formed the postmodern take on the authorial figure. Their work served as the critical 
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base for the critique of the romantic author later developed in the legal 
scholarship.500  
Barthes challenged the authority of the author by reinstating readers’ input in the 
process of creating meaning.501 Similarly, Foucault refused to see the author as the 
sole source of meaning. He described authorship as the mere function by which our 
culture limits the free re-creation of information and fiction.502 It is interesting to note 
that none of those explorations of the authorial figure seem to have envisaged the 
impact such theory could have on traditional understandings of performances. There 
is no mention in their work of performers’ relationship to the text or study of their role 
towards the creation of meaning.503 Their model was solely focused on the author in 
its interaction with the reader. To this extent, their postmodernist theories failed to 
provide a holistic critique of classical narratives on the author-figure which would 
have included considerations on performers.  
A number of reasons could account for this absence. First, both Foucault and 
Barthes were situated within the discipline of literary theory rather than performing 
art studies.504 Their intervention was later exported to this field by performance 
scholars.505 The latter explained that the role of the dramatist had already been 
diminished by the rise of new authoritative figures like producers, directors, and to an 
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extent, performers, prior to the performartive turn.506 Those theorists ultimately 
dismissed the depth of the impact Barthes’ and Foucault’s work had on the 
performing arts as their models did not challenge anything about the written text or 
the audience that the performative turn had not already questioned.507  
Alternative interpretations of Barthes’ theory would argue that performers were, in 
fact, present under the umbrella position of the ‘reader’ as posited by Umberto 
Eco.508 As tempting as it may be, this analysis is problematic because it by-passes 
the particulars of performers’ position at the junction between the authors and the 
audience. Thus it is submitted that such interpretations could only bring theoretical 
flaws to the Barthesian and Foucauldian models because it negates the differences 
in the position each group held and holds within western culture. The socio-cultural 
evolution of status performers went through is evidence of the fact that their role in 
western societies cannot be equated to readership. If readers may have also been 
discriminated against, regulated and stigmatised in the past, the reasons driving 
such policies and their timing were different than those affecting performing artists. 
This signals that the two groups cannot be merged into one conceptual entity.509  
A third possible explanation for Barthes’ and Foucault’s silence on performers’ role in 
the creation of meaning would suggest that the French authors simply did not 
explore the full potential of their theories.510 Even though Barthes did apply his 
semiotic arguments the creation and interpretation of ‘signifiers’ to theatre, his study 
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of the role of the performer in this context is very limited and the latter is described 
as accessory to directors’ inputs.511 
If performers’ absence from the postmodernist discourse can find justifications, the 
fact that the legal scholarship on the romantic authorship repeated this flaw is difficult 
to legitimise.512 Unlike literary philosophy, the field of intellectual property law 
functions with a more limited number of fundamental concepts and stakeholders 
which includes performances and performers. It is clear from the writing of scholars 
supporting the author-genius discourse that their understanding of the concept of 
‘reader’ does not encompass performers, and rightly so. The literary notion of 
‘reader’ has been translated as ‘user’ or ‘end-consumer’, understood as the 
consumer of protected works. This definition cannot be equated to the legal 
understanding of performers as expressed in statutes and case law,513 by any 
stretch of the imagination. Interestingly, performing artists are not included either in 
their plea for contemporary copyright to recognise collective or joint authorship as 
models truer to aesthetics ‘reality’.514 
Unlike literary theorists, copyright scholars cannot find justification in disciplines’ 
boundaries to exclude performers from their analysis without facing criticisms of 
incompleteness.515 This is because copyright law protects more than just literary 
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works and written texts.516 Copyright laws encompass in its scope dramatic, musical 
and choreographic works, all of which rely on performers to travel from the author’s 
mind to the audience, if one is inclined to couch artistic creation in those terms. 
Omitting such an essential link in the communication chain of the work is hard to 
justify. Their absence becomes even more bearing on this narrative when one 
considers that copyright laws were purposefully designed to foster the dissemination 
of creative works. How can such agenda be achieved if the key players in the 
dissemination of dramatic, musical and choreographic works are left out of the 
equation? Conversely, how can discourses critical of the copyright framework leave 
performers out of their analysis? 
The origin of the doctrine of moral right is perhaps the coup de grace to the author-
genius critique on this point. Indeed, moral rights epitomises everything the legal 
discourse criticises as being an ill-suited reflection of a romanticised authorship in 
the law.517 Often will the birth place of this doctrine be located in France. Little do 
those writers – seem to – know that the French doctrine was enacted in reaction to 
performers’ habits to modify texts, scores and choreographies in their 
interpretations.518 The very core of what supports the author-genius critique is thus 
intrinsically linked to performances, and the performative dimension of the protected 
text. In a way, it could be argued that this side of legal – romantic – authorship was 
in fact built in reaction to performances, bringing the latter at the core of what 
constructs the legitimacy of this title. 
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For those reasons, the indulgence extended to Foucault and Barthes can hardly be 
offered to their proselytes in the legal community. This suggests that the author-
genius critique and its translation of the postmodernist model of authorship is yet to 
reach its full potential as performers have not been included in their interpretation.  
Like Barthesian and Foucauldian theories before them,519 the romantic authorship 
discourse may be, in effect, furthering the ‘author-worship’ they swore to 
challenge.520 Their lack of awareness of other creative protagonists evolving around 
and outside the bipolar relationship linking copyright holders to users confirms the 
centrality of the author within their logic. Their efforts to deconstruct authors’ 
pedestal created a blind spot on the need for other artists like performers to be 
reinstated within western intellectual property frameworks as equal to their authorial 
peers. It is thus not surprising that the author-performer divide was neither critically 
nor theoretically challenged by those contemporary or postmodernist doctrines. 
Unfortunately for intellectual property scholars, there was no other neighbour 
discipline to complete their critique in the way performance theorists furthered 
Barthes and Foucault’s work.  
This is not to say that the critical thinking initiated by the author-genius discourse is 
not helpful. On the contrary, it offers valuable indicators as to what forms the cultural 
basis of socio-legal authorship.521 Working a contrario from the image of the author 
drawn by the romantic authorship narrative enables this analysis to delineate the 
contours of how performers are perceived from a legal perspective. Discourses on 
the author-genius revealed that authorship has been associated with intellectual 
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creativity exercised in isolation from the world so as to ease forms of true ex nihilo 
creation.522 This pattern led legislators and courts to depict an image of performers 
as the almost exact negative of this representation of authorship: performing artists 
are not intellectuals and they do not creating from nothing. The subsequent chapters 
further unfold those arguments and assess the extent to which they were relayed in 
legal narratives, starting with the doctrine of ex nihilo creation.    
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Chapter Three 
The doctrine of ex nihilo creation  
 
There is nothing new except what has been forgotten.
1
 
Marie-Antoinette, 1770-1793 
Previous developments briefly retraced the changing understanding of creativity and 
authorship over time.2 Creativity was, and still is,3 associated with the concept of 
creare, creation out of nothing, also referred to as ex nihilo creation. Exclusively 
divine to begin with, it was opposed to facere which was linked to other types of 
makings involving the repetition of esthetical or technical conventions in the shaping 
of existing matter. As humanism developed, artists and craftsmen progressively 
became able of ex nihilo creation and reached the status of authorship. This 
phenomenon blended the concepts of creare and facere.4 However, by the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, the distinction between creare and facere re-
emerged and came to separate artists from craftsmen. Because craftsmen were 
regarded as limited by the convention of their craft and bound to reproduce 
preexisting patterns for the purpose of their practice, they were considered as unable 
to achieve true creation, i.e creation out of nothing. Authorship was thus associated 
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with the work of intellectual artists whose contribution went beyond the expression of 
a particular craft or handiwork.  
This dichotomy between artist-authors and craftsmen, based on the distinction 
between creare and facere, has been maintained during the subsequent centuries to 
the extent of reaching the narrative framing intellectual property laws. Although the 
divide was made more permeable as a result of cultural and technological 
evolutions, it is argued that the western cultural belief according to which true 
creation and therefore authorship, can only rise from ex nihilo making still informs the 
functioning of intellectual property laws. This chapter is dedicated to highlighting the 
various elements of the law which illustrate the influence of the doctrine of ex nihilo 
creation. It is claimed that the doctrine is the first of three theoretical pillars basing 
the author-performer divide and hindering performers’ accession to authorship. For 
performances are understood as the interpretation on stage of pre-existing authorial 
works, authors’ creativity trumps that of performing artists, relegating the latter to a 
lesser legal division. Interpretations are thus perceived as a second-hand form of 
creation.5 The last paragraphs of this chapter close its analysis by focusing on 
unfolding the distinction between creation and interpretation which led to oppose 
authoring to performing. It is submitted that such opposition is the direct by-product 
of the imprint of the ex nihilo creation doctrine over the selected western legal 
frameworks.  
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I. Echoes of the ex nihilo creation doctrine in contemporary intellectual 
property narratives 
The doctrine of ex nihilo creation seems to have developed on the basis of two 
cumulative premises which both affected the narratives forming copyright and 
performers’ rights. The first one opposes authorship to the use of pre-existing 
material. To be regarded as the sole originator of her making, the author must not 
copy creative elements already available. The second premise of the doctrine 
refuses to regard as true creation any product which is the result of technical 
constraints and not that of the author’s free creative decision-making. The “authored” 
work must be the fruit of the artist’s conscious creative choices and not be 
substantially shaped by the state of the art, its function as a product or any other 
technical elements. Failing to evidence such creative freedom, the artist’s work risks 
becoming the product of facere making, for her work would be conditioned by 
existing aesthetical or technical conventions. The subsequent paragraphs articulate 
how those two facets of the exnihilo creation doctrine are indeed present in 
contemporary intellectual property laws.  
 
A. Creation from nothing  
The author is considered as the ‘originator’ of the work. The vision of authors as the 
source of meaning was criticised by Foucault6 and Barthes7 who underlined the 
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inherent and necessary intertextuality existing between cultural narratives.8 Despite 
the postmodern critique, such depiction of authors did not leave copyright 
narratives.9 In law, the author is the father of the work, sole and only individual 
responsible for its existence. This paradigm faced some complications as the class 
of protectable works expanded. The author-oriented doctrine somewhat struggled to 
articulate workable solutions as soon as the influence of pre-existing material made 
itself more pronounced, such as verbatim works or three dimensional translation of 
two-dimensional works for example. Those occasions were not taken as 
opportunities to re-assess and soften the doctrine of ex nihilo creation. On the 
contrary, convoluted decisions were reached to reaffirm the expression of the theory. 
Interestingly, the latter was actually strengthened as the award of copyright 
protection was facilitated.  
1. Coming from nothing but the author 
Two doctrines were developed to assist the enforcement of the originality 
requirement: the doctrines of origination and of independent creation. Both convey 
elements of ‘creation out of nothing’ at the heart of the originality condition, 
cornerstone of copyright law. 
a) Originality as origination, the author as ‘originator’ 
As explained, the author is understood as the ‘originator’ of the work by American, 
Australian and British juridical narratives.10 In this context, the author’s intellect is 
regarded as the source from which the work comes into being so much so that the 
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artist has been described as the person “to whom anything owes its origin, originator, 
maker, one who completes a work of science or literature”.11 The author is seen as 
the father of the work,12 an analogy which was criticised by holders of feminist13 or 
postmodern14 perspectives on copyright laws.  
The doctrine of origination was developed by the courts to give a practical 
understanding of the ‘originality’ condition since aesthetic considerations or concepts 
of novelty were rejected early on in the development of copyright law.15 
Consequently, to be considered original thus worthy of authorship, the work must 
have originated with the author. This way, the law ensures that the work does not 
rely on pre-existing (protected) material but only on the author’s thoughts and 
creative drive. In Wheaton and Donaldson v Peters and Grigg,16 the American 
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Supreme Court described the author as “a man [who has produced an original work] 
by the exertion of his rational power”.17 
b) Originality as independent creation 
This theoretical understanding of the author figure is also enabled by the ideal that 
the work was produced by way of independent creation. To be regarded as authors, 
artists must evidence that their work was the result of their independent creation to 
pass the originality test. In Walter v Lane,18 contentions based on principles of both 
ex nihilo and independent creations transpired in the argument proposed by the 
parties who held that “[c]opyright has never been allowed in cases where no 
independent labour has existed”19 because “[p]roduction not reproduction is what is 
meant to be protected” in order to encourage creativity and learning.20 More recently, 
British judges appear to have followed a similar reasoning influenced by the bias of 
ex nihilo creation in Beckingham v Hodgens.21 In the case, the Court enquired about 
the origin of parts of the work in order to assess their eligibility to copyright 
separately.22 Commenting on violin compositions, the Bench asked: 
The critical question is this: where did the violin part come from? Was it as Mr 
Valentino suggests arrived at by reversing the country lick, drawing sub-
consciously on Mr Mike? Or did Mr Hodgens play it to him, having composed 
it himself independently earlier?23 
 
This passage suggests that to be regarded as the author of this particular violin 
passage, the musician must have composed the piece independently from his 
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collaborator’s influence, ideas or suggestions.24 The doctrine of independent creation 
as evidence of authorship was dominantly developed in the British system as a 
defence against infringement proceedings rather than as a tool of establishment of 
right.25 This angle is further discussed in subsequent paragraphs.26  
The American judicial narrative employed references to ‘independent creation’ both 
for the purpose of establishing copyright and as a defence in infringement 
proceddings.27 In Baltimore Orioles Inc v Major League Baseball Players 
Association,28 the Court explicitly defined the concept of ‘originality’ as being 
synonymous to independent creation, when the circuit judges asserted that:  
It is important to distinguish among three separate concepts—originality, 
creativity, and novelty. A work is original if it is the independent creation of its 
author. Although the requirements of independent creation and intellectual 
labor both flow from the constitutional prerequisite of authorship and the 
statutory reference to original works of authorship, courts often engender 
confusion by referring to both concepts by the term “originality”.29  
A variety of decisions confirm this understanding of originality as being the result of 
independent creation.30 The American Supreme Court reinforced this ex nihilo-
oriented approach to originality in Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service 
Co31 where it held that:  
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Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), 
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.32  
 
In Australia, Finkelstein J held in the 2001 Telstra decision33 that although “[t]here is 
debate as to the meaning of "originality" in copyright law”,34 “[e]veryone agrees that 
for a work to be "original" it must be independently created by the author”.35 
In light of the above cited decisions, the judicial narrative seems to have fully 
endorsed a conception of originality, and seemingly creativity, informed by the 
doctrine of ex nihilo creation. Courts do appear to convey the belief according to 
which creativity occurs the vacuum formed by the author’s intellect and the exertion 
of her “rational powers”.36  
c) Who is the father author? 
As communication, artistic and technical practices developed, the theories of 
origination and independent creation became difficult to sustain. Instead of softening 
its interpretation of the doctrine, the legal narrative produced convoluted reasonings 
to confirm its legitimacy.  
This was notably the case in the context of adaptions from two-dimensional 
representations to three-dimensional productions of the same object. The question 
was whether the making in a different medium of an existing two-dimensional work 
should be considered as created from nothing, and be separately eligible to 
copyright protection. In each jurisdiction, the courts have regarded the three-
dimensional execution of a two-dimensional work as an extension of the former and 
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not an independent ex nihilo creation in its own right.37 Judges confirmed that ‘[t]here 
can be no doubt now that copyright in a work in two dimensions may be infringed by 
the production and sale of an article in three dimensions’.38  
In Nero v Monroe,39 the seventh circuit judge compared the work of the artist 
converting a two-dimensional work into a three-dimensional object to that of the 
“typesetter”40 of a book. In this case, the plaintiff, a sculptor, had asked a glass 
blower to create pieces the former had designed on paper for them to be later 
integrated into his work. The defendants submitted that this made the glass-blower 
the joint-author of Neri’s sculpture. The Court categorically rejected this argument by 
undermining the input of the glass-blower. In its conclusion, the latter opposes “true” 
authorship to what was “only a change of form […] from drawings to glass”.41 The 
judge proceeded to state that one “might as well say that the typesetter owns a 
book's copyright”42 if the conversion of a work from a two-dimensional to three-
dimensional medium is to be worthy of authorship. Although there is no explicit 
reference to the doctrine of ex nihilo creation, its influence clearly underlies the 
reasoning of this decision. The principle is fairly straightforward: artists cannot be 
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regarded as “true author[s]”43 if they limit their input to the conversion, translation or 
adaptation of somebody else’s pre-existing work.  
Exceptions to this principle mitigate this strict, yet implicit, application of the ex nihilo 
creation doctrine. The courts accepted that if there is no visible similarity to be noted 
between the two works, the second would not be regarded as infringing its 
predecessor and could itself claim copyright protection. So held the Supreme Court 
of Victoria in Cuisenaire v Reed44 where tables conveying dimensions were used to 
produce three-dimensional objects. The Court affirmed that: 
 Though literary copyright subsisted in […] in the tables or compilations, there 
would be no infringement unless what was produced was in itself in the nature 
of tables or compilations, whether in two or three dimensions, […] and since 
on the facts there was no physical resemblance between the rods produced 
by the defendants and the tables or compilations produced by the plaintiff, 
there had been no infringement of the plaintiff's copyright in the tables or 
compilations.45 
 
This exception was later narrowed down by subsequent decisions which stressed 
the fact that the resemblance must be visible to the layman and not the expert.46 An 
ordinary reasonable observer must be able to see the similarity between the two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works for it to be considered an infringing copy. 
As a result, three-dimensional constructions of complex plans or drawings are likely 
to be regarded as ex nihilo creations in the eyes of the Court whenever the 
genealogy between the two works is obscured by overly technical graphic 
representations.47 This solution was supported by the Gregory Report48 in which it 
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was recommended that the appropriate test of originality would have “an ordinary 
man” assess “whether [a] building or other reproduction can be recognised in 
another material or on a different scale to what has been drawn”.49 
In Interlego A G v Tyco Industries Inc,50 LJ Oliver slightly reversed the principle 
without, however, repealing the rule. He asserted that “there is no more reason for 
denying originality to the depiction of a three dimensional prototype than there is for 
denying originality to the depiction in two dimensional form of any other physical 
object”.51 Yet, the rule of law supported by the Gregory Report still prevails as the 
British judge then specified that: 
[i]t by no means follows, however, that that which is an exact and literal 
reproduction in two dimensional form of an existing two dimensional work 
becomes an original work simply because the process of copying it involves 
the application of skill and labour. There must in addition be some element of 
material alteration or embellishment which suffices to make the totality of the 
work an original work.52  
 
Much like what American copyright law protects is “production and not 
reproduction”,53 the British Court held in the same decision that “copying, per se, 
however much skill or labour may be devoted to the process, cannot make an 
original work. A well-executed tracing is the result of much labour and skill but 
remains what it is, a tracing”.54 Lacking the quality of ex nihilo creation, the tracing, 
copying or reproduction in a different medium of a pre-existing work falls short of 
originality and therefore of legal authorship.  
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B. Enabling the origination paradigm 
Various aspects of the intellectual property framework foster the grasp of the ex 
nihilo creation doctrine over the legal narrative. One of them lies in the fact that 
authorship is cheap, i.e the conditions to obtain copyright are low. The theory of ex 
nihilo creation will be all the stronger that the conditions to obtain copyright 
protection are made easier. Indeed, the lower the threshold of authorship is set in the 
first place, the more likely original creations will receive protection and make 
subsequent works unoriginal.  
This was notably the case in the French Borodine decision,55 discussed in previous 
developments.56 Two composers, Rimsky-Korsakov and Glazunov, had completed 
Borodine’s opera ‘Prince Igor’ after the latter’s death. No musical scores were 
available to them, so much so the two musicians re-created the opera from what 
they could remember of Borodine’s compositions when they were played to them 
during informal private gatherings. This creative process was captured by Rimsky-
Korsakov in his diary. Relying on such evidence, the French Supreme Court ruled 
that the completed opera was a collective work embedding Borodine’s musical 
creations, even though the latter had only been fixed in the mind and memory of few 
spectators. ‘Prince Igor’ was neither regarded as an independent work inspired by 
Borodine’s earlier unfinished compositions, nor was it considered to be a joint-work 
whereby all musicians’ contributions would have merged. In the eyes of the civil 
judges, Borodine’s work pre-existed the completed opera so much so that any 
subsequent work re-used elements of the late composer derived from his authorship 
and no other. His composition was the true ex nihilo creation, any musical work after 
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that would copy or add their imprint to its pre-existing, copyrighted substance. This 
theoretical representation of authorship has the practical effect of binding future 
composers to Borodine’s will and wishes or that of his heirs.  
This rather strict enforcement of the doctrine of ex nihilo creation is facilitated, if not 
supported, by the fact that French Intellectual Property Code does not require 
creative works to be fixed to be protected, at least in theory.57 As a result, any work 
which satisfies the originality condition and its ex nihilo premise, will be protected the 
second it is expressed and thereby make liable for infringement any future uses of 
those unfixed works.  
Would the Borodine case have received the same outcome in a common-law 
jurisdiction where copyright law requires the work to be fixed to be protected? In 
theory, this hypothesis cannot and should not be ruled out. As explained in previous 
developments, American, Australian and British copyright laws confer authors with a 
protection which applies retrospectively from the moment of fixation.58 Indeed, so 
long that fixation intervenes at some point during the life of the work, copyright 
protection will apply retrospectively to protect the work from the day of its creation. 
The existence of the protected work is effectively acknowledged as being the day of 
its creation even though the latter is not fixed yet.59 The moment of fixation marks the 
beginning of the legal protection of the work but not of its legal existence.60 As a 
result, even if it was only stored in the memory of its spectators until the completion 
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of the opera by Rimsky-Korsakov and Glazunov, Borodine’s estate could have 
claimed his legal authorship beyond the French borders.61  
 
C. Creation fettered by nothing  
 
True ex nihilo creation would also require artists to work free from technical 
constraints. If the shapes of the work were to be the result of mechanical 
conventions or technical functions, the author would not be regarded as having 
created it out of nothing. The condition of originality in contemporary intellectual 
property narratives bears marks of this conception of creativity, as they too, exclude 
technical and mechanical features from the scope of original material worthy of 
authors’ rights.  
1. Refusing protection to shapes driven by technical constraints  
 
The hand of the artist can be forced by two ranges of technical issues. The first one 
conditions the work because of its function or destination, whilst the second is 
shaped by the choice of material or technique employed to create the work. Either 
way, the creative product risks failing the originality test because its author’s 
creativity has not truly occurred ex nihilo but was pre-empted by material or technical 
considerations.  
a) Technical functions 
As the function of the work precedes and dictates its creation, any making which 
would heavily draw on such function without adding other features would fall short of 
displaying the necessary degree of creativity to obtain authorship. The function of the 
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work would hinder its accessibility to authorship in the same way pre-existing 
material would, according to the first tier of ex nihilo doctrine.62 
The Court of Justice (CoJ) was very clear when it excluded technical functions of 
creative works as contributing to their originality. In BSA63 the European judges held 
that whenever the expression of works eligible to authors’ rights “is dictated by their 
technical function, the criterion of originality is not met, since the different methods of 
implementing an idea are so limited that the idea and the expression become 
unseparable”.64 The dominant presence of the function in the expression of the work 
prevents the manifestations of the “author’s own intellectual creation” 65 which are 
evidenced by the exercise of “free creative choices”.66 The decision confirmed 
principles pertinent to the idea/expression dichotomy already present in the domestic 
narrative of member states.67 
Similarly, American courts grant limited protection to works which are considered as 
“largely functional” and none at all to features which are entirely governed by the 
product’s functionality. In Sega Entreprise Ltd v Accoldade,68 the court of appeal of 
the ninth circuit unequivocally held that “while the work may not be largely functional, 
it incorporates functional elements which do not merit protection. This result is 
neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the 
                                                          
62
 text to note 6. 
63
 C-393/09 Bezpecnostni softwarova asociace Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] EUECJ.  
64
 ibid, para 49. This position was reinterated by the Court of Justice shortly after in C-604/10 Football Dataco 
and Others v Yahoo! UK Ltd [2012] WL R(D) 57, para 19 and 39.  
65
 C-393/09 Bezpecnostni softwarova asociace Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] EUECJ, 
para 51.  
66
 C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH [2011] EUECJ C-145/10, para 89 citing Joined cases 
C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League & Ors v QC Leisure, and Karen Murphy v Media 
Protection Services Ltd [2011] EUECJ C-403/08_O, para 98.  
67
 See for example in France: Cass com, 23 juin 1987: Bull civ IV p 156; JCP G 1987, IV, 304 ; Paris, 4eme ch., 
19 novembre 2008, Gastronomie Distribution: PIBD 2009,889, III, 801; in the UK: Nova Productions Ltd v 
Mazooma Games Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 219, para 38 and 41. See for a similar decision on the un-
copyrightability of the functions of a video games in the US, Incredible Technologies Inc v Virtual Technologies 
Golf, 400 F3d 1007 (7th Cir 2005).  
68
 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v Accolade Inc, 977 F 2d 1510 (9th Cir 1992) citing Feist Publications Inc v Rural 
Telephone Service Co Inc, 499 US 340 (Supreme Court 1991) 350.  
189 
 
progress of science and art”. The refusal to protect functional features is not limited 
to computer programs or such like works. The same doctrine was applied to other 
artistic works such as costumes,69 musical instruments,70 architectural works,71 
taxonomical codes,72 lamps,73 or cooking recipes74 to only name a few.  
Altera Corp v Clear Logic Inc75 exemplifies the subjectivity in assessing what 
pertains to the function of the work and what does not. In the decision, the Court was 
unable to rely on expert evidence as the witnesses “differed with each and 
occasionally with themselves”76 when examining the issue with regard to a design. 
This demonstrates that although the principle makes consensus across jurisdictions, 
its enforcement in practice does not necessarily follow the same course.  
 
b) Material constraints 
Functional elements are not the only aspects artists must stay clear of when creating 
with in mind the ambition to obtain legal authorship. Constraints stemming from the 
material they use for the making of their work may also prejudice their eligibility to 
copyright protection. Whenever the shapes of the work are regarded as being 
moulded by the natural features of the matter it is composed of, candidates to 
authorship too will fall short in expressing the required amount of originality.  
In France, a television show director involving game playing was denied authorship 
over his programs because his input was entirely dictated by the nature, structure 
                                                          
69
 Entertainment Research v Genesis Creative Group, 122 F 3d 1211 (9th Cir 1997) 1221.  
70
 Pickett v Prince, 207 F 3d 402 (7th Cir 2000) 405.  
71
 Eales v Environmental Lifestyles Inc , 958 F 2d 876 (9th Cir 1992) 879.  
72
 American Dental Assn v Delta Dental Plans Assn, 126 F 3d 977 (7th Cir 1997).  
73
 ibid, 980.  
74
 Publications Intern Ltd v Meredith Corp, 88 F3d 473 (7th Cir 1996) 480.  
75
 Altera Corp v Clear Logic Inc, 424 F 3d 1079 (9th Cir 2005).  
76
 ibid, 1092-3, brackets omitted.  
190 
 
and rules of the game so much so that his work was the mere translation of those 
conditions. The Paris Tribunal held that: 
In the present case, concerning the record of television games, the ‘director’ is 
limited in his interventions as the later are constrained by the format and the 
rules of the above mentioned games.77 
 
In Australia, the writing of patient records was not considered the fruit of independent 
(i.e. ex nihilo) intellectual effort because the originality of such records derived from 
the medical knowledge employed by the practitioner rather than targeting its original 
expression. The communication of the information was the bare result of the writer’s 
knowledge rather the expression of his creative thoughts.78 The writer’s expression 
was here shaped by his diagnosis, to which he concluded on the basis of this 
medical knowledge itself ineligible to copyright.79  
In the US, gardeners or landscape designers cannot be regarded as authors either 
because they cannot control the colours, shape and smell of their work (when the 
latter is not represented on paper via drawings or plans).80 Seeds, flowers, trees and 
other vegetation are not “authored” by garden artists but found by them; “they 
originate in nature, and natural forces, not the intellect of the gardener”.81  
Similarly, the seventh circuit court of appeal property regarded title property 
commitments as not original enough to amount to authorship.82 The judges 
considered the expression employed in the legal forms to be a “mechanical 
language” which did not stem from the writer and thereby failed the originality 
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condition.83 The Court emphasised the fact that the composition of such titles is “too 
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever”.84 
c) Rejecting the protection of trivial derivations  
Building on the same reasoning, the courts also came to deny authorship to trivial 
variations composing alleged derivative works. Variations added to a pre-existing 
work too small to evidence the original input of the author in her (derivative) work will 
fail to conjure authorship. The bulk of this litigation concerned modifications triggered 
by the change of format or of material used in the re-creation of the work. No matter 
the aspect of the underlying work the edits emend, such modifications will not suffice 
to bend the rules of the ex nihilo creation doctrine.  
Changes in colours and other small modifications of a graphic work were placed in 
this category. In Sands and Mcdougall Pty Ltd v Robinson,85 the Australian judge 
Isaac J affirmed that:  
It is true that the appellants changed the colours of the political divisions, 
corrected the Balkan boundaries, introduced some places that had then 
acquired recent prominence, and cut out some places that were interfered 
with by some further features of arrangement of their own map. Their map 
was not a mere copy in the ordinary sense of the term, but it was clearly a 
reproduction of a substantial part of the respondent's map in a material form, 
which necessarily violated the respondent's copyright if his work be protected 
by the Act.86 
 
In Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc,87 LJ Oliver held that changing the size of a 
work by way of enlargement would not qualify for authorship as a derivative work 
despite the skills and efforts which may go into the process.88  
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Differences in dimensions and texture are too insufficient to obtain an independent 
copyright. In Entertainment Research v Genesis Creative Group,89 the Court 
emphasised that such variations are all the less likely to be considered as original 
inputs when they are driven by functional requirements.90  
In Lee v ART Co,91 the judges refused to qualify as derivative work the re-production 
of painted cards on tiles. The change of medium onto which the work was displayed 
did not make of its re-use a creative work worthy of copyright protection as derivative 
work. The seventh circuit declared that:  
Yet the copyrighted note cards and lithographs were not “transformed” in the 
slightest. The art was bonded to a slab of ceramic, but it was not changed in 
the process. It still depicts exactly what it depicted when it left [the author]'s 
studio.92 
 
The same was held in Pickett v Prince93 where a design on paper had been 
reproduced in the shape of a guitar. The presence of strings, frets and other 
elements of the instrument could not amount to authorship as they were dictated by 
the necessity for the guitar to “sound right right” and no other creative decision 
making.94 As in Entertainment Research v Genesis Creative Group, this case blends 
together the issue of function and underlying material. Indeed, both aspects can be 
considered as having shaped the derivative work.  
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Changing the speed of a recorded musical work does not lead to the creation of a 
derivative work. The copyright in the pre-existing piece will still cover the accelerated 
version.95  
In Gracen v Bradford Exchange,96 the Court held that the painted portrait made on 
the basis of a photograph did not display enough original differences to qualify for a 
separate copyright title as derivative work. Drawing parallels with previous cases, the 
Court confirmed the decision reached in first instance:  
We agree with the district court that under the test of Batlin Miss Gracen's 
painting, whatever its artistic merit, is not an original derivative work within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act. Admittedly this is a harder case than Durham 
Industries, Inc. v Tomy Corp., supra, heavily relied on by the defendants. The 
underlying works in that case were Mickey Mouse and other Walt Disney 
cartoon characters, and the derivative works were plastic reproductions of 
them. Since the cartoon characters are extremely simple drawings, the 
reproductions were exact, differing only in the medium. The plastic Mickey 
and its cartoon original look more alike than Judy Garland's Dorothy and Miss 
Gracen's painting. But we do not think the difference is enough to allow her to 
copyright her painting even if, as we very much doubt, she was authorized by 
Bradford to do so.97 
 
In this case, it seems as though the painting was held to higher standard of 
originality98 because the circumstances of its creation process stressed its lack of ex 
nihilo creation. Two renderings of the same scene can receive of separate and 
independent copyright protection. However, two renderings of the same portrait with 
one being based on the other leads to infringement of the second work over the 
other. This is so even though their likeness most certainly derives from the common 
intent to achieve the greatest realism possible. A very similar position was held in the 
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British case of Bauman v Fussell99 where a painting reproducing the unusual position 
of birds photographed during a cock fight was found to infringe the copyright 
covering the photograph.  
 
2. Craftsmanship and/in creation 
 
The ex nihilo creation doctrine contributed to the distinction between authorship and 
craftsmanship throughout the eighteenth century.100 Whilst artists were seen as the 
masters of their art and liberated from conventions and techniques, craftsmen were 
depicted as constrained by them.  
a) Savoir faire and originality  
In France, this logic still transpires in the context of perfumes. Fragrances are 
protectable by authors’ rights101 on the condition that they are not the mere result of 
‘savoir faire’. The court explicitly opposed originality in the legal sense to savoir faire 
which boils down to the expression of mere craftsmanship. The French bench held:  
But considering that the fragrance of a perfume which expresses the mere 
execution of savoir faire, does not equate the creation of a form qualifying for 
legal protection as work of the mind by authors’ rights, according to [the 
intellectual property code]102 
 
In this jurisdiction, such notion of craftsmanship or ‘savoir faire’ is unique to the 
jurisprudence on fragrant works.103 This seems to suggest that perfumes might be 
applied a slightly different threshold of originality, possibly higher than other types of 
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works, unless of course, the same rule for other works went unnoticed. This second 
interpretation seems somewhat unlikely as the Paris Court of Appeal did underline 
that the making of other protectable original works involved some level of 
craftsmanship:  
Considering that the fixation of the work is not a requirement of legal protection 
so long that the work is perceptible; that a fragrance whose olfactory composition 
is determinable satisfies this condition, no matter whether the composition can be 
experienced differently by different individuals unlike literary, graphic or musical 
works which, too, demand the execution of savoir-faire”.104 
 
b) Craft in creativity 
It would be inaccurate to summarise the law as categorically refusing to see 
originality in craftsmanship. As mentioned in the above civil decisions, various cases 
have emphasised the craftsmanship producing original creative works requires.  
In Walter v Lane,105 the Court clearly emphasised the craft involved in the short-hand 
writing technique executed by the journalist. The House of Lords contended that:  
Now, what is it that a reporter does? Is he a mere scribe? Does he produce 
original matter or does he produce the something I have mentioned which 
entitles him to be regarded as an "author" within the Act? I think that from a 
general point of view a reporter's art represents more than mere transcribing 
or writing from dictation. To follow so as to take down the words of an ordinary 
speaker, and certainly of a rapid speaker, is an art requiring considerable 
training, and does not come within the knowledge of ordinary persons. Even 
amongst professional reporters many different degrees of skill exist. Some 
reporters can take down the words of a speaker however rapidly he speaks; 
others less practised or proficient cannot, as the term is, keep up with the 
rapid speaker. Apart from the dealing with the rapidity of speech, there are 
some reporters whose ears and thoughts and hands never fail them, and who 
therefore produce reports of complete accuracy.106  
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Such skill was deemed enough to generate authors’ rights over the derivative 
creation.  
More recently, the original input of photographers received the same reward for the 
the craft they deployed in taking photographs though not particularly creative. In 
Antiquesportfolio.com plc v Rodney Fitch & Co,107 the Court held that the 
photographs of antique objects made for the purpose of a catalogue were original 
enough to be protected by copyright because the artist has displayed “some degree 
of skill was involved in the lighting, angling and judging the positioning”.108 The same 
was held in France109 and later by the CoJ.110 This type of originality is clearly 
pertinent to craft rather than intellectual creativity or ‘creative spark’ as other 
jurisdictions have referred to.111  
British judges paid the same credit to the fiddly work involved in the making of 
popular music in Bamgboye v Reed.112 In this case, the Bench referred to the careful 
“tweaking” of compositions during recording sessions involving the collaboration of 
composers and sound engineers.113 In the context of paper cutting, Carke J 
recognised the skills involved in the craft of the plaintiff to evidence her originality.114 
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The case finds in the fine “hollowing” and “flicking” of paper the creative signature 
and copyrightable input of the artist.115  
Similarly, in France, the making of theatre or film sets was considered a complex 
craft worthy of copyright protection despite the managerial and technical duties the 
role involves. In 2009, the Paris Court of Appeal held that:  
[The maker of theatre] sets does not just design the decors but also ensure 
the supervision of their construction and setting. He is responsible for its 
production on time (the set must be ready for the last rehearsal) and of its 
budget before the theatre company.  
It stems from this point that the theatre set maker is indeed forced to abide by 
those duties of supervision, and of budget and time management, yet he 
remains able to imagine, create and bring to life the set of the play in 
collaboration with the director; for this reason, and depending on 
circumstances which must be appreciated on a case per case basis, his work 
bears the mark of his personal sensitivity.116 
 
The representation by legal narratives of the authorial figure as distant from craft, 
handicraft or laborious processes is one of the many facets for which this ‘author-
genius’ paradigm was criticised by the scholarship.117  
 
Many aspects of intellectual property law contribute to embracing the view that 
creativity occurs ex nihilo, and that only such types of creations are worthy 
authorship. Yet this endorsement of the ex nihilo creation doctrine is not linear. On 
various accounts, the law has limited its grasp over authors’ and performers’ rights.  
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II. The limits of the ex nihilo doctrine  
Various elements building the conditions and exceptions of copyright protection have 
contributed to soften the enforcement of the doctrine in the legal framework. The law 
has allowed for a degree of intertextuality to occur between works. In addition, public 
policies have also motivated the bestowal of authorship where ex nihilo creation had 
not occurred but where the public good commanded it.   
 
A. Allowing Intertextuality : ‘there is nothing new under the sun’ 
The law allows for a very minimal degree of intertextuality118 by refusing to grant 
protection to particular elements of works so that future authors are not deprived of 
the raw materials they need to create. Doing so, the legal narrative implicitly refuted 
the idea of pure ex nihilo creation. This allowance of intertextuality between works is 
reflected on different levels: the enforcement of the idea/expression dichotomy, the 
doctrine of subconscious copying and insubstantial similarities, and finally the 
existence of derivative works.  
1. The idea/expression dichotomy  
The idea/expression dichotomy is a well-established principle of copyright law which 
has been much discussed in both the literature119 and case law. The following 
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comments do not aim to repeat those arguments but to point to the declination of the 
theory into three sub-strands which all contribute to mitigating the idea that the 
author works away from external influence and existing material. Indeed, the courts 
have identified as deriving from the idea/expression dichotomy the principles 
according to which references to facts, inspiration or influences are unoriginal and 
therefore not protectable. This hypothesis would be considered an expectable 
occurrence when two works are created within a similar cultural environment. To this 
extent, the law does not blindly perpetuate the idea that individuals, like the divine, 
brought into life creative products out of nothing. On the contrary, it acknowledges 
the fact that specific creative aspects are bound to be shared and ought not to be 
protected in order to preserve the freedom of expression of forthcoming authors.  
a) Ideas, facts and Information 
Ideas and facts cannot be covered by copyright because they are described as 
forming the building blocks120 of creative works.121 In order to protect individuals’ 
freedom of expression, no one is to own facts, abstract concepts or ideas 
otherwise copyright would allow some level of ownership of thoughts. Copyright 
strives to limit its grasp to the product of such thought, its expression, denominated 
as the copyright work within the framework of intellectual property. To this end, the 
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legal narrative opposes idea to expression, one eligible to copyright and not the 
other. The author re-using previously expressed ideas without replicating the 
expression itself will stay clear from infringement. Such result has been considered 
as “neither unfair nor unfortunate” for it is “the means by which copyright advances 
the progress of science and art.”122  
The British Supreme Court reminded us that “it all depends on what you mean by 
‘ideas’”.123 Indeed, a controversy rose in the academic arena as to the actual 
existence of facts and information as raw material floating around ready to be 
harvested by individuals. This vision of knowledge, separating information or facts 
from expression was regarded as artificial by some124 or even fallacious by 
others.125 Despite this criticism, the courts continue to abide by such dichotomy in 
order to maintain the semblance of a balance between freedom of expression and 
copyright interests.126  
The argument once expressed by British judges that “[t]his at any rate is clear 
beyond all question, that there is no copyright in an idea, or in ideas”127 still stands. 
The court then further clarified that “[a] person may have a brilliant idea for a story, or 
for a picture, or for a play, and one which appears to him to be original; but if he 
communicates that idea to an author or an artist or a playwright, the production 
which is the result of the communication of the idea to the author or the artist or the 
playwright is the copyright of the person who has clothed the idea in form, whether 
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by means of a picture, a play, or a book, and the owner of the idea has no rights in 
that product.”128 
b) Inspiration and influence  
The idea/expression dichotomy led to the exclusion of inspiration or creative 
influences from the scope of copyright. Works stemming from the same artistic 
inspiration will not be regarded as infringing one another so long that their expressive 
depiction of it remains different.129 This trait of the copyright framework mitigates the 
enforcement of the ex nihilo doctrine because the very of fact of refusing protection 
to inspirational elements and external influences acknowledges the presence of pre-
existing building blocks. It confirms that legal narratives do not entirely believe in 
creation as occurring in a vacuum. Such confirmation indirectly softens the edges of 
this model of creativity which views authors as creators cut-off from their cultural 
environment.  
Various cases rejected the idea that works would fail the originality test merely 
because their inspiration draws on pre-existing works. In France, the Paris Court of 
Appeal reminded the parties that the pre-existence of similar magical tricks involving 
a playing flying piano did not rule out the possibility for the artist to obtain protection 
over an advanced version of a near identical performance:  
[O]riginality is composed of the author’s own artistic input in the creation, 
disregarding the fact that he himself was inspired by pre-existing works 
belonging to the same genre […].”130 
 
                                                          
128
 Donoghue v Allied Newspapers, Limited [1938] Ch 106, 110.  
129
 Or alternative, the work must be the fruit of independent creation. On this see text to note 167.  
130
 Paris, 17 décembre 2003, n° [XP171203X] : D. 2004 jurisp. P 1588 note Fleury ; D. 2005 pan. P 1485, obs. 
Sirinelli. This decision reaffirms a long standing principle expressed in previous decision such as Paris, 1ère ch., 
11 mai 1965, Dali c/ Théâtre royal de la monnaie de Bruxelles et a. : D. 1968, 382 (in this case, the creation of 
additional costumes inspired from the initial drawings executed by Dali were considered as no infringement of 
the famous painter’s rights in his sketches). Author’s translation, see Appendix 1 for original text.  
202 
 
Rather pragmatically, the British Supreme Court reaffirmed that inspiration from 
other cultural artistic influences were bound to occur for “there is nothing new under 
the sun”.131 Without detour, the highest court confirmed that inspiration emerging 
from previous works was no obstacle to copyright protection:  
That is not to say that the plaintiff drew no inspiration from elsewhere […]. But 
the design was sufficiently original to earn copyright protection.132  
 
The same holding motivated the conclusion of Laddie J in IPC Media Ltd v 
Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd.133 The alleged infringement of a magazine 
cover was requalified as mere inspiration in the eye of the High Court as the 
work was described to be the result of the “blending together [of] known design 
features.”134 In this decision, the judge explicitly articulated the link between the 
notion of inspiration and the idea/expression dichotomy. He explained:  
The need to prove copying involves showing a design nexus between 
the defendant’s and the claimant’s works. However it is a mistake to 
believe that any nexus will do. The law of copyright has never gone as 
far as to protect general themes, styles or ideas. Monet, like those before 
him, acquired no right to prevent others from painting flowers or even 
water lilies or, to take an example referred to by Mr Howe, Georges 
Seurat would not have obtained, through copyright, the right to prevent 
others from painting in a pointillist style. Even someone who is inspired 
by Monet to paint water lilies or by Seurat to paint using coloured dots 
would not infringe copyright.135 
 
Laddie J proceeded to referring to an American case from the second circuit,136 a 
rather rare occurrence in the British judicial narrative of intellectual property 
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law.137 He recognised that although the line between idea and expressions, 
inspiration and expression might be arbitrarily drawn at times, it remained 
essential to constrain authors’ monopolies in this way.138  
 
Based on this general principle, judges also concluded that the confessed borrowing 
of a previous work’s “quirkiness and […] atmosphere”, “rhythm”, “pace and mood” 
was not sufficient to amount to infringement in Norowzian v Arks Ltd.139 The same 
outcome was reached in the context of musical work in Hayes v Phonogram Ltd140 
where Blackburne J held that:  
[t]he fact that […] the rap version may have influenced or inspired the 
production […] of the non-rap version […] does not, in my view, give [the] 
joint author of the rap lyrics any kind of interest in the musical work to be 
found in the non-rap versions.141 
 
Similar holdings were later transposed to other types of works such as video 
games.142 
British judges were equally careful to exclude from copyright considerations the 
divine inspiration of human authors. Automatic writings allegedly generated by the 
communication of spirits channelled through the body of living writers were 
considered to be owned by the latter rather than the influencing intellects residing 
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beyond the River Lethe.143 In Cummins v Bond 144 the Bench asserted that “the Court 
is not concerned with the question of the inspiration of the work by any psychic 
agency, but with the question who is the owner of the copyright.”145  
By referring directly to American authorities,146 the British case of IPC Media Ltd v 
Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd147 confirms the same interpretation of the 
idea/expression dichotomy is found in the US. Indeed, the court of appeal of the 
ninth circuit reminded the parties involved in Satava v Lowry148 that the copying of 
similar inspirations, in this case jelly fish, could not be considered as an infringement 
even if it lead to the production of similar artistic expressions.149 Because Satava 
was inspired by jelly fish to create his glass sculptures, he could not prevent other 
artists to do the same without claiming copyright over the idea of sculpting jellyfish in 
glass material.150 As in the UK, the same principles are frequently applied to musical 
works.151  
In parallel, the seventh circuit reasserted the importance of making previous works 
available for the creation of new ones. Recently, the circuit court of appeal noted the 
strong presence of intertextuality between creative products in Klinger v Conan 
Doyle Estate Ltd.152 The circuit judges stated:  
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Most copyrighted works include some, and often a great deal of, public 
domain material—words, phrases, data, entire sentences, quoted material, 
and so forth. The smaller the public domain, the more work is involved in the 
creation of a new work.153  
 
The cultural context and bond between previous and recent works had already been 
underlined by the Court half a century before that in Wihtol v Wells.154 In 1956, the 
same jurisdiction had reaffirmed that:  
 
[t]he Copyright Act specifically provides for protection of the work of a 
composer growing out of creations of those who came before.155 
 
 
In another one of his colourful dissenting opinions, Kozinski J reminded the ninth 
circuit court that intertextuality was essential to creativity which remains what 
intellectual property laws were sworn in to encourage.156 Commenting on White v 
Samsung Electronics America, Inc, he wrote:  
All creators draw in part on the work of those who came before, referring to it, 
building on it, poking fun at it; we call this creativity, not piracy.157 
 
2. Insubstantial and unconscious copying 
Defences to infringement also contribute to mitigating the influence of ex nihilo 
creation theories. Indeed, both insubstantial and unconscious copying can be argued 
to justify the borrowing of previous works without bearing the consequences of 
infringement or hampering one’s accession to legal authorship.  
a) The threshold of substantial similarities  
A substantial amount of what constitutes the work’s originality must be copied for any 
subsequent creations to be regarded as infringing their predecessor.158 If authors 
                                                          
153
 Klinger v Conan Doyle Estate Ltd 755 F 3d 496 (7th Cir 2014), 501.  
154
 Wihtol v Wells, 231 F 2d550 (7th Cir 1956). 
155
 ibid, 554.  
156
 White v Samsung Electronics America Inc, 989 F 2d 1512 (9th Cir 1993 - Dissenting opinion) 1514-5. See 
for the majority decision: White v Samsung Electronics America Inc, 971 F 2d1395 (9th Cir 1992).  
157
 White v Samsung Electronics America Inc, 989 F 2d1512 (9th Cir 1993 - Dissenting opinion) 1515.  
158
 Australia: Australian cases make directs references to British authorities on the question of substantial 
similarities. See for example, Vella v Cummins [2001] QSC 246, (2001) 53 IPR 538.  
206 
 
refrain themselves from copying those specific elements, nothing prevents them from 
obtaining full authorship for a work using already existing pieces. In this regard, a 
work made of already available parts, therefore not created entirely ex nihilo, may 
still be covered by copyright authorship so long that it satisfies the conditions of 
categorisation, fixation and originality.159  
This principle led the British bench to conclude that although similarities in the details 
of the expression may suggest copying or copyright infringement, the test does not 
stop there. Indeed, “no-one would say that those details alone meant that a 
substantial part of the copyright work had been taken – they are the starting point for 
a finding of infringement, not the end point.”160 This suggests that not all copying will 
lead to infringement; artists may obtain authorship for non-ex nihilo creations which 
would borrow the unimportant details of expressions existing in previous works, 
alongside with the themes, ideas, information or expression they convey.161  
In addition to being expressive of the substantial similarity of protected works, any 
borrowing from previous pieces must be visible. Invisible connections between two 
works will result in claims of infringement being dismissed.162 Although derivative 
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works need not to be perfect replicas of previous protected items to infringe their 
copyright,163 if the genealogy between the two works is barely visible, infringement 
will be unlikely, whether the connection is confessed or not. Three dimensional items 
reproducing numbers, sizes, tables or other calculations will not be regarded as 
infringing the expression of the same information on paper in the form of literary 
works.164 However, the work’s immaterial scope of copyright protection may survive 
if the similarity between the two works is traceable165 despite the fact that “work of 
the pirate is so cleverly done that no identity of language can be found in the two 
works.”166 For the visibility of the connection to disappear, the variation in the work 
must go beyond changing the medium through which the work is expressed.167 
b) Unconscious copying and independent creation 
Even where substantial similarities are found, the ex nihilo creation doctrine faces 
another potential obstacle. This last impediment is paradoxically both infirming and 
confirming of the doctrine. Alleged infringing parties may resort to the theory of 
independent creation to justify the resemblance between two works and escape 
liability. Wherever they can prove that their work was produced independently from 
the previous creation, no liability for infringement will be actionable and its own claim 
to copyright protection will remain intact. The law thus recognises the possibility for 
two substantially similar works to be created independently from one another by two 
different authors.  
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This led the courts of Australia,168 the UK169 and the US170 to conclude that “a work 
may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the 
similarity is fortuitous, i.e. not the result of copying.”171 If “two poets, each ignorant of 
the other, compose identical poems, neither work is novel, yet both are original and, 
hence, copyrightable.”172 To put it differently, “[a]s a general rule, the greater the 
similarities between the alleged infringement and the copyright work, the greater the 
prospect of copying being inferred. However, similarities do not necessarily indicate 
copying. The author and the defendant may have worked quite independently from 
common sources, in similar environments, to achieve similar objectives and made 
use of similar common design techniques so as to produce works which have a 
degree of visual similarity.”173 
Similarly, authors may subconsciously copy previous works as the latter become 
more and more integrated within one’s cultural or professional landscape.174 
Creators in such positions may argue the defence of ‘unconscious copying’ against 
allegations of infringement. However such hypothesis remains highly “unusual”175 
and so would be the occasions where the argument would succeed before the 
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court176 because the evidentiary burden rests heavily on the defenders’ shoulders.177 
Nonetheless, the Court did not rule out this possibility hoping for future medical 
discoveries to ease alleged infringers from the onus of proof weighing on them.178  
3. Copyrighting derivative works 
Derivative works form one last component of the intellectual property narrative 
contributing to diminishing the stance of the ex nihilo creation doctrine in law. 
a) Media and derivative works 
 Whether they are understood as derivative works, media works, translations, 
arrangements or adaptations, the very essence of this class of product contradicts 
the bond between legal authorship and creation out of nothing. By definition, these 
works depend on previous creations to exist, yet their coming into being is rewarded 
by full copyright.179 Although they do form a dent in the straight-forward enforcement 
of the ex nihilo creation doctrine by the law, the fact that the derivative authors’ rights 
remain slightly diminished in comparison to the primary author keeps the ex nihilo 
theory alive in the legal narrative. This issue further discussed in subsequent 
paragraphs.  
b) Artistic versus legal derivative works  
Jurisdictions with more stringent copyright conditions will allow the reuse of more 
creative works as a smaller share of those will be granted copyright protection. In 
this context, whenever a creative work does not qualify for copyright protection, any 
derivative uses made by its authors or other individuals will be regarded as created 
out of nothing legally, even though artistically it might not be the case.  
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This hypothesis was at play in Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd180 also known as the Oasis case. For the purpose of making the cover of their 
music record, the band had directed the making of an installation in and around a 
hotel’s swimming pool. An unauthorised picture of the artwork was taken and then 
sold in the newspapers.181 The claim for copyright infringement filed by the music 
band and its recording company failed before the Court who refused to identify the 
installation as a dramatic work, a work of artistic craftsmanship, a sculpture work or a 
collage.182 For the work did not fit in one of those categories and lacked fixation, 
Oasis’s installation was not regarded as a copyright work in the first place, so much 
so that its derivative product - the photograph - was both non-infringing and 
separately copyrightable.  
Similarly, the re-use of an entire segment of traditional patterns will not necessarily 
make the new work a derivative piece, or diminish its legal protection. Full authorship 
may still be granted to creators who heavily draw on artistic phrases composing the 
convention of their craft or folkloric cultural environment, or so it was held both in 
France and in the US. To start with the civil jurisdiction, the highest court quashed 
the appeal decision which had denied a sculptor full authorship over his work on the 
basis that the latter had limited his input to the reproduction of sculptural ‘scène à 
faire’. The Court of Cassation rejected this test for originality and specified that the 
Court ought to have examined whether the artist had stamped such reuse of 
sculptural common places with the mark of his personality. The absence of ex nihilo 
creation in the sculptural references displayed by the creator is irrelevant to the 
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originality test so long that his expression bears his own personal input. The Court 
asserted that:  
Considering that by adjudicating so, although it was not contested that the 
sculptures at stake had been made by the hand of Mr X, the court of appeal 
failed to determine whether such personal execution itself was enough to 
confer original qualities to the work, and thereby rendered its decision legally 
unfounded.183 
  
In the context of musical works, the American court of appeal of the seventh circuit 
reached the same conclusion in Wihtol v Wells.184 The defendant argued against the 
infringement claim brought by the plaintiff by putting forward that the musical works 
he had re-used were merely the repetition of folkloric tunes the plaintiff could not 
owned for precisely that reason. Although evidence testifying to the fact that the 
song was indeed substantially drawing from Italian, Latvian and Russian traditional 
music was accepted by the district court,185 this did not prevent the judges from 
siding with the plaintiff in granting him full copyright over the work. The bench 
confirmed this position in appeal when it candidly compares the claimant to a singing 
Sicilian sailor:  
In that case a Sicilian sailor sang and played his guitar on a long voyage. 
Sicilian folk songs he had heard and forgotten came back to his memory. He 
could not read music and such parts of the words and music as he could 
remember he sang and played by ear. What he could not remember he 
improvised. In this way he ‘learned’ a song which he claimed as his own 
composition. This product differed in words and music from any version of the 
original which was proved, though the theme was the same and the music 
quite similar. The court said: ‘There must have been something which 
Citorello [the sailor] added which brought the old song back into popularity 
with his own people in this country, and sufficient, I think, to support his claim 
of copyright.’ The Italian sailor may be said to have done something creative 
or original in improvising portions of the words and music.'186  
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On that basis they concluded to the validity of the claimant’s copyright despite the 
lack of ex nihilo creation artistically speaking.187  
The previous paragraphs revealed how copyright law has somehow allowed for a 
degree of intertextuality to play a role within the intellectual property framework. 
Doing so, it softened the grip of the ex nihilo doctrine over western copyright laws. 
The courts also came to play a part in mitigating the ex nihilo theory whenever public 
policy interests urged them to do so. This will be the discussion of the next 
paragraphs.  
 
B. Creating un-natural authorships  
Courts frequently reassert the fact that the copyright framework has been designed 
to serve specific public policies.188 To this end, un-natural authorships were created. 
Those authorships are regarded as ‘un-natural’ for their holders have failed to meet 
traditional cultural understanding of creativity. In most cases, they have failed to 
satisfy the requirement of ex nihilo creation, or any other ersatz doctrines expressed 
in courtrooms. Those un-natural authorships had to find their legitimacy elsewhere. 
The effort invested by the author in the production of her work coupled with in the 
public interest resurrected her claim for copyright protection. The current state of the 
jurisprudence thus relies on the subtle blend of those two reasons to avoid the 
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criticism which struck the sweat of the brow doctrine expressed over the last two 
decades.189  
1. Verbatim works: authoring faithful transcripts 
By definition, verbatim works are the ‘word per word’ reproductions of previous 
narratives, whether those are speeches, interviews or other oral works. The question 
asked to the courts was whether such replicas would qualify for copyright protection. 
The crux of the matter lied in passing the originality condition given that the work 
candidate to authors’ rights is intrinsically the reproduction of pre-existing material. 
By no means, its author can be considered as having created the work 
independently or out of nothing. He may have physically and materially brought the 
reproduction into being but not its immaterial content. A strict enforcement of the ex 
nihilo creation doctrine would deny any authorial quality, legal or not, to this type of 
production. Yet the courts came to accept as such, though not without insisting on 
particular conditions and on the peculiar nature of the circumstances. 
a) Transcripts of words 
In Walter v Lane,190 the House of Lords held that “an ‘author’ may come into 
existence without producing any original matter of his own”191 and proceeded to state 
that “[m]any instances of the claim to authorship without the production of original 
matter have been given at the bar”.192 This case concerned a speech which had 
been transcribed by a reporter and later published. Although there was no question 
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as to the speaker’s authorship over his speech, the process of shorthand notating 
the event so as to reproduce a faithful record for it to be published was considered 
as displaying the relevant amount of skills, effort of labour to regard the written 
rendition as original despite its lack of ex nihilo creativity. The dissenting opinions of 
LJ Halsbury and Robertson confirm that the conclusion reached by the Court in this 
case was nothing short of a revolution in conceptualising originality in copyright laws 
precisely because of its unorthodox take on the doctrine of ex nihilo creation.193  
b) Transcript of music  
In the US, a similar position was reached in the context of music. In Wihtol v 
Wells,194 the seventh circuit asserted that:  
Of all the arts, music is perhaps the least tangible. Music is expressed by tonal 
and rythmic [sic] effects. People can enjoy music without a technical 
understanding or education, but to make music available, someone must write it. 
To make a song available, someone must bring the notes and words together.195 
 
As in Walter v Lane, the American circuit court of appeal emphasised the public 
interest in having fixed embodiment of previous works made available. Like the 
speech in the British case, without their embedding in Wihtol’s songs, the folkloric 
tunes would not be otherwise available to the commons, or so goes the argument. 
Although none of those two authors can be considered as having created their work 
purely ex nihilo, their creations remain useful to their society and for that reason 
should be incentivised by way of copyright. The exact same reasoning was followed 
by the British Supreme Court in Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins.196 The creation of 
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modern performing scores of Lallande’s baroque composition which had fallen in the 
public domain was judged to be eligible to copyright despite, once again, its lack of 
ex nihilo creativity. The Supreme Court relied on the finding of Walter v Lane to 
ground its reasoning to declare that “whilst it is trite that mere servile copying (for 
instance tracing or photocopying) does not amount to originality, there are clearly 
forms of “copying” which do – the shorthand writer’s copyright is a paradigm example 
which has stood since Walter v Lane”.197 This interpretation crossed both the Atlantic 
and the Channel as it reached the continental jurisdiction of France at the same time. 
In 2005, The Tribunal de Grande Instance of Nanterre too concluded to the musical 
editor’s authorship despite the absence of ex nihilo creative input.198  
2. Useful versus slavish copying  
In addition to their reference to ‘public policies’, courts have also relied on the 
distinction between useful and slavish199 or servile copying200 to explain their 
complaisance towards certain types of non-ex nihilo forms of creations over others. 
Hinging on British authorities,201 the Federal Court of Australia held in Henley Arch 
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Pty v Clarendon Homes202 that “[c]learly copyright does not subsist in a slavish copy 
but an artistic work which derives from an earlier work may be a work in which 
copyright exists, if by reason of additions or changes it is a new or original work 
rather than a mere copy”.203 Whilst slavish or servile copying would lead to 
infringement, useful copying may lead its perpetuator all the way to authorship.  
3. Exceptions proving the rule  
There is a number of exceptions to the enforcement of the ex nihilo creation doctrine 
in the legal narrative their scope remains limited. Moreover, each exception 
underlined in previous paragraphs have also served to prove the rule of ex nihilo 
creation.  
a) Limited limitations  
Limits placed on the reach of the ex nihilo creation doctrine in the legal narrative are 
themselves limited. Starting with the idea-expression dichotomy, the courts have 
already pointed to the difficulty of applying its principles objectively.204 The British 
case of Temple Island Collections Ltd v New English Teas Ltd205 illustrates this point 
particularly well. In the decision, the court declared that the creative decision of 
photographing a red bus in colour driving across the typical skyline of London city 
centre shown in black and white was found copyrightable in itself. The repetition of 
this theme featuring the two colour pattern, the bus and the traditional London 
background was regarded as the expression of one’s idea intellectual input, or 
creative idea, rather than an idea in itself. From this perspective, as the grounds of 
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copyright ownership invade abstract forms of expressions such as this one, the 
possibility of legal authorship to allow for intertextuality between creative works 
diminishes. Simultaneously, the difficulty grows for individuals to create out of 
nothing. 
Similarly, in France, the apposition above a public toilets’ door of golden letters 
forming the word ‘paradise’ were considered as constituting a protectable work of the 
mind. As a result, the defendant who had subsequently photographed the door was 
found in breach of the artist’s author’s rights despite the highly abstract and 
conceptual nature of his creation.206 
Additionally, the lines between creative expression and inspiration has been 
somewhat blurred by the jurisprudence. The American case Wihtol v Wells207 and 
1993 decision of the French Court of Cassation208 discussed in the above 
paragraphs209 are excellent examples where folkloric or traditional influences did not 
preclude the obtaining of copyright over the works which would have otherwise been 
regarded as derivative by the man of the trade.  
Another feature of the copyright framework enabling intertextuality is the possibility to 
copy unsubstantial amounts of previous work, or infringe protected works 
unconsciously. However, both of these exceptions are envisaged very narrowly by 
judges. It is now accepted by the courts of all jurisdictions under study that the test 
for infringement is to be understood as a primarily qualitative test and not 
quantitative test.210 As result, borrowing a small portion of a protected work could 
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suffice to amount to a breach of copyright if such segment represents a substantial 
part of what makes the work original. The quantitative test only comes into play after 
this first qualitative assessment, and is only to be applied to the original elements of 
the work and not the work in its entirety. This interpretation increases the likelihood 
for substantial borrowings as the whole to which it is compared diminishes in size.  
In parallel, the defence against infringement residing in the notion of ‘unconscious 
copying’ has only been granted in rare occasions because of the expected difficulty 
to provide tangible evidence of one’s mindset or creative consciousness at the time 
of creation.211  
 
What was presented thus far as the most significant obstacle to the ex nihilo 
doctrine, i.e. the presence of derivative works, is also limited in its impact. Intellectual 
property laws have not gone as far as placing derivative and non-derivative work on 
an equal footing with other, one might say ‘true’, creators. Indeed, whilst the latter 
receive the standard monopoly granted by copyright, derivative authors remain 
subject to their predecessor’s consent to use their own derivative work.212 The 
existence of derivative copyrights for those artists does not severe their ties with 
previous creations, and does certainly not rebut the copyright titles protecting the 
portion of underlying work being recycled. As a result, derivative works both 
counteracts and confirms the ex nihilo creation doctrine. 
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b) Singling out 
The fact of distinguishing traditional derivative works from traditional authorial works 
reinforces the presence and hierarchy of one over the other. The very existence of 
derivative works in opposition to, or as a by-product of what one might call ‘regular’ 
works strengthens the doctrine of ex nihilo creation by placing derivative authorship 
as a default or secondary option. In Redwood Music Ltd v B Feldman & Co Ltd,213 
the Court stated that “it is not an unreasonable view that there is no need to give the 
same protection to the products of what is after all a secondary talent which consists 
in the gathering together of the fruits of the originality of other gifted minds.”214 
Dispositions related to those secondary works truly behave as exceptions which 
prove the rule.  
This singling out of non-ex-nihilo creative works also occurred in the context of 
unconventional authorships mentioned in previous paragraphs.215 The lack of 
apparent ex nihilo creativity did not make of those works obvious candidates for 
copyright protection so much so that it necessitated the proactive intervention of the 
courts or of the legislator216 to include those products into the scope of copyright 
ownership. This approach was reflected in the Australian case Sands And Mcdougall 
Pty Ltd v Robinson217 where Isaac J commented on the outcome of Walter v Lane218 
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in light of previous jurisprudence and understanding of authorship. The judge noted 
the revolutionary nature of considering non-ex nihilo creations as worthy of authorial 
rights:  
“author" has always connoted some amount of originality in the sense used in 
the older cases, the express use of the word "original" must carry with it some 
additional meaning, which, having regard to the case of Walter v Lane, (1900) 
AC 539, must necessarily, and in all cases be inventive originality. It is said 
that Walter v Lane decides that originality in an inventive sense was not in any 
case necessary in the then existing state of the law, and that it was sufficient 
for a person to be an "author" with whatever originality that word includes. The 
change suggested would be revolutionary.219 
 
This statement emphasises the stark step away from the primary originality doctrine 
aligned with ex nihilo theories on creativity.  
c) Reinforcing fictions 
In Sands, the Australian judge was not quite at the stage of explicitly embracing the 
idea of authorship growing out of blatant non-ex nihilo creations which were, and still 
are, regarded as a form of copying rather creating. This might be why the appraisal 
of the outcome of Walter v Lane was shortly followed by a statement which 
attempting to disguise the incongruence of the reporter’s authorship:  
I shall first consider the matter apart from the language of the Convention. In 
Walter v Lane (above) it certainly was there held that originality in respect of 
the ideas expressed, or in the composition recorded in the report, which was 
the subject of their Lordships' consideration, was not necessary to constitute 
the reporter the "author" of his report. But, on the other hand, the personal 
skill of the reporter, as well as his labour and expense, were considered to be 
material considerations, and as these resulted in the production of a material 
and visible representation of what had been said, I think it can be collected 
from the case that that representation was regarded itself as an original 
production. The reporter was certainly decided to be an "author" as to the 
report; and as no such thing existed previously he created, that is "originated," 
the report.220 
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If the beginning of this argument merely repeats the nuances introduced by Walter v 
Lane, its end appears to force the doctrine of ‘origination’221 on what is 
quintessentially not a form of ex nihilo creation. The reporter transcribing a public 
speech, is not the ex nihilo creator of the transcript as the content and form of his 
transcript is conditioned in its substance and part of its form by the speaker’s 
performance. That is not to suggest that the journalist should not be rewarded with 
authorship for his work. His work may well be worthy of copyright. However, it is 
argued that ex nihilo justifications and other related doctrines deployed to justify such 
protection should be dropped in order to avoid convoluted or illogical reasoning in 
the copyright jurisprudence.  
d) Fitting the law  
Conceptualising the work as the product of nothing else but the intellect of one 
individual presents practical advantages from a legal perspective. Indeed, such take 
on both creativity and authorship justifies granting full copyright to one person in lieu 
of many. By refusing the idea that authors owe part of their creation to individuals 
coming before them, the ex nihilo doctrine offers a theoretical base to simplify the 
distribution of rights. As explained in previous comments, legal frameworks strive to 
avoid implementing a complicated web of rights where legal claims and titles would 
be either shared or overlapping.222 Allowing for intertextuality would irremediably 
force copyright paradigms to design networks of rights where authorship is split 
amongst several right holders to reflect the cultural debt they owe their predecessors 
or the commons. If so, the question yet to be answered is whether the law relied on 
this vision of ex nihilo creation to justify simplifying the distribution of rights, or 
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whether the distribution of rights was rationalised because policy-makers did believe 
in ex nihilo creativity.  
 
 
III. Implications of the doctrine for performing artists 
 
This last section explores the impact of the ex nihilo creation doctrine on performers’ 
protection. It is argued that concept of ex nihilo creativity, dominant in western 
cultures, contributes to conceiving performers as uncreative, thus underserving of 
authorship. The subsequent developments point to various aspects of the legal 
framework which fuelled the understanding of performers as interpreting authorial 
works rather than contributing to them. This view point led intellectual property laws 
to deny performers authorship, but also made the existence of performances 
contingent to the presence of authorial works. Thereby, the task of performing is both 
excluded from and depending on creative processes judged to be authorial rather 
than performative.  
 
A. No authors in performers 
It is now clear that performers are not authors, and that performances are not work in 
the sense of copyright.223 Despite recent but rare challenges224 to the author-
performer divide, the latter remains well-entrenched in the legal frameworks of 
Australia, France, the UK, the US and of the European Union.225 It bases itself on the 
premise that interpreting is not creating and that, therefore, performing is not 
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authoring. This understanding of authorship and performance was relayed by both 
policy-makers and the judicature.  
1. Opposing creation versus interpretation, authoring versus performing 
 
Creating must occur out of nothing to be considered as such. The New Oxford 
Dictionary defines ‘creation’ as “[t]he action or process of bringing something into 
existence”.226 As per this definition, the link the legal narrative made between 
authorship and creation was justified and particularly well illustrated by the 
‘origination’ doctrine.227 
On the other hand, the notion of ‘interpretation’, often taken for the synonym of 
‘performance’,228 is by definition an activity intervening after an action of creation 
since the former aims to make sense, convey or embody already existing material.229 
As a consequence, interpretations cannot but be a non- ex nihilo creative process. 
The opposition between creation and interpretation operates on the premise of the 
dichotomy between ex nihilo and non ex nihilo creation of meaning. The distinction 
naturally slid towards separating authoring from performing where interpreting 
becomes a second-hand form of creative expression.230  
Legal narratives have not explicitly made the connection between ex nihilo creation 
theories and the creation-interpretation dichotomy they observe.231 However, the 
latter is openly mentioned by other policy makers or judges to justify the setting aside 
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of performers. The message is clear: interpreting is not creating. More importantly, it 
is not of the standard of creating, so why should performers receive authorship for 
this task?  
2. The opposition in the narrative of policy makers 
 
This argument is exactly what Charles Jolibois, member of Parliament, put forward to 
constrain the scope of performers’ rights to a minimum during the debates preceding 
the 1985 reform in France.232 The French senator explained in his report to the 
General Assembly:  
[Performers] come into play after the work is completed. Therefore, 
performances cannot be considered as works of collaboration nor 
derivative works – because the interpretation cannot be separated from the 
original work. Even though, it is sometimes referred to as a work, the use of 
this terminology does not justify in itself the attribution of authors’ rights to 
performers. It might be form the base of an intellectual right but one of a 
different nature than authors’ rights.233 
The same opposition between creation on the one hand and the work of performers 
on the other had already been voiced by the French and Hungarian delegations 
during the international negotiations at the 1948 Brussels conference in charge of 
updating the Berne Convention. It was reported that “[t]he French government 
continues to believe that performers and auxiliary performing artists are not 
creators”.234 This statement was supported by the Hungarian delegates who, too, 
refused to assimilate creation and interpretation:  
The Hungarian government approves, in principle, of protecting performers’ 
interpretations. It is nevertheless undeniable that performers are not original 
authors […] 
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One could read in the phrase ‘original authors’ a subtle reference to the fact that 
authors are creators in the sense of being originators of their work whilst performers 
‘only’ interpret such works, and therefore neither create nor originate new material. 
One may wonder whether the same philosophy led European policy-makers to open 
the 2001 Information Society Directive235 with the opposition between authors and 
performers conveyed by the phrase “authors and performers”. The eleventh recital of 
the directive reads:  
A rigorous, effective system for the protection of copyright and related rights is 
one of the main ways of ensuring that European cultural creativity and 
production receive the necessary resources and of safeguarding the 
independence and dignity of artistic creators and performers. 
Although one should rejoice that performing artists have been included in this 
agenda promoting of culture and intellectual property rights, this choice of words 
begs the question whether “artistic creators and performers” consciously intend to 
leave performing artists out of the class of ‘creators’. This reference to authors as 
creators separated from performers is the only occurrence in the European 
narrative;236 yet interrogations remain as to whether the phrase was a slip of the 
tongue, abuse of language or whether it is representative of the mind set of policy-
makers towards performing artists.  
Additionally, implicit references to creation-versus-interpretation argument could be 
read whenever reports advised against the creation of performers’ rights as they 
would be additional or supplemental to copyright.237 Even though, there is no direct 
mention of the fact that performers interpret existing works, the act of referring to the 
                                                          
235
 Information Society Directive (Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29 of May 22,2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, [2001] OJ L167 10.  
236
 There is no other use of the expression found in the rest of European directives included in this analysis.  
237
 See for example, Gregory Report (n 49) 61, 63 cmd 166 and cmd 176; Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, 
‘Performers’ Rights: Options for Reform’ (Report to the Interdepartmental Committee 1995) 28. For more 
illustrations of this argument in policy-makers or judicial narratives see text to note 53, Chapter 1.  
226 
 
overlapping of rights hints towards such understanding of performances. It 
presupposes that, in essence, performances will come after and on the top of the 
creation of authorial works and so would any rights attributed to performing artists.  
 
3. The opposition in judicial narratives 
Judges too involved themselves in separating creating from interpreting, and 
authoring from performing. In England, Park J held in Hadley v Kemp238 that “there is 
a vital distinction between composition or creation of a musical work on the one hand 
and performance or interpretation of it on the other.”239 This reasoning lead the court 
to deny authorship to the performers of the band over songs they had contributed to 
develop after a rough draft of the works had been presented to them by the lead 
singer.  
In France, the Paris Court of Appeal240 opposed the ‘field of creation’ from the ‘field 
of interpretation’ when it considered computers as equivalent of instruments, i.e. 
tools of performance: 
The [defendant] cannot distort the connection between the fields of creation 
and interpretation by qualifying the input of the computerised instrument as 
they did since the [plaintiff] engages with both fields, and as he indicated, this 
tool is a mere instrument like other more traditional ones allowing the 
performance of work created before hand241 
 
The same opposition was also voiced by American courts. In Neri v Monroe,242 the 
seventh circuit categorically rejected the idea that “the members of an orchestra who 
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play a new composition using their own interpretations of the score become 
the music's authors”.243  
The minority opinion in the 2014 Garcia case244 emphasised the lack of ex nihilo 
input in performers’ work. Smith J argued that the practice of an actress does not 
involve the type of creation rewarded with authorship for the simple reason that 
performers do not create, they interpret, or as he suggested, they lend their body:  
An actress like Garcia makes a creative contribution to a film much like a 
vocalist’s addition to a musical recording. Garcia did not write the script; she 
followed it. Garcia did not add words or thoughts to the film. She lent her voice 
to the words and her body to the scene.245 
 
Here transpires another specificity of performances which bar them from accessing 
the status of ex nihilo creation: their body. Performers’ body presents itself as an 
obstacle for performances to gain legal protection246 because it can never be 
regarded as anything but a biological given they are unable to author, mould or 
sculpt.247 In Toney v L’Oreal USA,248 the judges made their position on this point 
very clear when the circuit court of appeal affirmed that “there is no work of 
authorship”249 in the person’s physical appearance. “A person’s likeness – her 
persona – is not authored”.250 Because the performer’s input comes “in the form of 
facial expression, body movement, and voice”251 it can never amount to ex nihilo 
creation, especially when creation variations in the performances are thought to be 
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caused by the artists’ lack of range or skills.252 This logic does not fall from what the 
judges expressed in Kelley v Chicago Park Dist, where gardens were refused 
copyright protection because their designers could not be regarded as ‘authoring’ the 
vegetation they arrange.253  
Taking this argument on board, it appears that performers suffer from a double 
impediment when attempting to satisfy the requirement of creation out of nothing: 
presence of the underlying work and that of their body.254 Yet, those two features are 
fundamental and defining characteristics of the activity of performing, so much so, 
that performing can be regarded as fundamentally incompatible with the notion of ex 
nihilo creation which has informed the concept of authorship since the second 
century.255  
The above comments detailed how legal narratives have opposed creation to 
interpretation on the implicit grounds of the ex nihilo creation doctrine. Intellectual 
property frameworks went a step further in subordinating ‘perfomanceship’ to 
authorship by precluding the protection of performances whenever the latter do not 
occur as the renditions of underlying authorial works as per the definition of the law. 
As a result, not only is it impossible for performers to be (legal) authors, but neither 
can there be (legal) performers without (legal) authors.  
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B. No performers without authors 
The legal narrative went further in embedding performances’ lack of ex nihilo 
creativity in the framework of copyright. For interpretations to be protected as 
performances under the regime of performers’ rights, some jurisdictions require the 
pre-existence of an underlying copyright work. This condition both illustrates and 
fuels the perception of performances as non-ex-nihilo types of creation. This logic 
also supported a distinction between interpretation and improvisation which would 
seat half-way between performances and authorial making. For this reason, the 
subsequent paragraphs develop the extent to which the notion of improvised 
performance was used to further the ex nihilo creation doctrine against the valuation 
of performers’ input.256 
1. The presence of authorial work as a defining element of performances 
Performance cannot escape the lack of ex nihilo creation because without underlying 
works they would fall out of the intellectual property framework and its scope of 
protection altogether. Consequently, performers cannot legally exist without the 
presence of authors. They become entirely dependent on a prior act of authorship.  
a) Sport games  
This point was made very clear in the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal of 
December 14, 2007.257 In this decision, the civil judges refused to grant athletes’ 
performers’ rights for the purpose of their sport performances. Their reasoning was 
based on the fact that sportsmen’s performances could not be associated with the 
concept of performative interpretations protected by law because their activity was 
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not based on a pre-existing authorial work. Their activity could not be considered as 
choreographed or dramatized so as to award them the status of performances 
legally speaking.  
Similarly, the Australian Court too refused to consider sport events as copyrightable 
dramatic works in Australian Olympic Committee Inc v Big Fights Inc258 though the 
decision did not engage with the question of performers’ rights. Neither did the 
British and European judges when they rejected the argument that football games 
were eligible to copyright.259 
In the US, the seventh circuit reached the same conclusion but did compare the 
performance football players to that of more traditional forms of art260 in Baltimore 
Orioles Inc v Major League Baseball Players Association.261 Because the 
comparison was made in the context of rights of publicity and not copyright it is 
uncertain whether analogy drawn between football games and choreographic works 
referred to the actual legal categories of copyright works. 
Staying in the US, it must be noted that if the presence of an underlying authorial 
work is necessary for a performance to be legally protected, it suffices for such work 
to be copyrightable as opposed to effectively ‘copyrighted’. In Newton v Diamond262 
the Court acknowledged the existence of performers’ rights covering the musician’s 
interpretation of the scores but denied copyright protection over the composition 
itself for they considered it too generic to satisfy the originality test.263 Although the 
musical work interpreted by the flautist was copyrightable, it was not copyrighted. 
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This difference was no obstacle to trigger performers’ rights over the interpretation 
independently from the musical work’s copyright.  
b) Reality television  
In France, the Court of Cassation has consistently excluded from the scope of 
performances covered by the intellectual property code the participation in reality TV 
shows. 264 According to the civil court, TV participants cannot be regarded as actors 
because their intervention is not scripted and their performance limited to being 
themselves without playing a role. The French bench held:  
Considering that it is without contradiction that the Court of Appeal duly noted 
that the participants of the show were not given any part to play or text to 
recite, that they were only required to be themselves and express their own 
reactions when confronted to various situations and considering that the 
artificial element of those situations of their chronology does not amount to 
grant them the status of actors; the court of appeal was legally founded to 
deny them the quality of performers on the basis of such evidence […].265 
 
French courts have thus refused to grant casts of reality TV productions the status of 
performers because they regard the “profession of acting [as being the task of] 
interpreting a character other than oneself”. 266  
In 2008, the Court of Cassation followed the same logic in the context of 
cinematographic documentaries.267 The dispute concerned a documentary 
investigating the situation of primary schools which had filmed a teacher and ten of 
his pupils throughout the course of their academic year. The documentary was 
produced so as to be shown and commercialised in theatres as any other 
blockbusters. Shortly after its first viewings, the film was a commercial success so 
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much so that the teacher, main character of the documentary, claimed a variety of 
intellectual property rights over the production, including the status of performer. The 
Court rejected the latter contention on the basis that his involvement in the film 
lacked interpretation, a necessary feature for performances protected as such by the 
law:  
Considering that the decision noted that Mr Y [the teacher] has been filmed 
throughout the documentary during the course of his profession as school 
teacher, and that the short scene narrating the disappearance of a child is 
embedded in the routine of the classroom; noting also that the school teacher 
appeared in the documentary exclusively in the context of the reality of the his 
profession, without acting out a part for the purpose of the creative work being 
made other than his own, the Court of Appeal was legally justified to deny him the 
quality of performer, given that the production of a documentary excludes, per se, 
any interpretation.268 
 
c) Catwalking 
With the French Supreme Court ruling in the Ashby case269 that fashion shows are 
works of authorship protected by copyright law, one might wonder whether models 
walking down the runway should soon expect to be extended the privileges of 
performers’ rights. Since French courts require a pre-existing material for 
performances to be regarded as protected interpretations, does it mean that any 
interpretations of any work eligible to copyright protection because material covered 
by performers’ rights? Could models be seen as ‘performing’ according to the Court 
of Cassation’s definition of the term? National laws had denied models performers’ 
protection because the latter were not seen as interpreting any role or message but 
commercial ones.270 Should such understanding change now that runway shows 
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have become authorial works in their own right? This uncertainty highlights the shaky 
grounds on to which the jurisprudence built its principles. The lack of a holistic 
approach to both copyright and performers’ rights had them fail to anticipate all the 
implications of the Ashby theory.  
What those questions essentially ask is how determining a factor the presence of 
underlying copyright works is, in the French definition of performances. Although 
national and international provisions or agreements make no express mention of the 
fact that the interpreted work ought to be eligible to copyright protection for the 
performance itself to be protected, the presence of underlying works certainly is 
often mentioned in their definitions.271 Performances are often described as the 
interpretation of a work, whether oral, dramatic, musical or choreographic.272 Given 
that the very own concept of ‘work’ presupposes its eligibility to protection under 
copyright law, should we understand that those dispositions implicitly referred to 
underlying works as works eligible to copyright? Whilst it may be a stretch to reach 
conclusion, the latter only assumes of policy-makers a rigorous attention for details 
and consistency in drafting.  
That said, civil courts could easily prevent any attempt to enlarge the category of 
performers following the Ashby jurisprudence – should they wish to. Indeed, the 
originality test they devised to distinguish between performers, auxiliary performers 
and models could be used to such end273 as its lack of clarity makes it a flexible tool 
at judges’ disposal. 
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With the European Court of Human Rights confirming the Court of Cassation’s 
decision in the Ashby case,274 scholars asked whether a similar application of the 
law could ever reach the jurisdictions of Australia, the UK, or the US.275 The outcome 
of the decision was enabled by the open-ended approach to the copyright subject-
matter adopted by the French Intellectual Property Code (IPC). 276 As no such 
approach is enforced in the above mentioned common-law countries, their courts are 
unlikely to import the Ashby jurisprudence. However, some have contended that 
runway shows could possibility be fitted in the category of choreographic works.277 If 
so, would common-law copyright framework be more inclined to grant the status of 
performers to runway models?278 Only time will tell. As those jurisdictions do not 
implement any form of categorisation of performers, Courts would have to either 
welcome models as performers or develop clearer definitions of the substance 
protected by performers’ rights to prevent such extension.  
Those conjunctures highlight the full implications of extending the scope of copyright 
to new practices involving performative elements such as fashion shows. It also 
underlines the correlative relationship between authors’ and performers’ rights and 
how extending one may directly impact the other. Yet again, this angle of the 
problem, and of the Ashby jurisprudence, has not neither been considered nor 
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discussed. The literature279 focused on the often discussed tug-of-war between 
authors’ and users’ interests, and it overlooked other stakeholders involved in the 
creative loop: performers, or in this case, models. 
2. Quid de improvisations? 
 
Not all performers are concerned with underlying works. Improvising artists do not 
interpret pre-existing material. As a result, the obstacle formed by the ex nihilo 
creation doctrine should vanish. Like authors, improvising performers are regarded 
and accepted as creating from nothing. Improvising is described as creating and 
performing “spontaneously or without preparation”.280 For this reason, those artists 
receive full authors’ rights in France, to protect and control the fruit of their creative 
process. Although the IPC does not explicitly require courts to side with improvising 
performers, the lack of a formal fixation condition coupled with an open-ended 
approach to the types of protected subject-matter enabled civil judges to grant this 
particular category of performers’ authorship.281 So it was held in the context of 
music282 and dramatic works.283  
However, given the jurisprudence on participants of reality television and 
documentaries, the mere absence of underlying work does not suffice to obtain 
either authorship or performership. Although the supreme court acknowledged that 
such individuals were not following any particular script during the production 
process, the absence of a role playing element rendered their input ineligible to 
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intellectual property protection altogether, even as improvisers.284 The French bench 
seems reluctant to extend the reach of intellectual property rights beyond the 
boundaries of traditional performances. 
Under Australian, British and American285 copyright laws, improvising performers 
may too reach legal authorship whenever their performances are recorded since 
audio records have now been accepted as an eligible form of fixation for copyright 
purposes.286 In such case, both the record and the fixed content would receive 
copyright protection. Once fixed, improvised performances would then be 
categorised into the various types of copyrightable work and protected accordingly. A 
fixed musical improvisation would be considered the combination of a musical 
composition, its simultaneous performance by the musician and its record. 
Nevertheless, this situation is awaiting a confirmation by the courts as no statutory 
provisions require improvising performers to be granted copyright over their work.287 
Although, nothing prevents those artists from being regarded as performing 
composers, the courts are yet to be asked this exact question. Consequently, neither 
statutory nor judicial narratives have been as assertive in affirming improvising 
performers’ authorship over their ex nihilo creation as much as they have in the 
context of composers or playwright - except for France.  
On a side note and unfortunately for performers, improvising is not just a source of 
authorship; it may also be a trigger for liability. Recently, the Paris Tribunal de 
                                                          
284
 text to note 264.  
285
 In the context of American copyright, a limited portion of improvised performers (music performers mainly) 
receive protection against unauthorised third party recording at the federal level. On this, see Gregory Donat, 
‘Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational Performers’ (1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 
1363. On the limited scope of performers’ rights at the federal level see previous developments in text to note 
20, Chapter 2.  
286
 Arnold (n 224) 291. See for an early acceptance of audio records as acceptable method of fixation in the US: 
Capitol Records Inc v Mercury Records Corporation, 221 F 2d 657 (2
nd
 Cir 1955) 660.  
287
 Under Australian copyright law, co-ownership of the record is possible as improvisations are included in the 
definition of live performances as per s. 84 of the 1968 Copyright Act. On the question of performers’ co-
ownership of sound recordings. On this see text to note 81, Chapter 2.  
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Grande Instance sided with the composer of a song who had considered its 
performance by a singer who had inserted improvised segment in her interpretation 
as a breach of his moral right of integrity.288  
Summary  
This chapter introduced the first theoretical leg supporting the author-performer 
divide: the doctrine of ex nihilo creation. It pointed to places where the influence of 
the doctrine on the intellectual property frameworks of Australia, France, the UK and 
the US was most acute. It then closed its analysis by to describing the negative 
effect such theory had on the valuation of performers’ input by policy-makers seating 
either in courts or legislative chambers.  
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 TGI Paris, 21 février 2013, Fernandez (Nilda Fernandez) c/ Sonnery (Arielle Dombasle) n° 11/15192 : 
inédit.  
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Chapter Four 
The intellectualisation of creativity 
 
[T]he noises made by the performers, and heard by the audience, are not the music at all; 
they are only means by which [one] can reconstruct […] the imaginary tune that existed in 
the composer’s head.1 
Robin C. Collingwood, 1973  
 
Western culture has a long-standing history of depicting creativity as an intellectual 
endeavour. Once the concept was emancipated from divine making,2 the creative 
being never ceased to be ‘intellectual’ in expression and form.3 At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, aesthetics theorists Benedetto Croce and Robin Collingwood 
formulated in their definitions of creativity and of the ‘work of art’ centred on their 
intellectual nature,4 building on Kant’s depiction of the artist as an independent 
agent.5 They became the leaders of a school of thought on creativity known as 
‘idealism’ which was later contradicted by ‘action theorists’.6 Whilst the latter believed 
that the process in itself is creative and valuable,7 the idealist theory supports the 
view that the creative essence of a work is entirely encapsulated in the artist’s initial 
idea8 also described as a “moment of insight” or intuition.9 According to the latter’s 
                                                          
1
 Robin Collingwood, ‘Art as Expression’ in M Rader (ed), A Modern Book of Esthetics (4th edn, Holt, Rinehart 
& Winston 1973) 91.  
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 Sushil Kumar Saxena, Art and Philosophy: Seven Aesteticians (New Dehli, Indian Council of Philosophical 
Research 1994) 35-6.  
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2012) 87. 
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logic, the making process of a piece is deprived of creative value for it is the mere 
technical realisation of the overarching intellectual concept.10 The production process 
can thus be delegated to other individuals without them having any input in the 
creativity in the work.11  
Creativity scholar Keith Sawyer posits that the idealist position still dominates what 
he named the “western cultural model of creativity”.12 He also identified elements of 
similarities between his model and aspects of American intellectual property law.13 
This chapter furthers the scope and depth of his comparison. It extends it to the 
jurisdictions of Australia, France and the UK, and highlights the correlation between 
adopting such intellectualised views of creativity, and depreciating the work of 
performers.14  
This analysis illustrates how western legal narratives have shaped intellectual 
property laws so as to intellectualise the subject-matter protected. It evidences the 
intellectualisation of the material copyright laws cover never decreased despite the 
slew of reforms they went through. It is clear from the narrative framing 
contemporary authors’ rights that the system still shows a relatively strong deference 
to intellectual creativity rather than bodily or physical creativity. The definitions of 
author, copyright and originality bear the marks of such bias. This led the narrative to 
oppose mental to physical labour, one being deserving of authorship but not the 
other. This analysis underscores the connection between emphasising the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9
 Also known as “intuition” in Croce’s narrative. Kumar Saxena (n 2) 6; Sawyer Explaining Creativity (n 6) 87 
10
 Kumar Saxena (n 2) 6; Sawyer Explaining Creativity (n 6) 88.  
11
 Sawyer Explaining Creativity (n 6) 88.  
12
 Composed of ten beliefs, his model summarises the understanding and conception of the creativity western 
cultures have formed throughout the centuries. Two central premises of the model emphasise the intellectual 
nature of creativity. According to those, creativity is believed to be a “moment of insight”12 “mysteriously 
[emerging] from the unconscious” in Sawyer Explaining Creativity (n 6) 107; Keith Sawyer, ‘Western Cultural 
Model of Creativity: Its Influence on Intellectual Property Law, The Symposium: Creativity and the Law’ 
(2011) 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2027, 2030, 2033.  
13
 Sawyer Western Model Cultural Model (n 12). 
14
 Sawyer Explaining Creativity (n 6) 368. 
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intellectual nature of creavitity and denying value to creative processes relying on the 
body such as performing. It is contended that such mind-oriented representation of 
creativity has negatively impacted performers’ protection. Indeed, legal discourses 
appear to have associated performing with the work of the body as opposed to the 
work of the mind, denying it thereby any authorial qualities. As artists using their 
body to create (or perform), performers are refused the qualification of intellectuals, 
and by the same token become unworthy of authorship.  
 
I. The Intellectualisation of legal authorship 
 
Even though intellectual property narratives moved back and forth between 
considerations of ‘creativity’, utilitarian and economic approaches to justify the 
protection of artistic expression, the target of intellectual property rights never 
ceased to be intellectualised. Despite the evolution of copyright from one model to 
the other, the subject-matter it covered was always and still is intellectual. The 
following paragraphs refer to this phenomenon as the intellectualisation of legal 
authorship.  
 
A. The modernisation of copyright 
As mentioned in previous chapters,15 Bently and Sherman uncovered a shift in 
approaching creativity and originality which materialised the evolution from a pre-
modern model to a modern copyright framework.16 This shift occurred in response to 
one central issue: extending property theories to intangible products like human 
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 text to note 166, Chapter 1.  
16
 Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property - The British Experience 1760-
1911 (Cambridge University Press 1999) 44, 46. 
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creations. The scholars’ theory narrates the “British experience”17 of copyright before 
the 1911 Copyright Act. It is argued that although the models they depict are specific 
to the jurisdiction of the UK, their findings remain relevant to this comparative study 
as the copyright system of at least two other jurisdictions included in this analysis, 
namely Australia and the US, find their historical roots in the European jurisdiction.18 
During the pre-modern era which covers decisions from 1760 to 1911,19 the courts 
designed an ad hoc protection of creative works targeting the ‘mental labour’ 
encapsulated in the work. Creating was conceived as a process triggered and 
controlled by the author’s mind.20 Despite the inclusion of the process into the scope 
of originality covered by the law, cases were already opposing physical to ‘mental 
labour’.21 Creativity remained an intangible process influenced by the author’s 
intellect.22  
The codification of copyright law introduced by the 1911 Copyright Act23 maintained 
this stress on the intellectuality of ‘true’ creation but came to focus on the work rather 
than the process. The Act began the modern era of intellectual property which 
witnessed the end of casuistic approaches to protecting intangibles. The responsive 
methodology followed by the courts was replaced by an in abstracto conception of 
                                                          
17
 Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern IP (n 16). 
18
 See for the history tying the copyright framework of the US to that of the UK: Abrams H, ‘The Historic 
Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright’ 29 Wayne Law 
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Taylor (1769) 4 Burrow 2303, 2359.  
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the subject-matter protected which formally became the copyright ‘work’.24 The aim 
of the statute was to put an end to the ‘glorious muddle’25 created by judge-made 
copyright law so as to rationalise it. To this end, it implemented an abstract and 
open-ended definition of protectable works. This era enforced a renewed model of 
creativity turned towards the material aspect of creating: the work.  
In this modernised framework, the intellectual nature of the copyright work was 
maintained. The essential difference between the pre-modern and modern models of 
copyright lies in the ability of the material object to fully encompass the author’s 
creative input. The law no longer protects the creative process which leads to the 
production of a tangible object, but focuses on the tangible object itself, as the full 
and absolute embodiment of its author’s creativity. In doing so, the law lost track of 
the performative aspect of creation to only focus on the characteristics of the work.26 
The modern model moved from an abstract and dynamic approach to creativity to 
adopt a more static and material conception of it.27  
This logic still transpires in the provisions of the British and Australian copyright 
statutes, and is also an approach the American and French frameworks came to 
adopt. Indeed, the entire focus of the statutory provisions is on the work.28 Only the 
                                                          
24
 Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern IP (n 16) 3, 48. See also, on the notion of ‘works’ in copyright 
law: Brad Sherman, ‘What Is Copyright Work?’ (2011) 12 Theoretical inquiries in Law 99. 
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 Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern IP (n 16) 134. 
26
 ibid, 49. 
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 ibid, 48. 
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 The work only dictates the eligibility of the author to be recognised as such. The only subtle reference to the 
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means the person who creates it.
 […] In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is 
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work dictates the eligibility of its author to be recognised as such. The notion of 
process is absent from the copyright systems under study.29 
By the nineteenth century, as the discourse on creativity became more uniform,30 it 
soon disappeared to be substituted by the language of political economy.31 Naturalist 
needs to protect creativity were quickly replaced by the urge to secure the economic 
value of authorial works. In doing so, intellectual property law lost sight of creativity.32 
However, despite this attempt to move towards legal sciences33 and obliterate 
concerns about the essence of creation,34 the latter kept remerging under different 
guises such as the originality requirement.35 Subsequent developments of this 
chapter highlight how such resurgences were, and remain, largely intellectualised 
whenever they come up in the legal narratives.36  
 
B. The dematerialisation of copyright 
  
As mentioned in above paragraphs, the material and static modern model of 
copyright identified by Sherman and Bently is still endorsed by the current British 
framework, and that traces of a similar approaches in the other jurisdictions are 
noticeable.37  
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 Charlotte Waelde, Sarah Whatley and Mathilde Pavis, ‘Let’s Dance! But Who Owns It?’ (2014) 36 European 
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According to the scholarship,38 this model was recently threatened by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (CoJ). The Infopaq jurisprudence39 
was interpreted as erasing all the criteria defining the copyright work but one: the 
originality condition. In its decision, the Court defined the originality test as the 
requirement to evidence that the work is its “author’s own intellectual creation”40 
bearing the print of is intellectual input. This position made little, if no difference in 
France as the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) never enforced any other conditions 
to copyright protection than originality.41 This is, or was, not the case in the UK. 
Traditionally, British copyright law required eligible works to fit in prescribed 
categories and to be fixed in addition to be original. Therefore, the European 
jurisprudence was read as sweeping away the conditions of categorisation42 and 
fixation by remodelling condition of originality as the sole requirement.43 
Before Infopaq,44 British authorities had concluded that originality could be 
evidenced by displaying the relevant type and amount of skills, judgment and effort 
in the creation of the work.45 According to Griffiths, this approach to originality 
allowed the legal narrative to stay focused on the concrete materiality of author’s 
creative input in the work.46 By urging national courts to replace their originality test 
with a standard examining the ‘intellectual input’ of the creator, the CoJ is described 
                                                          
38
 See Jonathan Griffiths’s argument in ‘Dematerialization, Pragmatism and the European Copyright 
Revolution’ (2013) 33 Oxford J Legal Studies 767.  
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 C-5/08 Infopaq International A S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] EUECJ C-5/08_O; C-393/09 
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v Yahoo! UK Ltd And Others [2012] WLR(D) 57, [2012] Bus LR 1753, [2012] EUECJ C-604/10, [2012] WLR 
(D) 57; C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others [2011] EUECJ C-145/10, 
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43
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the Infopaq Decision’ (2011) 58 Journal Copyright Society of the USA 795, 803-807. 
44
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45
 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press, Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601, 611. 
46
 Griffiths Dematerialization, Pragmatism and the European Copyright (n 38) 772-5. 
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as forcing British judges to endorse a doctrine resembling the anti-thesis of what 
constitutes the national pattern of their copyright law.47 The originality embedded in 
copyright works will no longer be assessed on the basis of concrete and material 
elements present in the product but according to the dematerialised test of the print 
one’s ‘intellectual input’ which could potentially include analyses of the process.48 
Griffiths labels this shift triggered by the CoJ the ‘dematerialisation’ of copyright 
law.49  
Though criticised,50 the full impact of the decision on domestic jurisdictions is yet to 
be assessed.51 Griffiths suggests that the influence was only subtle52 and relatively 
recent cases such as The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding 
BV53 or Taylor v Macquire54 litigated in the High Court tend to confirm this position. In 
those decisions, three panels of judges concluded that the British test for originality 
and definition of copyright work had not been radically transformed by the European 
decision. In the first instance decision of The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v 
Meltwater Holding BV,55 Proudman J affirmed that the qualitative test for originality 
                                                          
47
 Griffiths Dematerialization, Pragmatism and the European Copyright (n 38) 775. 
48
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Dematerialization, Pragmatism and the European Copyright (n 38) 780.  
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 Taylor v Maguire [2013] EWHC 3804 (IPEC); [2014] ECDR 4. 
55
 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch); (2011) Ent LR 22 
(3) 101. 
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“has been re-stated but for present purposes not significantly altered by Infopaq.”56 
This reading of the European jurisprudence was praised by the Court of Appeal who 
confirmed the first instance decision and regarded it to be a “clear, careful and 
comprehensive judgment”.57 As in the Meltwater cases,58 the High Court did refer to 
the newly introduced originality test of intellectual creation in Taylor v Macquire.59 
Yet, in her assessment of the work’s originality District Judge Clarke mentioned the 
expression of ‘intellectual effort’ in creation as one possible way of evidencing 
originality but refrained from expressly ruling out preceding national doctrines on the 
question.60 
In France, the European decisions have had little if no sway at all on the outcomes of 
copyright disputes. The courts of the hexagon continue to enforce the same standard 
of originality they did before the passing of the Infopaq decision.61 The French bench 
may employ the language used by the CoJ in describing the originality test but its 
substance has certainly not changed and remains of a slightly higher threshold than 
its European counterpart. The recent Jimi Hendrix decision62 given by the Paris 
Tribunal de Grande Instance is representative of this lack of harmonisation.63 In this 
case, the French Tribunal denied copyright protection to the musician’s portrait for it 
failed the originality condition. The Court did follow the test laid out by the CoJ in the 
Painer decision64 yet reached what appears to be a divergent conclusion. Indeed, 
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 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch) para 81. 
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 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch); The Newspaper 
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whilst the European panel found the conservative head-to-shoulder portrait of a child 
with a sky-blue background as displaying the relevant amount of intellectual input 
and personality, the black and white shot of the rock star standing and smoking in 
front of the camera did not make the cut according to French standards.65 This 
decision illustrates the leeway left to domestic courts in assessing originality and 
attributing authorship despite the European attempt to level out the field. A 
consistent harmonisation is all the more difficult to implement since the finding of 
authorship is fact-sensitive and assessed by first instance judges as such.66 This 
was confirmed and reaffirmed by the CoJ which consistently reminds the parties that 
the task of assessing the originality of materials candidate to copyright is only for 
national judges.67 
 
C. The intellectualisation of copyright 
 
Even though the European decisions confirmed, if not accelerated, a process of 
dematerialisation of copyright, fundamental aspects of its model have not changed. 
The mutation of the frameworks from dynamic to static and casuistic to abstract has 
only made clearer at least one of its central characteristics: the intellectualisation of 
the subject-matter protected.  
The recent dematerialisation of copyright did not soften or decrease its 
intellectualisation. If anything, the movement uncovered by Griffiths strengthened it. 
The European jurisprudence did not replace creativity in its physical context but 
                                                          
65
 For more on the French jurisprudence in relation to photographic works see Annex 7.  
66
 See for a case where the first instance judge analyses the photographic works involved in the dispute one at 
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reinforced intellectualised biases.68 Subsequent developments further discuss this 
point.69 
 From the pre-modern to the European legal understanding of creativity, the 
substance covered by copyright excludes the body to privilege the ‘work of the mind’, 
“the mental labour”,70 the “genuine offspring of the mind”,71 “the author’s own 
intellectual creation”,72 the “sweat of the brain rather than of the body”.73 This heavily 
intellectualised approach to creativity, and to the authorial work, is the one constant 
trait of all the models envisaged by the courts under both British and European 
copyright law. It is contended that the same approach underpins the narratives of the 
American and Australian frameworks. The following section details the extent to 
which such mind-oriented favouritism has infiltrated the narrative framing and 
describing authorship, authorial works and authorial-like types of creativity.  
 
 
II. Protection of intellectual creativity 
 
Creativity starts and ends in the mind. Creating is the labour of the mind. Originality 
is intellectual and so are authors. Those statements are assumptions which underlay 
western legal understandings of creativity, originality and authorship. As a result, 
what constitutes an original work deserving of copyright protection has been shaped 
and defined by those precepts. It is argued that this perception of creativity and 
                                                          
68
 Unless we link the European jurisprudence to the French and via the use of the term “personality” the gap 
between mind and body is bridged, see text to note 399.  
69
 text to note 123. 
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 Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern IP (n 16) 2-3. 
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 ibid 144.  
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authorship contributed to excluding performing artists from the realm of copyright 
and to maintaining their status at bay from authors’ rights.74 It is also contended that 
this bias towards intellectualised representations of creativity has reached every 
level of copyright discourses to the extent of shaping the definitions of the author, the 
work and the originality condition.  
 
A. Authors as intellectuals 
 
Park J once wrote “[w]e have all seen imaginative sketches of the great classical 
composers of the past sitting at their desks in what one imagines might be an attic, 
quill pens in hand and sheafs of musical paper before them, writing out their 
compositions by hand”.75 This common depiction of the authorial figure has been 
long criticised and loudly so by the romantic authorship discourse.76 Woodmansee 
rejects the idea that creativity does not involve any “cutting and pasting” for it is an 
entirely intellectual exercise which resides in the mind of the author and does not 
involve the latter in any physical labour or handiwork.77 Rahmatian too joins her in 
this argument,78 though he is himself rather critical of the paradigm developed by the 
author-genius critic.79 This conception of the author as the solitary intellectual genius 
is outdated, inaccurate and has been disproved by a long-standing body of empirical 
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 This can be linked to Sawyer’s observations regarding performers’ creativity being neglected because of the 
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research in creativity.80 Yet, the legal narrative framing contemporary copyright still 
embraces it.  
At the same time as the pre-modern era came to an end in the UK, the vision of the 
author as an intellectual moved into swing in the narrative of the American Supreme 
Court. Creative ideas were depicted as emanating from the “author’s mind”81 and 
works were, and still are, understood as “the production of [the man]’s own genius or 
intellect”.82 With its Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v Sarony decision, the Supreme 
Court directly drew upon British authorities to endorse and enshrine in the American 
discourse the intellectual character of authors, of authorship and originality.83 This 
case served as the base for subsequent decisions84 to fully deploy the 
intellectualisation of the authorial figure in the transatlantic framework. This process 
culminated in Aalmuhammed v Lee85 where the author was described as being “the 
inventive or mastermind [who] creates, or gives effect to the idea” 86 by the ninth 
circuit.  
The idea of author as the intellectual genius or inventive master mind found similar 
resonances in contemporary British copyright discourses. As early cases depicted 
the author as the person who “must think the thoughts”,87 composers were later 
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portrayed as artists who “composed in [their] mind and [their] memory”88 “developed 
and fixed [their work] in [their] musical consciousness”.89 Indeed, according to British 
judges:  
[A] composer can ‘hear’ the sound of his composition in his mind before he 
ever hears it played. Beethoven could hear his music in this sense even when 
he was deaf.90 
 
In White-Smith Music Publishing Corporation v Apollo Corporation,91 the American 
Supreme Court too represented the composer as an intellectual artist when the 
bench held that “a musical composition is an intellectual creation which first exists in 
the mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon an instrument” .92 
The Australian and French frameworks were influenced by intellectualised 
representation of the author but their bias toward the creativity of the mind was made 
more evident in the context of defining the copyright work and the condition of 
originality. Those two points are the subjects of the following sections. 
 
B. Copyright work as works of the intellect 
 
Since true creativity is perceived to be intellectual, the work worthy of authorship 
must share this characteristic. The copyright work must rise from the mind to be 
deserving protection. Recent developments in copyright advanced by the CoJ 
reinforced the idea that the copyright work is an intellectual product. The subsequent 
paragraphs highlight how this logic was present in the narrative of the member states 
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before the intervention of the court and how the same ideal also penetrated the 
discourse of jurisdictions beyond the borders of the European Union. 
1. Works of the mind 
 
The copyright work is no exception to the intellectualisation of the law. Some 
jurisdictions go as far as referring to it as the work of the mind, and requiring that 
both the author’s and the audience’s intellects be engaged in and by the work for it to 
be worthy of protection. To put it simply, the authorial work must rise from, reside 
and end in the mind.  
a) The mind at the heart of copyright  
 
Even though French intellectual property narratives do not directly portray authors as 
intellectuals as the American and British judges do in their decisions, the IPC places 
intellectual creativity at the core of its framework when it expressly names the 
copyright work ‘oeuvre de l’esprit’, reading in English ‘work of the mind’ or ‘work of 
the intellect’.93 Policy-makers could hardly be clearer in defining the type of creativity 
rewarded with authors’ rights. It is that of the mind, springing from the author’s 
consciousness or sub-consciousness, and no other. 
The same expression was used in the preamble of the 1952 Universal Copyright 
Convention.94 In the introductory comments of the instrument, the signatory 
countries, which include all the jurisdictions under study in this analysis,95 declare 
having been “[p]ersuaded that such a universal copyright system will facilitate a 
wider dissemination of works of the human mind”, subject-matter targeted by the 
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Convention. The French ‘work of mind’ found a direct equivalent on the international 
stage in the expression “works of the human mind”.96  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) appears to have adopted this 
synonym for copyright work in the 2013 Ashby case.97 Examining a decision 
delivered by the Court of Cassation, the ECHR referred to the French expression of 
“oeuvre de l’esprit” and indicated its national and statutory origin by inserting vertical 
commas.98 By the end of the decision, the same term is completely embedded in the 
narrative of the Court who dropped the commas and presented the expression as a 
legitimate equivalent to the term ‘copyright work’.99 
Although this analogy between the copyright work and the work of mind was not 
directly introduced in the statutory dispositions of Australia, UK or the US, references 
to similar representations were made by the national judges of those countries. In 
Millar v Taylor,100 the Court described creations as residing the author’s mind since 
“[t]heir whole existence is in the mind alone”.101 This very expression was reused by 
the US Supreme Court in Holmes v Hurst102 where the court directly referred to the 
British decision Jefferys v Boosey.103 In Australia too, reference to the artist’s 
engagement of the mind in the work was necessary for the latter to be eligible to 
copyright. Judges have relied on this particular criterion to distinguish between the 
work of craftsman worthy of legal authorship and the work of pedestrian craft. In 
Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd104 and Sheldon and 
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Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc105 the Court held that for works of craftsmanship 
to be eligible to copyright protection “the mind of a craftsman must be engaged 
during the act of production”.106  
Combining these observations with the comments made in the above paragraphs,107 
the work emerges from and is located in the author’s mind in the American, 
Australian and British copyright discourses. Therefore, one could reasonably draw 
parallels between the French and the common law countries’ approaches to 
conclude that they all regard the copyright work as a ‘work of mind’ although the 
latter jurisdictions do not refer to it as explicitly and consistently as their civil 
counterpart does. 
b) Works for the minds 
 
The civil judges explored the full extent of this mind-oriented approach to the 
copyright work when they involved the audience’s intellectual activity triggered when 
engaging with the work as a defining characteristic. In 2007, the Paris Court of 
Appeal was asked whether a museum exhibition could be considered a work of the 
mind as per the dispositions of the IPC, a question to which the bench answered by 
the affirmative.108 Because the exhibition at stake was its “author’s original creation 
appealing to the visitors’ intellectual qualities and sensibility” it qualified as a work of 
the mind covered by authors’ rights.109 The lack of ex nihilo creation of the exhibition 
was no obstacle to protection since its strong intellectual appeal seems to have 
outweighed this flaw.  
                                                          
105
 Sheldon And Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [2004] FCA 0019, (2004) 61 IPR 1. 
106
 Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 593, 608; Sheldon And Hammond Pty 
Ltd v Metrokane Inc [2004] FCA 0019, (2004) 61 IPR 1, para 73.  
107
 text to note 75. 
108
 Paris, 1ere ch, 2 octobre 1997 : D. 1998, p. 312 note Edelman ; RIDA 1998 n 176, p. 422 
109
 Paris, 1ere ch, 2 octobre 1997: D. 1998, p. 312 note Edelman; RIDA 1998 n 176, p. 422. Author’s 
translation. See Appendix 1 for the original text. 
19 
 
Similar positions were held by British and American courts. In Hyperion v Sawkins,110 
the House of Lords concluded that the kind of musical works protected by copyright 
was in part defined by its appeal to the listeners’ intellect:  
In the absence of a special statutory definition of music, ordinary usage 
assists: as indicated in the dictionaries, the essence of music is combining 
sounds for listening to. Music is not the same as mere noise. The sound of 
music is intended to produce effects of some kind on the listener’s emotions 
and intellect.111 
Equivalent contentions were expressed in the decision Miller v Civil City of South 
Bend112 by the court of appeal of the seventh circuit, though the litigation did not take 
place on intellectual property grounds. Easterbrook J dissented from the majority’s 
opinion which placed strip-teasing within the scope of expression protected by 
constitutional rights. The judge considered that dancing for the mere purpose of 
entertainment could not be compared to higher forms of arts such as ballet because 
there was no appeal to the audience’s intellect.113 
In light of those decisions, the copyright work has become a work of the mind 
created by the mind of the author and destined to the minds of the audience. In this 
respect, the legal narrative seems to endorse, consciously or not, Collingwood’s 
vision of the artwork which entirely resides in the author’s intellect and can only be 
revealed by appealing the audience’s mind.114 
All those elements in which an intellectual quality has been identified contribute to 
composing the authorial work and reinforce the degree with which the whole 
copyright framework has been progressively intellectualised.  
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2. Intellectual creations 
 
Although not all jurisdictions explicitly employ the phrase of ‘work of the mind’ to refer 
to the copyright work, the expression ‘intellectual creation’ has dominated a number 
of regulatory pieces as well as decisions, at the European level and beyond.  
a) Embracing intellectuality at policy levels 
At the international and European level, policy-makers associated copyright works 
with intellectual creations without detour.  
i. International Consensus in Brussels  
The 1886 Berne Convention was the first international agreement to employ the 
phrase ‘intellectual creation’ to refer to copyright works in the body of its regulatory 
dispositions.115 Later, on the occasion of the 1948 Brussels Conference, the question 
of choosing the expression ‘intellectual creation’ to refer to copyright works was 
again discussed.116 On this point, the majority agreed that the use of the phrase in 
the body of regulatory instruments was not necessary since it was obvious to all 
delegates that such meaning was assumed and implied in the term ‘work’. Marcel 
Plaisant reported:  
[The delegates] have not considered it necessary to specify that those works 
constitute intellectual creations because, as the Delegate of Hungary pointed 
out, if we are speaking of literary and artistic works, we are already using a 
term which means that we are talking about personal creation or about an 
intellectual creation within the sphere of letters and the arts.117 
 
Considering the specific case of anthologies and collective works appearing under 
Article 2(3), the delegations also agreed that:  
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The discussion on them served to make it clear that protection was assured 
whenever the selection and arrangement of the contents of the works had the 
character of an intellectual creation.118 
 
The documentation of the conference119 narrating the same exchanges also reflects 
the interchangeable use of the terms ‘copyright work’ ‘subject-matter’ and 
‘intellectual creations’.120 When the delegates debated on the possible arrival of new 
works such as films, photographic works, works of applied arts or even 
performances, their respective legitimacy to enter the “supreme rank”121 of copyright 
work was assessed on the basis of their conceptual proximity to “intellectual 
creations”.122 According to the delegates, the general protection granted by authors’ 
rights could only cover the “products of intellectual creation” and “human 
intelligence”.123 
ii. The European trigger 
The European Union embedded the notion of ‘intellectual creations’ at the heart of 
European copyright law when it inserted the phrase under Article 1(3) of the 1991 
Directive on the legal protection of computer programs.124 The Article reads: 
A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the 
author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to 
determine its eligibility for protection. 
 
Two years later, a similar disposition was introduced in the 1993 Term Directive125 
with regard to photographic works. This time the regulations affirmed that:  
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Photographs which are original in the sense that they are the author’s own 
intellectual creation shall be protected in accordance with Article 1.126 
The 1993 Directive made direct references to the Berne Convention127 and the 1991 
Green Paper128 in the recitals which recycled the expression. This repetition 
indicates that its use was no inadvertent move on the part of the European 
Parliament. 
In 1996, the European body expressly extended the same vocabulary to databases. 
Article 3(1) of the 1996 Directive on the legal protection of databases129 bears an 
obvious resemblance with the wording of its 1993 predecessor:  
In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the selection 
or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual 
creation shall be protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be 
applied to determine their eligibility for that protection. 
Again, the same phrase of the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ as synonym to 
protected work is repeated in two of recitals of the same directive.130 Its ninth recital, 
like the 1991 Green paper before it, generally associates protected subject-matter 
with ‘intellectual creations’ and does not narrow the expression down to specific 
products like collections, photographic works or databases as previous instruments 
did. It reads:  
Any harmonisation of copyright and related rights must take as a basis a high 
level of protection, since such rights are crucial to intellectual creation.131  
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This recital was repeated in the 2001 Direction on the Information in the Society132 
and again in the 2006 Directive on the term of protection of copyright and certain 
related rights.133 
b) Cascading in case law 
 
This body of directives formed the narrative basis the CoJ stood on to deliver its 
decisions. This was notably the case in the landmark decisions of Infopaq,134 BSA,135 
Football Dataco,136 Painer137 but also in British Horseracing v William Hill,138 Fixtures 
Marketing139 and Apis Hristovich140 to only name a few.141 
Infopaq142 anchored the expression of the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’, 
synonymous to original copyright work, at the centre of the European framework. 
Basing its decision on the previously cited dispositions of the Berne Convention143 
and of 1991,144 1996,145 2001146 and 2006147 directives, the CoJ concluded: 
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It is, moreover, apparent from the general scheme of the Berne Convention, in 
particular Article 2(5) and (8), that the protection of certain subject-matters as 
artistic or literary works presupposes that they are intellectual creations.148 
The European judges then proceeded to confirm that: 
In those circumstances, copyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 
2001/29 is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in 
the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation.149 
Such reference to the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ as representation of the 
subject-matter protected by copyright is clearly deliberate as indicated by the twelve 
repetitions of the phrase throughout the judgement.150 This intention to reshape the 
copyright lexicon was duly noted by subsequent European and national cases who 
repeated the intellectually-oriented lexicon.151 
In France, the intellectuality surrounding the copyright work was always present, the 
latter being named after this particular feature, i.e. work of the mind.152 Although 
some cases do directly refer to the European jurisprudence when describing the 
conditions to meet to gain protection,153 the terminology used by the civil judges to 
describe original works has otherwise not been as rigorously aligned with that of the 
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CoJ. Although most expressions do focus on the intellectual nature of the copyright 
work, the French bench has not consistently adopted the phrasing of the ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation’. The courts rely on a variety of expressions to describe a 
similarly intellectualised creativity such as “intellectual construction”154 or “powerful 
intellectual production”.155 
Before Infopaq,156 British courts were already referring to copyright works as 
intellectual entities. Copyright laws were described as being only concerned with 
subject-matters equating “the expression of thought”157 and the work as the 
embodiment of “one’s own thought”.158 In Redwood Music Ltd v B Feldman & Co 
Ltd159 authorial works were depicted as “the fruits of […] gifted minds”.160 Bringing 
the British discourse closer to what became the European narrative a decade later, 
the subject-matter “protected as an original literary work is anything that can be […] 
any tangible product of intellectual endeavour”161 according to the Court in Exxon 
Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd.162  
Unlike their French counterpart, British courts seem to have been more inclined to 
adopt the wording suggested by the CoJ. Ten years after the Infopaq decision, its 
new vocabulary seems to have been more consistently embedded in national 
decisions.163  
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This standardisation of vocabulary does not necessarily equate to harmonisation of 
its substance. It is debatable and debated164 whether the definition of the copyright 
and its associated test for originality has actually been effectively harmonised by the 
CoJ or not. As explained in previous developments, France has maintained its own 
principles. In the UK, it seems as though the national and European definitions of 
works and tests for originality cohabitate. Taking for example the decisions 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks & Spencer Plc165 and Taylor v Maguire166 
both sets definitions of copyright work are combined and used in reasoning of the 
Court, one has not replaced the other.167 This point is further discussed in 
subsequent paragraphs describing the influence of the European jurisprudence on 
the originality condition.168 
The depiction of the copyright work as intellectual creation is not limited to the 
copyright frameworks of European Union member states. This paradigm reached too 
the jurisdictions of Australia and the US.  
To begin with Australia, the copyright work was referred to as ‘intellectual work’169 by 
judges who also affirmed that “to be the subject of copyright the matter must be a 
composition of the author, something which has grown up in his mind”.170 The 
wording of the Berne Convention which employs the expression of “intellectual 
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creation” was noted and discussed in IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty 
Ltd.171 
In the US, the Supreme Court defined the subject-matter protected by copyright as 
“mental creations or conceptions”172 and that such should only be extended to “the 
tangible results of mental conception”.173 Referring to common law copyright, the 
Supreme Court justices noted that the copyright work was understood as being the 
author’s “intellectual creation”.174 The same intellectuality was confirmed by the 
landmark case of Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co175 where the 
court concluded that authorial works were the “original intellectual conceptions of the 
author”176 citing another American authority in the field of copyright: Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co v Sarony.177 Doing so, the highest court of the US confirmed in 1991 
the intellectualised conception of the authorial work the framework expressly 
adopted towards the end of the nineteenth century.  
Such intellectualised understandings of the authorial work filtered down to the circuit 
courts. The seventh circuit abides by the jurisprudence set by Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co v Sarony in a variety of decisions directly refer to the authority178 or 
employ verbatim expressions. In JCW Investments v Novelty, the circuit judges 
required the presence of ‘intellectual production, of thought, and conception’ to grant 
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copyright protection to any creative item.179 In Harold Lloyd Corp v Witwer, the same 
circuit commented that:  
The theory is (however difficult may be its application at times) 'that the 
protection accorded the owner of copyright is of the intellectual product of the 
author.180 
 
Those cases stress the fact that the representation of the work as an intellectual 
production is not exclusive to the European copyright paradigm. Before the 
intervention of the Infopaq judgement, French and British judges were already 
envisaging authorial works according to similar intellectualised concepts. Similarly, 
Australia and the US followed an analogous theoretical path in describing the 
essence of the protected subject-matter. In both cases, the starting point of this 
intellectualised vision of the work found its roots in British jurisprudence which may 
explain the harmony existing across the jurisdictions on this particular point.  
 
C. Originality as an intellectual endeavour  
 
Previous developments evidenced that both the author and the authorial work are 
associated with intellectual understandings of creativity. The subsequent paragraphs 
submit that the same phenomenon of intellectualisation affected the originality 
condition, which is often regarded as the cornerstone of copyright protection.  
1. From mental labour to intellectual input 
 
The narrative framing the requirement of originality bears evident marks of 
intellectuality. As the modernisation of the condition was harmonised throughout the 
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jurisdictions, the language deployed to express it was intellectualised by the 
judicature.181 This modernisation process had originality evolve from mental labour to 
intellectual effort. The influence of the CoJ finally stabilised on the notion of 
intellectual effort or input. In jurisdictions beyond the latter’s authority, traces of a 
similar shift from terminologies of ‘mental labour’ to ‘intellectual effort’ are also 
noticeable and can be attributed to the historical ties existing between the copyright 
systems of the UK, Australia and the US. 
a) Labours of the mind 
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twenty first century, the 
notion of labour of the mind or intellectual labour was consistently present in the 
judicial narratives describing both originality and the types of creativity works worthy 
of legal protection. In Walter v Lane,182 British judges referred to “the intellectual 
labour constituting authorship”.183 The process of creating original works worthy of 
authorship, also referred to as “productions of the brain”,184 is described as being the 
fruit of the “labours of the mind” in Millar v Taylor.185 Similarly, when handling the 
question of non ex nihilo creations186 such as abridgements in Macmillan v 
Cooper,187 the Court considered that its author evidenced the type of originality 
targeted by copyright protection since “to make such an abridgement requires the 
exercise of mind, labour, skill and judgement brought into play”.188  
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The same notion of mental labour influenced the narrative of the American Supreme 
Court during the nineteenth century. In Wheaton and Donaldson v Peters and 
Grigg,189 the Court compared the “mental vigour” of different works as a “result of 
their [authors’] labours”190 during which “the mind has been intensely engaged”.191 
The creative process was evidently perceived as intellectual and remained so under 
the authority of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v Sarony192 which associated it with an 
“intellectual operation”193 requiring “intellectual conception”194 drawing from the 
author’s “own mental” capacities.195 A similar vocabulary was used by the Australian 
court in Sands and Mcdougall Pty Ltd v Robinson196 where the courts descried as 
“authorship [as] a mental operation deserving the character of an original work”.197 
The notion of intellectual labour or labour of the mind remained present in the 
American narrative198 slightly longer than it did in the British discourse, and even 
appeared briefly in Australia in Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty 
Ltd.199  
With the modernisation of copyright, the test of originality progressively evolved 
towards the doctrine of ‘skills, judgement and effort’200 the intellectualised conception 
of the condition was kept alive in the British discourse to read the Court depict the 
creative act as “the mental process of the artist” 201 utilising “mental material”202 in 
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1951. This suggests that even though there was no direct reference to the 
intellectual nature of the effort creators had to display in order to obtain authors’ 
rights in the doctrine per se, a degree of intellectuality has always underpinned 
judges’ approach to the originality requirement.  
b) Intellectual effort 
 
Going back to Australia, judges referred consistently to the notion of ‘independent 
intellectual effort’ as early as 1917 when assessing the question of the originality of a 
work candidate to copyright protection.203 This approach to the originality condition 
as ‘intellectual effort’ was then embedded in Australian jurisprudence on the issue.204 
Notions of intellectual “concentration”205 and “mental exertion”206 were at times 
added to clarify the meaning of independent intellectual effort. 
Australian decisions often refer to the jurisprudence of the UK when developing the 
meaning and context of the ‘independent intellectual effort’ doctrine.207 This appears 
to confirm the argument that the British narrative too is to be read as endorsing an 
intellectual approach to originality despite explicit references to the supposedly more 
material208 ‘judgement, skills and effort’ doctrine’.209 
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In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd,210 the Court noted 
that although many cases debated the originality of compilations due to their lack of 
ex nihilo creation,211 those cases came to agreement as far as the necessity for the 
original work to have been the product of ‘intellectual effort’ was concerned.212 In 
another decision of the Telstra saga,213 the Australian judicature specified that 
evidencing intellectual effort on its own is not sufficient. Such effort must have been 
“directed to the incarnation of the material form”214 of the work for it to be regarded 
as original and its author’s own. According to the Court, “care must [be] taken to 
ensure that the efforts of that person can be seen as being directed to the reduction 
of a work into a material form”.215 
i. Original intellectual effort 
The notion of intellectual effort as evidence of originality also emerged in the 
narrative of the CoJ. Similar to the Australian jurisprudence, in the joined cases 
Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v Gesellschaft für Musikalische Aufführungs- und 
Mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte, the Court referred to authors’ works as the fruit 
of their “[their] intellectual or artistic effort”.216 Yet, the mere display of intellectual 
effort is not enough to confer the quality of intellectual creation to a work. The CoJ 
made clear in Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK Ltd217 when the expression of 
‘intellectual effort and skills’ appeared in the question of the British Court of 
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appeal.218 As works candidate to protection are required to be their author’s own 
intellectual creation according to Infopaq,219 the British bench legitimately wondered 
whether displaying ‘intellectual effort and skill’ in producing such work would suffice 
to meet this newly harmonised and relatively vague threshold of originality. To this, 
the European Court responded in the negative:  
[T]he intellectual effort and skill of creating that data are not relevant in order 
to assess the eligibility of that database for protection by that right; 
[T]he significant labour and skill required for setting up that database cannot 
as such justify such a protection if they do not express any originality in the 
selection or arrangement of the data which that database contains.220 
 
This decision suggests that it takes a little more than mere ‘intellectual effort and 
skills’ to evidence the right amount of originality as per European standards.  
The notion of ‘intellectual effort’ was short-lived in the European narrative describing 
the originality condition. Although the phrase seemed to be a logical and somewhat 
promising linguistic choice since the copyright work itself has been consistently 
branded as ‘intellectual creation’, the CoJ soon preferred it the concepts of 
“formative freedom”,221 “personal touch”222 and “free and creative choices”.223 
To be protected, eligible works must “stem from a specific choice made by the 
author”.224 Such choices must be both “free and creative”225 so as to express the 
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“personal touch”226 and stamp of “personality”227 of the author “to set [her] work apart 
from that of the authors”.228 Skills229 and “creative effort”230 may come into play to 
evidence creative freedom, personal touch or creative choices but they have not 
become standards of originality per se. Indeed, any skills or ability must be exercised 
“in an original manner”231 to be rewarded by copyright. This appears to place the 
threshold of originality slightly higher than mere ‘intellectual effort’. The effort remains 
intellectual as the paradigm of the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ prevails but 
such effort must be original. In a nutshell, European copyright law rewards original 
intellectual effort.  
The substance of the copyright work and of the originality condition in the European 
narrative entertain an ambiguous relationship. The distinction between the two 
concepts collapsed as the CoJ read in the Union’s regulatory framework that they 
were meant to form one and only notional entity. The Court understands the 
definition of the copyright work and of the originality condition to be identical, i.e. the 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’. The same phrase substantiates both notions of 
copyright work and originality. Citing a series of previous cases,232 the European 
judges explained in Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK Ltd that:  
[It] is apparent from recital 16 of Directive 96/9 [that] the notion of the author's 
own intellectual creation refers to the criterion of originality233 
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ii. Filtering up and down 
 
Previous developments indicated that the effect of the Infopaq jurisprudence234 on 
British jurisprudence was only subtle.235 The categorisation condition seems to have 
remained, and so did the fixation requirement.236 The question is first whether the 
notion of original intellectual effort is consistent with the doctrine of ‘judgement, skills 
and effort’,237 and second, if not, whether national judges have modified their 
approach to originality. The British judicature seems to have opted for the 
compromise of making the two originality thresholds coexist with one another. In The 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV,238 Proudman J discussed 
the impact on the British understanding of the originality condition to conclude that 
the European jurisprudence had not deeply affected the substance of the test 
already known and enforced by the national courts.239 Her position suggested that 
the changes introduced by the CoJ were merely cosmetic, replacing one terminology 
to describe the originality condition and the copyright work by another.240 In her 
reasoning, Proudman J embedded this renewed vocabulary in the British copyright 
framework by combining the enforcement of the European ‘intellectual creation’ 
doctrine and its British equivalent focusing on skills:  
The effect of Infopaq is that even a very small part of the original may be 
protected by copyright if it demonstrates the stamp of individuality reflective of 
the creation of the author or authors of the article. […] It is often a matter of 
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impression whether use has been made of those features of the article which, 
by reason of the skill and labour employed in its production, constitute it an 
original copyright work.241  
Similarly, Taylor v Maguire242 referred to both tests but does not make any reference 
to neither the European cases nor directives. In this case, the High Court judge 
refers to the standard of ‘skill and labour’ as defined by the British authority 
Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd.243 Yet it opens the decision by 
stating that “[a]n “original artistic work” is a work in which the author/artist has made 
an original contribution in creating it – for example by applying intellectual effort in its 
creation”244 basing her affirmation on national statutory dispositions.245  
In light of those decisions, one could argue that the notion of intellectual effort in 
creation, foreign to the British discourse before Infopaq, has filtered down from the 
European concept of the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’.  
 
As mentioned in the previous developments,246 the Infopaq decision renewed 
definition of work and standard of originality has had little if no effect on redefining 
the requirement in France. The most consistent definition of originality enforcement 
in the French narrative has the condition defined as the expression of the author’s 
personality in the work,247 defining as an automatic reflex what constitutes a 
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protected work of the mind’.248 This similarity between the European and the French 
approaches lead scholars to assume the second had filtered up to the first and 
coloured the European narrative with French nuances.249 Indeed, both 
jurisprudences refer in their own words to the copyright work as a ‘work of the mind’ 
or ‘intellectual creations’ and to the presence of the author’s personality in the work, 
or personal touch, as evidence of originality. Considering the origins of the European 
doctrine, it is not surprising that no major change in the civil courts’ narrative framing 
the originality condition was observed following the Infopaq jurisprudence. 
 
c) Intellectual input 
 
The notions of ‘personality, ‘stamp of personality, or ‘personal touch’ do not preclude 
intellectualised conceptions of the originality requirement. Indeed, in its many 
expressive tools to refer to originality, the French bench has consistently relied on 
the concept of “intellectual input”250 as a shortcut to evidence originality, i.e. the 
presence of one’s personality in the work candidate to protection. On various 
occasions, the civil Supreme Court reminded the parties that the work must bear the 
author’s intellectual input for it to be original”.251 
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The concept evolved to become, at times, “an unprecedented intellectual input”252 
requiring “personal creative efforts”,253 or a “creative input” on the part of the 
author.254 The notion of ‘input’ also led the courts to look for artists’ “personal 
input”255 in their work to qualify them as original.256 The phrase of ‘personal input’ 
echoes the doctrine of ‘the author’s stamp of personality’ also found in the European 
narrative under the phrase of ‘personal touch’.257 Even in the expression ‘personal 
input’ elements of intellectuality are present. In a decision dating back to 2002, the 
French Court of Cassation held that originality lay in its author’s “personal input […] 
in […] the intellectual creation […] of the work”.258 If the author’s input must be 
injected in an intellectual process, in all logic, the same personal input ought to be 
intellectual itself. Confirming the intellectual nature of authors’ original input in their 
work, the Paris Court of Appeal came to resort to the notion of “intellectual effort” in a 
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series of decisions,259 a concept which forms the cornerstone of Australian discourse 
on originality.260 
The term of intellectual or personal input requires some degree of proactivity on the 
part of the author. Being involved in a creative process and intellectually responding 
to the task does not suffice for the work to be regarded as being stamped by one’s 
personality or touch. On that basis, the Paris Court of Appeal held that an 
interviewee could not be regarded as either the author or the co-author of the 
recorded interview even though he is intellectually involved in the exchange. In the 
eyes of the Court, such person lacks “personal initiative in the intellectual conception 
of the work”.261 
The previous developments highlighted how each jurisdiction developed their own 
national standard of originality adding their own touch to the condition, yet all shared 
an emphasis on its intellectual requirement. 
 
2. Creative sparks 
 
Another belief identified by Sawyer describes creativity as a “moment of insight”.262 
The insight theory forms another fold of the intellectual paradigm framing creativity. 
According to this understanding, the valuable input of the creative process is 
encapsulated in the idea which springs from the author’s intellect. Consequently, any 
subsequent steps is regarded as the mere manual or technical execution of that idea 
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which is therefore deprived of any creative value.263 This take on creativity is at the 
core of the difference between the idealist and action theories mentioned in 
introductory comments.264 According to the former, creativity is a spark which occurs 
and is completed in an instant, a ‘eureka moment’,265 whilst for the second, such 
sparks of creativity cannot be regarded as the finished work since many creative 
decisions occur during the stage of execution.  
The following paragraphs describe how reasoning resembling idealist theories266 can 
be found in the narrative of the jurisdictions included in the study in this analysis. 
However, no matter how dominant intellectualised depictions of creativity are in the 
judicial narrative, the courts can never escape acknowledging the inherent creative 
nature involved in the process. In doing so, judges automatically diminish the grip of 
their belief in creativity as being a ‘moment of insight’ over the legal narrative. 
a) Creative instants 
 
References to creativity as a ‘creative spark’ were made by the judicature in the US 
and Australia to define the originality condition. This suggests that the judicial 
narrative of those jurisdictions does side with an idealist take on creativity. 
The Court of Appeal of the seventh circuit held in its two Mid America Title Co v 
Kirk267 decisions that judges must “identify the requisite spark of creativity” in the 
work to grant copyright protection to its creator.268 In Kelley v Chicago Park Dist,269 
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the Court confirmed that the necessity to display “some creative spark”270 did not 
imply a higher threshold of originality. To the contrary, the circuit court judges stated 
that “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite easily”.271 
 
The bench of the ninth circuit joined their neighbour in using the creative spark as an 
effective test of originality in Ets-Hokin v Skyy Spirits.272 The Court stated:  
In assessing the "creative spark" of a photograph, we are reminded of Judge 
Learned Hand's comment that no photograph, however simple, can be 
unaffected by the personal influence of the author.273  
 
The Bench proceeded to assert that in the copyright area “[t]his approach […] has 
become the prevailing view"274 basing its interpretation on the work of the celebrated 
scholar David Nimmer.275 
A similar position was held by Australian courts in leading copyright cases but did not 
make consensus until 2009. In Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v Telstra 
Corporation Ltd276 the Federal Court of Australia discussed in great length whether 
the doctrine of the creative spark traditionally seen in the American judicial discourse 
could find similar applications within the Australian copyright framework. Fearing that 
such standard would raise the threshold of originality beyond what “Anglo-Australian 
law”277 has accepted thus far, the Court rejected this proposition.278 
Seven years later, the High Court of Australia overturned this decision in IceTV Pty 
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Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd.279 Sparing the parties long and winded 
developments on the question, the court stated in two sentences:  
One final point should be made. This concerns the submission by the Digital 
Alliance that this court consider the Full Court's decision in Desktop Marketing 
and, to the contrary of Desktop Marketing, affirm that there must be some 
"creative spark" or exercise of "skill and judgment" before a work is sufficiently 
"original" for the subsistence of copyright.280 
The Federal court shortly followed suit with the decision in Telstra Corporation Ltd v 
Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd281 where the judges concluded that “none of the 
[w]orks [they assessed were] original [because] the creation of the [w]orks did not 
involve some “creative spark” or the exercise of the requisite “skill and judgment”.282 
 
b) Sparking processes  
As mentioned in introductory comments, the idealist theory views creation as an 
instant, not a process. The material act of making the work can thus be delegated to 
other individuals without them having any input in the creativity embodied in the final 
product.283  
As much as the legal narrative adopted this representation by borrowing its 
language, describing creativity as an intellectual ‘spark’ springing from the author’s 
brain, it could not escape the reality of practice and contradicted this idealist 
paradigm on other accounts. No matter how intellectualised and idealist the narrative 
can be in describing authorship and the figure of the author, the judicial discourse 
cannot but accept that creativity is a process so much so that the author’s 
involvement in the latter was considered as important as being the brain 
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conceptualising the work when evidencing authorship over a piece. In 
Aalmuhammed v Lee284 which offers an intellectualised representation of the author 
at its paroxysm,285 authorship remains associated with a hands-on approach to 
creation. The cohabitation of those two contradictory conditions, intellectuality and 
involvement in implementation of the creative idea, describes and rewards a kind of 
creativity which is as much a process as it is a mental moment of insight. The Court 
stated that: 
 First, an author superintends the work by exercising control. This will likely be 
a person who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons in 
position, and arranging the place where the people are to be-the man who is 
the effective cause of that, or the inventive or master mind who creates, or 
gives effect to the idea.286 
This suggests that the legal discourse may have adopted a slightly more nuanced 
approach to creativity than represented so far. Similarly, often will the courts take 
into consideration the process of creation rather than the finished product to assess 
their eligibility to copyright, in the context of photographic works.287  
However, those nuances have not be used to mitigate or soften the edges 
separating authors from performers, or authors from individuals who are regarded as 
assistants to creation. To the contrary, they were employed to reinforce the figure of 
the author represented as the creative mastermind controlling the whole process 
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from its intellectual conception to its physical rendering.288  
 
III. Rejection of the labours of the body 
 
Legal narratives built the image of an intellectualised authorship on the basis of the 
opposition between inputs of the mind and inputs of the body. In this logic, the first is 
creative, not the second. It is submitted that this feature of copyright contributed to 
undermining the valorisation of performers’ creativity. The performative process is 
regarded as the lending of one’s body289 as opposed to the engagement of the 
mind.290 
This section argues that the doctrine of ‘the imprint of personality’ recently brought 
into European copyright by the CoJ may be a useful concept to soften this 
phenomenon of intellectualisation. It would allow legal frameworks to bring in the 
concept of originality elements of embodiment in order to widen the scope of 
authorship and progressively erase the author-performer divide.  
 
A. Opposing labours of the mind to labours of the body 
 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, it became clear in the legal narrative that 
the chosen subject-matter protected by copyright was intellectual and therefore 
would not include mere physical labour. Interestingly, the distinction between mental 
and physical work began with an analogy rather than an opposition. The analogy 
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was intended to promote the protection of intellectual labour by pointing to the 
resemblance between the work of the mind and that of the body. However, such 
comparison was short lived. The situation rapidly evolved and legal discourses came 
to exclude from the realm of copyright activities perceived as mainly manual. 
Remnants of this early intellectualisation process can still be found in contemporary 
intellectual property systems. They took the form of refusing to recognise handiwork 
or the ‘sweat of the brow’ as processes and skills worthy of authors’ rights.  
1. An analogy 
 
To begin with, the work of the mind was associated with the work of the body to 
justify the protection of intangible creative works. The analogy between manual and 
mental work was then deployed to enable the extension of property theories to 
intangible products.  
This logic is apparent in Millar v Taylor291 where the Court discussed the feasibility of 
‘propertising’ intellectual creations. Relying on Blackstone’s theories, the British 
judges explained:  
Mr. Blackstone observed that the labours of the mind and productions of the 
brain are as justly entitled to the benefit and emoluments that may arise 
from them, as the labours of the body are; and that literary compositions, 
being the produce of the author's own labour and abilities, he has a moral 
and equitable right to the profits they produce […].292 
 
Then, the Court assessed comparison between the labours of the body and the 
labours of the mind to be an argument with a “captivating sound”293 but refused to 
fully endorse the property analogy between tangible and intangible products for it 
                                                          
291
 Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burrow 2303.  
292
 ibid, 2359.  
293
 ibid. 
46 
 
would grant authors with a perpetual monopoly in their work which would be, in turn, 
detrimental to the common.294 Therefore, the Court only “readily admit[ted]” the fact 
that “every man [was] intitled to the fruits of his own labour”295 as in the case of 
manual work. This case illustrates how, first, the comparison between manual and 
intellectual work was one of analogy rather than opposition.  
A similar reasoning was followed by the US Supreme Court in Wheaton and 
Donaldson v Peters and Grigg.296In its decision the Court stated that intangible 
creations resulting from the exertion of one’s intellect are as worthy as the tangible 
product stemming from one’s physical effort:  
The great principle on which the author's right rests, is, that it is the fruit or 
production of his own labour, and which may, by the labour of the faculties of 
the mind, establish a right of property, as well as by the faculties of the body; 
and it is difficult to perceive any well founded objection to such a claim of 
right.297  
The American Court sided with Blackstone’s argument half a century after the latter 
was considered in Millar v Taylor.298 Again, the work of the body is used to justify the 
legitimacy of granting protection to the work of the mind, despite its intangibility. This 
comparison is regarded as the [t]e great principle on which author’s right rests”.299  
The analogy soon moved towards opposing the two types of activity.300 Mental 
labour became the focus of legal authorship and physical labour was progressively 
excluded from its scope. In The Making of Modern Intellectual Property,301 Sherman 
and Bently stress the fact that traces of this distinction were already present in the 
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narrative of Millar v Taylor.302 They proceed to detail how the opposition transpired 
through the logic of the legislative reforms carried out towards the end of the 
eighteenth century303 but only became a consistent narrative towards the beginning 
of the nineteenth century.304 As the legitimacy of rights vested in intangible objects 
ceased to require justification, the analogy between mental and physical labour 
disappeared to be replaced by an opposition of the two concepts.  
2. An opposition 
 
It is submitted that the antinomy between mental and physical work is still alive in 
current intellectual property frameworks. The courts have rejected the idea that 
authorship can rise from the mere craft of the hand or industrious efforts. Although 
none of those traits would preclude the award of copyright protection, their presence 
alone is not enough to satisfy the originality requirement. An intellectual creative 
intent must drive the artist’s crafty hands and his laborious efforts for them to amount 
to a form of protectable material. 
a) No craft of the hand 
 
As prescribed in Millar v Taylor,305 the mere craft of the hand does not suffice to 
meet the originality requirement and be worthy of authorship. The mind must be 
engaged and intellectual skills exerted. The exclusion of physical labour from the 
scope of copyright still underpins the logic of modern and contemporary frameworks.  
                                                          
302
 Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burrow 2303, 98 E.R. 201.  
303
 The scholars refer to the 1742 Act for Securing to John Byrom, Masters of Arts, the Sole Right of Publishing 
for a Certain Term of Years the Art and Method of Shorthand, Invented by Him and the 1735 Engravers’ Act, 
An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of Designing, Engravings, and Etchings Historical and Other Prints, 
by Vesting the Properties thereof in Inventors and Engravers during the Time therein Mentioned, 8 Geo. IIc. 13; 
cited in, Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern IP (n 16) 15-6.  
304
 Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern IP (n 16) 15-6.  
305
 Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burrow 2303, 2387. 
48 
 
In Walter v Lane306 LJ Brampton reinforced the intellectual nature of the reporter’s 
activity, rejecting thereby its relegation to mere “handiwork”. He affirmed:  
True it is that the reporter was not the author of the speech; but he was the 
composer and author of the book. Without his brain and handiwork the book 
would never have had existence, and the words of Lord Rosebery would have 
remained unrecorded save in the memories of the comparatively few who 
were present on those occasions.307 
 
If the reporter’s short-hand writings had not required the engagement of his intellect 
in preparing his article, his work would have been reduced to mere manual and 
mechanical effort, failing the originality threshold. In order to regard the verbatim 
short-hand notation of a speech as protectable, the Court had to purposefully 
‘intellectualise’ the representation of the reporter’s activity so as to justify bestowing 
authorship. Without this stage of intellectualisation, no protection could have been 
extended to the journalist’s work. Dissenting opinions saw no originality in the 
verbatim passages of the reporter’s article for he acted as the speaker’s scribe when 
notating his speech. To them, his work was the result of physical exertion rather than 
the display of intellectual faculties, and no attempt to ‘intellectualise’ the depiction of 
his input would manage to disguise its physical dimension.308 
In Australia, the landmark decision on the question of originality, IceTV Pty Ltd v 
Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd,309 opposed the “intellectual work” of making creative 
products from “manual work” when commenting on compilations.310 The decision 
based its reasoning on the authority of Sands And Mcdougall Pty Ltd v Robinson311 
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which itself grounded part of its argument on Walter v Lane312 but narrowed its 
application.313  
Sands And Mcdougall Pty Ltd v Robinson quoted the words of LJ Brampton who 
recognised in the reporter’s handiwork the engagement of his brain, thereby justified 
the award of authorship over the former’s work. Isaac J then proceeded to underline 
the fact that although the conclusions of the British case remained good law, “the Act 
does not depend on any strict examination of the language of Walter v Lane”.314 In 
other words, Walter v Lane has not made of all craft or handiwork intellectual 
creations deserving legal protection. Sands315 interpreted the British authority as the 
exception which proves the rule according to which authorship cannot be extended 
beyond the boundaries defining “mental operation[s]”.316 The last decision of the 
Sands dispute317 does not explicitly reiterate the dichotomy between “intellectual” 
and “manual work” as did the first decision.318 However, it did reach the same 
conclusion and was careful to warn Australian judges of the exceptional nature of 
cases where a degree of intellectuality can be found in otherwise largely physical 
endeavours such as verbatim short-hand notation. By containing the reach of Walter 
v Lane, the Australian judicial narrative expressly maintained the antinomy between 
mental and manual labour.  
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This interpretation of Walter v Lane was confirmed in IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network 
Australia Pty Ltd.319 In this case, the Australian bench drew the opposition between 
“intellectual” and “manual work” from Isaac J ’s decision.  
The phrase "intellectual creations" may be compared with the distinction drawn 
by Barton J in Robinson v Sands & McDougall Pty Ltd [(1916) 22 CLR 124 at 
129; [1916] HCA 51] between the "intellectual work" and the "manual work" 
involved in compiling the map in dispute in that case.320 
 
b) No sweat of the brow 
Moving to the US, the courts expressed the same rejection of laborious physical 
efforts deprived of any intellectual element was expressed by the courts. The refusal 
took the form of denying any legal stance or validity to the doctrine of the ‘sweat of 
the brow’. The theory regarded the expense of industrious labour as worthy of 
reward by copyright. According to the US Supreme Court, “a classic formulation of 
the doctrine appeared in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co v Keystone Publishing 
Co”.321 Quoting the second circuit decision, the Bench defined the doctrine as:  
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its 
preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has 
collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such 
materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or 
anything more than industrious collection. The man who goes through the 
streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with 
their occupations and their street number, acquires material of which he is the 
author" (emphasis added).322 
 
According to the sweat of the brow theory, if the creation of a piece had entailed a 
large volume of work on its creators’ part, the latter could still be regarded as original 
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on copyright terms, even though there was no particular creativity in its expression, 
design, organisation or structure. This interpretation of the originality requirement 
was later expressly rejected by the US Supreme Court in the landmark decision of 
Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co.323 The doctrine was criticised for 
allowing the extension of copyright to facts thereby “flout[ing] basic copyright 
principles”:324 
The "sweat of the brow" doctrine had numerous flaws, the most glaring being 
that it extended copyright protection in a compilation beyond selection and 
arrangement—the compiler's original contributions—to the facts themselves. 
Under the doctrine, the only defense to infringement was independent 
creation. A subsequent compiler was not entitled to take one word of 
information previously published, but rather had to independently wor[k] out 
the matter for himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the same 
common sources of information. "Sweat of the brow" courts thereby 
eschewed the most fundamental axiom of copyright law—that no one may 
copyright facts or ideas.325  
 
In short, intense physical labour in the creation of a work does not suffice to trigger 
the bestowal of authors’ rights. To be regarded as the originator of creative material 
and thus be worthy of authorship, the process must involve a degree of intellectual 
input in arranging and structuring such material.326  
Like in Australia, the jurisprudence litigated over the particular case of compilations. 
The reason why intellectual activity was not found in the making of compilations 
might have been influenced by the fact that those creations do not occur ex nihilo. 
This would suggest that the pre-conditions to copyright lying being one, creation from 
nothing, and two, creating with one’s mind are two requirements more permeable 
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than presented thus far. Those observations remain putative since no cases have 
yet formulated the problem as such.  
The above comments described how legal narratives came to endorse the 
opposition of intellectual and manual work also found in cultural discourses framing 
authorship and creation.327 Although courts made it clear that authorship shall not 
reward mere physical effort, the most express rejection of the body as subject-matter 
protectable by copyright was expressed in the context of performances. In the same 
manner the craft of the hand or the sweat of the brow were denied authorial qualities, 
performances, understood as the “lending”328 of one’s body were too made ineligible 
to copyright protection.  
 
B. Lending one’s body 
 
Judicial narratives described performing as the work of the body rather the work of 
the mind. For this reason, it cannot enter the scope of copyright protection. When 
performances did reach the rank of subject-matter protected by authors’ rights, this 
stretch of copyright was enabled by intellectualising performances so as to cover up 
their embodied nature.  
1. Mindless bodies 
 
Performing is the exercise of the body.329 Performers lend their face, voice, body to 
the interpretation of a pre-existing authorial work. Because the style, look and sound 
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of interpretations depend on the performer’s body which is itself “not authored”,330 
performances may not be granted the protection of legal authorship. This simplistic 
representation of the performing process overlooks any possible involvement of the 
performing artist’s mind in the use of his body, intellectual engagement which could 
potentially justify the award of authorship.331  
This depiction of performances has been conveyed by every jurisdiction under study 
with varying nuances. The majority of the judicature’s observations commented on 
the inability to author or copyright voices, or works deriving from vocal 
interpretations. 
In Toney v L'Oreal USA332 the court of appeal of the seventh circuit generally stated 
that an individual’s persona was not subject to copyright,333 including one’s voice in 
the umbrella term of ‘persona’.334 This position had been preceded by the ninth 
circuit in Midler v Ford,335 Sinatra v The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co,336 and Waits v 
Frito-Lay337 where the imitation of voices was not regarded as an infringement of any 
copyright interest vested in the performer since vocal interpretations are not eligible 
to such protection in the first place. Very clearly, the ninth circuit stated that “voice is 
not a subject-matter of copyright”,338 a position confirmed over a decade later in 
Laws v Sony Music Entertainment.339  
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In France, the “tone of one’s voice” was too denied the originality required to obtain 
authors’ rights.340 In 2008, the Court of Appeal of Versailles held that the artist who 
“lends his voice” to a character does not mark the character with the stamp of his 
personality because “he did not create the voice of the character who appeared in 
commercials in 1971 and was subject to sound recording in French language by 
several artists since then”.341 The Court proceeded to argue that “his personality 
does not transpire in his performance which consisted in reading the text, with the 
tone of a voice and an accent which are his own, even though he accentuated those 
traits”.342 
Following a similar line of reasoning, the Australian court concluded in CBS Records 
Australia Ltd v Guy Gross343 that changes to a musical work stemming from a 
different interpretation of vocal lines could not amount to creating an original 
derivative work as the modifications between the previous and new work are caused 
by the singer’s vocal abilities and no other intellectual creative intent. On this basis, 
the Court affirmed:  
For copyright in an arrangement to subsist, the differences from the work 
arranged must be such that a new original work can be identified. Differences 
resulting from mere interpretation, particularly differences brought about by an 
arrangement of a work to suit the qualities of a particular singer's voice, do not 
result in the creation of an original work. […] Creational composition is 
required to bring into being an original work.  
 
As many decisions did before this one, the Bench opposed performative and 
creational, or compositional, inputs. Here, the basis of this distinction appears to lie 
in the physical or vocal nature of the performers’ input as opposed to the intellectual 
contribution a composer or arranger would make. The outcome of this decision may 
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have been influenced by the fact that the second interpretation of the song, over 
which the performer claims copyright protection, was judged by expert witnesses and 
the court to be of a lesser quality than the first. Indeed, the Court confirmed the 
experts’ opinion according to which the notable differences between the previous 
and new work mainly derives from the fact that the second singer (Colette) was 
unable to perform the song with the technicality displayed by the performer (Anita 
Ward) in its original version. The judges explained:  
Collette sings the basic melody of "Ring My Bell" in a simple direct way. Much 
of the colour and variety which Anita Ward was able to give by her singing 
and which Collette could not reproduce or did not attempt to reproduce, were 
introduced by other means, as by emphasising the sound of bells and by 
having a male voice sing a part of the song.  
I am left with the impression that, in so far as Collette's vocal lines were 
concerned, they did not flow from a new composition of which Guy was the 
author but resulted from the fact that Collette sang "Ring My Bell" as best she 
could having regard to her style of singing, her limited range, the qualities of 
her voice and her experience.344  
 
In this case, it seems as though there were two impediments preventing the 
performer to obtain legal authorship for the purpose of her creative interpretation of 
Ring my Bell. First, her input resided in vocal interpretations, themselves depending 
on her natural tone and pitch which do not form the relevant substance for copyright 
protection. Second, the changes in the musical phrase were driven by the singer’s 
inability to perform the song as it was originally interpreted. The subsequent 
performance had thus been arranged to help with Colette’s vocal shortcomings as 
opposed to being intentional compositional decisions, one might say free creative 
choices.  
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In the UK, vocal performances were compared to the sounds of instruments, 
constituting “a part of the overall orchestration of a musical work”345 but not the 
substance of a musical composition itself eligible to copyright protection. This 
comparison emphasises the intellectual inertia of performers in their interpretations. 
It stresses their input as that of objects, or puppets, animated by the mind of the 
author.346  
That said, in Torry v Pink347 the British Court was reported as granting full copyright 
protection over a singer’s contribution which consisting in vocal lines she had 
executed on one of the Pink Floyds’ records. The Court accepted her claim 
according to which she deserved co-ownership of the musical work since her singing 
technique (‘wailing’) contributed to the original composition of the song, thereby 
going beyond the mere activity of interpretation.348  
The representation of the performer as the artist who lend her body, or whose body 
is borrowed by the author has also been conveyed in the jurisprudence of the ninth 
circuit. In Garcia v Google,349 Justice Smith’s dissented with the majority decision 
who had concluded to the eligibility of performers to copyright protection on the basis 
that their activity is deprived of any originality since they consist in lending one’s 
body. He wrote:  
An actress like Garcia makes a creative contribution to a film much like a 
vocalist's addition to a musical recording. Garcia did not write the script; she 
followed it. Garcia did not add words or thoughts to the film. She lent her voice 
to the words and her body to the scene. Her creativity came in the form of 
facial expression, body movement, and voice. Similarly, a singer's voice is her 
personal mobilization of words and musical notes to a fluid sound. Inflection, 
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intonation, pronunciation, and pitch are the vocalist's creative contributions. 
Yet, this circuit has determined that such, though perhaps creative, is too 
personal to be fixed. […] As a result, it does not seem copyrightable.350 
In each one of the above mentioned cases,351 what performers sought was the 
protection of their interpretation of the musical work they had performed. In their 
response, the courts built their argument around the idea that one’s performances 
equated to one’s body, so much so that when assessing the eligibility of 
interpretations to copyright the judges compared the features of the performing body 
to the characteristics of the subject-matter protected by copyright. In doing so, the 
courts reduced performers’ input in the musical work to that of their body. This 
reduction operates by way of metonymy where the performing body is taken for the 
performance, and as such excluded from copyright considerations. 
2. Mindful performances 
 
The portrayal of performers as mindless bodies knows very few exceptions. Rare 
were the occasions when performers have been granted the status of authors for the 
purpose of their performances. Such instances were enabled by intellectualising the 
performing process so as to bring the essence of interpretations closer to the 
subject-matter protected by authorship. A similar intellectualisation of performances 
formed the base of early philosophical works on the art of acting. According to 
theories dating back to the nineteenth century, performers are, or should be, 
intellectual gymnasts utilising their body via the strength of their mind. 
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a) Intellectualisation of performances 
In France, where the author-performer divide is the least stringent,352 the courts 
applied traditional concepts of originality in assessing interpretations without 
necessarily expressly inviting physical or corporeal aspects of performers’ work in 
the scope of authorial creativity. erformers were depicted as observing a creative 
process fairly similar to traditional authorial patterns, i.e. involving a degree of 
intellectuality in performing. This was notably the case in a decision of the Tribunal of 
Seine dating back to 1937353 where the bench explained that the actor « conceives, 
creates in his mind his interpretation beforehand, through an effort which is often 
long and meticulous, the rendering of which he performs, forming a continuous 
creation”.354 Since recordings were then allowing the mutilation of performances, the 
actor was considered as vulnerable as is as deserving of protection as painters or 
sculptors, thus in need of equal protection.355 This description of the acting process 
strikingly resembles the representation of composers’ work patterns given by Park J 
in Hadley v Kemp.356 
In the Sorbelli case,357 the Paris Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusion but 
softened ever so slightly the intellectual nature of the originality displayed by the 
performer which justified his award of authorship. To obtain the status of co-author of 
the picture in which he featured as model, the performer evidenced artistic 
“initiative”358 in the creative process and an “active role”359 in his collaboration with 
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the photographer. For this reason, his portraits were adjudged to be the result of 
both photography and performances combined, warranting the performer the status 
of co-author. Yet, in the depiction of this creative process, the Court did not describe 
performances as manual, physical or embodied works. The presence of the body in 
Sorbelli’s work was left aside and the Court focused on his intellectual or intentional 
input in the composition of the photographs. His creative choices of standing dressed 
like a prostitute in front of the Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, taking poses he 
improvised without the direction of the photographer were the elements regarded as 
worthy of protection, not his physical traits. Indeed, very much like its common-law 
counterparts the French Bench refuses to see in physical silhouettes any aspects of 
subject-matter eligible to copyright protection.360 No reference to the physical 
involvement of the artist in his interpretation was made or used as grounds for 
protection. Similarly, in a previous decision litigating over a trumpeter’s jazz 
improvisation,361 the same court limited its assessment of originality to evidence 
whether or not the musician’s performance bore the “mark of his own style”362 so as 
to present “the characteristics of an original creation”.363 Again, the physical 
presence of the artist in his improvised rendition of the musical work was left out of 
the Court’s reasoning. 
In Stuart v Barrett,364 British judges described with the same economy of words the 
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compositional element involved in improvised performances of a music band 
during jamming sessions. In depicting the input of performers, no mention was 
made to their bodily presence or to the physical nature of their work. Instead, the 
judge refered to the inherently compositional nature of their contribution since the 
musicians were not given any scores or notation of the idea they were expected to 
express through their instrument. 365 The group of performers were described as 
having “made important original contributions to the work”.366 The whole process 
was narrated by the Court as having occurred in the following way:  
[s]omeone started to play and the rest joined in and improvised and improved the 
original idea. The final piece was indeed the product of the joint compositional 
skills of the members of the group present at the time.367 
Here, both the intellectual representation of composing and the manual conception 
of performing were dropped to adopt a more neutral phrase referring to 
“compositional skills” and “original contributions”. 
b) Patterns of intellectualisation 
The intellectualisation of largely physical creative processes is neither a recent nor a 
novel phenomenon of the copyright discourse. Indeed, in Walter v Lane368 the Court 
brought out the mental work underlying the manual activity of shorthand notating a 
speech in order to justify granting full copyright to the reporter for his verbatim written 
rendition of a previous oral work.369 The same logical ‘trick’ was played in the context 
of performances to erase its physical component and augment its intellectual 
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substance so as to satisfy the cultural bias which portrays true creativity worthy of 
authorship as an intellectual endeavour in the legal narrative.370  
This phenomenon of intellectualisation of performances can also be found in the 
tiering of performing artists enforced by the French Intellectual Property and 
Employment Law codes. As explained in previous developments,371 the civilist 
system distinguishes between performers, auxiliary performers and models. 
According to statutory dispositions and their associated jurisprudence, such 
categorisation is based on the more or less original or active nature of performing 
artists’ inputs.  
Previous observations described the lack of clarity in the rules and tests separating 
models from auxiliary performers and auxiliary performers from performer.372 The 
overall scheme does however function on the premise that auxiliary performers 
demonstrate more originality, id est personality, id est intellectuality, than models but 
less so than ‘regular’ performers. Models are defined as passive individuals who 
pose in front of the camera according to the direction they receive from 
photographers and directors. According to the Employment Law Code, their activity 
is also restricted to conveying commercial or advertising messages.373 The passive 
nature of their input in the photography precludes the expression of their personality 
for it lacks both creative freedom and intellectuality. Because models are depicted as 
the epitome of human puppets,374 the act of modelling does not deserve the 
protection extended to ‘works of the mind’ or performances displaying a higher level 
of ‘personality’, in other words intellectuality.  
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This categorisation of performing artists is implicitly based on a grading of the 
intellectual effort invested by the artists in their interpretation. Modelling, portrayed as 
almost exclusively physical, receives the least protection from the law. The relevant 
protective regimes improves as performing artists’ work evidence stronger 
intellectual content, climbing up the ladder from models, to regular performers all the 
way up to author-performers as performers.375  
c)  Theories of intellectualisation: Diderot’s “tears of the brain” 
 
The intellectualisation of performances is not exclusive to legal narratives. Traces of 
similar thinking can be found in philosophical debates studying performing 
processes. As one of the first philosophers to examine the act of performing by 
focusing on the art of acting,376 Denis Diderot377 believed and explained how 
performing is and ought to be an intellectual effort rather than an embodied, or in his 
phrasing, emotional process.378 The philosopher applied his mind/body dualist theory 
to the art of acting to conclude that performing is both an intellectual and physical 
exercise during which actors ought to resort to their intellect in order to control their 
body with their mind rather than their own sensibility.379 According to the French 
theorist, actors must manipulate their body by employing reason so as to mould the 
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former into taking any forms, emotions or movements required by the role. In this 
logic, performing becomes an exercise taxing of the mind, but never the body.380 
Acting on the basis of one’s sensibility would be resorting to lower forms of 
performance, where the body is inevitably less malleable because it is impossible for 
actors to have encountered all the life experiences, stories and emotions playwrights 
may wish to convey to the public. When performers rely on this lower form of acting, 
they risk becoming “wretched pasteboard[s] figure[s]”381 from which the public will be 
unable to grasp the characters and messages authors wished to paint. The great 
performer on the other hand, manages to make of himself the perfect puppet in the 
writer’s hand by exercising his rational skills so to shed “tears of the brain”382 and not 
tears of emotions.383  
His theory reflects how valuable performances were too depicted as intellectualised 
form of expression during the nineteenth century.384 In light of these observations, 
this bias favouring intellectual processes to the detriment of physical ones appears to 
have reached both philosophical and legal discourses framing the questions of 
creativity, authorship, and performances.  
Since then, the intellectuality involved in performances has been acknowledged by 
subsequent theories385 and made consensus in the performing art literature. 
However, performance narratives are careful not to portray performing as wholly 
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intellectual but as the result of a subtle mixture of both intellectual and physical effort, 
they often refer to as ‘embodiment’.386 
3. Embodied exceptions to the intellectualisation of performances  
When accessing the rank of copyright work, performances were not always 
intellectualised by the courts. Garcia v Google387 stands as an exception in this 
series of decisions. In 2014, the court of appeal of the ninth circuit concluded that 
Garcia, the actress, was vested with a copyright interest in her performance. Unlike 
preceding jurisprudence, the decision affirmed the valuable and creative nature of 
performers’ interpretations for what they are: embodied processes drawing on artists’ 
physical traits and creative abilities. The Court presided by Kozinski J stated:  
Google argues that Garcia didn't make a protectible contribution to the film 
because Youssef wrote the dialogue she spoke, managed all aspects of the 
production and later dubbed over a portion of her scene. But an actor does far 
more than speak words on a page; he must live his part inwardly, and then 
give to his experience an external embodiment. That embodiment includes 
body language, facial expression and reactions to other actors and elements 
of a scene. Otherwise, every shmuck is an actor because everyone knows 
how to read. 
An actor's performance, when fixed, is copyrightable if it evinces some 
minimal degree of creativity ... `no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it 
might be. That is true whether the actor speaks, is dubbed over or, like Buster 
Keaton, performs without any words at all.388  
 
In this decision, the ninth circuit court did not attempt to disguise the nature of 
performances under a veil of intellectuality but embraced its originality for what it 
defined as being a process of “embodiment” including “body languages, facial 
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expressions and reactions to other actors and elements of a scene”.389 Despite the 
significant presence of the body in this form of creative expression, the Court 
maintained its finding for originality and authorship. For precisely this reason, mixing 
his argument with considerations of fixation Smith J dissented from the majority’s 
judgement.390 In appeal the decision was overturned, but neither the majority nor the 
dissenting opinions reiterated their arguments on the question of originality.391 The 
en banc panel limited its argumentation to the questions of fixation and layering of 
rights.392 Kozinski J, dissenting in this appeal, did not repeat his reasoning on 
performer’s creativity although he did reaffirm the physical nature of 
performances,393 and in parallel, insisted on the fact that the originality requirement 
was indeed met by performances.394 
A decade earlier, the same circuit had followed a similar reasoning to that of first 
Garcia decision.395 In Newton v Diamond,396 the American court of appeal did not 
dismiss the possibility for a performer to receive copyright protection in his 
performance, without intellectualising the process. The Court affirmed:  
[I]t is clear that Newton goes beyond the score in his performance. For 
example, Dr. Dobrian [expert witness] declared that "Mr. Newton blows and 
sings in such a way as to emphasize the upper partials of the flute's complex 
harmonic tone, [although] such a modification of tone color is not explicitly 
requested in the score." More generally, Dr. Wilson explained Newton's 
performance technique as follows: 
[T]he Newton technique produces a musical event in which the component 
sounds resulting from the simultaneous singing of one or more pitches and 
the interaction of this pitch or pitches with the various components of the 
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multiphonic array of pitches produced on the flute create a relatively dense 
cluster of pitches and ambient sounds that sometimes change over time. 
Whatever copyright interest Newton obtained in this "dense cluster of pitches 
and ambient sounds," he licensed that interest to ECM Records over twenty 
years ago, and ECM Records in turn licensed that interest to Beastie Boys.397  
What is described as being both creative and original here is the performing style of 
the musician, not the intellectual choices or compositional skills he might have 
displayed whilst performing. The Court envisaged the possibility for an activity a 
priori deprived of intellectual components to benefit from legal protection. The degree 
to which the body was involved in this case might have been slightly undermined by 
the dominant presence of an instrument (the flute), yet there is no trace in this 
argument of an attempt to augment the intellectual nature of performing or downplay 
the input of a performing style in the originality of the musical composition. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the decision did not play out in favour of the performer 
unlike the 2014 Garcia case,398 because the former had retained his right in the 
composition but not in the performance.399 
This section illustrated how the legal narrative of all jurisdictions under study came to 
distinguish between the work of the mind and the work of the body, rewarding and 
encouraging the first but not the second. The following and last part of this chapter 
suggests that the concept of ‘personality’ may be a notion useful to reunite both 
kinds of inputs in the originality condition, intellectual and physical.  
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C. Joining the mind to the body 
 
This section envisages the notion of ‘personality’ or ‘imprint of the personality’ as a 
door opening the originality condition to embodied aspects of creation as such those 
displayed in performative works. By definition, the concept of ‘personality’ is at the 
intersection of one’s mind and body. The notion has been used by both copyright 
and performers’ rights to target the essence of the subject-matter protected by each 
set of rights. The same concept is also known of other areas of law such as 
personality or publicity rights, which may have made the courts reluctant to fully 
explore the concept from an intellectual property perspective.  
1. Building a bridge: personality  
 
Personality can be defined as “the combination of characteristics or qualities that 
form an individuals’ character”.400 It is commonly accepted that one’s character is 
both formed by one’s mind and one’s body. Both understandings of personality, as 
intellectual and embodied, have formed the premise of different fields of law. Whilst 
intellectual property law has envisaged the concept from an intellectual stand point, 
publicity rights have acknowledged its corporeal and physical dimension. Indeed, 
one’s image, silhouette and voice, all physical traits, may be subject to legal 
protection under tort, personality or publicity rights in every jurisdiction envisaged in 
this analysis.401 The protection of physical attributes composing one’s personality 
reached an unprecedented level in the American case White v Samsung Electronics 
America402 where the vague resemblance of a television presenter (Vanna White) 
was artificially reproduced onto a robot for the purpose of a Samsung commercial. In 
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this case, the presenter’s persona was considered has being illegally reproduced by 
the technology company.403 Even though the law does seem to acknowledge the 
intellectual and embodied elements of the concept of personality, they remain 
separated and dealt with by different, sometimes clashing,404 areas of law. This 
section proposes to embed the notion in intellectual property systems so as to widen 
its understanding of originality and overall approach to creativity. 
2. Personality as definition of the originality condition 
 
Throughout the evolution of copyright laws, the notion of personality came to find 
itself a place at the heart of the framework. In France, the courts developed the 
doctrine of ‘imprint of personality’ to define the originality condition. The same 
doctrine is said to have inspired the recent harmonisation of copyright across the 
European Union driven by the CoJ. Going beyond the borders of Europe, early 
American cases have also relied on the concept to define the essence of authorship. 
a) The French doctrine of ‘imprint of personality’ 
 
As illustrated in previous developments,405 the notion of originality in the French 
system led to the creation and development of the doctrine of the “imprint of the 
author’s personality”.406 According to the doctrine, a work of the mind can be 
considered as such, so long that it bears the print of its author’s personality. Such 
personal mark may be expressed in a variety of ways which do not involve any 
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condition of novelty or quality, in accordance with other basic principles of copyright 
law also found in common law jurisdictions.407 In 2008, the Paris Court of Appeal 
explained that the author’s personality can be evidenced by the array of creative 
choices she has made during the creative process.408 
A variety of phrases to refer to the doctrine blossomed in the French jurisprudence. 
Relying on by-products and derivatives of the term ‘personality’ courts used the 
expressions of “personal work”,409 “personal imprint”,410 “reflect of personality”411 and 
“mark of personality”.412 In some decisions, the terminology shifted towards “the 
imprint of personality identifiable in the author’s personal sensibility”413 or the 
author’s “emotional personal imprint”.414 The Court of Cassation more consistently 
refers to the “creative effort bearing the imprint of the authors’ personality”415 
specifying that such requirement is the “sole effort able to confer the quality of 
original protected work”.416 
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In the context of the originality condition, the concept of personality is not entirely 
foreign to the British system either. Sherman and Bently point to the fact that 
although the work of the mind was defined as the subject-matter protected by the 
British copyright model as early as the pre-modern era, before that, a broad 
definition of the mental work was adopted by the courts so as to include elements of 
personality.417 
The preceding chapter described how the French judicature extended authorship to 
performers in cases heard before the 1985 reform on performers’ rights, but 
continued to do so under exceptional circumstances after that.418 The present 
chapter has also underlined that in doing so, the same courts may have 
intellectualised the notion of performances or performative inputs so as to render the 
act of performing eligible to author’s rights. The question remains whether in this 
process the courts applied to performers and performances the same test of the 
imprint of personality or not. If so, this would suggest that the doctrine may already 
be utilised to include embodied elements as part of individuals’ creative expression. 
If not, the decision to avoid the doctrine might indicate that the concept of personality 
remains too intellectualised to be applied to performances, so much so that the 
courts were careful to employ different expressions or standards in these particular 
circumstances.419  
In 1937, the Seine Tribunal recognised that interpretations were “personal 
creations”420 just like sculptures, paintings or engravings.421 The notion of “personal 
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417
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creations” resembles what later became by-products of the doctrine of ‘imprint of 
personality’ but no trace of its express mention can be found in the case.  
In 1995, the Court of Cassation referred to the jazz musician’s “mark of its own style 
bearing the character of original creation”422 to justify his award of author’s rights 
over his improvisation on the record “Mademoiselle Chante le Blues”. Here again, 
the notion of “the mark of one’s own style” does not fall far from the concept of the 
imprint of the personality but the expression does not feature in the decision 
verbatim.  
In Soberlli v Yoshida,423 the court granted authorship to the performer for his artistic 
direction and control over the composition of Yoshida’s photographs. Soberlli was 
himself present in the frame, but such physical presence was discussed under the 
cover of image rights rather than intellectual property issues. Although, the Court 
acknowledged his obvious physical presence in the work, they emphasised his 
creative initiatives and artistic control over the work to justify his co-authorship. The 
court referred to the series of choices he had made during his performance in front of 
the camera, but his interpretation was not described has having marked the work 
with the imprint of his personality. However, the doctrine was applied to the 
photographer’s contribution. Indeed, after assessing Sorbelli’s input in the work, the 
Court examined Yoshida’s. It concluded that she too deserved to share the 
ownership over the portraits as she had been in charge of arranging the lighting, 
choosing the angle and equipment with which to take the photographs. The Court 
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concluded that this series of choices led to seal on the work “Miss Yoshida’s 
personal imprint”.424  
One cannot help but wonder whether the application of the doctrine to the 
photographer’s input only, was a conscious and deliberate choice on the part of the 
Court. Is the doctrine of imprint of personality exclusive to authorial works? Did the 
Court apply to Sorbelli’s performance a different test, yet concluded that their 
respective inputs were equal in value? It would be both logical and reasonable to 
assume that the performer was applied the same test regardless of the lack of 
express reference to it.  
This review has left us with more questions than answers. As the law and 
jurisprudence stand in France, it is uncertain whether the notion of personality in the 
context of intellectual property issues could be widened to include physical elements. 
The above mentioned cases do seem to indicate that this hypothesis remains a 
possibility. As a result, the doctrine of ‘imprint of personality’ may offer the flexibility 
judges would need to further extend the close circle of authors and welcome 
performers without having to complicate their intellectual property framework with 
new notions, concepts or rights. 
b) A European take on the ‘expression of ones’ personality’ 
 
The development of the European jurisprudence on the question of originality in 
copyright works tends to confirm that the French doctrine may be the right tool to 
focus on in order to include embodied inputs as original in its scope so as to soften 
the edges of the author-performer divide.  
                                                          
424
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The French doctrine has been identified as the inspiration and origin of the European 
position on the originality condition in copyright law.425 In the context of photographic 
works, European policy-makers embedded in the 1993 Term Directive426 a verbatim 
equivalent of the French doctrine. The seventeenth recital of the regulatory 
instrument reads:  
[W]hereas a photographic work within the meaning of the Berne Convention is 
to be considered original if it is the author's own intellectual creation reflecting 
his personality, no other criteria such as merit or purpose being taken into 
account; whereas the protection of other photographs should be left to 
national law427 
 
Although the authors of the directive appear to attribute the paternity of its 
terminology to the Berne Convention, the only commonality between this statement 
and the wording of the international convention is the description of copyright works 
as “intellectual creations”. Nowhere in the Convention can be read that such 
intellectual creations must reflect their author’s personality. The phrase itself is 
absent from the language of its dispositions. This addition is a direct import from the 
French jurisprudence by the authors of the 1993 Term Directive. The Directive had 
the unhidden agenda of harmonising the originality condition as applied to 
photographic works across national jurisdictions:  
Whereas the protection of photographs in the Member States is the subject of 
varying regimes; whereas in order to achieve a sufficient harmonization of the 
term of protection of photographic works, in particular of those which, due to 
their artistic or professional character, are of importance within the internal 
market, it is necessary to define the level of originality required in this 
Directive428  
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This renewed definition of original photographic works as the intellectual creations 
bearing their author’s personality was duly noted by the CoJ which applied the test 
as spelled out in the 1993 Term Directive. In its Painer decision,429 the European 
judges stated:                   
In view of the foregoing, a portrait photograph can [...] be protected by copyright 
if […] such photograph is an intellectual creation of the author reflecting his 
personality […].430 
The Directive formed the base of the Court’s decision which it cited on many 
occasions. 431 The same judgement coined the expression of “personal touch”432 as 
by-product from the directive-inspired doctrine, which is not without reminding us of 
what first instance courts have done in France.433 
The European endorsement of the French interpretation increases the relevance of 
the personality doctrine when considering ways to shift the thinking around originality 
to include embodied aspects of creativity. Indeed, under the authority of the CoJ, the 
doctrine should be able to go up from the French jurisdiction to the European Union 
level and back down to the British national framework - as well as in any other 
Member States’ system. 
The European take on the doctrine was followed by Proudman J, in The Newspaper 
Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV434 where the national judge came 
close to introducing a verbatim equivalent of the continental paradigm into the British 
discourse as a consequence of the Infopaq jurisprudence. Her decision stated that: 
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The effect of Infopaq is that even a very small part of the original may be 
protected by copyright if it demonstrates the stamp of individuality reflective of 
the creation of the author or authors of the article.435 
 
Yet despite Proudman J’s judgement being confirmed by the Court of Appeal,436 the 
High Court denied any significance to the impact of the European jurisprudence on 
the British copyright framework two years later. Indeed, in Temple Island Collections 
Ltd v New English Teas Ltd,437 the Patent County Court reviewed the state of the 
national jurisprudence in light of the Franco-European doctrine of ‘imprint of author’s 
personality’ to conclude that equivalent tests already present in the British narrative 
would lead to the same result. The Court explained that there was no difference 
beyond the question of language between the standards imposed by European 
policies and those known to domestic judges. When one of the parties referred the 
Patent county judge to a decision of the Austrian Supreme Court complying with the 
Infopaq and Painer jurisprudence,438 he replied:  
In accordance with more recent jurisdiction of the finding Senate, photographs 
are to be considered photographic works […] if they are the result of the 
creator's own intellectual creation, with no specific measure of originality being 
required. […] 
Although the language used in this judgment differs from the way in which an 
English court would traditionally express itself in a copyright case, I believe 
there is no difference in substance between the law as applied here by the 
Austrian Supreme Court and the law here.439 
In order words, the Patent County court found no difference in substance between 
the traditional ‘skills, judgement and effort’ doctrine440 used in British copyright law to 
evidence originality and the doctrine of the ‘imprint of the author’s originality’. This 
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suggests that the national bench has no intention to revise its core copyright 
principles. This attitude may severely limit the reach of the Franco-European 
interpretation of originality, unless further decisions of the CoJ specify the need for a 
change of language in national frameworks. Finally, the question remains whether 
the doctrine will stay contained to the question of photographic works or whether its 
scope will be extended to all intellectual creations, as it is the case in France.  
c) The expression of personality as originality in the United States 
Even though British courts may be wrestling with the recent European jurisprudence 
by resisting its influence, the US seems to have embraced the notion of ‘personality’ 
as far as the originality condition is concerned. Indeed, as early as 1903, the US 
Supreme Court stated in Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co441 that:  
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity 
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something 
irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright 
unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.442 
 
This decision placed the notion of personality at the core of copyright as it defined 
the originality condition as well as the essence of authorship in the American 
framework. This aligns the discourse of the transatlantic common law jurisdiction 
with that of its French counterpart, reinforcing the relevance of exploring the concept 
as a possible route to extend the scope of copyright. The presence of the notion in 
early American copyright cases also confirms Sherman and Bently’s finding 
according to which the notion of personality was blended with the concept of 
intellectual work during the pre-modern era of copyright.443 
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3. Personality as the subject-matter protected by performers’ rights 
 
The concept of personality is not exclusive of authors’ rights. Legal regimes 
applicable to performers also intend to protect elements of artists’ personality and its 
expression.444 Publicity or personality rights are two example. Yet again, copyright 
protection affords a greater level of protection than their non-intellectual property 
neighbours, despite the fact that they cover similar subject-matters.  
a) Performer’s imprint of personality 
Although the French IPC never mentioned ‘personality’ as a defining criteria of 
‘performers’ or ‘performances’, the jurisprudence developed on its basis the 
distinction between the three categories of performing artists. The expression of the 
performer’s personality in his or her interpretation was used to differentiate between 
the work of the model, the auxiliary performer and the performer. The judges of the 
hexagon explained:  
Considering that in the interpretation of a determined musical work, auxiliary 
performers are to be distinguished from performers not only because of the 
complementary and accessory nature of their role, but also and most 
importantly because their personality does not transpire in their interpretation 
unlike performers who are entirely invested in their performance and make it 
original.445 
 
The exact same reference and wording was again used by the Paris Court of Appeal 
in 2008,446 where the Bench held that in the absence of professional conventions 
outlining what amounts to performership and what does not, the expression of the 
artist’s personality would be the standard applied by the courts:  
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In cases where there are no professional conventions applicable in the field to 
identify the nature of the respondents’ interpretations, one must appreciate 
their character on the basis of the evidence presented to the Court and taking 
into account that auxiliary artists distinguish themselves from performers not 
only by the complementary and accessory nature of their role, but also and 
most importantly by the fact that their personality does not transpire in their 
interpretation447 
Later the same year, the judges seating at the Versailles Court of Appeal followed 
their Parisian colleagues’ argument in the Uncle Ben’s case:448  
His personality does not transpire in his interpretation which consisted in 
reading a text, with the tone of a voice and an accent both of which are his 
own, even though he exaggerates the later […].449 
 
In light of those cases, the mother jurisdiction of the imprint of personality doctrine 
clearly appears to have extended its precept to performers’ legal rights. Going 
further, one could envisage utilising the concept of personality to diversify the types 
of creativity protected by intellectual property confirms its strength since the French 
doctrine is at the source of current interpretations of the EU copyright framework.  
This instrumentalisation of the notion of personality gained further ground as a result 
of Kozinski J’s opinion in the 2015 Garcia case. 450 In his dissent, the ninth circuit 
judge relied on this very concept to open up the notion of originality to embodied 
creations such as performances. After acknowledging that performing is indeed a 
physical exercise, the federal judge concluded to its eligibility to copyright protection 
since originality is to be understood as the expression of one’s personality. Referring 
to the Supreme Court’s authorities on the question, he affirmed:  
Garcia’s performance had at least some minimal degree of creativity apart 
from the script and Youssef's direction. One's personality always contains 
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something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very 
modest grade of art has in it something which is one man's alone.451  
 
b) The shadows of personality rights 
The presence of performers’ personality in their work have also barred their 
protection by intellectual property laws. Indeed, elements of the performing artists’ 
persona invested in their performances may trigger the enforcement of publicity or 
personality rights, thereby precluding their enforcement at the federal level.452 In the 
US, Title 17 of the Constitution were specifically amended to prevent such protection 
from trumping the enforcement of federal copyright interests.453 The reform was 
motivated by the wish to limit state-law-originated remedies protective of performers 
from hampering the protection and monopoly conferred to authors by federal 
copyright law.  
It is contended that one’s persona and the expression of one’s personality are two 
different subject-matter of which legal frameworks would be able to draw the 
respective boundaries if equipped with the adequate structure. It is clear that in many 
cases, what performing artists aimed to obtain was protection for the creative work 
invested in the creation of their interpretation. Their claim failed because of narrow 
understandings of the copyright work and originality. Although the courts were 
correct in assuming that a part of performers’ work is infused with their persona and 
personality, reducing performances and performers’ creativity to just that is 
overlooking the conclusions of a century worth of research on and around the 
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performing process.454 Because performing goes beyond the passive display of 
one’s persona, its protection should not be limited or exclusive to publicity or 
personality rights.  
This line of reasoning was supported by Kozinski J when he presided the first Garcia 
v Google decision455 of the ninth circuit court of appeal: 
Just because someone's voice — its particular timbre and quality — can't be 
copyrighted, doesn't mean that a performance made using that voice can 
never be protected.456  
The accumulation of both regimes would a workable option, were it to be adequately 
designed by either policy-makers, the courts, or both. The French judicature opted 
for this alternative and managed to articulate the two types of prerogatives in the 
context of performances, whereby performers’ persona is generally protected as any 
other individuals as well as when it is injected in their work as artists.  
The courts acknowledge that although both sets of rights are available to performers, 
third parties may only be liable to one of the two when the same act was found to 
breach both. As a result, whenever a breach of the performers’ rights is found, this 
higher level of protection shall trump one’s right to the protection of their image. 
Ruling on the use of a clip recording a performance of the Macarena dance by its 
choreographer Mia Frye and accompanying dancers,457 the Paris Tribunal held that:  
The Tribunal considers that the defenders are correct in asserting that Mme X 
[Mia Frye] who asks for the protection of her interpretation as performer, 
cannot invoke her right to one’s image for the purpose of the same infringing 
acts since the two sets of rights are not cumulative.458 
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This position reflects the nature of performances as being the combination of both 
intellectual and embodied creativity expressing one’s personality without depriving 
the artists of their rights to protect their image whenever their performances would be 
regarded as ineligible to intellectual property rights. The Court maintained balance 
between performers’ and third parties’ interests by allowing the two sets of rights to 
coexist but not to be cumulated when actioned. The position of the French judicature 
suggests that legal frameworks can function by protecting both individuals’ persona 
and performing artists’ expression of personality even when the two levels of rights 
overlap.  
 
Summary 
Legal narratives reflect western cultural representations of creativity depicting the 
latter as an intellectual endeavour. Indeed, the comparative study of the American, 
Australian, British and French systems revealed that western intellectual property 
frameworks do convey a bias towards intellectualised understanding of creativity 
which translates in the definition of the author, the copyright work and the originality 
condition. This chapter stressed how such intellectualised representations of 
authorship have negatively impacted the development of performers’ protection 
whose work remain perceived as a lesser contribution to our culture.459 By opposing 
the labour of the mind, authoring, to the labour of the body, performing, the laws of 
Australia, France, UK and the US maintain in contemporary intellectual property 
systems understandings of performances dating back to the nineteenth century if not 
earlier. Although doors opening on modern definitions of creativity are available, 
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such as the notions of personality460 or embodiment,461 very few are the courts who 
engaged on this path. 
It is contended that raising awareness around the influence intellectual biases have 
had on the finding of authorship may trigger the necessary changes in the way 
gatekeepers, judges and policy-makers, handle copyright issues involving 
performances.462 By lowering the degree of intellectuality with which authors are 
expected to infuse their work and acknowledging the level embodied creativity which 
inherently composes any work, the courts may be able to strike the right balance 
allowing both traditional authors and performers to be protected by copyright. In this 
attempt, the notion of ‘personality’ may present itself as an available and useful 
tool.463 The following chapter explores how the intellectualisation of authorship had 
the direct consequence of ‘disembodying performances’, comparing the role of 
performers as that of puppets.  
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Chapter Five 
The disembodiment of performances 
 
 
Grown-ups like numbers. […] If you tell grown-ups, "I saw a beautiful red brick house, with 
geraniums at the windows and doves on the roof...," they won't be able to imagine such a 
house. You have to tell them, "I saw a house worth a hundred thousand francs." Then they 
exclaim, "What a pretty house!”1 
 Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, 1943  
 
James Bond was first born British but became half-Scottish, half-Swiss ten years 
after his literary birth.2 This change of nationality had nothing to do with marriage or 
permanent residency in either Scotland or Switzerland. It occurred after the author of 
the novels watched Sean Connery’s impersonation of the famous spy.3  
Following the actor’s performance, the literary character borrowed some of the 
personal traits brought to him by Connery. In order words, the performer re-shaped 
James Bond’s profile during and after his interpretation. This transformative input 
was later made tangible by Flemming’s decision to rewrite his character’s family 
history. This anecdote illustrates in concrete terms the extent to which the act of 
performing participates in the creation of meaning. Although this position has been 
long-accepted by modern performance theories,4 it has not been so from a legal 
perspective. It is contended that this situation resulted in shaping the author-
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performer divide legal narratives have entrenched in the intellectual property 
systems. 
Previous chapters grounded the presence of the author-performer divide in the belief 
of ex nihilo creation and in the intellectualisation of creativity. It is now submitted that 
the divide is also enabled by a third theoretical principle which, to a certain extent, 
draws on the second. This third theoretical explanation is referred to as the 
‘disembodiment of performances’. It is submitted that such disembodiment 
contributes to conceiving the performing process as an uncreative stage in the 
production of creative works, or at least inferior to authoring. This depiction of 
performers allows for the over-simplification of performances which in turn, supports 
its alleged inferiority. This perception of performances is itself based on two distinct 
but interlinked premises: the ability for all performing bodies to interpret all works as 
if they are universal human puppets (1), themselves controlled by the author’s 
transcendental creative thought (2). This chapter unfolds those two principles and 
underscores their resonance in the legal narrative. The last section reinstates the 
creative contribution of performances by emphasising the role and impact of 
‘embodiment’. It relies on contemporary interdisciplinary research and evidence 
dismissing the reduction of performers as authors’ mouthpieces.  
 
I. Simplifying performances 
  
Previous developments stressed the extent to which the legal narrative perceived 
performances to be of a lesser creative value than authorial works.5 The subsequent 
section explores a third possible explanation for such hierarchy. It is contended that 
the split existing between authors and performers, authorial works and performances 
                                                          
5
 text to note 329, Chapter 4. 
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stems from, first, conflating the figure of the author, and second, from reducing the 
role of performers to that of puppets. Those premises will be examined in turn before 
highlighting the consequences they have had on defining and assessing the essence 
of performing.  
 
A. Conflating authors 
 
The disembodiment of performances is closely connected with the intellectualisation 
of creativity and authorship.6 Both the authorial figure and product are depicted as 
intellectual. As a result, creators worthy of legal protection are, or ought to be, 
intellectually-gifted individuals. Building on this representation, legal narratives 
portrayed those individuals as geniuses blessed with foreseeing clairvoyance whose 
artistic authority ought to be respected. This deference for the figure of the author 
lent support for the view that the latter’s voice transcends subsequent stages of 
communication of the work to the public. In the context of works destined to the 
stage, such as dramatic, choreographic or musical pieces, this vision suggests that 
the message conveyed by the authorial composition reaches the audience thanks to 
the authority of its prose rather than the enabling process of performances. The work 
would dominate the stage of performances through the authoritative meaning the 
author injected in it. The work written, composed or choreographed by the author is 
thus constructed as the exact entity leaving his mind to reach that of the audience 
without distortion, provided that performers offer the necessary skills. This 
exaggerated representation of authorship can be evidenced in the legal narrative on 
                                                          
6
 see generally Chapter 4 ; text to note 329, Chapter 4. 
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different levels. It resonates in decisions which religiously defer to archetypes of the 
authorial figure and belief in the complete and transcendental nature of their work.  
1. Deferring to creative geniuses 
This deference to the authorial figure built its archetype in the image of long dead 
artists, portrayed as pillars of western cultures. Represented as extensions of 
authors’ personality, original works are too subject to the same protectionism by the 
Courts. In France, the doctrine of moral right further enables such veneration by 
shielding protected works against artistic distortions in the name of creative paternity 
and integrity.  
a) Canonising legendary authors 
In describing creativity, Courts often drew on the practice of celebrated artists who 
thereby became human representations of the authorial archetype. The legal 
narrative rallied Mozart, Bach, Beethoven and Dickens to the cause on various 
occasions. In Rockford Map Publishers v Directory Service Co of Colorado7 the court 
of appeal of the seventh circuit explained that the timeframe during which the 
creative product is made is irrelevant to its eligibility to copyright. It was so decided 
by referring to the creative experiences of those distinguished names. The American 
bench stated:  
In 14 hours Mozart could write a piano concerto, J.S. Bach a cantata, or 
Dickens a week's installment of Bleak House. The Laffer Curve, an economic 
graph prominent in political debates, appeared on the back of a napkin after 
dinner, the work of a minute. All of these are copyrightable. Dickens did 
not need to complete Bleak House before receiving a copyright; every 
chapter-indeed every sentence-could be protected standing alone. […] [The 
plaintiff], like Dickens, loses none of its rights by publishing copyrightable 
matter in smaller units.8 
                                                          
7
 Rockford Map Publishers Inc v Directory Service Co of Colorado Inc, 768 F 2d 145 (7th Cir 1985). 
8
 ibid, 148-9. References and citation omitted.  
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Departing slightly from intellectual property considerations,9 a similar pedestal was 
again erected for Mozart and Beethoven, this time accompanied by Balanchine, 
Oscar Wilde, Rembrandt and Bathus to only name a few.10  
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the court of appeal of the ninth circuit appears to 
have recently updated its repertoire as it built its legal argument referring to the 
cinematographic productions of the Lords of the Rings and the various performances 
it involved.11 This mention granted the American actor Elijah Wood his first feature in 
intellectual property jurisprudence, next to Wilde, Mozart et alii.12 
 
Moving to the UK, the courts there too relied on representations of veneered 
composers’ creative process. In Hadley v Kemp,13 the parties’ composing practice 
were yet again compared to the late Beethoven’s14 even though the Court admitted 
that musical creative processes had changed significantly since then.15  
                                                          
9
 The case of Miller v Civil City of South Bend was not concerned with a dispute on intellectual property 
grounds but on the legality of a ban of strip-teasing establishments in light of the first amendment of freedom of 
expression. See, Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 904 F 2d 1081 (7th Cir 1990). 
10
 see for example Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 904 F 2d 1081 (7th Cir 1990) 1093-5. Stepping away from 
artistic references, American judiciary also reverted to the work of Albert Einstein, the epitome of creativity in 
sciences, to illustrate what creative material is covered by copyright : “Any original literary work may be 
copyrighted. The necessary degree of “originality” is low, and the work need not be aesthetically pleasing to be 
“literary.”[…] Scholarship that explicates important facts about the universe likewise is well within this domain. 
Einstein's articles laying out the special and general theories of relativity were original works even though many 
of the core equations, such as the famous E=mc2, express “facts” and therefore are not copyrightable. Einstein 
could have explained relativity in any of a hundred different ways; another physicist could expound the same 
principles differently.” in American Dental Association v Delta Dental Plans Association, 126 F 3d 977 (7th Cir 
1997) 979, see also Seng-TiongHo v Taflove, 648 F 3d 489 (7th Cir 2011) 499-500. 
11
 Garcia v Google Inc, 786 F. 3d 733 (9
th
 Cirt 2015) 742-3.  
12
 That the author is aware of.  
13
 Hadley v Kemp [1999] All ER (D) 450; [1999] EMLR 58, para N5. See also, text to note 53. 
14
 ibid, para N3, Park J states: “To describe Gary Kemp as the 'writer' of the music could be misleading without 
adding a little explanation. As I have said once or twice already he did not write the music down on paper. We 
have all seen imaginative sketches of the great classical composers of the past sitting at their desks in what one 
imagines might be an attic, quill pens in hand and sheafs of musical paper before them, writing out their 
compositions by hand. Popular music is not usually created that way, and Gary Kemp did not create his music 
that way. He composed at home, with a guitar and sometimes a piano. In this way for each song he developed, 
and fixed in his musical consciousness, the melody, the chords, the rhythm or groove, and the general structure 
of the song from beginning to end. Usually at the same stage he wrote the entire lyrics for the song.”  
15
 Hadley v Kemp[1999] All ER (D) 450 ; [1999] EMLR 58, para N5. In the same decision, Park J states: “After 
all, when Mr Kemp devised the song he devised it for performance, not by himself as a solo artist, but by Mr 
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References to such emblematic personalities of western culture combined with a 
description of the creative process as an intellectual and solitary experience confirm 
the contentions expressed by the critique of romantic authorship.16 Indeed, those 
decisions appear to fall in line with an exaggeration of the authorial figure criticised 
by Woodmansee and Jaszi amongst others.17 
b. Sanctifying authorial works 
In France, the same “author-worship”18 explicitly transpired in a 2004 decision of the 
Paris Court of Appeal. In this case, the Court sided with Victor Hugo’s estate who 
argued that the publication of sequels of the French writer’s most famous novels was 
a breach of his moral right of integrity. In deciding so, the Bench stressed the cultural 
importance of the stories which made them relics of both national and international 
literature. Consequently, derivative works could do nothing but damage the quality 
and integrity of Hugo’s legacy. Expressing an unhidden deference to the author’s 
work, the French Court stated:  
Considering that, outlawing sequels of Les MISERABLES does not, as the 
parties contend, breach the principle of free creation since, in the facts 
presented before us, this work, a real monument of world literature […] is not 
just a mere novel for it presents a philosophical and political angle […]; 
Considering that, it follows that no sequel shall ever be given to a piece such 
as LES MISERABLES, forever complete, and that, the company Plon has, in 
editing and publishing COSETTE OU LE TEMPS DES ILLUSIONS and 
MARIUS OU LE FUGITIF, presenting the works as sequels of LES 
MISERABLES, infringed Victor Hugo’s moral right vested in the latter literary 
work;19 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hadley and the whole band. A composer can 'hear' the sound of his composition in his mind before he ever 
hears it played. Beethoven could hear his music in this sense even when he was deaf.” (para N5) 
16
 text to note 421, Chapter 2. 
17
 text to note 430, Chapter 2. 
18
 Peter Jaszi, ‘Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?’ (2009) 12 105, 116. 
19
 Paris, 4ème Ch, A, 31 mars 2004, « Les Misérables » : D. 2004, jurispr. P2028 note Edelman ; JCP E 2005 N 
1216 § 1. Author’s translation, see orignal text in Appendix 1. 
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The decision held the publishing company liable for the symbolic amount of one euro 
in damages for breach of Hugo’s moral right. Confronted with contradictory evidence 
of the author’s opinion regarding possible creative reuses of his work, the Court was 
eventually swayed by the reputation of Hugo’s work. In the decision, Les Misérables 
appeared as a “philosophical and political” sanctified entity of “world literature” the 
Court made its mission to protect. Despite the Bench’s passion and lyricism, the 
judgement was reversed by the Court of Cassation three years later.20 The highest 
civil court held that criteria of merit or completeness do not, and shall not, enter into 
the scope of the author’s moral right of integrity. The right cannot be placed as a 
barrier to exercise the right of adaptation or the freedom of creation which is 
protected by both the Intellectual Property Code and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.21 
However, the same right to one’s freedom of creation did not receive the same 
degree of protection in the Beckett case.22 A decade earlier, the Paris Tribunal de 
Grande Instance litigated in favour of Samuel Beckett’s estate and forbad the 
performance of Waiting for Godot by a female cast. Here again, the claim had been 
brought on the basis of the late author’s right of integrity. Because the Irish 
playwright had explicitly expressed his wish for the lead characters to be performed 
by male performers only before his death, the French Tribunal accepted his heirs’ 
request to ban the production who had staged women as Vladimir and Estragon.23 In 
                                                          
20
 Cass, civ 1, 30 janvier 2007, N° 04-15.543, arrêt n° 125, Société Plon et autre c/ P. Hugo et Société des gens 
de lettres: Bulletin 2007, N° 47 p. 41. 
21
 ibid. 
22
 TGI Paris 15 oct. 1992, Lindon et Sacd c/ La Compagnie Brut de Béton et Boussagol : inédit, RTD com. 
1993. P. 98 note Françon.  
23
 Near identical facts were presented before the Rome Court of Appeal but received the opposite outcome. The 
Court refused to upheld the French interpretation of the moral right doctrine on the basis that it was a breach of 
the performers’ human right of expression according to McMahon’s account. See, Barbara McMahon, ‘Beckett 
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this decision, the performers’ rights of adaptation and to “freedom of creation”, in the 
Court of Cassation’s own words, were trumped by Beckett’s pre-mortem artistic 
wishes.  
This jurisprudence draws new and deeper lines within and around the author-
performer divide. It appears that users considered as future authors are better 
protected than user-performers whose to free creation can be curbed by underlying 
authors’ rights, even for questions of gender. Although the Hugo and Beckett cases 
are far from identical in their contentions,24 they may implicitly contribute to furthering 
the hierarchy instigated by the moral right doctrine between authors and 
performers.25 Although mitigated by the Court of Cassation in 2007, this line of 
jurisprudence contributes to aligning the judiciary’s deference to esteemed creative 
works with that of their highly-regarded authors. The intellectual aura granted to 
authors by the legal narrative appears to be extended to their works regarded as the 
vessels of their talent and personality. This particular trait of ‘author-worship’ is not 
contained to the civil jurisdiction. Indeed, similar prerogatives were enabled by the 
legal American system beyond the frontiers of the continental doctrine.  
In the US, where the moral right doctrine has barely any grip,26 a dispute presenting 
facts not dissimilar to that of the French Beckett case rose between licensees and 
licensors of Twain’s The Adventures of the Huckleberry Finn. A school production 
had staged Big River, the musical adaptation of the famous novel.27 For the purpose 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Estate Fails to Stop Women Waiting for Godot’ The Guardian (Rome, 2006) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/04/arts.italy> accessed 10 March 2016. 
24
 Respectively, one relates to the question of writing a sequel independently from the work itself, the other 
concerns the performance of the work itself by actors of a different gender than specified by the author.  
25
 text to note 133, Chapter 2.  
26
 As explained in previous developments, the US only provide a limited range of moral rights in the context of 
works of visual arts. Dramatic, musical or choreographic works know no protection from this perspective. US: 
US Code, Title 17 para 16 (1) to (6), 106 A. See also, text to note 142, Chapter 2. 
27
 Michael Carroll, ‘Copyright’s Creative Hierarchy in the Performing Arts’ (2012) 14 Vand. J Ent. & Tech. L. 
797, 798. 
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of their production, Glenelg High School had cast a black student to perform the role 
of Huckleberry Finn, a white character, but a white actor to interpret the role of Jim 
the Afro-American slave.28 In the same manner the prohibited production staging 
Waiting for Godot presented a cross-gender interpretation of the play, the school’s 
version of Big River had reversed the race of the main characters. The school 
production was stopped by Twain’s right holders who considered such reversal as a 
breach of the license agreement they had extended to the theater company. 
Although American copyright law does not grant rights to dramatic works,29 the 
presence of economic rights in Twain’s works and its adaptation coupled with 
contractual prerogatives were enough to leverage the licensee’s bargaining power 
and deter the students from performing their interpretation of the piece.30 Those legal 
rights functioned in a very similar manner moral rights did in the context of the 
Beckett case, in a jurisdiction otherwise reluctant to enforce the civil doctrine.31 
The British judiciary went further by rewarding with authorship the task of pursuing 
previous authors’ creative agenda. In Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins,32 the House 
of Lords rewarded the skills, time and effort the musicologist Sawkins spent on 
reproducing in modern notations the late composer’s intentions:33  
It was the aim of Dr Sawkins, so far as was possible, to reproduce faithfully 
Lalande’s music in the form of an accurate edition close to the composer’s 
original intentions.34  
                                                          
28
 Carroll (n 27) 798. 
29
 n 26. 
30
 Carroll (n 27) 798.  
31
 Respecting those wishes, the Courts are careful not to allow parties to create ersatz of moral rights to fill in 
this voluntary gap by relying on other available mechanism. For an illustration of this point, see for instance, 
Lee v ART Co, 125 F 3d 580 (7th Cir 1997), 582-3. See also, n 32. 
32
 Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins [2005] EWCA Civ 565. 
33
 ibid, para 22.  
34
 ibid. 
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The presence of the Lalande’s underlying composition was no obstacle to granting 
full copyright over the modern notation of the late musician’s work to Sawkins.35 In 
this case, the Court seems to have managed the lack of exnihilo creation for 
Sawkins deployed a significant amount of creative effort in faithfully reproducing the 
author’s original wishes. The Court concluded:   
The first question is whether the performing editions are incapable of being 
regarded as “original” works because Lalande composed the music and Dr 
Sawkins made his editions of that music with the intention that they should be 
as close as possible to the Lalande originals.36 […] 
In my judgment, […] the effort, skill and time which the judge found Dr 
Sawkins spent in making the 3 performing editions were sufficient to satisfy 
the requirement that they should be “original” works in the copyright sense. 
This is so even though (a) Dr Sawkins worked on the scores of existing 
musical works composed by another person (Lalande); (b) Lalande’s works 
are out of copyright; and (c) Dr Sawkins had no intention of adding any new 
notes of music of his own.37 
The decision confirms and reinforces the need to chase and faithfully materialise the 
composer’s authorial will. 
This deference to the sanctified representation of the authorial figure is not without 
exception. Beside the 2007 decision of the French civil Supreme Court in the dispute 
opposing Plon publishing company to Victor Hugo’s heirs, an earlier Australian 
judgement had too made a dent in the protectionism of authorial relics. In Schott 
Musik International Gmbh v Colossal Records of Australia Pty,38 the Court refused to 
recognise a breach of the author’s rights in the electro adaptation of Carl Orff’s 
composition of classical music O Fortuna. The recording company defended its 
contention by relying on the notion of ‘debasement’ as limiting one’s right to produce 
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 Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins [2005] EWCA Civ 565, para 33 and 36. 
36
 Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins [2005] EWCA Civ, para 33. 
37
 ibid, para 36. 
38
 Schott Musik International Gmbh & Co v Colossal Records of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 483. 
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derivative works whenever the latter distorts the original piece.39 According to the 
claimant, the techno-version of O Fortuna had debased the Orff’s work presenting 
his work to the public in a degrading manner. This argument was rejected as it would 
have required the formulation of an aesthetical judgement, which the Court 
categorically refused to deliver.40 Concurring with this argument, Lindgren J also took 
into consideration the fact that the modern adaptation of the musical work had made 
a traditional musical composition popular among more recent sub-cultures.41 He 
affirmed:  
In my view, an arrangement will be less likely to be a debasement where, as 
here, it is an arrangement which ``makes available'' the original musical work 
to the musical tastes of a different period of time or of a different subculture, 
or (as here) of both, and which thereby acquires its own integrity.42 
 
The Australian decision substituted the opinion of a “reasonable person” to that of 
the author in deciding what amounted to adaptations debasing her work.43 
Although isolated exceptions are to be noted, the line of jurisprudence described 
above evidences a clear conflation of the authorial figure as a genius mastermind 
who ought to be respected. In turn, this led the Courts to cherish authorial works as 
the material remnants of those talented minds. The subsequent paragraphs stress 
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 Schott Musik International Gmbh & Co v Colossal Records of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 483, 484-5. 
40
 ibid, 498-9. Lingrend J comments: As Hill J has observed, the capacity to describe music is limited, and 
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 Schott Musik International Gmbh & Co v Colossal Records of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 483, 499. 
42
 ibid, 498. 
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 Schott Musik International Gmbh & Co v Colossal Records of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 483. 
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the great powers legal discourses conferred on authors, going beyond the status of 
intellectual artists. Those alleged powers may explain or justify why the same 
narratives express such devotion to authors. 
 
2. Depicting foreseeing geniuses 
Previous chapters pointed to the intellectualisation of creativity in legal narratives.44 
This section confirms and furthers this argument. It is submitted that more than being 
an intellectual, the author is represented as a creative genius gifted with near 
omniscience or artistic clairvoyance. As the copyright work forms the extension of 
the author’s person, it itself holds the same wholeness and authority in the legal 
discourses.  
a) Omniscient authors  
According to legal narratives, authors are either omniscient or clairvoyant. This claim 
is made on the basis of descriptions of the creative process which depict the author, 
often the composer, as the individual not only able to compose the musical work in 
his mind,45 or “consciousness”46 but as the person who can also anticipate what the 
work will sound like once performed by musicians. This point was the crux of the 
dispute opposing the parties in Hadley v Kemp.47 In the decision, Park J granted 
Kemp with the skill of foreseeing, or ‘fore-hearing’, the performances of his 
collaborators so much so that, his mental composition of the song had already 
included any interpretative variations they performed before their performance was 
executed. The British judge stated:  
                                                          
44
 text to note 12, Chapter 4. 
45
Hadley v Kemp [1999] All ER (D) 450, para N5; White-Smith Music Publishing Co v Apollo Co, 209 US 1 
(Supreme Court 1908) 17. See also, text to note 9 and 262, Chapter 2. 
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 Hadley v Kemp [1999] All ER (D) 450, para N5. 
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 Hadley v Kemp [1999] All ER (D) 450. 
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A composer can 'hear' the sound of his composition in his mind before he 
ever hears it played. […] When Mr Kemp was devising his songs the sound 
which he had in his musical consciousness must surely have been the sound 
they would have when performed by Spandau Ballet, not the sound they 
would have when sung by Mr Kemp alone to the accompaniment just of his 
own guitar.48 
 
Park J did not overlook the fact that significant differences may exist between the 
work presented by the author to the group and the work performed by them for the 
purpose of the record. However, the judge asserted that no differences exist 
between the mental version of the work the musician had composed and the 
recorded version performed by the group. The two versions form the one and only 
vision of the same work the author had in mind. For this reasoning to function, the 
author must have anticipated the performance of each musician before they 
occurred. The Court affirmed:  
As to […] the critical point is that, in my opinion, the songs in their recorded 
form were the same musical works as the songs which Mr Kemp had 
composed in his mind and his memory. Of course there was a marked 
difference between (a) the sound of the song sung by Mr Kemp to the 
accompaniment of himself on an acoustic guitar, and (b) the sound of the 
song sung by Mr Hadley with the backing of the whole Spandau Ballet band. 
But that does not mean that the whole band were creating a new and different 
musical work. Rather they were reducing Mr Kemp's musical work to the 
material form of a recording. After all, when Mr Kemp devised the song he 
devised it for performance, not by himself as a solo artist, but by Mr Hadley 
and the whole band.49 
 
A similar portrayal of the musical work as being a complete unity first conceived in 
the composers’ mind and later played by musicians was also put forward by the US 
Supreme Court. In White-Smith Music Publishing v Apollo,50 the Court held that 
“[a]musical composition is an intellectual creation which first exists in the mind of the 
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 Hadley v Kemp [1999] All ER (D) 450, para N5. 
49
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composer; he may play it for the first time upon an instrument”.51 According to the 
American bench, the performance by the musician is a copy of the pre-existing 
mental work which had somehow anticipated its sounds, pace and interpretation. 
Like in Hadley,52 the American Supreme Court regards the performance of the 
musical work as the exact materialisation by the performer of the mental composition 
created by the author since the former anticipated the inflections of the former. For 
this reason, the author becomes an intellectual individual gifted with the rare talent of 
foreseeing how others will receive, understand and in turn interpret his work, for his 
creation conveys and carries the necessary authoritative creative power to achieve 
this feat.  
b) Omnipotent works  
Represented as the material image of the author’s creative intention, the written, 
fixed or recorded work has become the second authoritative reference in the 
performing process, after the author herself. Not only can the author foresee what 
and how performers will interpret the work, but the work itself is the embodiment of 
that prediction. As a result, performances must refer to and abide by the predications 
of the written work. As the author appears to be omniscient, the work becomes by 
the same token somewhat omnipotent in its ability to communicate through time and 
bodies the genial thought of its creator. This assumes that the mental conception of 
the work was complete in the author’s mind and that the same completeness was 
then encapsulated in its material form. In this logic, performers need not to intervene 
in the composition of the work’s substance when interpreting it since the latter is 
complete, therefore readily performable. Performing artists thus limit their input to 
                                                          
51
 White-Smith Music Publishing Co v Apollo Co, 209 US 1 (Supreme Court 1908) 17. 
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lending their body, a consequence the legal narrative explicitly noted in the American 
decision Garcia v Google.53 The presence of the script as the complete embodiment 
of the film maker’s creative thought made of performing a creative contribution 
irrelevant for copyright purposes. Smith J noted:  
Garcia did not write the script; she followed it. Garcia did not add words or 
thoughts to the film. She lent her voice to the words and her body to the 
scene.54 
 
This passage illustrates how the performing input is conceived as channelling the 
complete work of the author rather than adding any substantial additional meaning. 
This representation of performances is only possible if the work itself is perceived 
and understood as the whole representation of the authorial thought.  
i. The myth of the musical work 
In the field of music studies, and particularly in classical music, the relationship 
between the musical work, the scores and the performance is the subject of much 
debate.  
Classic, one might say conservative, theories believe in the existence of the musical 
work, as the unchanging result of the author’s composing process. According to this 
understanding, composers conceive and create musical works whose contours, 
depth, notes, pitches and tempos are definite and set in stone.55 As a result, every 
performer interpreting them must strive to replicate those works with the same 
exactitude the composer created them with.56 In this logic, each musical creation has 
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its own immaterial avatar, performers faithfully reproduce in order to be regarded as 
acceptable references of a particular work.57 In their task, performers are aided by 
the scores or records58 which are often taken for near perfect embodiments of the 
musical work.59  
In Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd,60 the British High Court of the Chancery Division 
confirmed this function of the scores:  
Clearly the more comprehensive the instructions to the performers in the 
score are, the less room there will be for the performers to experiment or 
improvise. By the same token the composer may, by producing a detailed 
score of this kind, be able to convey to the audience a more precise version of 
the music he intended. 
 
In The Composer’s Advocate, Enrich Leinsdorf supports a strong protection of 
composers’ wishes and creative intentions against “the risk of interpretation”.61 That 
said, the theorist also contends that the best way to convey and have one’s creative 
intentions respected by future performers is to allow for the work its material 
renditions (i.e. the scores) to evolve with its audience. According to him, “the score 
with the fewest directives is usually the most resilient, because the text itself, free of 
extra comments, allows for the changes that decades and centuries bring about.”62 
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Leinsdorf advocates that “the interpreter’s chief task is to perform works of earlier 
times in ways that make them most meaningful to audiences of his own generation, 
without in any way distorting the intrinsic nature of the works or violating the intention 
of the composer or playwright”.63 Performers should be able to achieve such effect 
by differentiating between “the essential character of a work – its structure, tone, and 
meaning – and its time-bound externals”.64 The theorist compares musical works and 
scores to planes and buildings which too, must adapt to the environment elements 
surrounding them in order to survive the pressure they work against:  
[Bach’s] music reminds us of great buildings and bridges that must sway with 
the winds and yield to the elements, lest they crack under the strain of too 
rigid resistance. Ships and airplanes too also must be flexible; and scores that 
are to survive the ages have some of these qualities.65  
Modern or radical views question the very existence of musical works as this 
immutable avatar of the composer’s creative intention.66 According to the latter 
movement, music does not have any set, definite musical works with clear-cut 
boundaries and invariable parameters, depth, notes, pitches or tempos. 
Compositions are conceived as ever evolving, existing in the moment of 
performance and vanishing after that.67 There are no works to refer to as music is 
defined by the lived experience of performing and hearing the performance. This 
conceptualisation of music thus emphasises its intangibility and immateriality.68 The 
same critique underlines the development of sound records as reinforcing the myth 
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of the musical work and of the scores as an objective point of reference to abide 
by.69  
ii. Doubting the scores 
The modern movement envisages musical scores as representations of 
compositions inevitably incomplete because their two-dimensional nature fails to 
convey every element of performativity. Cook points to the historical evolution of 
musical notations to evidences their intrinsic inability to be taken for the perfect 
representation of the composer’s wishes.70 He writes:  
 
c) Passive audiences 
This representation of the author and work as transcending the performing stage 
ultimately depicts audiences or readers as passive agents. Although this observation 
takes the present analysis on a slight detour from its focus on the relationship 
between authors and performers, works and performances, it remains relevant for it 
is a direct consequence of the premises established so far. This conception of 
authors has made them the creator of meaning, and their work the source of it. Their 
powerful authority is not limited to controlling and moulding the stage of 
performances but also assumes that authors entertain the same power relationship 
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with readers and spectators who become passive recipients of the meaning they 
compose.  
A substantial body of research has challenged this vision of the author, of its 
authority and of the creation of meaning.71 This critique formed the backbone of post-
modern theories on authorship and continues to inform contemporary scholarship in 
the fields concerned.72 Taking the example of literature studies, Louise Rosenblatt 
narrates how obsolete the fiction is that paints readers as passive agents on the 
receiving end of the transaction of meaning sent by the author.73 She stresses the 
conversational and proactive approach to reading many theorists and philosophers74 
adopted. Indeed, the latter reconceptualised the act of reading as a phase of active 
contemplation,75 deciphering,76 and co-creation of meaning. 
In the legal discourse, similar representation of readers’ active input has been noted 
by the court of appeal of the seventh circuit. In Gaiman v McFarlane,77 Posner J 
drew the difference between “literary and graphic expression”.78 The circuit judge 
explained that “[a] reader of unillustrated fiction completes the work in his mind”79 
whilst “the reader of a comic book or the viewer of a movie is passive”.80 According 
to him, “[t]he description of a character in prose leaves much to the imagination, 
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even when the description is detailed”.81 Although the proactive position of readers is 
only acknowledged in the context of unillustrated literary works and the decision 
makes no particular reference to post-modernist or academic views on the question, 
the seventh circuit’s definition of the reader brings the legal discourse a step closer 
to modern theories.  
 
B. Standardising performers 
 
As explained above, authors are described as able to predict performances for they 
mentally anticipated them and designed the work accordingly. This ability is either 
enabled by the gift of clairvoyance and omniscience, or by the reduction of 
performers to one identical performing body, or both. The above described model of 
authorship thus functions on the premise that all performers are the same, that is, 
that all performing bodies present similar physicality and skills. Performers become 
universal therefore inter-exchangeable. This approach to the performing body 
enables the first premise which assumes that the author is able to anticipate any 
interpretation given by any performing body.  
1. Authors’ puppets 
By reducing the input of performers to that of identical blank canvasses onto which 
authors paint their work to the public regardless of who the performing individuals 
are, the latter are essentially reduced to being their puppets. The analogy between 
performers and puppets reflects the position of performers as artists entirely 
controlled by the author through the authoritative power of his work. Performing 
artists would mould their body to each creative piece as its creator requires, taking 
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shapes and forms on command. As a result, the same work, performed by different 
performers to different audience, would and should have the same impact and 
convey the same message.  
Parts of the legal narrative have endorsed this representation or understanding of 
performers. Though, cases have not expressly referred to performers as ‘puppets’, 
passages describing their interaction with other the alleged authors or copyright 
works illustrate the comparison. This analogy assumes two distinct characteristics of 
the performing body which are characteristics of the puppet figure: its malleability in 
the hands of the author, and its interchangeability with others of the same kind.  
a) Performers as malleable mannequins  
In France, it appears that the ability to shape the performing body is an integral 
component of authorship. By contrast, malleability appears to be the skill of the 
performing body, at least as far as models are concerned. In a 2008 decision of the 
Paris Court of Appeal,82 the Bench held the photographer’s control over the pose 
and expression of the actress he photographed on the set evidenced the authorial 
nature of his input in the shots he took.83 The power-relationship between the 
actress, here model, and the photographer defined his position as author of the work 
produced by their collaboration. In contrast, the depiction of his control over her 
posture contributed to describing her input as that of a passive mannequin, or block 
of clay ready to be moulded by the photographer in the same way a sculptor would. 
The courts points to this specific interaction between the author and the performer as 
included in the range of creative choices, photographers make when they produce 
original protectable works. The judgement concluded: 
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It follows that the photograph reproduced on the cover of the publication 
entitled CINEGUIDE 2001 bears the mark of [the photographer]’s because the 
choices he made – position of the actress, angling, lighting – contributed to 
make of the photography an original work of the mind, and as such, eligible to 
the protection granted by Title I of the Intellectual Property Code.84 
It appears that the French jurisprudence had included the artist’s control of the pose 
of the subjects she photographs to the list of the elements traditionally taken into 
consideration by the CoJ to evidence the right type of originality in a photographic 
work. This position seems to have been maintained after the Painer decision given 
by the CoJ three years after Paris Court of Appeal’s decision.85 Indeed, in the Jimi 
Hendrix case,86 the Paris Tribunal might have implicitly taken into consideration the 
lack of control over the musician’s posture and expression to deny copyright 
protection to the photographic work.87 This ‘implicit’ approach to assessing originality 
may explain why the Parisian jurisdiction declared its decision compliant with the 
European authority. Indeed, whilst Gered Mankowitz (Hendrix’s photographer) was 
described as having had not say in the icon’s demeanour in front of the camera, the 
opposite was proved in the context of Ms Eva-Maria Painer’s work. Although the 
positioning and expression of the child she photographed is not mentioned as one of 
the elements the Court would have included in the series of creative choices the 
author must make in order to inject her personality in her work, it is very likely that 
she was indeed in control of this aspect of the picture’s composition as well, unlike 
Mankowitz. Indeed, the model’s position in front of the camera is one of the aspects 
of photographic portraits regimented by aesthetic conventions applied to this type of 
portrait, alongside the lighting, the angle and choice of background. This criterion 
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appears to be the only logical argument reconciling the French jurisprudence to the 
European position, although no mention of it is made by either decision.  
The same reasoning according to which the performer is not in control of his or her 
body during the interpretation of underlying creative works was expressed in the 
American judicial discourse. As mentioned on many occasions before, this was the 
point put forward by Smith J in it dissenting opinion in the first decision given by the 
ninth circuit in the Garcia dispute.88 The circuit judge pointed to the fact that the 
performer speaks the words and embodies the movement determined by another 
creative mastermind, that is, the author.89 
b) Performers as interchangeable marionettes 
The second key feature of the performer-puppet analogy is their uniformity or 
interchangeability. Since puppets can take any form at the pull of their strings, 
performers too should present the same universal corporeality or uniformity. As 
such, one performer would and should be replaceable by another without 
significantly impacting the rendition of the work.  
This particular trait was underlined by the French jurisprudence on the question of 
auxiliary performers. One key aspects of this class of performers is, according to the 
civil judges, their ability to be replaced by others without modifying the overall 
performance. The notion of interchangeability of performers has sometimes been 
permuted with or evidenced by the impossibility to identify or distinguish a particular 
performer from the rest of her performing cohort. In a decision dating back to 1993, 
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the Paris court of appeal90 affirmed that granting the status of performers to auxiliary 
performers on the occasion of a performance identical to that of other extras would 
empty the notion of auxiliary performers. Basing its decisions upon legislative intent, 
the Bench submitted:  
Considering that Mr Armbruster plays, in this film, one of the three wolves, 
which all adopt exactly the same attitude, execute de same movements and 
cannot be distinguished from one another ; that in their segment, the wolves 
do not have prominent role, that their performance is shorter (few seconds at 
most) than that of the couples; that impersonating the character of the wolves 
does not require any particular skills, not that any of the other roles do, that 
the performers interpreting the wolves cannot be given the status of 
performer, without emptying the category of auxiliary performers of its 
substance and extending the advantages of “neighbouring rights” beyond 
what the legislator intended, as the public ministry pointed out correctly ; in 
such circumstances, the first instance judges were correct in denying Mr 
Armbruster the status of performer for the purpose of his performance in the 
advertising clip […]. 
 
Fifteen years later,91 the same court deployed a similar logic in the reasoning of its 
2008 Uncle Ben’s decision,92 distinguishing between performers and auxiliary 
performers: 
The expert noted in his report dated 30 November 2005 that even case when 
the recordings were played independently from the advertising clips, only 
careful listening or listening in excellent conditions could allow the 
identification of [the claimant]’s voice among previously recorded renditions of 
the character by other performers who lent their voices to Uncle Ben, and so 
despite the obvious qualities of his voice presents. In light of these elements, 
[the claimant] cannot be granted the status of performer since his 
performance was the work of an auxiliary performer […] 93 
The interchangeability of performances and performing bodies was made the 
bedrock of the distinction between the categories and auxiliary performers by the 
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French jurisprudence. The Paris Court of Appeal went further in affirming that this 
criterion shall be the primary element to define the scope of performership, trumping 
other considerations such as duration and prominence of performances. Litigating a 
dispute between two solo singers collaborating with the choir Era and the group’s 
recording company.94 The Court stated:  
Despite their brief duration, [their performance] is not secondary but, to the 
contrary, marks a change in the overall work giving it a noticeable coloration;  
Considering that, it can neither be said of their voices that they are 
interchangeable; that indeed, another performer with another tone of voices 
would necessarily give the work a different coloration […].95 
The question remains whether the colouration of one’s voice is considered as 
varying because no two performers are identical, or because the Court accepts that, 
like instruments, different categories of instruments will offer variety within the range 
of the their class that is here voices. In this case, performers are no longer puppets 
but human instruments, a new comparison further discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
c) Performing bodies as instruments  
The passivity supporting the performer-puppet comparison continues to prevail when 
performers are taken for living instruments. When commenting on the relationship 
between lyrics and musical works in Williamson v Pearson Partnership,96 the British 
High Court stated: 
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After all one gets enjoyment from hearing a song sung in a language with 
which one is totally unfamiliar. The enjoyment could well be diminished if the 
vocal line were replaced by another instrument, eg, the piano or a flute.97 
 
Here, Baker J seems to take for synonymous the performance of a musical phrase 
by an instrument, and that of a vocal line by a performer. The human voice appears 
to be associated with an instrument used by the performer as the seating judge 
employs the phrase “another instrument” to refer to pianos and flutes, implying that 
one’s voice belongs to this group. Although the decision of the Court does point to 
the unique character and input of performer’s voices compared to instruments, it 
maintains the analogy between the two, suggesting that they are inter-exchangeable, 
like instruments within the same class.  
This interpretation of Baker J’s comment is comforted by the observations made in 
Hayes v Phonogram Ltd.98 in which Blackburne J based his reasoning on the 
verbatim quote of the previous decision, here above cited.99 Leaning on this 
statement, the judge sitting at the Chancery division insisted on the association 
between the performer’s use of his or her body and that of an instrument. 
Responding to the claimant’s argument, he confirmed:  
I understand [Baker QC’s] observations to mean no more than that the human 
voice can constitute a part of the overall orchestration of a musical work, 
much like a musical instrument in a band or an orchestra.100 
 
This comment expressly reasserts the association between performers’ use of their 
body and that of musical instruments. This suggests that the performing body can be 
reduced to being an instrument, usable and malleable at will by the performer in 
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order to channel without distortion the author’s creative intention, so expressed in the 
copyright work, or any other material renditions of it.  
In Australia, the Spicer Committee expressed a similar view in the context of musical 
performances. In its 1959 report,101 the committee proposed to substitute the word 
“performers” for “instruments” in the wording of Section 8(6) of the 1956 Act related 
to adaptation rights.102 The original disposition read:  
 (6) For the purposes of this section an adaptation of a work shall be taken to 
be similar to an adaptation thereof contained in previous records if the two 
adaptations do not substantially differ in their treatment of the work, either in 
respect of style or (apart from any difference in numbers) in respect of the 
performers required for performing them.103  
According to the Spicer committee “[t]he meaning of this provision is rather 
obscure”104 because “it is not clear whether the last requirement refers to the quality 
of the performers or the instruments or to both.”105 The report details:  
It seems to us that different instruments rather than performers is the vital 
factor. We therefore recommend the enactment of a provision to the effect of 
section 8 (6) substituting “instruments “for “performers“.106 
In Schott Musik International Gmbh v Colossal Records of Australia,107 the Federal 
Court of Australia pointed to the substitution advised by the Committee and 
subsequently enacted by the Australian Parliament in May 1967.108 In the same 
decision, the Bench noted that such modification “did not mark a difference of 
substance from the then recently enacted United Kingdom provision.”109 This 
suggests that neither legislators nor the judiciary considered the amendment 
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important in defining the relationships between authorial works, derivative works and 
performances. This analysis rejects and contradicts this view. It is contended that 
such swap is indeed revealing of both legislative and judicial perceptions of 
performers. Policy-makers appear to consider the roles of performers and 
instruments as similar, if not as identical, in the interpretation of musical works. The 
analogy between the performing body and the instrument furthers the perception of 
performing artists as passive objects in the delivery of the work to the audience. This 
confirms the interchangeable nature of their contribution, and their ability to behave 
like puppets channelling the author’s mind.  
2. Ingenious puppets 
The analogy between the performer and the puppet is more refined than the above 
paragraphs suggest. In The Paradox of Acting,110 Diderot developed an interesting, 
but equally reductive, theory on the role of performers. He distinguishes between two 
types of puppets, associated with two kinds of performers. As explained in previous 
developments,111 the French philosopher emphasises the difference between 
interpretation coming from the performer’s sensitivity and those emulated by his 
mind.112 According to Diderot, only the second can be considered as developing the 
art of acting, whilst the other is a pale imitation of it.113 When the actor deploys the 
strength of his intellect to places on his/her body at the service of the author, the 
latter becomes a universal “pasteboard figure”,114 whose “own special shape never 
interferes with the shapes he assumes”115 so much so that he can be “everything 
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and nothing”.116 Diderot unequivocally relies on the puppet/performer analogy to 
elicit the essence of the art of performing.117 He explains that “a great actor is also a 
most ingenious puppet, and his strings are held by the poet; who at each line 
indicates the true form he must take”.118 Like “most ingenious puppets take every 
king of shape at the pull of the string in his master’s hand”;119 the performer who 
knows his craft120 is able to offer a universal corporeality to be moulded by the 
author’s creative intentions.  
The French theorist stresses the rarity of such skill and for this reason rejects the 
comparison between instrument and performing bodies. According to him, “a great 
actor is neither a piano forte, nor harp, nor a violin […] he has no key peculiar to him, 
he takes the key and the tone fit for his part of the score and he can take up any. I 
put a high value on this talent of a great; he is a rare being as rare as, and perhaps, 
greater than, a poet”.121 The performer is more than an instrument, he is an 
ingenious puppet. A talent so rare to display, that Diderot offers to reverse the 
author-performer hierarchy in favour of the latter under the exceptional 
circumstances where a performer would evidence the rarest ability of all: 
disembodying his own body. 
Indeed, what Diderot suggests here, is that no performing body is actually universal, 
therefore interchangeable as the legal discourse may suggest, but can be made so 
via the exercise of the mind. To him, the embodiment or interpretation of a dramatic 
or musical work is enabled by a primary stage of disembodiment of the performers’ 
own corporeality, who thereby stripes his body from any particularities, histories, 
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emotions or sensitivity in order to offer himself as an immaculate human canvas onto 
which the author will be able to paint his work to the audience without distortion. For 
Diderot recognises the complexity of disembodying one’s own body for the purpose 
of embodying somebody else’s creative intention, he places a high value on this 
particular skill. 
This understanding of the art of acting as an art of ‘disembodiment’ offers an 
application of mind-body dualism at its paroxysm. According to Diderot’s theory, the 
actor’s body assists the creative purpose of another mind, that of the author. The 
performer’s mind has no interaction with the meaning produced by the author. To the 
contrary, it is focused on preparing his body to channel the authorial work from the 
page to the stage without modification, in full obedience to the playwright’s wishes.122  
 
3. Disruptive puppets  
The channelling transaction between the author, the performer and the audience 
may be prejudiced whenever the actor fails to adequately ‘disembody’ his body 
thereby becoming what Diderot refers to as a “wretched pasteboard”.123 In such 
circumstances, the work presented to the audience will be unintentionally coloured 
by the performers’ particularities and the message will be conveyed proportionally 
distorted. As a result of this chaotic transaction linking the author to the spectator via 
the ill-equipped performer, the work communicated to the public will be deformed.124 
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The Australian case CBS Records Australia Ltd v Guy Gross125 dealt with this 
particular hypothesis. In this case, the performer had modified the original musical 
work because her interpretation skills did not allow her to perform it otherwise.  
In this decision, the Court refused to see the modifications of a song triggered by the 
singer’s inability to replicate the original performing style as amounting to composing 
a derivative work or giving rise to arranging rights in the subsequent version. In order 
words, the modification of a work arising from a poor performance is not to be 
rewarded with authorship. The threshold of originality may be modest, but it is not 
quite that low. The Court stated:  
[I]n so far as Collette's vocal lines were concerned, they did not flow from a 
new composition of which Guy was the author but resulted from the fact that 
Collette sang "Ring My Bell" as best she could having regard to her style of 
singing, her limited range, the qualities of her voice and her experience.  
[…] Differences resulting from mere interpretation, particularly differences 
brought about by an arrangement of a work to suit the qualities of a particular 
singer's voice, do not result in the creation of an original work.126 
 
The facts presented before the Australian court illustrate the theoretical notion of 
performers as “wretched pasteboard[s]”,127 who become dysfunctional puppets. In 
distinguishing between compositional modifications and modifications of a work 
caused by the lack the performer’s lack of skills, the Court appears to side with 
Diderot in noting the risks of mutilating musical works poor performances create.128 If 
such occurrences are not sanctioned by the Australian framework, they shall not be 
encouraged or rewarded either.  
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C. Streamlining performances 
 
The previous developments illustrated how legal discourses endorsed a one-sided 
transitional approach to the relationship between authors and performances. 
Performing is conceived as enabling the author’s creative authority to reach 
audiences by offering her a passive and malleable channelling platform. The 
conflation of the authorial figure combined with the reduction of the performing input 
form two sides of one coin otherwise referred to as the process of disembodiment.  
The disembodiment of performances allows the representation of the performing 
stage as an uncreative and linear step in the process of communicating the work to 
the public. From this perspective, such performances form one link of the larger 
chain connecting the author to the end-user. This wider chain is streamlined as a 
one-way uniform transaction,129 where the author is the source of meaning which 
she conveys in the work the user receives passively. In this transaction, performers 
form an enabling step whenever the authorial work needs interpretation to be fully 
accessible by the audience, whether it is by performing scores or offering a lived 
three-dimensional experience of a dramatic and musical work. In this logic, 
performers’ contribution to the chain is and should remain limited to this basic 
enablement, leaving the initial authorial meaning intact, neither distorted nor 
augmented. In the context of music, some have contended that performers were in 
fact an unfortunate necessity to cope with the audience’s illiteracy. Arnold 
Schoenberg once explained that “[m]usic need not to be performed any more than 
books need to be read aloud, for its logic is perfectly represented on the printed 
page; and the performer […] is totally unnecessary except as his interpretations 
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make the music understandable for an audience unfortunate enough not to be able 
read it in print”.130 This position represents the musical work as an objective entity, a 
depiction of the authorial creation post-modern views on authorship aimed to 
dismiss.131 
This model assumes a variety characteristics of the performing process. Mirroring 
the overarching communicative transaction, performances are a transparent stage 
during which the work is channelled without distortion whenever authors are 
fortunate enough to have their creation interpreted by performers with the necessary 
skills.132 Performances do not result in the production of any additional meaning 
beyond the substance already contained in the work. Being a transitional step in the 
communication chain, performances do not lead to the creation of any product, 
tangible or not, but enabled the full accomplishment of a pre-existing one: the 
authorial work.133  
This model summarises the performing stage as first, transparent and linear and 
second, unproductive and intangible. Those two traits combined made of the 
performing phase an invisible step in the creation of meaning and cultural narrative. 
It is submitted in the subsequent developments that the value of performances in the 
communication of creative works can only be accepted if it is made more 
ascertainable, more visible.  
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II. Reinstating performances  
 
This section points to theories and concepts which would allow the reinstatement of 
performances as creative original expression, and cultural narratives in general. It is 
argued that the valorisation of performances can be achieved by the inclusion of the 
notion of ‘embodiment’ in the concept of originality in relation to copyright laws. 
Although defining ‘embodiment’ may be a challenge, it is contended that the concept 
remains the relevant path to explore in order to insert performances within the 
category of protected subject-matter. For this insertion to be successful, it is crucial 
to make it accessible to non-expect such as lawyers, judges and a policy-makers.  
 
A. Acknowledging embodiment  
 
It is submitted that performers’ creative input lies in the process of embodiment. The 
value of performance resides in the necessity for this stage to occur for the 
performances to take place. The notion of ‘embodiment’ moves away from a 
transactional representation of the relationship between the authorial work and the 
performing artist. It pictures a complex triangular connection between the author, the 
work and the performer. This redefined conceptualisation of the performance and 
performing body implicitly rejects the notion that the latter are, or can be made, the 
same. The very concept of embodiment functions on the premise that performing 
bodies vary from one to the other so much so that no authorial work can ever be able 
to predict every one of those variations. 
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1. Works as complex ménage à trois 
Acknowledging the role of embodiment walks hand in hand with dismissing the 
disembodiment of performances identified in the previous developments. 
Approaches critical of disembodied takes on the performing process reject 
arguments according to which the authorial work is complete, therefore readily 
performable, and that universal performing bodies exists. The following paragraphs 
point to the various aspects of the western legal narratives included in this analysis 
which have supported the same criticism, intentionally or not.  
Previous comments stressed the conceptualisation of the authorial work as 
encapsulating an omniscient creative thought with omnipotent capabilities in shaping 
performances. This theorisation echoed Diderot’s analogy between the performer 
and puppet in which the author, or in his narrative the poet, becomes the master 
puppeteer controlling its movements, shapes and says.134 Modern approaches have 
challenged this reduction of performances to mouthing the authors’ words on stage 
since the early twentieth century and their position still informs current thinking in 
performance theories. Their findings were adopted by Kozinski J in the ninth circuit 
court of appeal’s first decision on the Garcia dispute.135 The decision marks the first 
penetration of contemporary performance theories into the legal narrative as a base 
for justifying performers’ eligibility to copyright authorship.  
a) Re-embodying performances  
At the very beginning of the twentieth century, Georg Simmel challenged Diderot’s 
conception of the performer despite the strong aesthetic conventions still favouring 
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his French predecessor at the time.136 For the German philosopher, acting has 
nothing to do with the ability of being human canvases onto which the author can 
paint his play to the spectators. Simmel describes the complex ‘ménage a trois’ 
between the character depicted by the author in writing, its understanding by the 
performer, and the performer’s own personality and physicality. To him, a subtle 
fusion of the three composes the performance. More importantly, Simmel appears to 
be the first author to question the author’s ability to conceive ‘ready-to-be-performed 
characters. He argues that even the most meticulous playwright is unable to 
describe a character in such details: 
The dramatic character given in a text is, in some sense, an incomplete 
human being; he does not represent a sensual human being but the sum of all 
that can be known about a human being through literature. The poet cannot 
predetermine the voice or pitch, the ritardando or accelerato of his speech, his 
gestures or even the special aura of the living figure. Instead, the poet has 
assigned fate, appearance, and the soul to the merely one-dimensional 
processes of the mind.137 
Simmel is presented as the first philosopher to acknowledge the necessary and 
inevitable input performers inject in their interpretations, even when working with the 
strictest stage directions and guidelines.138 This view was later deepened by 
theorists who emphasised performers’ free and indispensable contribution. Jerzi 
Grotowski’s assimilated the actor’s performance to the river flowing between the 
banks built by the text.139 Influenced by the Polish playwright’s work and agreeing 
with this understanding of performances, Richard Schechner later described 
performers’ gestures as the flame in the candle glass formed by the text.140 Building 
on these new foundations and redefinition of performance as a fully embodied act, 
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contemporary theorists further challenged the boundaries of performances and 
investigated its components.141 
Furthering Simmel’s work, an aesthetic shift was more clearly made in the 1960’s 
which was identified by Fischer-Lichte as the “performative turn”.142 As mentioned in 
previous developments, this “turn” recognised the value of performance for itself, 
independent from the underlying work’s meaning and quality. The performance is 
now perceived as adding value to the work, and performers as contributing to our 
culture and the construction of knowledge. As such, performances are as valuable143 
and worthy of recognition as the work of authors whose dominant position in the 
creative process has been over-estimated for too long.144 
b) The breakthrough of embodiment 
As mentioned on numerous occasions now,145 the majority position in Garcia v 
Google presided by Kozinski J is the first explicit reference made by the legal 
discourse to contemporary performance theories in finding for authorship.146 When 
envisaging performances’ originality, the circuit judge explicitly referred to the 
concept of ‘embodiment’ to translate the unique creative process and moment 
occurring when performing. The Court explained:  
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[A]n actor does far more than speak words on a page; “he must live his part 
inwardly, and then give to his experience an external embodiment.” That 
embodiment includes body language, facial expression and reactions to other 
actors and elements of a scene. Otherwise, “every shmuck... is an actor 
because everyone... knows how to read.”147 
The decision then proceeded to associate ‘embodiment’ to the modicum of creativity 
required by federal copyright law to obtain legal authorship. It concluded that such 
threshold was easily met by performing artists given that the US Supreme Court had 
continuously repeated its low level.148 
In finding for authorship, the majority decision referred to the literature of 
contemporary performance studies. The court of the ninth circuit quoted Constantin 
Stanislavski and held that the actor “must live his part inwardly, and then give to his 
experience an external embodiment”.149 In the same passage, the author writes how 
performing requires the union of the mind and the body: 
I ask you to note especially that the dependence of the body on the soul is 
particularly important [...]. In order to express a most delicate and largely 
subconscious life it is necessary to have control of an unusually responsive, 
excellently prepared vocal and physical apparatus. This apparatus must be ready 
instantly and exactly to reproduce most delicate and all but intangible feelings 
with great sensitiveness and directness. That is why and actor of our type is 
obliged to work [...], both on his inner equipment, which creates the life of the 
part, and also on his outer physical apparatus, which should reproduce the 
results of the creative work of his emotions with precision.150 
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Like Simmel, Stranislavski stepped away from Diderot’s classic conception of acting, 
imbued with mind-body dualism.151 He rejected the idea that the performer is the 
“ingenious puppet”152 in charge of reproducing the work exactly as the author had 
conceived but that the former should rather focus on faithfully recreating the 
emotions he experiences through the work.  
The 2014 Garcia decision also cited the words of Sanford Meisner,153 according to 
whom the actor cannot just be the mere mouthpiece of the author otherwise “every 
shmuck [...] is an actor because everyone [...] knows how to read.”154 It is clear to the 
ninth circuit court that the process of embodiment is not to be confused with the 
mere presence of one’s body on stage or in front of the camera. As such, the 
majority refused to adopt the metonymic logic according to which granting legal 
authorship to performances equates to copyrighting the performing body evolved in 
it. The Court appeared confident that the legal system and its practitioners were apt 
to work with this fine yet fundamental line:  
A performer's voice is analogous to her image, which we've said "is not a work 
of authorship" under the Copyright Act. Downing v Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 
F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir.2001). But that doesn't answer the question of 
whether the artist's creativity, expressed through her voice or image, is 
protected by copyright. Just because someone's voice — its particular timbre 
and quality — can't be copyrighted, doesn't mean that a performance made 
using that voice can never be protected. In fact, many vocal performances are 
copyrighted. See, e.g., Laws v Sony Music Entm't, Inc, 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 
(9th Cir.2006).155 
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It is interesting to note that the discourse forming the first Garcia decision mirrors the 
contradictory holdings which oppose classic to modern theories on performance. 
Indeed, whilst the majority of the ninth circuit court of appeal appear to have sided 
with the Simmel conclusions’ and that of those walking in his footsteps (i.e. Meinser 
and Stranislavski), Smith J dissented on the basis of a reasoning pertinent to 
Diderot’s vision of the art of acting. To him, the actor only functions has the author’s 
puppet, and limits his input to speaking the word of the script. In 2015, the en banc 
formation of the ninth circuit court of appeal reverted to classic definitions of 
performances by overturning the majority’s decision. Although the literature on 
performing theories did not feature in the second decision, Kozinski J maintained his 
position with regard to performers’ creativity in a colourful dissenting opinion.  
2. Varying performing body 
 
By incorporating the performing body in the creativity of performances, those modern 
theories emphasised the need for performers to not only complete the work for it to 
reach a three-dimensional format but to adjust it to their body. This reasoning 
indirectly presents the performing body as never identical to any other, and therefore 
not non-interchangeable with any other. As, two bodies are never the same, neither 
are performing ones. For this reason, no author is in the position of being able to 
envision and then create a work suiting every kind of physicality without requiring 
any adjustments. Claiming the contrary would confer on authors will the gift of either 
omniscience or clairvoyance,156 and on performing bodies characteristics of blank 
templates.  
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a) Positive and explicit judicial affirmation  
As the term embodiment appeared in the American judicial discourse in 2014, the 
impossibility for performers to be taken for inter-changeable objects also made its 
way in the narrative of other jurisdictions on other occasions. Those particular 
occurrences took place in France and were each time a construction of the courts. 
As explained in previous developments,157 the French intellectual property 
framework categorises performers according to their input in the communicative 
chain of the creative work. Although the categorisation of performers was decided by 
the legislator and inserted in either the IPC or the employment law code, its 
thresholds, conditions and enforcement were details devised by the civil judiciary. In 
doing so, the courts firmly stated that the key feature raising performers above the 
rank of extras, also known as ‘auxiliary performers’, is the ability to be distinguished 
from the mass and are non-interchangeable. The very notion of ‘non-
interchangeability’ evidences the essence of performership in the French legal 
system. 158 The Paris Court of Appeal is clear: “[d]espite their brief duration, [the 
performer’s interpretation] is not secondary but, to the contrary, marks a change in 
the overall work giving it a noticeable coloration; [c]onsidering that, it can neither be 
said of their voices that they are interchangeable; that indeed, another performer 
with another tone of voices would necessarily give the work a different coloration”.159 
In this particular case, the Court went as far as concluding that the singer’s 
performances were so unique that their presence on the record had contributed to 
the compositional structure of the overall musical work:  
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Considering that after listening to the musical works […] the Court also noted 
that the claimants’ particular tone of voice contributed to melodic line of the 
segments sung by them, breaking with of both the choir and the instrumental 
parts so much so that it plays a role in the composition of the works. 160 
 
Unlike the 2014 Garcia decision,161 this acknowledgement of embodiment and of 
performers’ creative input in the authorial substance of the work was not approached 
in the discussion focused on the author-performer divide but on the one separating 
performers from auxiliary performers. Yet, the Parisian’s judgement should not go 
unnoticed. It reveals judges’ sensitivity to performers’ creativity in the context of 
musical works where the presence of the scores has until then dismissed performing 
musicians’ opportunities to reach authorship.162 The next step would be to explore 
and shift boundaries on the grounds of authorship rather than ‘performership’. 
Refusing to recognise performers as interchangeable is rejecting the idea that all 
performing bodies are the same and that performers’ corporeality can be made the 
same. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that there are no shadows of 
disembodiment left over the French intellectual property framework. Indeed, the 
recognition of performers as unique came into play as a criterion delineating the 
class of performers from that of auxiliary performers. Unlike the former, the latter are 
indeed inter-changeable, for less significant in the production and easily replaceable. 
Consequently, the same line of jurisprudence simultaneously embodies and 
disembodies different groups of performers according to their input in the work.  
b) Negative and implicit judicial affirmation 
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The French courts were again faced with the necessity to refute the existence of 
universal performing bodies when litigating disputes on an entirely different aspect of 
intellectual property law. This time, the discussion took place in the context of 
authorial rights, and more specifically, moral authorial rights.  
In the Beckett case,163 the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance judged the 
performance by female comedians of the play Waiting for Godot disrespectful of the 
author’s moral of integrity.164 The French court recognised that such swap in the 
actors’ gender was enough to compromise the work’s integrity and breach the 
author’s moral right. In ruling so, not only did the French judges enforce a very strict 
application of the moral doctrine, reinstating the controlling power of the author over 
its work, but they also, and paradoxically, acknowledged the impact of 
the performing body on the work, that is, on the performed body. The appeal judges 
agreed to pierce the conventional veil of illusion behind which the performing body 
supposedly disappears to only embody the performed character. The court 
considered that even though the characters were interpreted as males, female 
performing bodies yet altered the work because their female corporeality remained 
accessible to the audience. The illusion of theatre, even when invoking and staging 
the best authors, seems to never offer a veil thick enough to cover up the performing 
body.165 
By acknowledging that the act of performing required a series of decisions on the 
performer’s part and that the latter is not always inter-changeable with another artist, 
the courts dismissed the argument according to which the authorial work is a 
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complete creative entity waiting to be communicated to its public by the universal 
pasteboard that the performing body would form.  
Recognising performers’ input in theory may be facilitated by pointing to more 
material evidence of its existence in practice. It is submitted that performing artists’ 
contribution in creative process has been overlooked because of its intangibility and 
invisibility. Modern theories of embodiment would make a more compelling argument 
in favour of performers if material evidence of the latter’s input would illustrate or 
confirm its existence.  
 
B. Evidencing embodiment 
 
Many scholars and artists have dedicated their work to unravelling the mystery of 
performances in order to better understand the process, or make visible the invisible. 
It is contended that evidencing the transformative impact of performances may 
facilitate the endorsement of performers’ original input by the legal discourse.  
It must be noted that invisible creative inputs have been and are currently protected 
by copyright laws.166 This suggests that the visibility of performers’ input may be 
more needed to convince gatekeepers of intellectual property laws than to enable 
the system to function efficiently.  
1. Expressing the ineffable 
In researching the art of performing, scholars and practitioners explored both 
theoretical and empirical methodologies. Despite the range of those studies, it may 
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be that a legal audience will find more accessible, and thereby useful, the approach 
offered by contemporary practices.  
Performance, theatre, music and creativity studies have offered alternative methods 
to investigate performers’ creativity. Ranging from the development of analogies to 
the collection of data, this attempt to define or measure creativity remains an issue to 
be tackled.  
Although those attempts propose interesting perspectives, they produce complex 
outputs which become in turn less easily transferable into legal analyses. As 
Kozinski J explained in June 2015 to an audience of intellectual property lawyers,167 
simple arguments using simple analogies are the most efficient ones in court. After 
noting that intellectual property disputes are prone to involve a fairly high degree of 
complexity because of the subject-matter this particular area of law governs, the 
ninth circuit judge advised advocates to keep legal and interdisciplinary niceties 
simple when building arguments. More importantly, technical knowledge ought to be 
made understandable to the Bench for arguments relying on it to appear 
compelling.168 Keeping this recommendation in mind, the subsequent developments 
offer a succinct overview of a varied body of literature which has engaged with the 
task of determining the boundaries of the performing process. It attempts to select 
examples of outputs documenting performer’s creativity which are both relevant and 
accessible to a legal audience. 
a) Wording the ineffable 
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Building on Simmel’s conclusions, contemporary performance theorists developed 
new approaches to performances, involving a variety of analogies to describe the 
performing process. Jerzi Grotowski offers to define performances as the water 
flowing between the banks formed by the text.169 The river is constantly moving and 
evolving, shaping the banks themselves over time. This representation emphasises 
the interlinked relationship between the text and the performance which was missing 
from Diderot’s performer-puppet analogy.170 Similarly, but reaching a somewhat 
diametrically opposed metaphore, Ryszard Cieslak proposed to compare 
performances and their connection with the underlying work as that existing between 
a candle and a candle-glass.171 According to the Polish writer, the performance 
would be the flame situated in the candle glass erected by the play. Referring to the 
text and the mise-en-scene as the ‘scores’ of the performance, Cieslak’s explains:  
The score is like the candle inside which the candle is burning. The glass is 
solid, it is there, you can depend on it. It contains and guides the flame. But it 
is not the flame. The flame is my inner process each night. The flame is what 
illuminates the scores, what the spectators see through the scores. The flame 
is alive. Just as the flame, in the candle-glass moves, flutters, rises, fall, 
almost goes out, suddenly glows brightly, responds to each breath of wind – 
so my inner life varies from night to night, from moment to moment.172 
Schechner furthers the Polish thinker’s analogy to offer a more refined application 
where the text and gestures compose the candle-glass and the performer’s action 
becomes the fire.173 
Although those analogies propose interesting illustrations of the relationship 
performances entertain with authorial works, they do not seem to offer workable 
standards from a legal perspective. If anything, those references develop the 
                                                          
169
 Schechner, Performance Theory (Routledge 2003) 47. 
170
 Diderot (n 121) 62; text to note 127. 
171
 Schechner Performance Theory (n 180) 46-7.  
172
 Personal conversation (1970) cited in Schechner Performance Theory (n 180) 47. 
173
 Schechner Performance Theory (n 180) 53-4. 
129 
 
intangibility and ephemerality of the concept, aspects about which the legal 
scholarship appears to be rather anxious.174 Even if, the intellectual property 
narrative is familiar with the construction of analogies to elucidate complex 
concepts,175 those illustrative explanations are unlikely to present the most 
compelling argument in evidencing the existence of performers’ input for their lack 
materiality. Though they elicit a complex phenomenon but do not evidence its 
presence. They would prove useful in wording the performing phenomenon but in no 
way proves or magnifies the existence of performers’ input in the layperson’s eyes. 
Moreover, those analogies might be unsuccessful in easing the uninitiated reader 
into the literature composing the field. Comparisons between performers and candle 
fire or fine distinctions between performing gestures and performing actions risk 
increasing the sophistication of arguments initially intended to demystify the 
substance of performances.  
b) Measuring the ineffable 
Moving away from theoretical attempts to define performances, musicology has 
extensively explored empirical methodologies since the 1930’s,176 as enabled by 
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recording technologies.177 Technologies of audio and sound analysis made possible 
the conversion of performed sound into tangible measurable data. Taking the form of 
numbers or graphs, performances can be represented on paper with a relatively high 
degree of accuracy.178 This conversion allows the eye179 to grasp what the expert 
hears. It articulates in a different medium what a listener fails to notice otherwise.180  
In Empirical Methods in the Study of Performances,181 Erick Clarke selected the 
examples of such outputs to illustrate the kind of outputs of data analysis produce 
from recorded performances. They have been reproduced in Appendix 2 as Figures 
13 to 17. Through their media, sounds become quantifiable numbers and variations 
in performances of the same work are objectively revealed in the varying lines of 
graphics (Figure 14 to 17). Those figures identify and measure the variation between 
two performances of the same musical piece. In this regard, they evidence the 
presence of embodiment. They reveal that each interpretation inevitably incurs a 
variation in the rendering of the work in a concrete, tangible and empirical manner.  
No matter how useful empirical analysis may be, this method is not infallible. 182 
Clark notes that data is often extracted from the recording of performances occurring 
in unnatural circumstances, where the performer executes a piece for the purpose of 
a particular study in the absence of the audience.183 They also frequently ignore the 
visual components of musical performances, although this aspect has been recently 
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investigated by more recent studies which focus on musician’s body positions during 
the performances.184 More generally, the scholar stresses how empirical studies of 
performances tend to fix, simplify185 and reify interpretations, reducing them to 
objects rather than processes.186 All those remarks contribute to feeding the 
difference between hard fact and data which is a danger also red-flagged by Cook 
and Clarke.187 Those methodological flaws contribute to making of the data a form of 
partial truth, or Clarke’s words “a very partial view of what happens in 
performance”.188 Therefore, just as musical scores are unable to fully represent the 
musical work, so empirical recorded data are unable to fully grasp the substance of 
the performing process. Finally Clark criticises the very objective and premise which 
motivate and base empirical musicology employed to study performances’ creativity. 
The music scholar explains how those methods were, and still are, used to scrutinise 
performers’ expression and input in interpreting musical works.189 To him, this 
standpoint implies and endorses a perception of music as “a kind of disembodied, 
ahistorical”190 piece “divorced from any cultural assumptions about how the notation 
may be understood and interpreted”.191 In a way, the perspective of empirical 
musicology still separates the performance from the production of music and 
prevents the recognition of performers’ full contribution in the production of musical 
events. 
Considering this shortcoming, the input of empirical musicology may be an 
unsatisfactory candidate to fill in a legal reasoning for the purpose of illustrating 
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performers’ originality. In addition to these remarks, the format in which such outputs 
are produced remain fairly complex which further limits their accessibility by a legal 
audience unfamiliar with musicology studies, their science and jargon. Nevertheless, 
they present the advantage to contribute to making visible the invisible, i.e. 
performers’ input in the scores. 
2. Making the invisible visible 
Like other disciplines, creativity research is also aimed at obtaining a firmer grasp on 
the essence of the performing process. In this endeavour, Sawyer appears to have 
been able to compose a useful and approachable narrative relying on an 
interdisciplinary methodology. However, it is submitted that better evidence of the 
embodiment stage involved in performances is to be found in the recorded work of 
dance artist and choreographer Caroline Bowditch.  
a) Wording the invisible  
Sawyer too confesses the complexity of researching and investigating the kind of 
creativity involved in performances.192 In The Interdisciplinary Study of Creativity in 
Performance,193 the creativity scholar reflects on his experience of studying the work 
of performers. He stresses the recent development of performance studies at the 
time, and that the body of scientific, ethnographic, or ethnomusicologist had focused 
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on fixed elements of performances rather that their ritual and lived experiences.194 In 
his later treaty on creativity research, Explaining Creativity The Science of Human 
Innovation,195 Sawyers summarises the position of the field a decade later. He 
underlines how the focus on the assessment of the product’s creativity had led to 
overlook the one present in performances,196 thereby dismissing the historical roots 
of dramatic works being ‘all’ performative before the invention of writing.197 He points 
to the work of theatre director Brian Crow who attempted to highlight the input 
performers must have in the written text in order to embody them on.198 Crow 
developed a notation system which mimics on paper the natural oral phrasing 
adopted by the actor on stage on the basis of the text.199 Working from the evidence 
uncovered by Crow’s technique of “conversation analysis”, Sawyer describes the 
input of performers as follows:  
Normal scripts don’t have this much detail – normally actors have to decide 
where to pause, and how long each pause should be; whether there should 
be speaker overlap at various pints in the dialogue; and how to deliver each 
line = which words to emphasize, and with what one of voice. When you see a 
transcript like [Crows], you realise how much information is left out of the 
typical script. Everything that’s put back in by the actors involves acting 
creativity. And although a lot of those decisions are made in rehearsal, many 
of them are made improvisationally every night, on stage, in front of the 
audience.200 
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Sawyer stresses to the fact that as the aesthetic of realist performance developed, 
the skill of performing described by Crow was intensified. Like Kozinski in the 2014 
Garcia case,201 the scholar reverts to the work of Constantin Stanislavski and his 
performing practice.202 
Furthermore, Sawyer concludes that performers may display a greater sense of 
creativity for their decision-making is made live, in front of an audience, unlike 
painters and sculptures who can correct their creative choices at will before 
presenting their work.203 
The simplicity with which Sawyers extracts and articulates the findings of 
performance theories is the level at which the findings of those experts should be 
pitched to be accessible and re-usable by a legal audience. It is the level at which 
the ninth circuit court presided by Kozinski J introduced the concept of embodiment 
to include it in the notion of originality in the 2014 Garcia v Google decision.204  
b) Performing the invisible 
It is submitted that the contemporary dance practice described in the following 
paragraphs furthers the accessibility of embodiment to parties still left unconvinced 
by the above arguments. The performance may achieve to convey what words fail to 
explain with “rational means”.205 
This section reviews the work of dance artist and choreographer Caroline Bowditch 
and contends that her recast of the work Love Games originally choreographed by 
Joan Clevillé conveys in motion what Sawyer and Kozinski attempted to express in 
words. The author invites the reader to watch Bowditch’s performance of Love 
                                                          
201
 Garcia v Google Inc, 743 F 3d 1258 (9
th
 Cir 2014) 1264. 
202
 Sawyer, Explaining Creativity (n 58) 364. 
203
 ibid, 367.  
204
 Garcia v Google Inc, 743 F 3d 1258 (9
th
 Cir 2014) 1264. 
205
 Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 904 F 2d 1081 (7th Cir 1990) 1085. 
135 
 
Games, a record can be found on page 311. Alternatively, the piece is available 
online at <http://www.youtube.com /watch?v=6YEtEyr6N4g>.206 This video is a 
montage juxtaposing two performances of the same choreographic work. It captures 
extracts of the original Love Games authored by Clevillé, interpreted in 2011 by 
Naomi Murray (on the right hand side) and in 2012 by Caroline Bowditch (on the left 
hand side), both accompanied by the same male partner, Jori Kerremans. 207 The 
performance was described by Sarah Whatley as follows:  
In the film, the two ‘versions’ of the duet run on screen side-by-side. The 
‘original’ version features Naomi Murray and her male partner Jori Kerremans. 
In the second version, Bowditch is cast in the female role with the (same) 
male partner. The duet in Love Games explores the dynamics of a 
male/female relationship that is playful and affectionate. In the Murray version, 
moments of gentle touching, embracing, and lyrical lifts and swoops are 
interspersed with more dynamic confrontations. The dancing is marked by an 
easy fluidity, a spirited youthfulness and athleticism as the dancers move 
through a sequence of intricate entanglements. Murray conforms to the image 
of the ‘dancer’s body’; she is long-limbed, long-haired and graceful, with a 
femininity that is highlighted by the male partner, who is the stronger of the 
two, and who supports her and lifts her with ease. It generally upholds many 
of the conventions of a typically hetero-normative duet. The recasting of 
Bowditch imposes a new frame, which blurs traditional gender roles. The 
female ‘dancerly body’ is refracted through the very different physicality of 
Bowditch, who dances in her wheelchair. In many ways the recasting is a 
clear example of how to ‘translate’ a role from one dancer to another but in so 
doing it exposes much more about the politics of translation and adaptation 
within mainstream theatre dance. The opening moment sees each woman 
lifted into an embrace by the man. What is striking is that Bowditch is just over 
three feet tall, so she resembles a child when held by her partner. But this 
image quickly dissolves as the duet continues and her confident physicality as 
a wheelchair dancer resists any reading of youth or innocence. The emphasis 
on verticality and linearity in the first duet gives way; the man moves more into 
and from the floor to negotiate new ways to partner Bowditch in her 
wheelchair, who refuses to be his muse. Bowditch’s wheelchair opens up a 
different kind of dialogue on the stage space. So often a powerful signifier of 
disability/immobility, her wheelchair is now enabling, signifying mobility, 
independence and the power to support. Bowditch manoeuvres her chair with 
a technical virtuosity equal to the technical feats of the non-disabled dancers, 
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integrating the chair into her dancing in a way that chimes with Albright’s 
description of Charlene Curtiss’s dancing:‘[Curtiss] claims the chair as an 
extension to her own body [and] revises the cultural significance of the chair, 
expanding its legibility as a signal of the handicapped into a sign of 
embodiment.’208 
 
The above description underlines the marked differences between the two works. 
Without drawing attention to them, the lay spectator is able to notice the variation 
between the two interpretations of Love Games. This visible difference is the result 
of embodiment. The noticeable changes between the two interpretations equate to 
what performers’ invest in the authorial work in order to be able to perform it. In this 
particular case, the interpretation or re-creation of the work is such that Bowditch’s 
performance may come across as a derivative work, possibly giving rise to arranging 
rights.209 In the context of this analysis, it is submitted that the visible differences are 
in fact evidence of the performing process, no more and no less.210  
Bowditch’s input is purely performative. One may be inclined to redefine it as 
authorial because of its stark visibility. It is argued that, although this particular 
production makes Bowditch’s personal contribution in the work more visible, its 
nature has not changed, and still belongs to the realm of performership. The urge to 
classify her input as authorial211 only stresses that once the performer’s input is 
made visible, the author-performer divide is no longer tenable, and collapses. 
Performers become authors. The substance targeted by Bowditch’s potential 
intellectual property rights in her performance is her embodiment, i.e. interpretation, 
of Clevillé’s work. Her input is no more, nor less creative that that of the 
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choreographer and has been made as visible and tangible by way of records 
featuring juxtaposed screens.  
The process of embodiment became more noticeable in this instance because of 
Bowditch’s disability. The differently-abled dance artist contradicts all theories on the 
universality of the performing body. She also confronts any argument according to 
which a different body is a “wretched pasteboard figure”.212 Whatley stressed the 
quality of the re-cast and the respect it paid to the essence of the work and of its 
creative intentions.213 The differences between the work rises from the differences 
between the expected physicality of the female dancing body (i.e. a non-disabled, 
ballerina-like physique) and Bowditch’s unique corporeality. There was no possibility 
for the choreographer to predict Bowditch’s physicality and range of movements both 
shaping the work before the audience. The dancer had to adjust the work to her 
physique in order to convey Love Games with her own, and only available, 
vocabulary of movements. This adjusting is what every performer does, disabled or 
not, with any authorial works they interpret. The presence of Bowditch’s disability 
acts as a magnifying glass over the embodiment process and for this reason it is 
submitted that her work is a useful illustration of the argument this chapter has 
developed. It is claimed that the embodiment process is made more obvious, 
therefore accessible and, in turn, re-usable by a legal audience, since it can not only 
be worded clearly and simply but is also visible to the naked eye.214  
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C. Defining embodiment 
 
For the notion of embodiment to be used by judges as a way to widen the condition 
of originality in copyright, the concept ought to be given clear contours and 
substance. How does ‘embodiment’ manifests itself in the performing process? What 
should performances evidence ‘embodied’ originality to be satisfied? Can 
performances fail the test of embodiment? If so, how? All those questions relate to 
what the concept would entail in the context of extending authors’ rights to 
performers. 
Interestingly, the ninth circuit court of appeal did not find themselves required to 
provide any definition of the term when the majority made this very notion the 
cornerstone of their decision in the 2014 Garcia.215 The circuit court judges simply 
referred to the input performers invest in the work in order to fill in the gaps left 
between written and embodied versions of a work. To this end, the decision 
associated embodiment with the series of adjustments actors make to the underlying 
work in order to interpret it before the camera.216  
This begs the question whether a clear-cut and tangible definition of the notion of 
embodiment is at all needed for the term to be made part of the armoury of legal 
references available to intellectual property advocates, courts and policy-makers. 
More generally, this approach questions whether intellectual property can function 
effectively even when relying on key terms difficult to ascertain objectively. Previous 
jurisprudence seems to answer by the affirmative. The presence of porous concepts 
is evidenced and confirmed by the use of the ‘elephant test’ in intellectual property 
law cases. The test refers to the instinctive knowledge rising from personal 
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encounters. Literally, the test presumes that one should instinctively know what an 
elephant is at the sight of the mammal. The test was used in a number of British 
decisions to define subject-matter protected by copyright. In IPC Media Ltd v 
Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd,217 the Court stated:  
These principles apply to the copyright in artistic works. Although describing 
what is at too high a level of abstraction to be protected may be difficult, like 
the elephant, you recognise it when you see it.218  
 
In adjudicating so, Laddie J directly drew upon the methodology followed by LJ 
Hoffman in dealing with the dispute of Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams.219 
Though practical, the elephant test is rarely lauded. Recently, the UK Supreme Court 
took a rather critical stance towards such approach. In Lucas Ltd v Ainsworth,220 the 
highest court of the UK expressed their doubts towards the logical standing of 
deductions stemming from the same elephant test which had been, again, employed 
by the Court:  
We would uphold the judgments below very largely for the reasons that they 
give. But (at the risk of appearing humourless) we are not enthusiastic about 
the “elephant test” in para [77] of the Court of Appeal’s judgment (“knowing 
one when you see it”). Any zoologist has no difficulty in recognising an 
elephant on sight, and most could no doubt also give a clear and accurate 
description of its essential identifying features. By contrast a judge, even one 
very experienced in intellectual property matters, does not have some special 
power of divination which leads instantly to an infallible conclusion, and no 
judge would claim to have such a power. The judge reads and hears the 
evidence (often including expert evidence), reads and listens to the 
advocates’ submissions, and takes what the Court of Appeal rightly called a 
multi-factorial approach. Moreover the judge has to give reasons to explain 
his or her conclusions.221 
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This decision suggests that knowing what embodiment is when one sees it might not 
meet the standards of accuracy sound legal references require. An intermediate 
solution between avoiding a rigid definition and applying an ersatz of the elephant 
test would resort to agreeing on an open-ended and abstract definition.222 
Drawing on Kozinski’s use of the term in the Garcia v Google and the input of 
performance theories discussed in above paragraphs,223 embodiment could be 
defined as the intellectual and physical adjustment performers go through during the 
interpretation of any pre-existing creative works, without which no performance of 
any work would be possible. More specifically, the concept could be understood as 
the combination of skills and creative effort performers employ to bridge the gap left 
by authors between the written work and the performance, gap which takes the form 
of the exercise of the performing mind and body. Borrowing the wording of the 
French judiciary and that of the CoJ, the notion of embodiment could also be taken 
for the umbrella term used to refer to the series of creative decisions and choices 
performers make in bringing to life and to a three-dimensional standing existing 
creative works, thereby marking such interpretation with the print of his/her personal 
personality. Alternatively, a British take on the same concept might be more inclined 
to embed the concept of ‘embodiment’ as the judgement, skills and effort exerted by 
a performer during the interpretation of an underlying work. Finally, a less 
prescriptive approach to embodiment could also view the concept as the additional 
source meaning added to the authorial work when interpreted by a performer. 
It is submitted that all of those definitions may be workable references from a legal 
perspectives. They all acknowledge the intellectual and physical nature of 
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performers’ creativity, creativity which is affirmed despite the presence of an 
underlying protectable work. In light of the above comments, this analysis concludes 
that the concept of embodiment is a notion readily employable by the legal narrative 
to strengthen the protection of performers and soften the edges of the author-
performer divide.224 Its boundaries would be ascertainable by the courts in the same 
manner the scopes of the doctrines of ‘free creative choices’225 or ‘skills, judgement 
effort’ have been in the past.226  
It must be clearly articulated that the proposed definition of embodiment is distinct 
from other meanings the courts have associated the same term with in previous 
intellectual property cases, unrelated to performances. The courts relied on the 
concept of embodiment as the materialisation of abstract concepts, referring thereby 
to the primary sense of the word that defines it as the “representation or expression” 
of “an idea, quality or feeling” in “a tangible or visible form”.227 In this context the 
notion of embodiment was used as synonym of the fixed versions or copies of 
creative works.228 The Australian Federal Court stated that that “the word 
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“embodied'' refers to the giving of a material or discernible form to an abstract 
principle or concept”,229 after reminding the parties that “[t]he statutory definition says 
nothing about the form of the embodiment”.230 This meaning of the word is not the 
one with which the present discussion proposes to engage, simply because it is 
disconnected from the question of the relationship between fixed and performed 
creative works.  
 
Summary 
This chapter uncovered and explained the phenomenon of disembodiment 
performances. Connected with the intellectualisation of authorship, it is submitted 
that such phenomenon fuelled the divide and hierarchy separating authors from 
performers. It was submitted that the disembodiment of performances is enabled by 
two distinct but interlinked premises according to which, authors are able to predict 
the interpretation of their work by all performers, for all performers are the same. 
Those two premises were themselves supported by conflated representations of the 
author-figure and the reduction of performers’ input to that of human canvasses, or 
puppets. This model leads to streamlining the performing process as a transparent, 
linear and unproductive stage in the communication of creative works by authors to 
their audience. It assumes that both performers and spectators are passive agents in 
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this one-way transaction. On many accounts, the legal narrative reflect and 
perpetuate such model in western the intellectual property frameworks, despite the 
long-standing body of literature criticising this simplistic description of the 
construction of meaning or knowledge. It is submitted that, contemporary theories 
and artistic practices can bring to the legal narrative the necessary tools to 
modernise its understanding of authorship, ‘performership’ and creativity. Although 
this interdisciplinary approach may present difficultly in transferring usable findings, 
data and highly specialised knowledge, pathways between the disciplines of law, 
creativity research and performance theories remain available. This chapter puts 
forward the concept of ‘embodiment’ as one of them. It is contended that the notion 
may prove useful in widening the condition of originality as currently understood by 
copyright laws across the jurisdictions under study in this analysis. The next chapter 
explores this option further, alongside other measures driven by the objective to 
improve performers’ legal protection.  
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Chapter Six 
Shifting divides 
 
My Lords, may I suggest that [performers’ rights are] rather like these unenforceable laws of 
a 30 m.p.h. speed limit? They cannot be enforced, but, on the other hand, it is possible that if 
they are there the majority of people will obey them.
1
 
Lord Somers, 1963 
 
Previous chapters described how the legal frameworks of Australia, France, the UK 
and the US came to enforce a divide between authors and performers. It became 
apparent that the divide is the result of national laws’ endorsement of outdated or 
conflated representations of creativity, originality, authorship and performances. The 
subsequent developments thus attempt to address this particular issue in places 
where the disjunction between legal discourses and contemporary artistic narratives 
seems most acute. Those suggestions are directed towards one aim: erasing, or at 
least softening, the author-performer divide so as to better reward the contribution 
performing artists make to our culture. In doing so, this chapter circles back to issues 
raised in previous comments and offers graded solutions to tackle them. It reviews 
the questions of the originality condition, the categorisation of performers and the 
distribution of royalties. The chapter concludes by mitigating the expected difficulties 
the intellectual property system would have in increasing performer’s protection, or in 
deleting the divide altogether.2 
                                                          
1
 HL Deb., 05 February 1963, Vol. 246, cols 512-20, at 520.  
2
 text to note 20, Chapter 1.  
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The following recommendations are articulated around the distinction between 
internal and external divides across the legal categories of authors and performers. 
Within the category of performers itself, the law distinguishes between different types 
of performing artists. Those additional sub-categories are referred to as internal 
divides for they are located within the same sub-group of artists. Following this logic, 
the distinction between authors and performers is considered external.  
In order to improve performers’ protection, this chapter envisages options for reforms 
in the context of both internal and external divides. The overall objective is to either 
erase or rationalise their boundaries so as to offer a more workable scheme. Raising 
the profile of performers’ protection within their own category would work towards 
narrowing the width of the spectrum opposing least and most protected artists. The 
revision of internal categorisations should soften the edges of the external author-
performer divide by bringing the antipodes of the spectrum closer together. 
 
I. Revising internal divides 
 
Internal divides can either be horizontal or vertical. Legal frameworks create a 
horizontal classification among this class of artists by categorising performers as 
audio (musical) or audio-visual performances. The categorisation becomes vertical 
when the legal system established a hierarchy amongst performing artists by 
applying a grading scale of rights to performers, auxiliary performers and models. 
Changes in the context of both internal divides, horizontal and vertical, are 
necessary in order to better performers’ protection.  
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A. Deleting the divide between audio and visual performers 
Previous developments relating the successive reforms of performers’ rights at the 
international and national levels pointed to the fact that discrepancies exist between 
the protection of audio (musical) and audio-visual performers.3 It is submitted that 
this distinction has legitimate standing other than being the result of ad hoc 
responses to the evolution of recording technologies. The relatively recent 
conclusion of the Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performances4 confirms this position 
as the convention aimed to bridge this gap by aligning the duration of international 
audio-visual performers’ rights with the one applicable to live aural performances 
since 1996.5 The subsequent paragraphs argue in favour of furthering this 
harmonisation of rights between audio (musical) and audio-visual performers at the 
domestic level.  
1. Remnants of the horizontal internal divide 
As previously mentioned, the distinction between audio-visual and musical 
performers lies for the most part in the uneven length of protection each group 
receives.6 Whilst, performers involved in live audio performances or sound records 
receive a protection lasting up to fifty years,7 audio-visual performing artists are 
protected for a duration of twenty years.8 Although harmonising this particular point 
                                                          
3
 text to note 27, Chapter 2.  
4
 Beijing Treaty on the Protection of Audio-visual Performances, adopted on June 24, 2012.  
5
 text to note 28, Chapter 2.  
6
 text to note 151, Chapter 2.  
7
 The International 1996 WPPT had required signatory states to enforce performers’ rights lasting at least fifty 
years for live audio performers. See 1996 WPPT, Art 17; see also, text to note 148, Chapter 2.  
8
 Rome Convention, Art 14.; At the national level, the regimes applicable to musical and audio-visual 
performers had been levelled by the British and the French legislators who enforced the same protection for both 
group of artists ; see text to note 157, Chapter 2.  
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was the crux of the Beijing Treaty, the latter is yet to come into force in the countries 
under study in this analysis.9  
Rather confusingly, supra national policy-makers have sent mixed messages with 
regard to such harmonisation. Less than a year before the cohort of signatory 
countries reached a consensus on this question in Beijing, the European Parliament 
enacted a directive defeating the treaty’s levelling agenda. Indeed, the 2011 
European Term Directive10 added another twenty years to this second term of 
protection for the benefit of performances fixed in sound recordings,11 leaving the 
duration of protection for other performers unchanged.12 Although there is nothing in 
the European instrument expressly undercutting the objective of the Beijing Treaty 
as far as audio-visual performers are concerned, the 2011 Directive has certainly 
diminished the extent to which the international convention levelled the regime 
applicable to performers by keeping musical performers a step ahead of their audio-
visual peers.  
Inadvertently perhaps, this reform maintains a system where the provisions 
applicable to audio and musical performers run in parallel. This suggests that supra-
national policies are still in lack of a holistic approach to the performers’ protection. 
This begs the question whether performers’ right should be conceived as a 
                                                          
9
 The contracting parties having ratified the Treaty as of January 2016 are Bostwana, China, Japan, the Syrian 
Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Chile, Qatar, Moldova and Slovakia. On February 10, 2016, 
the President of the United States sent a proposal to Congress with the view to ratify the Treaty. See, ‘Message 
from the President of the United States Transmitting the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, done at 
Beijing on June 24, 2012’ 114th Congress, 2nd session, US Government Publishing Office, 59-118 (Washington 
2016). Given the current political context, it seems unlikely that a bill will be passed before the end of the US 
President’s time in office in January 2017. 
10
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 
2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 265/1.  
11
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU, Art 1(2); introduced into national legislations under 
IPC, Art L211-4 1 in France and CDPA 1988, s. 191(1) and (2) in the UK.  
12
 France: IPC Art. L 211-4-2; UK: CDPA 1988, s. 191 (2).  
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homogenous and overarching regime or as a collection of ad hoc rights. This point is 
further discussed in subsequent developments.13  
 
2. Echoes of the horizontal internal divide  
The distinction between musical and audio-visual performers goes beyond the mere 
question of right duration. The substance of their rights has also been affected by the 
same tiering, placing audio-visual performers in a worse position than their musical 
peers, without any apparent logical reasons beside hypotheses of unequal lobbying 
forces. The following comments succinctly gather together provisions applicable to 
performers in the US, France and Australia, which participate to constructing this 
horizontal internal divide.  
In the US, the federal framework achieved the feat of discriminating between the 
protection of musical and audio visual performances without enforcing actual 
performers’ rights in the first place.14 The American Congress never formally 
introduced performers’ rights at the federal level, limiting itself to prohibiting the 
making of unauthorised records of live musical performances.15 Although the 
                                                          
13
 text to note 32.  
14
 It was judged that the protection of performances by copyright was not a power granted to Congress by the 
copyright clause of the federal constitution. Most of the debate focused on the argument that the Congress’s 
legislative intent centred on the protection of copyright works fixed ‘in writings’ and that performances cannot 
be regarded as such. Although this reasoning is hardly tenable now with the development of recording 
technologies and the accession of sound recorders to copyright (see Goldstein v California), the position still 
holds. Judith Kim, ‘The Performers’ Plight in Sound Recordings - Unique to the US: A Comparative Study of 
the Development of Performers' Rights in the US, England, and France’ (1986) 10 Columbia VLA Journal of 
Law and the Arts 453, 470-3; Goldstein v California, 412 US 546 (Supreme Court 1973). Kimberlee Withearall 
contends that musical performances involved in the making of sound recording share ownership over the record 
with the sound record. See, Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘“Pretend-y Rights” On the Insanely Complicated New 
Regime for Performers’ Rights in Australia, and How Australian Performers Got Gypped’, New Directions in 
Copyright Law, Vol. III (Edward Elgar Press 2005) 196. This position does not seem to be shared by the 
American scholarship, see for instance, Mary LaFrance, ‘Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound 
Recordings’ (2002) 75 Cal. L. Rev. 375, 392. 
15
 US Code, Title 17 para 1101. This was the result of the 1994 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. See, US Code, Title 17 s.1101 amended by the Public Law 103-465 of December 8, 1994: A of An 
Act To Implement the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Title V, subtitle A)  
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provision does not compare with what other jurisdictions refer to as ‘performers’ 
rights’, it offers a minimal degree of protection which, yet again, does not include 
audio-visual performers. The situation may be affected by the Beijing Treaty, but as it 
is the case with all of the other jurisdictions under analysis in this study, the 
ratification and enforcement of the international instrument by the American federal 
legislator is still pending at the time of writing.  
Adopting a diametrically-opposed position, the Australian legislator embedded a 
similar form of discrimination at the heart of its version of performers’ protection. 
Unlike their American counterparts, Australian policy-makers enforced a much 
stronger set of rights in the favour of performing artists. Indeed, not only did they 
introduce full performers’ rights in their national intellectual property system, but they 
also made performers involved in the making of sound-recordings co-owners of the 
material rendering of their works, i.e. the record.16 Erasing in this instance the 
author-performer divide, Australian laws increased by the same token the gap 
separating musical performers from their audio-visual peers, as the same privilege 
was not extended to cinematographic works.17  
The framework of the European Union too bears the mark of this horizontal internal 
divide. In 1992, European Directives geared towards harmonising the rental rights 
attached to protected works introduced the right to equitable remuneration for the 
commercial use of phonograms.18 On this instance, European policy-makers, and in 
                                                          
16
 1968 Copyright Act, section 22; text to note 80, Chapter 2.  
17
 The legitimacy of enforcing different protective measures for different categories of performers is further 
discussed in subsequent developments, see text to note 32.  
Moreover, the gap existing between performers and sound recorders may have been bridged as the Australian 
statute may maintain the divide by granting performers the status of ‘makers’ or ‘co-owners’ but necessarily that 
of ‘authors’. On this see text to note 63. 
18
 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of November 19, 192 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, [1992] OJ L77 20PO). The 1992 Directive was 
repealed by the Directive 2006/115/EEC. In 2012, the Beijing Treaty extended the right to equitable 
remuneration for audio-visual performers when performances were communicated to the public via broadcast 
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turn, national legislators came close to bridging the gap separating authors and 
performers since both groups of artists are to be compensated on an equitable basis 
for the use of their work19 when it has been recorded on phonograms later rented for 
commercial purposes.20 Nevertheless, by erasing this external divide, the same 
directives continued to convey an artificial gap between musical and audio-visual 
performers21 as the same right was not been introduced in the context of recorded 
cinematographic works.22 Although the provisions include film performers as 
recipients of the right to equitable remuneration, it is limited to the commercialisation 
of their work in the form of sound recordings, leaving out the format which represents 
the essential of their practice: video records.23 
This slight double standard of protection was furthered by the 2011 Term Directive24 
which coined the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ provision25 accompanied by the 20-per-cent 
fund.26 The benefits granted by those rights were left unmatched by the regime 
applicable to audio-visual performers involved in the film industry.27 Those 
dispositions are further discussed in subsequent paragraphs.28 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
or otherwise transferred. See, 2012 Beijing Treaty, Art. 11.2 and 12.3. The ratification of the Treaty is still 
pending. However, Article 12.3 Beijing Treaty does enforce the right to equitable remuneration to audio visual 
performers.  
19
 Though equitable, the remuneration is not necessarily equal.  
20
 Australia: 1968 Copyright Act, s. 22(3A)(b) (performers considered as makers of sound recordings of their 
live performers are co-owners of the copyright in the latter); France: IPC, Art. L 214-1 ; UK: 1988 CDPA, S. 
182D; European Union: Council Directive 92/100/EEC, Art. 4.  
21
 Rights to equitable remuneration on the transfer of performers’ rights to producers or other third parties, 
whether rental or otherwise, do exist in the context of audio-visual performers. See for example, in the UK: 
1988 CDPA, s. 191F to 191H, and in France: IPC, Art. L 212-3 and L 212-5. See on this, Charlotte Waelde and 
others, Contemporary Intellectual Property (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 230-1.  
22
 Council Directive 92/100/EEC, Art 4.  
23
 Waelde (n 21) 230-1.  
24
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU, of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 
2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, L 265/1.  
25
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU, Art 1(2)(c). 
26
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU, Art 1(2)(c). 
27
 Understood broadly as being any visually recorded performances.  
28
 text to note 34.  
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Moving away from EU-imposed measures, dispositions unique to the French 
intellectual property code (IPC) also relay aspects of this horizontal internal divide. 
The continental legislator made a dent in audio-visual performers’ legal shield in 
regulating the form performers’ consent must take for it to be considered a valid 
transfer of their rights to third parties. Whilst French intellectual property laws require 
performers’ consent to be express and made in writing,29 an exception was 
introduced in the context of audio-visual recording contracts signed between audio-
visual performers and their producers.30 Article L 212-4 of the French Code specifies 
that such contract will be taken for implicit consent to “fix, reproduce and 
communicate to the public the performance of the performer”31 for the duration of the 
agreement.32 Again, without the expression of any particular rationale behind this 
exception, this difference of treatment between audio-visual and musical performers 
contributes to forming an unjustified gap between the two sets of performing artists.  
3. Discrimination or tailoring? 
The present analysis by no means advocates for the creation of an identical regime 
in the protection of musical and audio-visual performers. Although harmonisation is 
                                                          
29
 IPC, Art. L 212-3. The Courts specified what constituted consent given in writing and what did not. For 
instance, the authorisation given in writing by an event organiser to broadcast a performer’s interpretation does 
not hold (see Paris, 16 juin 1993, n° [XP160693X] : D. 194 p 218 Edelman ; D. somm. com. p. 277). The 
recording contract agreed between a producer and an event organiser authorising the reproduction of 
performances cannot amount to a legally authorised transfer of performers’ rights if the latter were not party to 
the contract (Cass, 1ère civ, 16 juillet 1992, n° 90-19.207: Bull. 1992 civ i p 234; RIDA 1993, n 155, 177 obs. 
Kéréver). Although, implied consent to the use of the record seems to have been accepted by the Court in the 
following case: Paris, 18 janvier 2012, Société Civile De Perception Et De Distribution Des Droits Des Artistes 
Intepretes De La Musique Et De La Danse c/ L'institut National De L'audiovisuel, n° 09/29162 : inédit.  
30
 Article L 212-4 reads “The signature of a contract between the performer and a producer for the making of an 
audio-visual work shall imply the authorization to fix, reproduce and communicate to the public the 
performance of the performer. Such contract shall lay down separate remuneration for each mode of exploitation 
of the work.” IPC, Art. L 212-4. Official translation. See also, Cass, soc, 10 février 1998, n° 95-43.510: 
Légipresse 1998, No 153, III, 101, note Veyssière Bull. 1998 v N° 82 p. 59. 
31
 IPC, Art. L 212-4. Official translation. See also, Cass, soc, 10 février 1998, n° 95-43.510: Légipresse 1998, 
No 153,III, 101, note Veyssière Bull. 1998 v N° 82 p. 59. 
32
 ibid. This may be a remnant in the French narrative of the longstanding distinction the international 
community maintained between musical and audio-visual performers, recently revived by the 2011 European 
Term Directive. European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU of 27 September 2011 amending 
Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 265/1.  
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sought between the two groups of performing artists, such objective could, and 
perhaps should, be achieved whilst accommodating ad hoc needs with measures 
tailored to either musical or audio-visual works specifically. Indeed, it may be that the 
needs of each creative industry differ from one another. However, policy-makers and 
legislators ought to be able to carefully elect which rules are pertinent to suitable 
tailoring of the law, and those which are the mere result of slow or discontinued 
reforms of the law pressured by varying lobbying forces. Whilst there may not be any 
adequate test already available to policy-makers to distinguish between desirable 
and undesirable individualisation of regimes, existing provisions may provide useful 
basic cardinal principles to guide future reforms.  
Uneven protection with regard to basic rights such as the right to authorise fixation 
and distribution of the work, alongside provisions specifying the duration of such 
rights and conditions in which they can be transferred form a fundamental protective 
base which should not differ from one horizontal category to the other. Modifications 
to this fundamental base of rights would represent undesirable differences of 
treatment because hardly justifiable. Variations may however be introduced in the 
context of other additional rights designed to tackle specific issues arising from 
practices unique to particular sectors. Those would compose a flexible added 
protective layer, tailored to the needs of performers and other stakeholders involved 
in the field concerned.  
Taking the 2011 Term Directive as an example,33 the regulatory instrument enforced 
both desirable and undesirable variations in the protection of musical and audio-
visual performers. As mentioned above, the Term Directive reinforced the internal 
divide by augmenting by twenty years the protection extended to performers involved 
                                                          
33
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 
2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 265/1.  
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in sound recordings.34 In addition to longer rights, the European Regulatory body 
voted for the enactment of a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ provision35 and for the creation of a 
‘twenty-per-cent-fund’,36 to further protect musical performers’ financial interests. The 
‘use-it-or-lose-it’ privilege allows performers who have assigned their rights over to 
recording companies to claim them back if the latter failed to commercially release 
their performances in sufficient quantity within the extended twenty-year period.37 
Additionally, a ‘twenty-per-cent-fund’ will be formed for companies to repay twenty 
per cent of revenues earned during the twenty year extension.38 Once collected, 
those revenues will then be distributed in the form of annual supplement to 
performers who had transferred or assigned their right to equitable remuneration in 
exchange of a one-off payment. Those mechanisms were introduced to allow 
performers who had assigned their rights to benefit from the term extension.39  
Comparing the introduction of those three different protective measures to above 
suggested test, one would fall within the scope of undesirable variations of treatment 
between musical and audio-visual performers, while the other two could be 
associated with welcome tailoring of the legal framework in the music industry. 
Changes in the term of protection affect the core of the protection offered by 
performers’ rights and therefore should not vary across horizontal internal 
categories. Consequently, the extension of musical performers’ rights should also 
concern audio-visual performing artists. In contrast, the provisions introducing the 
‘use-it-or-lose-it’ disposition and the ‘twenty-per-cent fund’ constitute justifiable 
variations between the two categories of performers. They respond to specific 
                                                          
34
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU, Art 7.  
35
 ibid, Art 1(2)(a).  
36
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU, Art 1(2)(c). 
37
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/77/EU, Art 1(2)(a).  
38
 ibid, Art 1(2)(c).  
39
 ibid, recital 5 ; see also, Waelde and others (n 21) 231.  
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issues, believed to be unique to the structure and practices of the music recording 
industry. For this reason, those two additional prerogatives may differ within sub-
groups of performers.  
B. Vertical internal divides 
In addition to internal horizontal divides, the French legislator embedded at the core 
of performers’ protection an additional categorisation between performing artists. On 
many occasions the present analysis described and detailed the distinction 
intellectual property and employment laws created between performers, auxiliary 
performers and models.40 This labelling exercise ultimately impacts the degree of 
protection performing artists receive.41  
If seemingly clear, the categorisation deployed by the French legislator remains an 
unfinished piece of regulatory work the judiciary had to complete. Indeed, the 
professional conventions taking the precaution of defining what constitutes an 
auxiliary performer or extra in their own field are scarce. Such texts exist in the 
context of theatre performances and dramatic performances recorded for the 
                                                          
40
 The Intellectual Property Code refers to performers as the performing artists who interprets a work but is not 
an auxiliary performer. Aside their mention in this provision, auxiliary performers are absent from the 
Intellectual Property Code which refers to “customary conventions” relevant to each sector of the creative 
industries to define the category. The Employment Law Code picks up again on the category but fails to define 
the term. Models on the other hand have been granted their own definition. According to, the Employment 
Code, models are the individuals who are “charged of other presenting to the public, directly or indirectly by 
way of reproduction of his/her image on any visual or audio-visual medium, a product, a service or an 
advertising message; or of posing as model, with or without later use of his/her image”. See, IPC, L 212-1; 
Employment Law Code, Art 762-1, L 7121-2, L 7121-3 and L 1723-4.  
41
 As performers, the latter would be entitled to both performers’ rights and employment law benefits. As 
auxiliary performers or models however, they become ineligible to intellectual property, their position being 
fully assimilated to that of employees of the creative or advertising industries. Models form the category of 
performing artists which receives the thinnest protection of all three groups. See on this, text to note 282, 
Chapter 2.  
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purpose of television drama,42 but no equivalent can be found in the context of dance 
or music performances for instance.43  
Whenever confronted to the silence of professional agreements, the courts 
developed their own tests and conditions to draw lines between the categories of 
performers, auxiliary performers and models. In doing so, the French bench created 
a confusing condition of originality, cousin to what is known in the context of authors’ 
rights in the hexagon.44 Although each category is distinct, they all are differentiated 
on the basis of the same test: the artist’s imprint of his/her personality on the 
disputed work (performance). Reading the jurisprudence, the presence of the same 
input, is what makes an artist, author but not performer, performer but not auxiliary 
performer, auxiliary performer but not model.45 As a result, this test blurs all the 
categories situated between authors and models into one, securing only one firm 
distinction: the test between models and authors.46 Indeed, authors always print their 
creation with the mark of their personality, whilst the work of a model never does. 
Anything between those two poles cannot be clearly ascertained. As previous 
developments discussed this particular point in more details, this section will not 
repeat them but refers to previous comments made in Chapter Two.47  
It is contended that the French grading scale of rights remains a useful tool despite 
the complexity categorising the various types of performing artists may involve.48 The 
                                                          
42
 see Paris, 18eme ch., 18 février 1993, n° [XP180293X] : D. 1993, p 397 note Weksteinbeg.  
43
 ibid ; Paris, 4ème ch., 4 juillet 2008, n° 06/21406, Universal Music… : RTDCom. 2008, 745, obs. Pollaud-
Dullian ; Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 06/03959.  
44
 text to note 303, Chapter 2.  
45
 ibid.  
46
 ibid. 
47
 ibid. 
48
 Subsequent developments explain how such categorisation system may present itself useful in other 
jurisdictions to cope with the ‘floodgate argument’ if the author-performer divide was to be dropped, see text to 
note 166.  
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scheme would be to be completed by either legislators or the courts to meet the 
standard of sound law.  
After considering options to reform internal classifications, the following 
developments review ways in which the external dimension of the author-performer 
divide could be tackled.  
 
 
II. Dropping the Author-Performer divide 
 
Policy-makers have at their disposal a range of possible avenues to explore, should 
they wish to remove the author-performer divide from intellectual property 
frameworks. This could be achieved by explicitly including performers in the class of 
authors, widening the categories of protected subject-matter or by remodelling the 
originality condition. Whilst the first two options would require legislators to reform 
statutory provisions,49 the last one could be achieved directly by the courts. In this 
respect, the first two options are holistic proposals in comparison to the third 
alternative which would rely on an incremental change of the law.50  
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 There is no reason to believe that such reforms would place national legislators in breach of international 
treaties on authors’ and performers’ rights. Indeed, both France and the UK went beyond the minimal standard 
of protection required by the Rome Convention when each jurisdiction respectively introduced performers’ 
rights at domestic levels. It is submitted that introducing performers’ rights equal to copyright would be 
comparable to those earlier predicaments.  
50
 To refer to the dichotomy employed by Arnold J. in Richard Arnold, ‘The Need for a New Copyright Act : A 
Case Study in Law Reform’ (2015) 5 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 110, 110-11.  
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A. Opening the circle of authors 
Like photographers,51 sound recording producers,52 broadcasters53 and computer 
software designers54 before them, performers could be introduced as a new sub-
class of copyright holders. This modification would require national legislators to 
formally amend their copyright provisions. The gradual extension of copyright to new 
areas of the innovation industries proves that such change is possible, was it to be 
supported in parliamentary chambers. 
 
1. Leading by (comparative) example 
Not only do previous reforms prove that such amending of the law is possible, but 
comparative examples also confirm that the integration of performers as copyright 
holders has already been endorsed, at least partially. As mentioned earlier,55 the 
Australian legislator made of musical performers involved in the recording of their 
live performances56 co-owner of the record.57 This demonstrates that intellectual 
property systems are able to devise mechanisms where performers can be rewarded 
on par with other copyright holders for their contribution. The Australian position also 
suggests that bringing performers’ rights on an equal footing with other right holders 
of the copyright ecosystem is manageable despite the risks of clashing or 
overlapping claims. This is not to say that the Australian model could not be 
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 n 449, Chapter 2.  
52
 n 463, Chapter 2.  
53
 n 464, Chapter 2.  
54
 n 465 and 466, Chapter 2.  
55
 text to note 80, Chapter 2.  
56
 The Act does not provide any particular legal definition of the term ‘live performance’. It is unclear whether 
such performances require the presence of an audience, or for the performance to be recorded in the context of a 
musical event for their performers to be co-owner of the record. It could be argue that all performances executed 
for the purpose of a recording are to an extent ‘live performances’ but this understanding would depart from 
what is commonly understood as ‘live performances’ which references to unrecorded real time performances. 
Indeed, The Act defines the “sound recording of a live performance” as the “sound recording, made at the time 
of the live performance, consisting of, or including, the sounds of the performance.” 1968 Copyright Act, s 22. 
57
 1968 Copyright Act, s 22(3A) and s 100AD.  
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improved. At present, performers’ co-ownership is only applicable in the cases of live 
musical performances,58 whenever their work has not been commissioned.59 For the 
author-performer divide to regress, the benefit granted by Section 22 of the 
Australian 1968 Copyright Act ought to be extended to all categories of performers.  
It is claimed that similar reforms should take place in the jurisdictions of France, the 
UK and the US, in order to erase the author-performer divide.60 Naturally, those 
reforms must be embedded in a manner which respects the terminology and logical 
structure of each domestic statutory framework.61 By listing performances alongside 
already protected authorial works, the legislator would in effect add performers to the 
circle of authors, and would thereby confirm current judge-made authorship for 
performers already awarded in jurisdictions like France.62 
2. Ownership does not make authorship – or does it? 
The Australian Copyright Act is clear: live musical performers are “makers” of sound 
recordings. For this reason they are made “co-owners” of the copyright subsisting in 
it.63 The terminology begs the question whether co-ownership equates to authorship. 
Are live musical performers authors under Australian copyright law, or simply co-
owners?  
                                                          
58
 The Act defines the “sound recording of a live performance” as the “sound recording, made at the time of the 
live performance, consisting of, or including, the sounds of the performance.” 1968 Copyright Act, s 22.  
59
 1968 Copyright Act, s 97(3).  
60
 It would also be desirable for the divide to be formally removed from international conventions as well 
however, reforming domestic frameworks appear more realistic than tackling international treaties as the supra 
national community struggles to reach consensus which considerably slows down reforms. See for instance, 
records of discussions considering the reform of the Berne Convention in 1948 at the Brussels conference : 
‘Documents de La Conférence de Bruxelles 5-26 Juin 1948’ (1951).  
61
 For example, in the UK, for performers to become legal authors and copyright owners, section 9 of the 1988 
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act would have to be amended, as well as all other relevant dispositions building 
on its provisions. Substantial changes along similar lines would have to be carried out in the American Federal 
copyright systems and the Australian framework. 
In France, authorship is not defined. Instead, the list of works eligible to authors’ rights is provided by the 
Intellectual Property Code, and the latter defines the categories of artists eligible to their protection. The Courts 
have utilised the open-ended nature of the concept of ‘work of the mind’ to include performances whenever they 
considered the originality condition fulfilled by the performing artists concerned.  
62
 text to note 260, Chapter 2.  
63
 1968 Copyright Act, s. 22 and s. 100AD. 
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The 1968 Copyright Act does not expressly articulate the relationship between 
authorship and ownership. What is openly stated by the British Copyright, Designs 
and Patent Act 1988,64 may be taken for granted by its Australian equivalent, that is, 
that initial ownership follows authorship. As per the British statute, the author of the 
work is its initial owner, unless the right was transferred or it is stated otherwise.65 
Unlike its European counterpart, the Australian copyright statute does not make a 
systematic use of the term author or authorship to refer to the first or initial owner.66 
The concept of authorship seems to be attributed to a particular class of copyright 
holders, which are not to be confused with others, such as “makers” or 
“publishers”.67 Indeed, Section 29(7)(b) relating to unauthorised uses of protected 
material, specifies that the creators of sound recordings are not “authors” but 
“makers”.68 Linking this specification with the phraseology employed by Section 22, it 
appears that performers, if co-owners, are not “authors” but “makers” as per the 
wording of the 1968 Copyright Act, and that the two concepts should not be 
amalgamated. Taking this distinction into account, it seems that the Australian 
system too, adopted a restricted view on authorship, which does not include 
performership, even in the context of the sound recording of live musical 
performances. Though subtle, the Australian Act thus maintains a distinction 
between authorship and co-ownership attributable to performers. If performership 
can reach ownership, it cannot access authorship. Instead, the status of ‘makership’ 
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is granted as ersatz authorship. Therefore, even under Australian laws a formal 
distinction between authorship and performership is maintained despite the presence 
of performers’ copyright co-ownership in sound recordings.  
This divorce between granting ownership and extending authorship conveys the 
stigma attached to performership into the legal narrative. Although, the legal regime 
of performing artist is improved by accessing copyright ownership, their exclusion 
from authorship maintains a cultural divide at the core of the Australian legal 
discourse. That said, if terminological technicalities were the last remnants of the 
divide in the copyright framework regulating Australian creative industries, it is 
submitted that performers in this jurisdiction would enjoy a satisfactory level of 
protection. Lexical discrimination in labelling their status, between owners and 
authors, may be an acceptable price to pay, were all other facets of their legal 
protection to be levelled with that of authors. 
3. (Mis)reading the Constitution  
This analysis submits that the rights granted to performers by Section 22 of the 1968 
Copyright Act are unique to the Australian jurisdiction, but others have argued that a 
similar level of protection to performing artists was also available in the US.69 The 
dispositions of paragraph 201 of the federal copyright clause related to joint 
authorship have been read as granting performing musicians co-ownership over the 
record of their live performances.70 The author sides with other scholars on the 
question,71 and rejects this interpretation of the Constitutional provision. Nowhere in 
the wording of the provision is it explicitly stated that performers are granted co-
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ownership of the sound recording made out of their live performance simply because 
their authorisation is required to fix their interpretation in the first place. This 
provision is closer to the functioning of traditional performers’ rights, than that of 
copyright.  
 
B. Opening the categories of protectable works 
In many jurisdictions, authors are identified by the work they produce since 
authorship is triggered by the characteristics of their creation rather than their 
condition as artist. This is why opening up the circle of authors to performers can 
only be fully achieved if, in turn, performances are listed as protected subject-matter 
by statutory provisions. The following comments draw on past examples where a 
similar extension of copyright material was achieved through legislative reforms. It 
considers the possibility of inserting the concept of ‘performances’ or ‘performative 
work’ under the relevant dispositions so as to have interpretations protected by 
authors’ rights as a copyright work rather than as its neighbour. However, the 
necessity of carrying out such reforms may be mitigated in the context of European 
jurisdictions since the CoJ begun a movement of ‘de-categorisation’ of the subject-
matter covered by copyright law. This jurisprudence would render obsolete any 
further effort of categorisation, once fully endorsed at the national level, at least 
theoretically.  
1. A familiar process 
As explained in the above section,72 this would not be the first time copyright extends 
its scope to a new subject-matter. As technologies and cultural practices evolved, 
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new authors and new protected works were born and baptised under the sacraments 
of copyright.73 The present suggestions build on the historical evolution of copyright 
to assess the feasibility of adding performances to the list of protected subject-
matter. As comments under Chapter Two envisaged such evolution in details, those 
arguments will not be repeated here.74 Instead, the analysis will move on to review 
the modifications national intellectual property framework would require in order to 
have performances feature as copyright works. The following suggestions are by no 
means thought to be acceptable work of legislative draftsmanship. They serve the 
more modest design of depicting in concrete terms the ways in which the law could 
be amended.  
2. The ‘performative work’ 
All jurisdictions under study provide a list of the works covered by authors’ rights.75 In 
order to remove the author-performer divide from domestic intellectual property 
frameworks, it is submitted that performances must appear on those lists to be 
protected by copyright systems on par with other more traditional work such as 
dramatic, literary, artistic, musical works. This introduction would remove the hurdle 
of categorisation in countries where fitting in one of the categories of protectable 
works form a condition for artists to abide by in order to obtain copyright protection.76 
It is argued that such modification is necessary even in France where the list of 
protected works was made not exhaustive but merely illustrative.77 This is because 
the list functions as a confirmation of the ways in which the de minima concept of 
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‘oeuvre de l’esprit’78 (work of the mind) ought to be interpreted by the courts. 
Although, on rare occasions the French bench has already allowed performances to 
access the rank of authorship by relying on the open-ended approach of the IPC, 
reforming Article L 112-2 would fully endorse the precursor to judge-made legal 
construction.  
The phraseology employed by the proposed reforms would have to be moulded on 
the terminology already used by each domestic law. In the UK, Sections 1 and 3 of 
the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act (CDPA) could be amended to include 
performances by referring directly to interpretations as ‘performances’, very simply, 
or as ‘performative work’ in order to fit in the alliteration of the Act.  
The phrase ‘performative work’ would allow the reform to avoid confusion with the 
other ways in which the term ‘performance’ is used in the Act.79 Moreover, the word 
‘performative’ is commonly used and understood by performance, theatre, dance, 
and music scholars as expressing the essential characteristics of a performance, or 
performing event.80 Even though this proposal recommends adding a new concept to 
an already complicated framework, the phrase presents two advantages: side-
stepping possible confusion and inviting a piece of the narrative emerging from the 
specialised literature into the body of law which it is designed to regulate. For similar 
reasons,81 the adoption of the same phrase is considered a suitable option for reform 
to introduce under Title 17 of the US Copyright Clause.  
Although the language used in the Australian 1968 Copyright Act offers more variety 
in the ways the statute refers to protected material, the word ‘performance’ is already 
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in use two similar phrases – ‘performance’82 and ‘live performance’83 – which 
themselves refer to two entirely different concepts. For this reason, the 1968 
Copyright Act could also benefit from inserting performances as its own category of 
works protectable by copyright under the label ‘performative work’. 
In France, the wording of the reform would take a slightly different route due to 
linguistic specificities. The word ‘performance’, in French ‘interprétation’ or 
‘prestation’ could be inserted under the dispositions of Art. L 112-2 of the French IPC 
so as to confirm the protection by authors’ rights of original performative works under 
the French law.  
3. European (ir)relevance 
Reforming the copyright laws of France and of the UK may appear irrelevant in the 
light of the recent position of the CoJ. Indeed, the Infopaq jurisprudence84 was read 
by many as suppressing the condition of categorisation from the national framework 
of Member States.85 From this perspective, introducing an additional type of 
protectable work within a classification system already made redundant by the CoJ 
seems counter-productive, or simply useless. Nevertheless, a few points ought to be 
raised to mitigate this objection.  
Although the categorisation may have lost of its grasp on the definition of the 
copyright work, the list of creative works may maintain some authority as evidence of 
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legislative intent to protect performances as authorial works. Judges may be more 
likely to see performances as the artist’s “own intellectual creation” if the latter are 
already regarded a protectable type of work by their respective Parliament. This is 
the approach District Judge Clarke appears to have adopted in Taylor v Maguire86 
which concerned paper cutting works. In this logic, both Section 3 of the CDPA and 
Article L 112-2 of the French IPC would serve the same illustrative purpose.87 
Moreover, British courts may be reluctant fully to adopt an open-ended approach to 
copyright protection. Consequently, until the European position finds itself fully 
endorsed on British territory, reforming Section 3 of the CDPA would prove useful. 
 
C. Opening (up to) originality  
The originality condition would have to be widened in order to open up to new forms 
of creativity regardless of the long-term impact the CoJ’s jurisprudence will have 
domestic laws. In doing so, the courts are advised to de-intellectualise the current 
narrative framing the originality condition in order to allow for a re-embodiment of 
creativity in the legal discourse. This approach proposes to counter-act both 
phenomena of intellectualisation of the subject-matter protected and disembodiment 
of performances uncovered in previous chapters.88 It is contended that triggering an 
effective and long-lasting change of discourse must also involve sensitising the 
authors and gatekeepers of those narratives, being in this case, the judiciary.89  
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1. De-intellectualising originality 
The following paragraphs aim to offer conceptual tools to reshape the courts’ current 
approach to originality in order to re-direct the subject-matter covered by copyright 
towards embodied creative expressions such as performances. The following 
recommendations review options envisaged in previous chapters such as the use of 
‘personality’ or ‘embodiment’. 
a) A literal de-intellectualisation of originality 
The least invasive measure the courts of Australia, France, the UK and the US could 
pursue in order to soften the current intellectualisation framing the originality 
condition, is avoiding the adjectives ‘intellectual’ and ‘mental’ when referring to the 
kind of input, creativity, skills or labour necessary which compose a work eligible to 
copyright protection. If above mentioned standards must go with a qualifier, more 
neutral epithets such as ‘original’ or ‘creative’ could be accolated to ‘works’, ‘skills’, 
‘labour’ or ‘input’ in order to complete respective expressions. It is contended that the 
notions of creative ‘skills’ or ‘original’ ‘labour’ would be no less or more nebulous 
than referring to the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’,90 ‘mental labour’,91 
origination92 or ‘independent intellectual effort’.93 Yet, they would still present the 
advantage of neither favouring intellectual representations of creation nor rejecting 
others considered more manual-oriented. 
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b) Persona-lising originality 
Previous chapters94 explored whether French courts’ openness to include 
performative originality within the category of creativity protected by authors’ rights. 
The present comment will not repeat details of arguments formulated earlier,95 but it 
stresses the ability of the concept to bridge within one term the notions of mental and 
physical creative labours. 
The legitimacy of this proposal was made all the stronger by the jurisprudence of the 
CoJ who invited parts of the doctrine of the author’s print of personality at the 
supranational level. The doctrine is expected to trickle back down to domestic 
frameworks at a later time. From that perspective, utilising personality to widen the 
originality condition may be a less invasive way of reforming national laws. Indeed, 
was the notion to be embedded, this evolution would fit in the general process of 
Europeanisation of domestic intellectual property laws. The welcoming of performers 
as authors and performances as copyright works would thus be part of a wider plan 
of harmonisation of the French and British systems according to European 
standards.  
c) Re-embodying originality: including embodiment 
The preceding chapter reviewed the possibility of opening the originality condition to 
the notion of ‘embodiment’ so as to have performances become work eligible to 
copyright protection.96 The fleeting appearance of the concept in the 2014 Garcia 
case97 confirmed its relevance in the context of improving performers’ protection by 
intellectual property laws. The presence of the notion in the jurisprudence of the 
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ninth circuit also confirms that the latter is accessible and usable by legal 
audiences.98 This signals that a long-term transplant of the concept in the legal 
repertoire is likely to be successful despite the fact that the term finds its origin in a 
difference discipline, i.e. performance theory.  
Furthermore, it was argued that the interdisciplinary nature of the concept also plays 
to its strength.99 Importing the notion of ‘embodiment’ would therefore contribute to 
realigning legal paradigms with discourses found in the performing arts where the 
term is widely-accepted as a reference to performers’ input in stage or studio 
interpretations.100  
2. Inviting a new repertoire 
Opening up legal authorship to a new range of artists does not just require the formal 
reform of the law. It also requires of institutions in charge of following or adapting the 
law to be convinced of the cultural legitimacy driving the proposed policy. To this 
aim, it is submitted that the judiciary ought to be sensitised to contemporary 
references and literature framing current discussions on authorship, performership 
and creativity. It is believed that by updating the theoretical culture underpinning their 
legal reasoning, judges will be able to better ground the legal perspectives 
suggested here above. Helping them in this task, the following developments review 
the role of expert-counselling in the Courtroom which is embodied by expert 
witnesses and professional conventions.  
a) sensitising gatekeepers  
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The judiciary would have to open up to new references reaching beyond the 
boundaries of legal scholarship in order to strengthen the cultural backbone of the 
legal argument defending performers’ creativity,. In developing their endorsement of 
performers’ authorship, the courts of common-law jurisdictions would be also 
confronted with the hurdle of departing from precedents which have plainly rejected 
such hypothesis in the past. Finally, in the absence of reforms, the judiciary would 
have to be confident in creatively interpreting current dispositions so as to fully 
include performers in the realm of copyright. All those points acknowledge the 
normative power of judges in modernising their domestic intellectual property 
framework. Although they are not supposed to directly author the law, they do 
contribute to re-shaping its substance by enforcing it on a case-per-case basis.101  
i. Opening the gate to new references 
Chapter Five reviewed the body of literature that could be effectively relied on in 
order to align the applied letter of the law with contemporary theories on 
performances, authorship and creativity. Drawing on Kozinski J’s experience with the 
ninth circuit court of appeal, it is contended that the sensitisation of the judiciary to 
cross-disciplinary theories ought to be built in their training as early as their first 
introduction to performers’ rights in university curricula. This strategy would allow 
contemporary paradigms on performances to not be the mere fleeting eccentricities 
they have been taken for by Kozinski’s detractors,102 but a body of theories with 
which the legal audience would be familiar, at least from an academic perspective. 
To this aim, it is claimed that reforming intellectual property curricula, whether 
delivered at universities or later as part of professional trainings, may prove useful to 
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modify counsels’ and judges’ position towards performers’ input in the chain of 
creative value protected by copyright.103  
Exposure to cross-disciplinary references, if not training, is believed to be all the 
more relevant that the remits of intellectual property laws are closely connected to 
understanding the subject-matter it regulates.104 This training must, however, ensure 
to encompass contemporary literature so as to avoid the sole repetition of outdated, 
conservative references.105  
ii. Side-stepping old references 
Not matter how convinced by cross-disciplinary literature precedent-abiding judges 
may be, earlier case law is clear: performers are not authors, interpretation is not 
composition. This statement was grounded in the law and applied as such by 
preceding decisions in nearly every jurisdiction included in this analysis.106 
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Possibilities to by-pass earlier authorities siding against performers’ authorship will 
be specific to each jurisdiction, and so would be each dispute presented before 
judges since finding for authorship is extremely fact-sensitive.107 The following 
comments will illustrate options for doing so, but is by no mean an exhaustive report 
of all solutions as they only focus on the British jurisdiction.  
The first avenue to consider lies in the fact that the statutory provisions the former 
applied may have been repealed since then. This was notably the case for Godfrey v 
Lees,108 Hadley v Kemp109 or Island records v Corkindale110 where judgements were 
passed as per provisions of the 1956 Copyright Act. Courts could then argue that the 
CDPA commands a different ruling as it introduced new perspectives on authorship 
and evidenced care for the protection of performers’ interests.111 This possibility was 
suggested in passing by High Court of Justice in Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd112 
by Patten J.113 
An alternative option would utilise the flexibility in defining the copyright work 
introduced by the Infopaq jurisprudence to depart from previous authorities. Though 
possible, this option was considerably hampered by British courts’ interpretation 
which considered that the European authorities did not substantially differ from what 
was already enforced at the domestic level.114 
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iii. Stepping in improvisation 
Opening intellectual property disputes to new references is likely to lead judges to 
depart from the letter of the law. Courts would thus be confronted not only with the 
task of inviting a new repertoire of references, but with the responsibility of 
improvising a new set of rules by interpreting the regulatory framework through an 
innovative, contemporary and cross-disciplinary lens. This new approach to passing 
judgements may provoke concerns of unpredictability, inconsistency and judicial 
activism as judges would be115 in effect granted a licence to ‘improvise’ a large part 
of the law. Yet, it is claimed that, improvisation, has always been at the core of 
passing fair judgements, if not all judgements.116  
In her work, Sara Ramshaw stresses the improvised component of legal decision-
making in the context of family law.117 She underlines the similarities between 
theatrical, musical and ‘legal’ improvisations, by drawing parallels between the 
responsibilities of litigating sensitive disputes to the task of improvising in a theatrical 
or musical context. In doing so, Ramshaw corrects two preconceptions about 
passing legal judgements and artistic improvisation. Firstly, she emphasises that 
theatrical or musical improvisation requires knowing and abiding by a large number 
of conventions whether concerned with the stage, the audience, collaborators, or the 
content itself such as tempos, harmonies and so forth.118 Secondly, Ramshaw points 
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to the fact that every judgement is in part improvised or ‘spontaneous’, even when 
respectful of previous precedents,119 because each decision is indeed fact-sensitive.  
Drawing on Derrida’s theory, the scholar argues that a better understanding of 
theatrical or musical improvisers’ training and approach to what makes ‘good’ 
improvisation could provide a useful insight in perfecting a skill which is transferable 
to judges’ practice.120 Indeed, adapting a general rigid framework to the specificities 
of each case requires the investment of both thorough knowledge of the rule of law 
and creative interpretation of it. This is precisely where the skill of ‘improvising’ would 
come into play. Theatrical and musical improvisation is set on the very same 
premises and commandments. It is contended that Ramshaw’s conclusions drawn 
from the experience of judges in family law are relevant to intellectual property law 
and the present discussion.  
The skill of improvising within the boundaries of a rigid framework or within the scope 
of an open-ended rule of law becomes all the more relevant in a European context 
since the CoJ appears to have endorsed the approach of the civil jurisdiction.  
b) Advising gatekeepers 
Judges can be assisted in their improvisation by the counsel of other professionals, 
taking the form of expert opinions or professional conventions. Those two sources of 
specialised knowledge are examined in the subsequent paragraphs.  
i. Inviting expert witnesses 
By definition expert witnesses are trained experts in the field of their trade. Some are 
also accustomed to infringement procedures, the functioning of courtrooms and 
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more generally the intellectual property framework.121 Between their background and 
experience, experts may form a bridge for the judiciary to rely on to combine legal 
reasoning and accessible expert cross-disciplinary knowledge so as to reach the 
fairest outcome possible. As a matter of fact, expert witnesses are indeed intended 
to fulfill such role. From this perspective, they would make the Bench’s best-
equipped assistants in guiding their panels through contemporary performance 
theories and creativity research. 
Yet, not all opinions have proved useful in legal debates. At times, judges have been 
rather forceful in expressing their distrust of the witnesses testifying before them:  
The [expert’s] report turned out to be an embarrassment, as it contained 
material that was not placed in context by any other report […], and its nature 
ensured that it contained no nuance.122  
A number of judges have protested at the willingness of some experts to 
exploit the ignorance of the court on matters within their special expertise. 
Where the subject-matter of the action lies in a highly technical area it is of 
particular importance that the expert is scrupulous in putting forward all 
relevant considerations which occur to him or her as being relevant to the 
issue to be decided. The court has no points of reference other than those 
provided by the expert. It is reprehensible for the expert to hold back relevant 
information. The danger is manifest. If both experts lack objectivity the court is 
deprived of any proper basis to arrive at a decision.123  
 
This reveals that inviting expert opinions may increase opacity where one would 
have assumed that resorting to specialists’ input would bring clarity.124 This concern 
was very clearly expressed in Altera Corp v Clear Logic Incorporated.125 Litigating 
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the alleged infringement of copyright vested in computer chips, the ninth circuit court 
stated:  
Where chips appeared to be similar, Congress assumed that admitting expert 
testimony to assist in determining whether subtle changes in a mask work 
layout were significant would resolve the problem of distinguishing a copy 
from a legitimate reverse engineering attempt in most cases.126 
 
The same panel later concluded:  
 
[T]his is the type of case in which it might have been useful to have a court-
appointed, independent expert. Neutral definitions and a common 
understanding of the underlying technology would have been extremely 
helpful as background for determining whether the chips should have been 
compared for substantial similarity only at the transistor level, only at the 
component level, or at some level in between.127 
. 
This points to a series of flaw the assistance of expert opinions may present. First, 
expert witnesses have been criticised for lacking independence or evidencing bias. 
In Cala Homes Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Homes Ltd,128 the British Court stated:  
Whilst the court is aware that a party is likely to choose as an expert 
someone whose view is most sympathetic to its position, the court is likely 
to assume that the expert is more interested in being honest and right than 
ensuring that one side or another wins. An expert should not consider that it 
is his job to stand shoulder-to-shoulder through thick and thin with the side 
which is paying his bill. The judge is not a rustic who has chosen to play a 
game of Three Card Trick. He is not fair game. Neither is the truth.129 
 
Moreover, expert witnesses may also be influenced by the economic weight of 
parties on the market, instigating further bias in addition to the pressure inevitably 
applied by the litigants’ payment of their commission fees. They may fear to be 
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black-listed as expert witnesses by influential companies were they to testify against 
them in court:130 
For Highbury, Mr Mellor displayed some lack of enthusiasm for the need for 
expert evidence. In particular, he said that Highbury perceives it to be likely 
that there will be real reluctance on the part of any would-be experts to give 
evidence against IPC, an organisation which is regarded as king in the 
relevant field. The perceived concern of such would-be witnesses is that, if 
they give evidence, IPC might then put them on a black list and so exclude 
them from the opportunity of providing services to IPC that it might otherwise 
have been willing to engage.  
 
Another weakness in relying on expert opinions to guide judges’ decision is the fact 
that most intellectual property tests, notably of infringement or originality, are 
assessed from the perspective of the reasonable lay-person and not that of an 
expert. This rule keeps a backdoor open for judges to escape any expert conclusions 
they would disagree with. In Norowzian v Arks Ltd,131 Rattee J valued his 
perspective over that of expert opinions presented before him by the parties:  
[The expert witness’s] approach amounts, in my opinion, to analysing the real 
effect of the film out of existence. The question whether one film is a copy of a 
substantial part of the other is, in my judgment, on which can be answered by 
the judge seeing the films and using the evidence supplied by his or her own 
eyes, as indeed Mr. Norowzian's expert, Mr. Brignull, inevitably accepted in 
the course of his cross-examination. In my judgment, the expenditure of time 
and money on expert evidence on this sort of question is to be deprecated.132 
 
The combination of all those pitfalls challenges the ability of expert witnesses to 
assist judges in their law-making tasks.  
ii. Relying on professional conventions and customary rules 
Alongside expert opinions, customary rules as well as professional conventions, also 
known as conventions collectives in France, may be useful in supporting judges’ 
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design of performers’ protection. This option was explored and adopted by the 
French legislator. The IPC directly refers to customary rules in applying the 
categorisation of performing artists133 which distinguish between performers, 
auxiliary performers and models.  
This strategy enables the enforcement of a one-size-fit all regime in the first place 
whilst leaving room for tailoring the law to specific needs in the second. 
Nevertheless, this legislative construction is far from perfect. The French system fell 
short by assuming that every artistic sector was organised and uniform enough to 
formulate consensual definitions of what distinguishes a performer, from an auxiliary 
performer or a model. Case law reveals that, on many occasions, the French bench 
had to design the rules collective conventions failed to provide. In their task, they 
relied on expert evidence as well as tests of originality they had devised.134 Judges 
explicitly rejected the option of drawing on the customary rules applicable to 
particular fields to fill in the gaps left in others.135 Despite its loopholes, this 
regulatory framework successfully delivered a model meeting its stakeholders’ 
expectations wherever guidelines were supplied by the relevant professional bodies. 
On this basis, it is believed that the input of unions or other organised professional 
representatives may prove useful in devising a better and fairer body of performers’ 
rights.  
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The previous paragraphs offered suggestions for reforms or changes at every level 
composing legal authorship: the author, the work, and the originality condition. One 
condition to protection, fixation, was left out of the present chapter because it was 
dealt with in more details earlier in this analysis.136 This particular question was 
ignored because the issue has been discussed in more details in previous 
developmentsand in greater length in the literature.137 It is the author’s contention 
that the fixation problem seems to have been used as a pretext to rule out the 
possibility of protecting performers as authors for all the cultural reasons explained in 
preceding chapters.138 Cases from various jurisdictions proved that western 
intellectual property frameworks are indeed able to function efficiently even when 
handling material as intangible as performances.139  
The theoretical feasibility of creation a performers’ copyright is not the only concern 
which would stand against the present proposals. Many may take issue with the 
practical question of managing and enforcing performers’ augmented rights. The last 
section of this chapter reviews those concerns with the view to mitigate their reality 
and reach.  
 
III. Managing without divides 
 
Dropping the author-performer divide raises a larger number of question pertaining 
to the attribution and administration of performers’ protection once upgraded to the 
standard of copyright. Those questions stem from the difficulty of foreseeing 
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straightforward infringement procedures involving performances, and the possibility 
of paralysing the management of both performers’ and authors’ rights, especially in 
the context of complex creative productions. The following developments envisage in 
turn the different folds of those arguments in turn.  
 
A. Creation of rights 
 
Extending copyright to performances, or upgraded performers’ rights to the standard 
of their authorial counterparts will require defining the scope and boundaries of those 
new privileges. What would the conditions of attribution of a performer’s copyright 
be? Which performances are protected and when does their protection begin? 
Fortunately, those questions were, at least in part, answered by the introduction of 
performers’ rights at the international and domestic level. Although one might argue 
that the current definition of protectable performances or of protected performers is 
unsatisfactory, the presence of those rights remain proof that policy-makers and 
courts are able to create a legal nomenclature for this type of artistic expression. For 
this reason, the present developments will not delve into more details regarding the 
definition of performers or performances.140 The current framework could be 
improved through the consultation of performers’ unions and representatives so that 
the relevant categories of performative works find themselves covered by future 
proposal of reforms. 
It is also submitted that the level of originality performers should display in order to 
be eligible for their (augmented) rights, was it to be made a requirement for their 
protection, would be left to the courts to define, as it was and still is the case in the 
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context of authorial works. In this process, the courts may rely on elements 
suggested in previous paragraphs such as embodiment or personality, as well as 
expert opinions.141 
In light of previous comments, the only consideration which is yet to be answered or 
decided is the point of departure of augmented performers’ rights, or of performers’ 
copyright. Performers’ rights currently protect the artists’ consent from the making 
and use of recordings of his/her performance, and subsequent uses. Therefore 
although the right may be considered as vested in the performer from the moment of 
performance, one might say creation, it only becomes actionable upon fixation of the 
performance.  
This situation is not dissimilar to what can be found under the copyright provisions in 
Australia, UK and US.142 Indeed, as mentioned in previous developments, though 
the fixation requirement is a necessity to obtain authorial rights, the latter protect the 
work retrospectively so as to include in its coverage the period situated between the 
moment of creation and the moment of fixation.143 France operates under slightly 
different principles as the IPC considerably relaxed the requirement of fixation to 
officially enforce no such condition - although procedural rules in cases of 
infringement would necessitate a degree of materiality of the work to be protected in 
courts.144 Taking into consideration rules applicable to authors’ rights, it seems as 
though performers’ improved protection ought to be triggered by the act of creation, 
or in their case the act of interpretation rather the moment of its material fixation in 
recordings. That said, the moments of fixation and of interpretations should almost 
always coincide. Therefore, the practical importance of distinguishing between the 
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two events in relation to performances may be moot. Nevertheless, the distinction 
may hold grounds to justify its presence for at least three reasons.  
First, policy-makers may wish to anticipate future technological advancements which 
may radically change the ways records are made nowadays. Second, maintaining 
the point of departure of performers’ rights on the day of interpretation rather than 
the day of fixation achieves a full alignment with traditional copyright holders from a 
theoretical perspective, but also in jurisdictions where the moment of creation 
suffices to trigger legal protection such as France. In Australia, the UK and the US, 
the same alignment would be performed by recognising performers protection upon 
fixation with retrospective effect from the day of interpretation. Third, including the 
day of interpretation as a parameter of the legal protection of performers also 
confirms the fact that the subject-matter protected by reformed performers’ rights is 
not merely the use of the recorded performances but its underlying immaterial 
components too. Under rare circumstances, this may allow performers to protect 
their interpretation against imitation or other acts which would otherwise not amount 
to literal copying.145 This last point is further discussed in the following paragraphs. 
  
B. Infringement of rights 
 
Aligning authors and performers’ rights supposes the creation of greater depth in the 
current protection of performers which remains limited to consenting to the fixation 
and use of one’s recorded performance.146 This proposition soon triggers concerns 
related to the possibility of sanctioning non-literal copies of performances. The issue 
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of distinguishing between original elements pertaining to a performative input and 
those stemming from the underlying work may also present itself as a potential 
challenge for the courts. Those observations combined, although never raised until 
now,147 may spur reluctance amongst the judiciary who is expected to pave the way 
for a reform favourable to introducing performers’ copyright, or equivalent.  
 
1. Unwanted flattery 
One of the key substantial differences between current authors’ and performers’ 
rights is the fact copyright covers the immaterial side of the work, whereas 
performers’ protection does not.148 Performers’ rights are constrained to sanctioning 
the unauthorised fixation of performances and its use, but no elements composing 
the performance itself, nor the performing style falls within that scope. As it stands, 
performers are therefore unprotected against the imitation of their performances or 
performing style,149 unlike authors who may find in copyright legal remedies against 
such unwanted flattery.150 
A few simple objections can be raised to mitigate this fear of subjective decisions 
ruling over alleged imitations of performances. First, the task of drawing fine lines 
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between un-authorised non-literal copying and imitation falling outside the scope of 
copyright has been a responsibility resting on judges since the introduction of 
copyright laws. Indeed, this complex exercise is already at the heart of copyright 
infringement procedures and the burden of identifying substantial similarities or 
applying any other test is no greater because the subject-matter now considered 
would include comparing one performance to the other. Judges would be able to 
resort to the same skills, experiences and resources such as expert evidence and 
specialist literature to guide them through the litigation of those cases.  
Second, one could argue that the embodiment process so often mentioned in this 
analysis would theoretically prevent any admission of a non-literal copy of a 
performance by another person, another body. Indeed, if one considers that each 
performance is unique not only to particular moment in time, but also to a particular 
performer, no two performances can be the same, whether performed by the same 
person or not. Therefore the un-authorised reproduction by another performing body 
of a protected performance should be theoretically impossible - in accordance to the 
embodiment theory which bases the legitimacy of performers’ augmented protection 
in the first place. Yet, this argument of embodiment only defeats the possibility of an 
exact replica of a performance by another performing artist. The embodiment theory 
does not prevent the eventuality of an interpretation being substantially similar to a 
previous one, especially less so now that performances can be recorded with a very 
high level of accuracy and re-played at leisure at very low cost. Moreover, the 
embodiment theory would argue against the likelihood of two separate individuals 
coming up with the near identical performances of the same work. Similarities may 
indeed be caused by the guidance of the underlying work or the pressure of following 
performing conventions. Yet the marginal difference made up by the performances 
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between those parameters and the completed performance delivered on stage or in 
studios remains the fruit of a unique set of factors personal to each individual 
performers. Therefore, for the result of the equation which includes all those 
elements to be exactly the same, imitation or copying is likely to have taken place, 
making this hypothesis worth considering for infringement purposes. 
Finally, one might find comfort in the idea that non-literal copying of performances is 
likely to constitute a smaller portion of the disputes generated by the introduction of 
augmented performers’ rights. It is expected that the vast majority of disputes will still 
centre on the un-authorised fixation and un-authorised use of recorded 
performances as those infringing acts remain more common than imitation of 
performances, and their associated litigation avenues more familiar to right-holders 
and their counsels.  
2. Disentangling original inputs 
One may also legitimately fear that granting copyright protection, or any equivalent, 
to performances will put subsequent interpretations of the same work at risk of 
infringing preceding ones. As a result, performers’ liability to intellectual property 
infringement would increase significantly, thereby deterring them from practising their 
art by way of automatic reflex. This situation would defeat the primary purpose of 
augmenting the protection of performers according to the traditional theory that 
intellectual property laws, especially since copyright and authors’ rights are driven by 
the goals of incentivising creative individuals.  
This concern bases its argument on the idea that judges would not be able to 
distinguish between compositional input and interpretative contribution worthy of the 
same protection. However, this exercise has been practised by the courts of 
185 
 
Australia,151 France,152 the UK153 and the US154 on many occasions, without 
questioning judges’ ability to draw the lines which maintain the author-centred 
nomenclature national frameworks currently enforce. This analysis simply 
encourages judges to continue engaging with the same qualification task but with 
reference to more current indicators of originality, and definitions of authorship or 
performership. This line of litigation may involve a degree of subjectivity, yet it is 
contended that the latter is no less present in the context of traditional copyright 
cases.155 On this point, the French Bench noted that the fact a work could be 
perceived in different ways by different individuals should not be an obstacle to 
copyright protection, even though the lack of objective reference to the work 
complicates the litigation of such those rights.156 This proves that seating judges are 
comfortable with the idea of engaging in decision-making which may involve various 
degrees of subjective assessments of the disputed subject-matter. 
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C. Management of rights 
 
Detractors to performers’ augmented rights often solely focus their efforts on issues 
regarding the management of rights.157 First in line are arguments questioning 
whether increasing the substance of performers’ rights will, in practice and effect, 
translate into an actual and substantial improvement of their economic power. In 
short, this questions whether more rights would mean more protection. Additionally, 
author-centred arguments would and could argue that the arrival of new recipients 
eligible to full copyright in the interpretation of underlying work they own will 
prejudice their interest. From their perspective, more protection for performing artists 
would equate to diminishing the substance of their rights. The following section 
examines counter-arguments to those two issues taken with the notion of equal 
protection between authors and performers. 
1. More rights, no more protection  
Improving performers’ legal protection may not translate into bettering their economic 
situation. Often placed in a weaker bargaining position, performers may have neither 
the opportunity nor the resources to action their rights. It might be that imbalanced 
contractual arrangements waive their protection and assign their copyright for the 
same amount of money they would obtain through the performers’ rights currently 
covering their practice.  
An extreme solution to this issue would be to make performers’ rights equal to 
authors’ as well as going further by making their copyright neither waivable nor 
transferable. However, doing so would give rise to a number of issues. First this 
would introduce an unbalance in favour or performers, making their protection of a 
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higher standard than that of authors for no justifiable or logical reasons besides 
correcting current economic patterns. Second, ‘un-waivability’ and non-transferability 
would be both contradictory to the nature of copyright and burdensome for its 
management. Indeed, copyright incentivises the commercialisation of creative works 
to later reward their production. It is contended that locking the mobilisation of works 
involving performers would defeat this objective. This is not to suggest that granting 
non-transferable performers’ rights would be unworkable. The introduction of a 
carefully crafted licensing scheme whereby performers retain the long-term control of 
their rights whilst allowing the immediate commercial exploitation of their works, 
could alleviate those concerns.158  
Another possibility for policy-makers to secure the economic gain associated with 
their rights is to further the construction of equitable remuneration introduced in the 
context of recorded musical performances. This comment refers back to the remarks 
made earlier with regard to the abolition of internal divides existing between musical 
and audio-visual performing artists.159  
It is asserted that protecting performers on par with authors would not be a vain 
exercise despite the fact that performers’ economic position is slow to improve. 
Indeed, it would send a cultural message to artists that their respective society 
values their input in the creative industries, and wishes to reward their contribution 
accordingly.160 This comment was made in Sherman and Bently’s report 
commissioned by the Australian government on ways to improve performers’ rights 
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at the national level in 1995.161 It is reiterated here as the argument has not lost any 
of its relevance. 
Moreover, the issue that a positive economic impact on performers’ working 
conditions would not necessarily follow suit the introduction of (more) performers’ 
rights, was also a point raised during the debate the British Parliament held when the 
introduction of civil remedies for the bootlegging of recorded performances was 
discussed in 1963.162 Showing a clear sense of pragmatism, Lord Somers compared 
the introduction of performers’ rights to thirty-mile-per-hour limitations placed in 
urban areas. In his analogy, he points to the fact that the majority of drivers do 
respect those rules despite the absence of any mechanisms to enforce them.163 It is 
contended that, fifty years later, this argument still stands. It is submitted that the 
introduction and enforcement of performers’ augmented rights could be enough of a 
deterring factor to bent current practices in the creative industries on the long term.  
2. More rights, less protection 
The last paragraphs of this chapter circles back to specific objections reviewed in the 
introductory comments of this analysis.164 It assumes that the criticisms voiced 
regarding the increase and overlap of both claims and claimants would, again, be 
raised against the proposal of granting performers with full copyright protection. The 
following paragraphs suggest ways of addressing this issue, whether performers’ 
protection is made equal to that of authors, or simply improved.  
Objections which have already been disregarded will not be repeated here; only 
issues which have only been mitigated in previous developments will be addressed. 
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Therefore, the section considers primarily the ‘floodgate’ argument165 in all its 
declinations. Concerns with regard to parasite claims made by individuals located at 
the outskirts of what would traditionally be considered as performances from an 
intellectual property perspective will be tackled first. Second, and lastly, the section 
concludes by succinctly reviewing solutions to facilitate the pressure added by 
extending protection to performers equivalent to that of authors.  
 
a) Coping with flooding and dilution 
The above recommendations do not imply that all performers should be made 
eligible to full copyright protection or equivalent. Only a section of the group 
composed by performing artists would qualify for rights equalling that of authors. For 
this reason, in jurisdictions where either courts or legislators would opt for protecting 
performers on par with authors, a categorisation of performers similar to the scheme 
enforced in France would be strongly recommended in order to rationalise which 
performers would be eligible to legal authorship and which would not. Finally, to 
further mitigate this fear of dilution, the argument concludes by drawing on the 
experience of the French and Australian intellectual property systems which protect 
performers as authors or co-authors without collapsing, or flooding courts with 
claims.  
i. Performers: a disappearing legal species 
Granting full copyright to performers would in effect make the latter legal authors. As 
a result, a large portion of performers would be lifted from the latter category to join 
the ranks of legal authors. Doing so, would reduce the ranks of individuals 
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considered as performers, possibly to the extent of extinguishing their class. This 
hypothesis ultimately questions the legitimacy of maintaining a legal regime for 
performers. Alternatively, the risk would be to fill the category of performers with 
performative practices originally left out of the scope of intellectual property 
protection such as sportive performances, journalism to only name a few examples 
considered as an undesirable stretch of the intellectual property scope.166 This 
scenario would create a dilution of the interests protected by authors’ and 
performers’ rights by including works or performances located at the outskirts of the 
subject-matter targeted by intellectual property. 
Although those hypotheses are possible risks, they could be easily managed. 
Indeed, the present analysis does not advocate for upgrading all performers 
currently protected by intellectual property laws to the level of legal authors. Only 
those satisfying the originality test proposed in above comments would access to 
copyright protection or its equivalent.167 It is contended this situation should concern 
only a small portion of the population of performers. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that this analysis does not recommend enlarging of the subject-matter covered 
by intellectual property laws. Its objective only focuses on reshuffling the distribution 
of rights amongst artists already protected by copyright and performers’ rights.  
ii. Categorising performers 
Jurisdictions contemplating the option of extending copyright to performers are also 
recommended to accompany the reform with the introduction of a categorisation of 
performers as it exists in France. Although the French model is to be improved and 
rationalised on many accounts, its enforcement allows a clearer read of the 
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population protected by intellectual property laws whilst allowing for more nuances in 
protecting it. By creating the categories of author-performers, performers, auxiliary 
performers and models, the law would devise a scheme which takes into account the 
different nature of performers’ input according to their line of practice. Such scheme 
would allow a more realistic representation of performers’ practices even though the 
former remains a simplistic representation of their range.  
This recommendation is made with the caveats expressed in previous comments 
with regard to the model currently enforced in France.168 Inconsistencies and gaps 
would have to be corrected in collaboration with bodies representing the interests 
involved, i.e. performers’ and authors’ unions or societies, and taking into 
consideration the sliding roles and inputs of each category according to the discipline 
they are involved in.169 However, it must be noted that if the categories must be 
tailored to the artistic market they relate to, the present argument does not 
recommend the introduction of horizontal internal divides between performers, but 
only a vertical one for the reasons expressed in previous developments.170  
iii. No flooding abroad 
Performers are protected as legal authors or co-owners in both France and Australia, 
in limited cases.171 This was achieved without paralysing neither their intellectual 
property frameworks nor the courts operating them. Although there is no empirical 
data available to support this claim,172 the fact that performers’ authorship and co-
ownership have not been repealed suggests that granting equal rights to performers 
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is feasible under both common-law and civil-law inspired intellectual property 
systems.  
b) Relieving pressure  
This chapter concludes its analysis by pointing to already existing mechanisms 
designed to manage multiple, sometimes competing, copyright claims involved within 
the same creative product. It is argued that the same solutions would be able to 
handle performers’ copyright or equivalent, as they do with authors’, sound 
recorders’ and broadcasters’ interests.173 It is contended that contractual 
arrangements, statutory licensing and right collecting societies are all be options to 
explore in order to facilitate the collection of copyright owned by the hundred 
musicians playing in McCardie J’s orchestra.174 They aim at releasing the pressure 
of clashing rights over the same piece of work by rationalising its management. In 
effect, they offer to manage the undesired phenomenon of layering of rights 
described in Chapter One.175 
i. Contracts 
Copyrights can be transferred, assigned, licensed or left unused by their owners. 
Performers’ copyright or authorial rights would be no exception to this flexibility. 
Therefore, producers or copyright holders fearful of right management issues may 
devise contractual agreements to remove this hurdle.  
Contractual assignments or transfers of copyright would not be more cumbersome 
than already existing administrative procedures remunerating performers.176 From 
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this perspective, granting performers copyright would in fact be as burdensome as 
the protection they currently receive from other intellectual property or employment 
laws.177 Neither the number of performers involved in an ensemble nor the fact that 
each performance may trigger its own copyright are issues which would significantly 
increase the administrative weight of transferring those rights by contracts. Indeed, 
actors, extras, session musicians are required to sign presence sheets to count their 
hours in order to be adequately remunerated for their time. It is customary practice 
for the same presence sheets to also collect performers’ consent to be recorded and 
the conditions in which such recording may be used in the future. It would thus be 
reasonable to conceive that the same presence sheets would also gather agreement 
to assign or license performers’ authorial rights was this option adopted by national, 
federal or regional parliaments. From this perspective, the introduction of performers’ 
copyright would add little, if no, administrative or transactional burden to existing 
working relationships. The ease with which performers’ copyright could be 
transferred signals that their bargaining power may as easily diminished. This 
comment ties contractual practices to earlier points made with regard to the realistic 
impact on performers’ working condition of reforms erasing the author-performer 
divide. Again, although it is accepted the increasing performers’ legal protection may 
not be followed by a proportionate augmentation of their economic power, it is held 
that such reforms remain a step in the right direction.178 
ii. Compulsory licences 
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In order to avoid paralysing the utilisation of underlying works’ copyright, a system of 
compulsory licenses extended to all performances could be devised to centralise the 
management of performers’ augmented rights whilst ensuring a fair remuneration for 
their input. This option has been adopted by many jurisdictions under study179 in 
varying contexts whether they helped regulating the use of musical works, orphan 
works or copyright material used for educational purposes.180 It is contended that if 
the same scheme was introduced for the management of performers’ copyright, 
especially in the context of productions involving a large number of performers, 
compulsory licenses’ schemes would be a useful mechanism to reduce the legal 
pressure increased rights would exert on the management of creative products 
involving performances.181 Compulsory or statutory licenses would have to 
applicable to all horizontal categories of performers to avoid creating internal 
horizontal divides between performers.  
iii. Collecting societies 
Finally, developing the roles of right collecting societies may be a third and last 
option to consider in order to relieve the pressure of layering multiple copyrights over 
the same artistic production. However, this suggestion bears at least one caveat. 
Right collecting societies have been criticised for lacking accountability and 
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transparency in the management of artists and right holders’ interests182 which is 
fostered in part by their dominant positions on national markets,183 and so despite 
legislative efforts at national and regional levels to tackle some of those issue.184 It 
was also argued that the bureaucratic weight created by those organisations in the 
right clearance process could now be by-passed by reverting back to individual 
management thanks to new technologies which offer better platforms for such 
transactions to take place at low costs.185 Those observations inevitably challenge 
the ability for collecting societies to be in charge of the management of more 
substantial performers’ rights. Though their structure and services could be 
improved,186 it is submitted that their role would remain essential in tackling concerns 
related to multiple claims because they have both the experience and expertise in 
dealing with such transactions.187 
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Summary 
The chapter proposed to rationalise divides internal to the category of performers as 
well as to delete, or at least soften, the external distinction between authors and 
performers. In so doing, it offered a number of suggestions for legislators or judges 
to take into consideration when reforming performers’ rights at the national level. 
Although the overall objective of aligning authors’ and performers’ legal regimes 
could be regarded as rather radical considering the current stance taken by legal 
scholarship on the question, the above proposals aimed towards this goal are not. 
The proposed changes in law or legal decision-making are thought to fit within the 
current regional and national frameworks, so much so that the introduction of 
performers’ protection equivalent to copyright would not necessarily require 
legislators to reconstruct their domestic copyright system. It is contended that the 
necessary changes could be triggered by re-directing key concepts of the intellectual 
property paradigm such as the originality condition, authorship, performership, 
approaches to tangibility, or fixation. It is submitted that if those concepts central to 
the Australian, France, British and American frameworks were to be modernised to 
take into account contemporary considerations, little work should be required in 
terms of formal reform. Moreover, the integration of the authors’ and performers’ 
legal regimes would contribute to perform a more general mutation of current 
copyright frameworks. The latter would move away from its current modern model188 
to embrace a contemporary form whose paradigm would welcome both intellectual 
and embodied forms of creativity, including performances.189 In the same manner, 
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copyright law evolved from a pre-modern to a modern paradigm,190 the extension of 
authorial privileges to performers would have its current modern structure mutate 
into a third contemporary model.  
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Conclusion 
 
Interdisciplinary activity, valued today as an important aspect of research, cannot be 
accomplished by simple confrontations between various specialized branches of knowledge. 
Interdisciplinary work is not a peaceful operation: it begins effectively when the solidarity of 
the old disciplines breaks down […].1 
Roland Barthes, 1979  
 
At this point, the author hopes the reader understands why Kozinski J’s decision to 
grant the actress full copyright over her performance in the Garcia case2 was the 
right one indeed. The subsequent developments synthesise the reasoning this thesis 
followed to side with the ninth-circuit judge. They review its research questions and 
findings before tying them back to the wider context contemporary intellectual 
property laws sit in. Without repeating comments made in previous chapters, this 
conclusion succinctly summarises the theoretical and practical implications the 
findings entail. Finally, suggestions for future research with the view to further the 
contribution of this thesis will close its concluding remarks.  
 
I. Research questions and findings 
This research project assessed the substance of the legal distinction between 
authors and performers; a feature common to most western intellectual property 
frameworks and certainly found in all the jurisdictions under study in this analysis, 
those being Australia, France, the UK and the US. Due the supranational dimension 
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of this field of law, the scope of this project also included policies initiated at global 
and regional levela as expressed in international conventions and the framework of 
the European Union. 
The research explored the existence, depth and rationale behind the legal 
categorisation of artists as either authors or performers, a phenomenon it referred to 
as the ‘author-performer divide’. The main objective was to identify how the divide 
manifested itself in legal narratives and whether its enforcement was a conscious 
decision made by policy-makers. Simply put, this analysis aimed to uncover both the 
divide itself and its foundations by answering how, where, when, why and by whom it 
has been introduced into the above listed western intellectual property models.  
 
A. How & where in the law 
This thesis concluded that the author-performer divide is present at every level of the 
protection provided by intellectual property laws. Indeed, the name, substance and 
duration granted to authors or performers bear the mark of a hierarchy favouring the 
former group. Performers’ work is covered by ‘neighbouring’ rights to copyright within 
a narrower scope and for a shorter period.3 Scholars have commented on the fact 
that the introduction of performers’ moral rights by the WPPT in 19964 should be 
interpreted as the breaking of performing artists’ glass ceiling, existing in intellectual 
property frameworks.5 This claim was vigorously challenged by stressing the number 
of provisions that continue to maintain a significant gap between copyright and 
                                                          
3
 text to note 33, 78 and 148 in Chapter 2. 
4
 1996 WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty, Art 17.  
5
 Mira Sundara Rajan, ‘Center Stage: Performers and Their Moral Rights in the WPPT Law, Technology and the 
Arts Symposium: The WIPO Copyright Treaties: 10 Years Later’ (2006) 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev 767; Ruth 
Towse, ‘The Singer or the Song? Developments in Performers’ Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural 
Economist’ (2007) 3 Review of Law and Economics 745, 746. See text to note 65, Chapter 2.  
200 
 
performers’ rights. There is indeed much to achieve before the regime of authors’ 
and performers’ right can be considered harmonised. Performers would have to be 
granted a protection lasting their lifetime from the day of the first performance plus 
seventy years,6 the scope of economic rights would have to be extended to the 
substance of performances,7 and two additional moral rights would have to be 
introduced in jurisdictions which offer the full portfolio of the doctrine.8 This is without 
mentioning the internal divide existing between musical and audio-visual 
performers.9 None of those changes are minor adjustments for legislators to make. 
Reforms to the core of copyright and neighbouring rights would have to be 
implemented, for a levelling of the two regimes to take place. This is because the 
core of copyright regulation is precisely where the author-performer divide is 
anchored.  
 
B. Written by whom  
Uncovering the divide also revealed its authors. Parliamentary bodies whether 
located at the international, regional or national level used the letter of the law 
pertinent to either copyright or neighbouring rights to shape the divide. It is clear from 
legislative debates and reports commissioned by policy-makers at all those levels 
that the crystallisation in the law of a hierarchy between authors and performers was 
no inadvertent move on their part.10 The author-performer divide is the result of a 
deliberate choice to favour authors, and to ensure that the introduction of performers’ 
protection would not threaten their rights. 
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In turn, in every jurisdiction the divide was followed by the courts as the sacred 
expression of legislative intent. In applying the categorisation, judges laid out the 
flesh on its skeleton built by legislators. They gave the divide a practical significance 
which had them draw questionable lines between modes of creative expression 
regarded as either creation or interpretation. Though it must be noted that if the 
judicial discourse was respectful of the hierarchy created by legislative bodies 
overall, it has sometimes poked holes in the wall the law erected between authors 
and performers. On a number of occasions in France, the UK or the US, judges have 
abolished the author-performer divide11 or preceded legislative reforms to improve 
performers’ protection.12 As a result, the distinction between the two groups of artists 
has been made much more porous in jurisdictions like France where the courts have 
been particularly active in redefining the scope of authorship and performership.13 
 
C. When 
It was never the agenda of this investigation to offer a thorough historiography of the 
author-performer divide. Nevertheless, the research pinpointed the crystallisation of 
the author-performer divide in the 1960s, more specifically in 1961 with the passing 
of the Rome Convention.14 Although traces of the divide have been noted before this 
particular point in time,15 the international treaty and the national reforms it triggered 
formalised in intellectual property paradigms. The 1961 Convention and its 
requirement on signatory states to provide performers with a civil right of action 
separate from copyright, was the first time the distinction was materialised on 
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statutory intellectual property grounds at the international level, signalling thereby the 
consensus of western policy-makers in this regard.  
 
D. Why 
Explaining the rationale behind the divide has been the main research objective of 
this thesis. It avoided reiterating arguments which had the discussion stagnate on 
questions of fixation or hypothetical legal millefeuilles.16 Instead, a deeper 
investigation was carried out into the reasoning deployed by courts and policy-
makers to justify the divide. Surprisingly perhaps, the justifications usually articulated 
in the literature on this point were not necessarily dominating the legislative or 
judicial narrative. Careful qualitative analyses of the those discourses revealed that 
most decisions and reports were motivated by more complex underlying cultural 
beliefs on creativity, authorship and performership which played against the 
evaluation of performers as equal to authors, going beyond mere legal or economic 
concerns. The same analyses revealed how cultural beliefs framing the notions of 
creativity, authorship and performership have been imported into the legal discourse 
to be translated in legal arguments to support the author-performer divide enforced 
by the law. In so doing, this thesis identified three distinct phenomena which served 
as the theoretical basis to building a case against performers’ equal protection: the 
doctrine of ex nihilo creation,17 the intellectualisation of the subject-matter 
protected,18 and the disembodiment of performances.19 Three chapters of this thesis 
were dedicated to explaining and illustrating each argument.  
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Interestingly, each one of these chapters stressed the existence of a gap separating 
legal conceptions on the notions of originality, authorship and performances from 
those endorsed by scholars or practitioners in the performing arts.20 Those 
discrepancies led this thesis to conclude that the author-performer divide is the result 
of outdated perceptions of creativity, authoring and performing. It is contended that 
those legal references should be removed from intellectual property models and 
replaced by contemporary equivalents found in performance theories and the 
literature in the arts more generally. Only then will the intellectual property models be 
able to meet the expectations of a wider range of stakeholders, including both 
authors and performers.  
 
 
II. Theoretical and practical implications 
This thesis advocated for the removal of the author-performer divide from the 
intellectual property frameworks listed above because of the discrepancies in 
understanding performances it creates between the law and the fields it is designed 
to regulate. It posits that their legitimacy and cultural standing withered a little over 
half a century ago if one takes the ‘performative turn’ as the starting point of 
consensual modern considerations on performers’ creativity. It is submitted that the 
author-performer divide is the remnant of outdated paradigms on both creativity and 
performances which anchors great archaism at the heart of what are supposed to be 
our society’s laws of innovation.  
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The preceding chapter proposed various ways, some more radical than others, in 
which the legal frameworks listed above could be geared towards a contemporary 
model of intellectual property laws rewarding both intellectual and embodied forms of 
creative expression on an equal basis.21 One of the main recommendations 
suggests involving greater ‘interdisciplinarity’ in the work of intellectual property 
lawyers and policy-makers understood broadly.22 It is submitted that intellectual 
property paradigms and the enforcement of the rights they offer could be significantly 
improved by learning more from and about the fields this body of law is designed to 
regulate.23 To this end, interdisciplinarity ought to be better integrated into the 
training of policy-makers, judges and counsels. However, as with any work involving 
an interdisciplinary dimension, one runs the risk of engaging with other fields on a 
superficial manner, and in turn risks repeating stereotypical concepts or outdated 
views in relation to those areas. It is believed that this problem can be addressed by 
ensuring that meaningful collaboration between experts takes place to guide cross-
disciplinary ventures.24  
 
III. Future Research 
Moving forward, the work undertaken by this thesis could be furthered in many ways. 
First of all, its comparative study could be improved by including in its scope at least 
Canada and Germany. Both jurisdictions are considered western countries and have 
developed interesting national intellectual property doctrines. Comparing and testing 
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the present findings against the Canadian and German frameworks could thus 
complete the range of this study.  
The present argumentation could also gain in strength by including numerical data 
representing the flow of incomes circulating between producers, authors and 
performers within different creative markets. Right collecting societies and main 
music publishers had been contacted in order to obtain such data without success. 
This area of research was therefore left unexplored. 
Keeping to the topic of right collecting societies, further work would have to be 
undertaken in order to assess whether those institutions are indeed a suitable option 
to administer performers’ new rights – were reforms to take place. To this end, more 
research on their structure, management and distribution policies would have to be 
carried out.  
Additionally, it is contended that a more detailed knowledge of the structure, patterns 
and functioning of each creative industry employing performing artists could valuably 
deepen the analyses of this project. For instance, this would enable a more 
substantial assessment of the relevance of vertically categorising performers as well 
as allow the research to convert some of its theoretical principles into more practical 
solutions.  
Another recommendation expressed in Chapter Six was to rely on the guidance of 
expert witnesses to update core concepts of intellectual property laws.25 Were this 
route to be taken, it seems necessary to do further research on the procedural rules 
applicable to expert witnesses in different jurisdictions in order to accurately 
ascertain the risks involved in increasing the weight of their opinions on the judicial 
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decision-making. In doing so, it would be interesting to investigate judges’ 
relationship or attitudes to expert opinions according to their jurisdictions but also 
according to witnesses’ expertise.26 
On the same note, judges should also be the focus of further research. More 
precisely, judges’ training should be studied in greater detail to investigate whether a 
correlation exists between their stake on creativity, authorship and performership 
and their background.27 
 
IV. Original contribution of the research 
As it stands, this thesis offers an original contribution to the literature on performers’ 
protection by providing the first in-depth theoretical analysis of the relationship 
between performers’ and authors’ rights at the national, regional and international 
level. Previous research either focused on detailing the substance of performers’ 
rights,28 or proposed superficial suggestions as to why performers’ rights were 
designed as the Cinderella sister of intellectual property rights, but no deeper 
investigation had been carried out.29 The present analysis bridged this gap in 
                                                          
26
 Work on this point has already be done by notably Joseph Bellido as far as the British intellectual property 
system is concerned. See, Joseph Bellido, ‘Looking Right: The Art of Visual Literacy in British Copyright 
Litigation’ (2014) 10 Law, Culture and the Humanities 66. However, a more extensive and comparative analysis 
is yet to be performed.  
27
 This point was brought up by Lionel Bently in ‘Authorship in Popular Music in UK Copyright Law’ (2009) 
12 Information, Communication and Society 179, 192.  
28
 See for example, Richard Arnold, Performers’ Rights (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008); Owen Morgan, 
International Protection of Performers’ Rights (Hart Publishing 2002); Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral Rights of 
Authors and Performers: An International and Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press 2006); Bonnie 
Teller, ‘Toward a Better Protection of Performers in the United States: A Comparative Look at Performers’ 
Rights in the United States, under the Rome Convention and in France’ (1990) 28 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
29
 See for example, Rebecca Tushnet, ‘Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied’ (2013) 60 
Journal Copyright Society of the USA 209; Paul Olagnier, Le Droit Des Artistes Interprètes et Exécutants 
(Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1937); Judy Kim, ‘The Performers’ Plight in Sound Recordings 
- Unique to the US: A Comparative Study of the Development of Performers' Rights in the United States, 
England, and France’ (1986) 10 Columbia VLA Journal of Law and the Arts 453 ; Ruth Towse, ‘The Singer or 
the Song? Developments in Performers’ Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural Economist’ (2007) 3 Review 
of Law and Economics 745.  
207 
 
knowledge by relying on an extensive interdisciplinary qualitative and comparative 
study of western intellectual property models which included the jurisdictions listed 
above. 
In this process, this thesis uncovered the author-performer divide and the theoretical 
arguments supporting it: the intellectualisation of the subject-matter protected by 
copyright, the reproduction of the doctrine of ex nihilo creation and the 
disembodiment of performances. All of those patterns are new conceptual avenues 
to use and explore when critically assessing intellectual property laws. The findings 
of this thesis have allowed the discussion on performers’ rights to leave the state of 
stagnation the current literature had it locked in. In doing so, this research revitalised 
the need for intellectual property frameworks, narratives and models to update their 
standards of references and cornerstone concepts. Not only would it impact the 
regime applicable to performing artists, but it would also affect that of any other 
creative agents currently left out of the scope of copyright protection because of 
current models’ biases towards intellectual creativity and ex nihilo creation. 
Ultimately, this research thus offers a critical lens through which to analyse current 
intellectual property laws with the view to better protect future forms of creative 
expressions.  
Finally, this thesis also proposes new ways of undertaking qualitative research in 
intellectual property law. As explained in introductory comments,30 the research 
findings were the result of the study of a substantial volume of cases, reports and 
statutes enabled by the software program NVivo which is more commonly used to 
analyse interviews and testimonies. This methodology allowed the construction of a 
thorough qualitative data analysis, laying out the solid foundations of this work. It 
                                                          
30
 text to note 36, Introduction. 
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contributes to validating the legitimacy and rigour of qualitative studies in law by 
easing the processing of a significantly larger number of judicial decisions and 
legislative documents compared to traditional manual techniques. 
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Annex 1  
On harmonization in copyright law (or lack thereof) 
 
Referenced in Chapter 1, note 51 
 
See “Inforpaq” case: C-5/08 Infopaq International A S v Danske Dagblades Forening 
[2009] EUECJ C-5/08_O and the “BSA” decision: C-393/09 Bezpecnostni softwarova 
asociace Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [ 2010] EUECJ C-393/09, 
EU:C:2010:816, ECLI:EU:C:2010:816, [2011] FSR 18, [2011] ECDR 3. Eleonora 
Rosati, ‘Originality in a Work, or a Work of Originality’ (2011) 58 Copyright Society 
USA 795, at 803-16; Eleonora Rosati, Originality In EU Copyright - Full 
Harmonisation through Case Law (Edward Elgar 2013), 207. Jonathan Griffiths, 
‘Infopaq, BSA and the “Europeanisation” of United Kingdom Copyright Law’ (2011) 
16 Media & Arts Law Review.  
 
Outside the scope of the European Union’s authority, there is little in the form of 
harmonisation. Unsuprisingly perhaps core copyright concepts vary from one 
national system to another. The definition of the work and the necessary condition to 
satisfy vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. Taking the fixation condition 
for example, whilst it is strictly applied in the United States (US Code Title 17 para 
101), United Kingdom (CDPA 1988, S. 3(2)) and Australia (1968 Copyright Act S. 
22(1) to (3)),France does not enforce any condition of the sort in theory (see IPC Art 
L 111-1 and L111-2). The IPC reads that “[t]he author of a work of the mind shall 
enjoy in that work, by the mere fact of its creation, an exclusive incorporeal property 
right which shall be enforceable against all persons” and that “[a] work shall be 
deemed to have been created, irrespective of any public disclosure, by the mere fact 
of realization of the author’s concept, even if incomplete” (official translation). An 
exception is made in the case of choreographic works which need to be “fixed in 
writing or in another manner” (art. L112-2 4°). However, this absence of fixation 
requirement must be read in light of civil procedural rules which require a form of 
fixation to pursue litigation in application of the adage “Idem est non probari et non 
esse; non deficit jus, sed probation” (in English: What does not appear and what is 
not is the same; it is not the defect of the law, but the want of proof). On this, see 
Ysolde Gendreau, ‘Le Critère de Fixation En Droit Français’ (1994) 159 Revue 
internationale du droit d’auteur 111. The lack of international harmonisation on the 
question of fixation is largely due to the failure of the negotiations of the Berne 
Convention in reaching a consensus on question. See Berne Convention 1886, as 
amended in 1979, Article 2(2): “It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories 
of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form.” 
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As a result of those varying requirements to obtain copyright, the definition of the 
‘authorial’ will vary from one jurisdiction to another, leaving authors protected in 
some countries and not in other. For example, perfumes are authorial works 
protectable by authors’ rights in France whilst they are unlikely to obtain equivalent 
protection in the above mentioned jurisdictions for they lack the necessary 
materiality. See, Paris, 25 janvier 2006, n° 04/18300: D. 2006 jurispr. P 580 obs. 
Daleau; JCP E 2006, 1386 note Caron (concluding that perfumes are protectable by 
copyright even though they may also be patented).  
 
The absence of a clear, streamlined copyright framework is also absent from 
domestic frameworks to the extent that courts finds themselves challenged by the 
application of their own national law. This lead Wood J to state that “[t]he standard 
for copying is surprisingly muddled […] [t]he various efforts to define these two key 
concepts [i.e. originality and substantial similarity], however, have unfortunately had 
the unintended effect of obscuring rather than clarifying the issues.” To which he 
added that “[o]ther circuits have also had trouble expressing the test with any clarity” 
in Peters v West, 692 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2012) at 632,633 para 6. On the same note, 
the same circuit compared the copyright to a “maze” on questions as narrow as the 
eligibility to protection of video games. Evans J commented: “[i]t seems somehow 
fitting that the Atari case, involving the insatiable little yellow circle PAC-MAN, is a 
leading case guiding us through the maze of copyright law as applied to video 
games” (Evans J.) in Incredible Technologies Inc v Virtual Technologies Golf, 400 
F3d 1007 (7th Cir.2005) at 1011. On this, see also, Alex Kozinski, ‘How I Narrowly 
Escaped Insanity’ (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev 1293.  
In France, the jurisprudence framing the protection of perfumes is equally puzzling 
as Courts have been accepting or rejecting claims covering fragrances on the basis 
of conditions foreign to the French Intellectual Property Code. See for an example of 
contradicting decisions: Paris, 4ème ch., 14 février 2007, n° 06/09813, Beaute 
Prestige…: JCP G 2007, I, 176 N 4 obs. Caron (agreeing that perfumes are eligible 
to copyright protection); Cass, 1ère civ, 13 juin 2006, n° 02-44.718: Bull. Civ. 2006 I 
N° 307 p. 267; D. 20006, act. P 1741 note Daleau ; pan. p. 2993 obs. Sirinelli 
(accepting perfumes as protectable by copyright on the condition that they are not 
the mere result of ‘savoir faire’). 
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Annex 2 
 On the jurisprudence on collaboration 
Referenced in Chapter 1, note 57 
The narrow interpretation of joint authorship is intentional and deliberate. The 
jurisprudence in each jurisdiction has been very careful not to include too many 
collaborators in the realm of legal authorship. In Australia: Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd 
v Tonnex International Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 362 (2011) 91 IPR 488 (no case of joint 
authorship for several employees working on production of the same document); 
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44 (2010) 264 
ALR 617 (same position held in this case in the context of directories made by 
employees of a company) ; Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 3) 
[2011] FCA 846 (unreported BC201105581) (the intervention of different persons in 
the redaction of information sheets, do not make them joint authors of the 
documents) ; Prior v Sheldon [2000] FCA 0438, (2000) 48 IPR 301, para 64 
(contributing to the theme of a work does not suffice to obtain joint authorship); 
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd 
[2010] FCA 984 (2010) 272 ALR 547 (the writing of headlines does not trigger joint 
authorship over the article it refers to); Brumar Contractors v Mt Gambier Garden 
Cemetery [1999] SASC 1636, (1999) 47 IPR 321 (supplying ideas and measurement 
for the creation of a vault does not amount to joint authorship over its design); Bartos 
v Scott (1993) 26 IPR 27 (collaborators must be involved in fixing the expression of 
the work to be regarded as joint authors, the mere provision of tables, research and 
suggestions as to the final format of the work does not suffice); Primary Health Care 
Ltd v Commissioner Of Taxation [2010] FCA 419 (2010) 267 ALR 648 (the 
contribution of various doctors to the redaction of patient records does not amount to 
joint authorship over those records).  
France: Paris, 1ère ch., 11 mai 1965, Dali c/ Théâtre royal de la monnaie de 
Bruxelles et a. : D. 1968, 382 (the painter Salvador Dali cannot be regarded as joint 
author of the ballet for having sketched four costumes out of thirty six as the ballet 
was inspired by previous works and composed of various contribution from different 
artists for the composition of the music and the choreography. To be regarded as 
joint authors, collaborators must share “spiritual intimacy in the making of a common 
piece of work and create the later by means of their artistic input whether they 
belong to the same artform or not” author’s translation, the original text reads: 
“Considérant que sont co-auteurs, ceux qui, dans une intimité spirituelle ont 
collaboré à l'oeuvre commune et l'ont créée par leurs apports artistiques dans un art 
semblable ou different” ; Cass, 1ère civ, 10 mars 1993, n° 91-15.774: Bull. 1993 I N° 
105 p. 70 (the re-edition of a guide does not make the second edition a joint work but 
a derivative work); Cass, 1ère civ, 2 décembre 1997, n° 95-16.653 : Bull.1997 I N° 
348 p. 236 ; RIDA 1998 N 176, p. 409 (in the production of a comic, the work of the 
designer and writer amount to joint-authorship if it is the result of “concerted 
collaboration and creative efforts with the objective to create the characters” 
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(author’s translation – the original text reads: ‘Attendu que les griefs du pourvoi se 
heurtent à l'appréciation des juges du fond qui ont caractérisé la participation de M. 
X... pour le graphisme et de M. Y..., pour les dialogues, résultant d'un travail 
concerté et créatif conduit en commun, en vue de la réalisation des personnages 
litigieux, qui ont acquis leur identité par la conjonction des efforts des deux 
coauteurs’. Judges in the first instance enjoy full discretionary power to determine 
whether the contribution of each collaboration satisfy the test for joint authorship); 
Cass, 1ère civ, 6 mai 1997, n° 95-11.284 : Bull. 1997 I N 145, p. 97 ; RIDA 1997 N 
174, p. 231 Obs. Kéréver ; D. 1998, p. 80 (Judges cannot assume that the 
collaboration between cartoonists and writers in the context of the production of a 
comic book will lead to joint authorship, the court must identify their respective 
contributions in the work and assess their nature before concluding to joint 
authorship).  
United Kingdom: Celebrity Pictures Ltd & Anor v B Hannah Ltd [2012] EWPCC 32 
(19 July 2012) para 1 to 6 (instructions given to a photographer does not amount to 
joint authorship); Creation Records Ltd. & Ors v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] 
EMLR 444, at 450-451 (the person who chooses the angles, sets the scene to 
photograph and directs the person who presses the button on the camera is the sole 
author of the photograph, there is no joint authorship involved); Ray v Classic FM Plc 
[1998] EWHC Patents 333, para 27-28 (A joint author is a person “(1) who 
collaborates with another author in the production of a work; (2) who (as an author) 
provides a significant creative input; and (3) whose contribution is not distinct from 
that of the other author.”); Godfrey v John Lees and others [1995] EMLR 307; 
Wiseman v George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. and Donaldson [1985] F.S.R. 525 
(the “helpful critic and adviser” of a play is not its joint author as his contribution lacks 
the necessary “artistic involvement”); Fylde microsystems v key radio systems [1998] 
F.S.R. 449 ; (1998) IP & T Digest 11 (suggesting corrections does not amount to 
joint authorship); Levy v Rutley (1870-71) L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (who suggests an original 
idea without participating in its expression is not a joint author); Stuart v Barrett and 
Others [1994] EMLR 448, at 463 (same) ; Cala homes v McAlpine [1996] F.S.R. 36. 
United States: Ripple I. admitted that creative processes are more collaborative than 
copyright law reflects: “We have observed in the past that published creations are 
almost always collaborative efforts to some degree—peers make suggestions, 
editors tweak words, and so forth. Were we to deem every person who had a hand in 
the process a co-author, copyright would explode.” (citation omitted) In Janky v Lake 
County Convention And Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2011) at 363 (The 
artists who compose the music of a song and write its lyrics with the intend to jointly 
create a work are joint authors); Gaiman v McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir.2004), 
2004 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,758 (7th Cir.2004), 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1946 (7th Cir.2004); 
Gaiman v McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir.2004), at 658 (if suggestions sufficed to 
amount to joint authorship, “copyright would explode”); Seshadri v Kasraian, 130 
F.3d 798, 75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 934 (7th Cir. 1997), 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 
45,111 (7th Cir. 1997), 1997 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,706 (7th Cir. 1997), 122 Ed. Law Rep. 
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603, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 1997); Erikson v Trinity Theatre Inc et al., 13 F3d 
1061 (7th Cir. 1994), at 1064 (inviting authors to contribute to the script of a play 
does not make them joint authors if the playwright controls “what eventually [is] put in 
the script”; Aalmuhammed v Lee, 202 F. 3d 1227, at 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Claimjumping by research assistants, editors, and former spouses, lovers and 
friends would endanger authors who talked with people about what they were doing, 
if creative copyrightable contribution were all that authorship required.”).  
See also on this, Rebecca Tushnet, ‘Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and 
Disembodied’ (2013) 60 Journal Copyright Society of the USA 209, 216-8 
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Annex 3 
On derivative works 
 
Referenced in Chapter 1, note 70 and Chapter 3, note 212 
The Australian and British statutes do not explicitly mention the concept of ‘derivative 
work’ in their provisions. The Australian 1968 Copyright Act refers extensively to the 
concept of adaptation whose definition can be found under s. 31 (1)(vi)-(vii) (4) (5) 
(7). See, Australian Copyright Office, ‘Artists & Copyright’ 1, 5 
www.copyright.org.au/admin/cms.../342838564504046861d3bf.pdf (accessed 10 
March 2016). See also, s. 10, 13 (2), 14 (b), s. 21(2), s. 27(4), s. 40 (1)-(2), s. 41, 
s.42, s. 43A, s.44, s. 45, s. 46, s. 47. In the British copyright framework, sound 
recordings, films and broadcast will be regarded as derivative work (See Bainbridge 
DI, Intellectual Property (9th edn, Pearson 2012) 994) so are adaptations (see CDPA 
1988, s. 16 9e) and s. 21(1) to (5)).  
 
France: IPC, Art. L. 112-3 refers to “composite work” (oeuvre composite) as: 
“Composite work shall mean a new work in which a pre-existing work is incorporated 
without the collaboration of the author of the latter work. The authors of translations, 
adaptations, transformations or arrangements of works of the mind shall enjoy the 
protection afforded by this Code, without prejudice to the rights of the author of the 
original work. The same shall apply to the authors of anthologies or collections of 
miscellaneous works or data, such as databases, which, by reason of the selection 
or the arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations”. Official 
translation, emphasis omitted.  
 
United States: US Code, Title 17 para 101, 103 (a)-(b). Para 101 reads “A “derivative 
work” is a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial 
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. 
Although derivative works are protected by copyright independently from the 
underlying work, the primary author whose work is being used remains entitled to 
infringement proceedings if he has not consented to the re-creation of his work.  
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Annex 4 
On collective works 
 
Referenced in Chapter 1, note 71 
Unlike derivative works, collective works have been defined with a varying degree of 
care by all national legislation included in this analysis. In the UK, the 1988 CDPA 
considers that both works of joint authorship (a) and works “ in which there are 
distinct contributions by different authors or in which works or parts of works of 
different authors are incorporated”(b) (CDPA 1988, s. 178 (a)-(b)). In Australia, 
France and the US, collective works only refer to the second tier of the British 
definition (1968 Copyright Act, s. 204(2) (a)-(c); IPC, Art. L 113-2; US Code, Title 17 
para 101). 
 
Australia: the term ‘collective work’ is mentioned in two places throughout the 1968 
Copyright Act (s.204-2 and 239-4 (c)) without clear definition given apart from under 
s. 204 (transitional provisions) which reads : “collective work means: (a) an 
encyclopaedia, dictionary, year book or similar work; (b) a newspaper, review, 
magazine or similar periodical; or (c) a work written in distinct parts by different 
authors, or in which works or parts of works of different authors are incorporated.” 
(italicisation omitted). 
 
France: IPC, Art. L 113-2 reads: “Collective work” shall mean a work created at the 
initiative of a natural or legal person who edits it, publishes it and discloses it under 
his direction and name and in which the personal contributions of the various authors 
who participated in its production are merged in the overall work for which they were 
conceived, without it being possible to attribute to each author a separate right in the 
work as created.” (official translation)  
 
United Kingdom: the term ‘collective word’ is mentioned at various places throughout 
the CDPA 1988 without offering a clear definition. See for instance CDPA 1988, s.6 
(b), s. 81 (4)(b), s. 116 (4)(a), s. 79 (6)(b), s. 178(b), and Schedule 1, s. 27 (5)(c). 
Section 178(b) reads: “ [In this Part] ‘collective work’ means […] a work in which 
there are distinct contributions by different authors or in which works or parts of 
works of different authors are incorporated”.  
 
United States: US Code, Title 17, para 101 reads: “collective work” is a work, such 
as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopaedia, in which a number of 
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are 
assembled into a collective whole. 
 
  
216 
 
Annex 5 
On the original author’s claim over derivative works 
 
Referenced in Chapter 1, note 74 
See Annex 3 and Chapter 1, note 70 plus its accompanying text on the regulatory 
framework of derivative works and adaptations. The overarching claim of the 
underlying work’s author has been confirmed by the Courts:  
 
Australia: EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd (2011) 191 
FCR 444 : “the aural resemblance need not be resounding or obvious” to infringe (on 
musical derivative works) ; CBS Records Australia Ltd v Guy Gross (1989) 15 IPR 
385 (on arrangement rights) ; CHH Australia Ltd v Accounting Systems 2000 
(Developments) Pty Ltd (1991) 20 IPR 555 (on adaptation of computer program); 
George Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd [1994] FCR 240 ; [1994] 130 ALR 659 ; [1994] 
30 IPR 209 (reproduction of a painting on a carpet); Australian Medic-
C2099.10.30are Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1220, (2009) 
261 ALR 501 (overarching rights in translation).  
 
France: Cass, 1ère civ, 24 novembre 1993, Dopagne c/ Cts Vian, n° 91-18.881 : D. 
1994, p. 405 note Edelman (adaptation of a novel into a script); Paris, 4ème ch. B, 
27 septembre 1996, Centre culturel Aragon Triolet c/ Instant Théâtre : D. 1997, p. 
357 note Edelman (the adaptation on stage of a play must respect the wishes of the 
playwright) ; Cass, 1ère civ, 12 juin 2001, n° 98-22.591 : Bull civ. 2001 I N° 171 p. 
111 (even though derivative works must respect the rights attached to the underlying 
work including the right of integrity, such rights must be enforced in light of the needs 
to modify the work for the purpose of the adaptation); Paris, 5 février 1997, n° 96 
02074 (arrangement rights).  
 
United Kingdom: ZYX Music GmbH v King (1995) 31 IPR 207 (on arrangement 
rights) Brooker & Anor v Fisher [2008] EWCA Civ 287 [2008] Bus LR 1123, [2008] 
FSR 26, [2008] EWCA Civ 287, [2008] EMLR 13 (same); Morrison Leahy Music 
Limited and Another v Lightbond Limited and Others [1993] EMLR 144.  
 
United States: Schroeder v William Morrow & Co, 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977) 3; 
Gracen v Bradford Exchange 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) at 302 (on painting made 
out of photograph); Midway Mfg. Co. v Artic Intern., Inc., 704 F.2d 1009(7th Cir. 
1983) para 8 (derivative work of a video game); Weinstein v University of Illinois 811 
F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987) at FN3 (however, authors cannot use the derivative work 
doctrine to enforce a right equivalent to the moral right of integrity); Pickett v Prince, 
207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir.2000) 405, 406 (the adaptation of a the two-dimensional 
symbol into a three dimensional object infringes the copyright vested in the symbol); 
Neri v Monroe, 726 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2013) 992, 993 (derivative works involved in 
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the creation of a sculpture); Benny v Loew's Incorporated, 239 F. 2d 532 (9th Circuit 
1956) 536,537 : (McAllister J) “Whether the audience is gripped with tense emotion 
in viewing the original drama, or, on the other hand, laughs at the burlesque, does 
not absolve the copier.” (on burlesque adaptation of a play; fair use did not apply); 
Entertainment Research v Genesis Creative Group, 122 F. 3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997) 
1218 to 1221 (costumes inspired by two-dimensional cartoon characters are 
derivative works infringing the copyright vested in the designs of the characters); US 
Auto Parts Network, Inc. v Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F. 3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) 
1015,1016.  
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Annex 6 
On one’s right to one’s name 
Referenced in Chapter 1, note 197 
France: TGI Paris, 4 juin 2008, n° 05/06811 (In this case the Court awards the 
dancer damages for breach of the right of image but rejected her claim based on 
performers’ rights declaring that the two protection cannot be cumulated); Cass, 1ère 
civ, 24 septembre 2009, n° 08-11.112 « Jacky Boy Music »: Bull. 2009, I, n° 184; D. 
2009 act. Jurispr. P2486, note Dalleau (the French supreme court held that the use 
of a performer’s image on the cover of a record when neither the use of the 
photograph nor that of the record was authorised breaches the artist’s right to image 
which bears its own economic value); Paris, 3 décembre 2004, Sorbelli c/ Yoshida, 
n° 04/06726: D. 2005, juris, p. 1237 [lexbase=A0681DGC], JCP E 2005, No1863 
para 3. (reproducing and selling the photographs taken of a performing artist without 
his consent is a breach of his right of image; the performer was also made co-author 
of the photograph); Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 
06/03959 (In France, the use of a person’s voice without his consent is protected by 
the right to one’s image. The same right can be assimilated to the performer’s right 
to control the use of his performance and the moral right to control the use of his 
name in relation to his performance);  
 
UK: Campbell v MGV Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; Peck v United Kingdom, [2011] ECHR 
1661. 
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Annex 7 
On photographic works and originality in France 
 
Referenced in Chapter 2, note 458, 459 and 460; in Chapter 5, note 94 
For instance, the Paris Court would not regard the work of paparazzo as creative.1 Similarly, 
sport photographers would contend themselves with shooting football players’ performances 
in automatic mode cannot claim copyright protection for their photographs as they who fail 
the originality condition.2 The Paris tribunal explained:  
 
Considering that if the choices in the technical techniques belong to the 
photographer, whenever the situations he shoots present themselves to his camera 
during the course of a game, as it is the case here, such situations are to be 
regarded as banal football actions which have been published in sport magazines for 
decades; that photographs taken during a game without the protagonists’ knowledge 
is the mere result of chance which founds its source in the phases of the game and 
whose setting is out of the photograph’s control, his input being limited to capturing a 
fleeting moment; Considering therefore that the collection of indivisible photographs 
is not eligible to copyright protection as they do not reveal the photographer’s 
personal search for the appropriate angle, frame, contrast or light, and that neither 
light nor the physiognomy photographed can be protected.3 
 
The same position was held regarding team shots, about which the court commented:  
 
“Considering that, as it was correctly pointed out the judges in first instance, this 
photographic work respects ordinary conventions in the representation of a group of 
people where the individuals are organised in ranks and lined up so for everybody to 
be visible; and that the framing is dictated by the necessity to have a shot of the 
overall group on the photograph; and finally that the exterior background [chosen by 
the photographer] is barely noticeable; those characteristics are banal for this type of 
photographic works; Considering the subsequent touching up are the mere results of 
technical manipulations eased by the use of computer programs designed for 
                                                          
1
 Paris, 4ème ch., 5 décembre 2007, n° 06/15937, SIPA Press : D. 2008 jurispr. P. 461 note Bruguière; 
RTDCom. 2008 p. 300 obs. Pollaud-Dullian (the work of a paparazzi is not eligible to copyright protection); 
2
 Paris, 1ere ch., pole5, 14 novembre 2012, SARL Acces Photo c/ Tours FC, n° 11/03286: inédit. The Australian 
jurisdiction held a similar position in the context of film recordings of the Olympic Games. The latter cannot be 
considered as a dramatic works, as the film recorder has no power over the actions taking place before the 
camera, in Australian Olympic Committee Inc v Big Fights Inc [1999] FCA 1042; (1999) 46 IPR 53, para 42.  
3
 Paris, 1ere ch., pole5, 14 novembre 2012, SARL Acces Photo c/ Tours FC, n° 11/03286: inédit. Author’s 
translation, original text reads : « Considérant d'autre part que si le choix des moyens techniques incombe au 
photographe, les situations qui, comme en l'espèce, s'offrent à son objectif au cours d'un match ne sont que de 
banales scènes de jeu ou d'actions footbalistiques qui sont données à voir depuis des décennies dans tous les 
magazines sportifs; que la photographie prise au cours d'un match à l'insu des protagonistes n'est que le fruit du 
hasard qui trouve son origine dans les phases animées du jeu, dont tant la mise en oeuvre que le résultat échappe 
à la volonté du photographe qui ne fait qu'intercepter un instant fugace; Considérant qu'il y a donc lieu de 
considérer que cet ensemble non individualisé de photographies en ce qu'il ne révèle aucune recherche 
personnelle du photographe sur l'angle de prise de vue, le cadrage, les contrastes, la lumière et les physionomies 
n'est pas éligible à la protection du droit d'auteur ». 
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numeric photographic alterations were also banal and did not bear the print of the 
author’s personality”.4 
 
Other jurisdictions are not as strict and follow a lower threshold of originality as far as 
photographic works are concerned.5 One could wonder whether the French approach to 
photographic works comply with the European doctrine as expressed in the Painer decision.6 
In 2015, the Paris Tribunal confirmed the compliance of the French position on the originality 
of photographic works. The bench held that the characteristics described by the 
photographer were pertinent to the artistic quality of his work but not to its originality. The 
originality condition will only be satisfied when the author has injected elements of his/her 
personality in the photographer which can only be verified by evidencing the ‘author’s 
reflexion on the photograph and its subject’. The judges here seemed to suggest that 
photographic works must be the result of a conscious and careful creation decision-making 
process by the photographer to be copyrighted. Without this intentional input, the original 
condition is not met. This interpretation of the originality condition and ‘imprint of personality’ 
seems to have raised the threshold of the originality condition by adding another fold of 
deliberate creative choices to the test. This additional requirement is all the more 
problematic to enforce that it will rely on artists’ ability to bring evidence as to their intent 
prior to making the photographs which very often are not formulated or expressed but 
through the photographic work itself.  
The difficulty of enforcing this interpretation of the originality condition transpired in an earlier 
decision of the Paris Court of Appeal in 2008.7 In this case, the Court concluded that the 
same shooting, involving the same set and aesthetics lead to the production of both 
copyrightable and copyrightable pictures of the same model. The claimant had been invited 
to take photographs during the production of a film. The set, some of the lighting, the general 
ambiance of the scene and the subjects he would photograph were not parameters he was 
able to control. Therefore, any photographic works capturing those elements would fail the 
originality requirement. However, the shots which were the result of the photographer 
directing the actress to take poses going against the general mood created by the film set 
will be copyrightable. Although the distinction may seem workable in theory, the practical 
burden of proving and documenting one’s intentional decision-making or creative choices 
whenever involved in a collaborative setting is a heavy onus on the photographers; a burden 
which is not bore by any other art form protected by French intellectual property law.  
                                                          
4
 Paris, 1ere ch., pole5, 14 novembre 2012, SARL Acces Photo c/ Tours FC, n° 11/03286: inédit; Author’s 
translation, original text reads: « Mais considérant, comme l'ont relevé à juste titre les premiers juges, que cette 
photographie est conforme aux représentations habituelles de groupe où les personnes sont disposées sur 
plusieurs rangs et alignées de manière à être toutes visibles et où le cadrage est dicté par la nécessité d'avoir 
l'ensemble des personnes sur la photographie, qu'enfin le lieu, en extérieur, est à peine visible; que l'ensemble de 
ces caractéristiques est banal pour ce genre de photographie; Considérant que les retouches ultérieures ne sont 
que le résultat de manipulations techniques facilitées par l'emploi des logiciels de retouche photographique 
numérique et présentent également un caractère banal ne portant pas l'empreinte de la personnalité du 
photographe; » 
5
 UK: See for instance, Antiquesportfolio.com plc v Rodney Fitch & Co [2001] E.C.D.R. 5; [2001] E.B.L.R. 20; 
[2001] FS.R. 23; [2000] Masons C.L.R. 51; (2000) 23(11) I.P.D. 23092; (2000) 97(30) L.S.G. 41; Times, July 
21, 2000.; EU: C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others [2011] EUECJ C-145/10, 
EU:C:2011:798, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 
6
 EU: C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others [2011] EUECJ C-145/10, 
EU:C:2011:798, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 
7
 Paris, 20 février 2008, n° 06/22330, SARL Les archives to 7eme Art c/ Stéphane Mirkine : Propr, Intell. 2008, 
p. 319 note Lucas (photographie de plateau) 
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Appendix 1: Original text in French language 
 
Chapter One 
Note 10: Jolibois Report No 212 (n 7) 28. Author’s translation. Original text reads : [L]es 
droits voisins du droit d’auteur [ici comprendre droit des artistes interprètes] porteraient 
incontestablement atteinte aux droits des auteurs. Ce qui serait inacceptable. D’une manière 
très concrète, il risque d’en être ainsi lorsque l’utilisation d’une œuvre devra acquitter une 
nouvelle rémunération en vertu des droits voisins. La tendance naturelle sera alors, soit de 
verser une rémunération moindre a tel auteur en particulier, soit d’utiliser moins d’œuvres et 
donc de verser moins aux auteurs en général. Conclusion : La ratification de la Convention 
de Rome ou l’adoption en l’état du projet the loi risquent d’avoir des effets pervers à l’égard 
des droits des auteurs et même de la création en général. 
Note 11 : Brussels Conference Documents (n 8) 309. Author’s translation. The original text 
reads : « En toute bonne foi, il serait donc impossible de soutenir que le droit des exécutants 
sera certainement sans répercussion sur les recettes des auteurs aussi longtemps qu’il n’est 
pas prouvé que la redevance due aux exécutants puisse être englobe dans le prix fait à 
l’acheteur. » 
Note 151 : Cass, 1ère civ, 14 novembre 1973, « affaire du Prince Igor et opéra de 
Borodine » n° 71-14.709 : Bull civ  I, p.390, RIDA avril 1974, p.66, author’s translation. The 
original text reads : « Mais attendu que les juges du second degré qui, dans l'exercice de 
leur pouvoir souverain d'appréciation, ont considéré que Rimsky-Korsakov et Y... Avaient 
repris sans les modifier des fragments exécutes par Borodine devant certains auditeurs qui 
les avaient conserves intacts dans leur mémoire, ont, par là-même, constate que ces 
morceaux avaient été créés ». 
Note 152 : Cass, 1ère civ, 14 novembre 1973, « affaire du Prince Igor et opéra de 
Borodine » n° 71-14.709 : Bull civ  I, p.390, RIDA avril 1974, p.66 . Author’s translation, 
original text reads : « Mais attendu que la cour d'appel a releve qu'il ressortait du "Journal de 
ma vie" de Rimsky-Korsakov que le premier choeur, les danses polovtsiennes, la plainte de 
Iaroslavna, le recital de la chanson de Vladimir x..., l'air de Kontschkovna et du prince 
Vladimir z..., ainsi que le choeur final avaient ete termines et orchestres par Borodine que 
Rimsky-Korsakov et Y... avaient decide d'achever l'opera et d'en rendre possible la 
publication » 
Note 211 : Cass, 1ère civ, 11 décembre 2008, n° 07-19.494 : Bull. 2008, I, n° 282. Author’s 
translation. The original text reads : « si ce droit peut valablement donner lieu à 
l'établissement de contrats conférant à une partie les prérogatives d'ordre patrimonial qui lui 
sont attachées, l'objet de la transmission doit être précisément déterminé, ce qui implique 
que le domaine d'exploitation des droits cédés soit délimité quant à son étendue et à sa 
destination, quant au lieu et quant à la durée ». 
Note 212 : Cass, 1ère civ, 11 décembre 2008, n° 07-19.494 : Bull. 2008, I, n° 282. Author’s 
translation. The original text reads : « sous toutes ses formes et par tous procédés, pour 
toute destination et pour le monde entier, pour une durée de quinze ans renouvelables ». 
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Note 214 : Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 06/03959. Author’s 
translation, original text reads: “Il résulte du rapport d'expertise (rapport d'étape au 30 
novembre 2005) qu'en 1995, le cachet journalier de base d'un comédien enregistrant sa voix 
pour un film publicitaire était de l'ordre de 4 500 [francs] (686,02 [euros]), cette somme 
comprenant les droits liés à l'utilisation de la voix pendant une durée d'un an à compter de la 
première diffusion de l'enregistrement, mais pouvait donner lieu à majoration en raison 
notamment de la notoriété de l'intéressé ou de certaines spécificités tenant à sa voix. 
L'expert, qui a estimé que la voix de M. G. était typée et flatteuse et que le public pouvait y 
être sensible a estimé qu'une telle majoration pouvait être appliquée et qu'il y avait lieu de 
retenir un coefficient multiplicateur de 1,5 à 4 » 
Note 227 : TGI Paris, 3ème ch., 27 septembre 1996, Daures c/ Sté Western Passion et a., 
n° 13957/95. Author’s translation, original text reads : « Attendu qu'il est acquis aux débats 
que Jean-Philippe DAURES est l'auteur du dessin qu'il a tatoué en septembre 1992 sur le 
bras de l'artiste Johnny HALLIDAY; Attendu que ce dessin d'inspiration amérindienne 
représente en blanc et noir, une tête d'aigle au-dessus d'une plume d'aigle placée à 
l'horizontale et comportant une médaille ronde frappée d'un oiseau stylisée; Attendu qu'il 
s'agit d'une oeuvre de l'esprit dont l'originalité n'est pas contestée. Que Jean-Philippe 
DAURES est recevable à agir sur le terrain des droits d'auteur; […] » 
Note 229 : Paris, 3 juillet 1998 in Carrière (n 228); Author’s translation, original text reads : 
« Considérant que le dessin de Jean-Philippe DAURES tatoué sur le bras droit de Johnny 
HALLYDAY constitue certes un attribut de la personnalité du chanteur; qu’il serait donc 
loisible à la société POLYGRAM d’exploiter, avec l’accord de Johnny HALLYDAY, la 
photographie de ce dernier sur le bras duquel, comme l’ont indiqué les premiers juges, le 
tatouage serait visible “nécessairement mais de façon accessoire”; Mais considérant que tel 
n’est pas le cas en l’espèce où la société POLYGRAM et la société WESTERN PASSION 
ont reproduit, non pas une photographie de Johnny HALLYDAY sur laquelle serait visible le 
tatouage de celui-ci, mais le dessin de ce tatouage dont Jean-Philippe DAURES est l’auteur 
et sur le quel Johnny HALLYDAY ne possède ni ne peut céder de droits. » 
 
Chapter Two 
Note 166 : Brussels Conference Document (n 34) 310. Author’s translation, original text 
reads : « Le Gouvernement français persiste à penser que les interprètes et les exécutants 
ne sont point des créateurs d’œuvres de l’esprit et que la protection international qui leur es 
due […] ne peut a aucun titre prendre place dans la Convention d’Union de Berne destinée 
à protéger les droits des créateurs d’œuvres littéraires et artistiques » 
 
Note 165 : Brussels Conference Document (n 34) 310-1. the original text reads : « “Sans 
préjudice des droits des auteurs, l’artiste exécutant sera protégé, dans le Pays ou 
l’exécution a lieu, contre toute confection non autorisée par lui de disques ou d’instruments 
similaires servant à reproduire les sons par les moyens desquels son interprétation d’une 
œuvre dramatique ou musicale peut être reproduite, qu’il s’agisse d’une œuvre tombée dans 
le domaine public ou non”. Documents de La Conférence de Bruxelles 5-26 Juin 1948’ 
(1951) 310-1. 
 
Note 167 : Brussels Conference Document (n 34) 309. original text reads : Sans préjudice 
des droits des auteurs, l’artiste exécutant sera protégé, dans le Pays ou l’exécution a lieu, 
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contre toute confection non autorisée par lui de disques ou d’instruments similaires servant à 
reproduire les sons par le moyen desquels son interprétation d’une œuvre dramatique ou 
musicale peut être reproduite, qu’il s’agisse d’une œuvre tombée dans le domaine public ou 
non. 
 
Note 175 : Jolibois Report No 212 (n 4) 27. Author’s. translation, original text reads : " 
L’ambition du projet français est d’autant plus grande qu’il accorde un droit moral aux 
artistes-interprètes, ce que ne fait pas la Convention de Rome. En résumé, l’actuel projet de 
loi va très au de-là de ce qui est nécessaire pour ratifier la Convention de Rome et le 
Gouvernement souhaite mettre en place la législation la plus avancée en matière de droits 
d’auteur et de droits voisins du droit d’auteur. » 
 
Note 245: Paris, 1re Ch, 8 juin 1960, Eudes c/ Jean Cocteau : JCP G 1960, II, 11710 
conclusions de l’avocat général Combaldieu. Confirming the decision in first instance : Trib. 
Seine, 2 juillet 1959, Eudes c/ Gutman, Cocteau et autres : Le Droit d’Auteur 1959, vol 72 
No 5 p. 93. Author’s translation, original rext reads : « Certes, le ballet peut être, est, en 
général, une oeuvre de collaboration. Mais, en l’espèce, la partition musicale mise à part, 
Jean Cocteau apparaît comme le seul auteur. Son génie universel dans le domaine littéraire 
et artistique (que ce soit le théâtre, le cinéma, la chorégraphie et j’en passe) lui permet ce 
tour de force, assez inhabituel il est vrai. ». 
 
Note 246 : Paris, 1re Ch, 8 juin 1960, Eudes c/ Jean Cocteau : JCP G 1960, II, 11710 
conclusions de l’avocat général Combaldieu. Confirming the decision in first instance : Trib. 
Seine, 2 juillet 1959, Eudes c/ Gutman, Cocteau et autres : Le Droit d’Auteur 1959, vol 72 
No 5 p. 93. Author’s translation, original text reads: « S’il y avait un propriétaire de la 
chorégraphie, ce serait d’ailleurs Monsieur Roland Petit et non Monsieur Eudes qui le serait. 
Or Roland Petit n’a jamais rien réclamé; il ne s’y est pas trompé, il a justement considéré 
que son rôle était celui d’un conseiller technique, Jean Cocteau l’avait précisément choisi 
parce qu’il l’écouterait et le traduirait dans le langage de la danse.» 
 
Note 261 : Trib Seine, 23 avril 1937, Rigault dit Marnay c. Chaperot et Copelier : Le Droit 
d’Auteur, No 11 p 129, 130Author’s translation, original text reads : «Attendu, en effet, que si 
en général et sauf exceptions, les artistes dramatiques ou cinématographiques ne peuvent 
prétendre à aucun droit sur l'ensemble que constitue l'œuvre dramatique ou le film, il est 
équitable, par contre, de leur reconnaître, au même titre qu'aux autres artistes, peintres, 
sculpteurs, graveurs, architectes, un « droit » sur leurs créations personnelles, c'est-à-dire, 
en l'espèce, sur l'interprétation qu'ils donnent aux rôles qui leur sont confiés et qui 
constituent la seule manifestation de leur art qui soit perceptible aux sens, qui soit publiée » 
 
Note 262 : Trib Seine, 23 avril 1937, Rigault dit Marnay c. Chaperot et Copelier : Le Droit 
d’Auteur, No 11 p 129, 130. Original text reads : « Attendu que ce droit ne peut toutefois leur 
être concédé, de même qu'aux autres artistes, que dans la mesure où leur oeuvre présente 
un caractère personnel et original, et constitue, dès lors, une «création» au sens donné à ce 
mot lorsqu'il est appliqué aux productions de l'art ». Author’s translation : “Considering that, 
however, just like other artists, this right can only be granted if their performances evidence 
personal and original characteristics which would thus make them ‘creations’ when the word 
is used and understood in the context of artistic productions” 
 
Note 263 : Trib Seine, 23 avril 1937, Rigault dit Marnay c. Chaperot et Copelier : Le Droit 
d’Auteur, No 11 p 129, 130. The original text reads : ”[Attendu que] d'ailleurs, l'usage actuel 
de faire figurer, sur les programmes des spectacles et sur le «générique» des films le nom 
de chaque interprète en regard de celui du personnage qu'il incarne, peut être considéré 
comme une manifestation de ce droit de l'artiste, puisqu'il permet au public, grâce à cette 
identification, d'attribuer à chaque acteur le mérite de son œuvre ». Author’s translation: 
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« [Considering that] as a matter of fact, the current practice of featuring, on the programme 
of shows and on films’ generic the names of each performer in relation to the character 
he/she interpreted can be considered as an expression of this artist’s right, since it allows 
the public, thanks to this identification to apportion to each artist the credit he/she deserves 
for his/her work.”  
 
Note 268: Paris, 3 décembre 2004, Sorbelli c/ Yoshida, n° 04/06726: D. 2005, juris, p. 1237 
[lexbase=A0681DGC], JCP E 2005, No1863 para 3. Author’s translation, original text reads : 
« Considérant qu'en l'espèce, comme le fait observer à juste titre M. Sorbelli il n'a pas été 
seulement un sujet pris en photo par Mlle Yoshida, sujet inactif, qui aurait pris des poses 
dictées par la photographe, mais a été un sujet actif »  
 
Note 269 : Paris, 3 décembre 2004, Sorbelli c/ Yoshida, n° 04/06726: D. 2005, juris, p. 1237 
[lexbase=A0681DGC], JCP E 2005, No1863 para 3. Author’s translation, original text reads : 
« qu'en effet, c'est à son initiative et en raison de l'existence de sa création, puisqu'il 
s'agissait, lors de cette prise de vue, de réaliser son portrait « en situation », que la 
photographe a pu fixer des moments de cette création » 
 
Note 273 : Cass, crim. 13 décembre 1995 : Bull. crim., 1995 N° 379 p 1110; D. 1997. p.196. 
author’s translation, original text reads : « qu'en vue de la production d'un disque, Bernard 
E..., qui a procédé à l'orchestration de la chanson, a fait appel au trompettiste Pierre X... afin 
qu'il exécute des improvisations de jazz «dans le style de Louis Armstrong » ». 
 
Note 275 : Paris, 5 février 1997, n° 96 02074. Author’s translation, original text reads : 
« [c]onsidérant qu'il ressort du rapport d'expertise […], la nécessité de reconnaitre à [l’artiste 
interprète] M. Pierre Dutour la qualité d'auteur d'une œuvre originale de création 
personnelle, protégeable et qui comporte la marque de son originalité ainsi que de son style 
propre » 
 
Note 277 : Paris, 3 mai 2006, n° 05/01400, « Ph. Chany » : D. 2007 jurispr. P 2653. Author’s 
translation. Original text reads : « Considérant, en revanche, qua la société FRANCE 2 et la 
société TOP 50 contestent à l'appelant la qualité d'artiste interprète des enregistrements de 
ces oeuvres musicales; qu'elles font valoir que celles-ci, ayant été créées par l'intermédiaire 
de logiciels de composition, il n'y aurait lieu à aucune interprétation, le choix des sons et de 
leurs critères s'effectuant uniquement par l'intermédiaire de la souris, alors que, toujours 
selon elles, un artiste musicien, au sens de l'article L. 212 1 du Code de la propriété 
intellectuelle, s'entendrait exclusivement d'une personne qui exécute ou joue une partition 
musicale par l'intermédiaire d'un instrument musical quelconque et non d'une personne se 
contentant de donner des instructions informatiques dans le cadre de l'utilisation d'un logiciel 
proposant des banques de données sonores ». 
 
Note 278 : Paris, 3 mai 2006, n° 05/01400, « Ph. Chany » : D. 2007 jurispr. P 2653. Author’s 
translation. Original text reads: « Philippe C. fait valoir que, comme beaucoup de 
compositeurs interprètes de sa génération qui écrivent pour les secteurs audiovisuels, il est 
à la fois le compositeur de ses musiques, l'artisan de leur interprétation qu'il dirige comme 
un chef d'orchestre et qu'il assure, en même temps, l'exécution des oeuvres en tant que 
musicien interprète sur plusieurs instruments (claviers) et au synthétiseur » […] « “Mais 
considérant que l'on ne saurait méconnaître, a priori, l'apport des techniques informatiques 
tant dans le domaine de la création que de l'interprétation, […] il apparaît ici que les 
musiques de base, c'est-à- dire préexistantes dans des durées excédants largement celles 
définitives retenues ensuite, ne peuvent avoir été réalisées dans une forme aussi aboutie 
qu'après élaboration par le compositeur d'une structure musicale établie, que celui-ci a fait 
jouer, exécuter par des musiciens placés sous sa direction, quand il ne l'a pas interprété lui-
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même en précisant dans tous les cas de figure, l'ordinateur, aussi sophistiqué soit-il, ne peut 
se substituer à la pensée musicale créatrice, n'apportant un soutien logistique à l'œuvre de 
l'esprit dont seuls le compositeur, le musicien interprète et le directeur artistique gardent la 
maîtrise tout au long de la réalisation ».  
 
 
Note 286 : Conseil d'Etat 23 février 1998: Lebon 1998. The highest administrative court here 
reminds that the artist acting as performer does more than what a mannequin which is 
‘limited to the sole exploitation of his/her image’. Author’s translation – the original text reads: 
‘lorsqu'un artiste interprète se livre, dans le cadre du tournage d'un film publicitaire, à une 
prestation répondant à cette définition, qui ne se réduit pas à la seule utilisation de son 
image, il ne se produit pas en qualité de mannequin’. 
 
Note 287 : Employment Law Code, Art L 7123-2. Author’s translation - original text reads: 1° 
Soit de présenter au public, directement ou indirectement par reproduction de son image sur 
tout support visuel ou audiovisuel, un produit, un service ou un message publicitaire; 2° Soit 
de poser comme modèle, avec ou sans utilisation ultérieure de son image. » 
 
Note 295 : Paris, 18eme Ch, 18 février 1993, n° [XP180293X]: D. 1993, p 397 note 
Weksteinbeg. Author’s translation. The original text reads: “à l’exclusion de l’artiste de 
complément (même s’ils sont appelés à réciter ou à chanter collectivement un texte connu), 
silhouettes (artistes de compléments dont le personnage doit pour les nécessités de la mise 
en scène, ressortir dans le champ de la camera), […], doublures lumière”. 
 
Note 298: Charles Jolibois, ‘Rapport No 212 Fait Au Nom de La Commission Spéciale Sur 
Le Projet de Loi Adopté Par l’Assemblée National Relatif Aux Droits D'auteur et Aux Droits 
Des Artistes-Interprètes, Des Producteurs de Phonogrammes et de Vidéogrammes et Des 
Entreprises de Communication audiovisuelle’, vol Tome II (1985) 83 Authors’ translation – 
original text reads: « les artistes dont le rôle a un caractère anonyme car ils sont ‘perdus 
dans la foule’ et les artistes de complément dont le rôle est tout à fait secondaire » 
 
Note 458: Paris, 1ere ch., pole5, 14 novembre 2012, SARL Acces Photo c/ Tours FC, n° 
11/03286 : inédit. Author’s translation, original text reads : « Considérant d'autre part que si 
le choix des moyens techniques incombe au photographe, les situations qui, comme en 
l'espèce, s'offrent à son objectif au cours d'un match ne sont que de banales scènes de jeu 
ou d'actions footbalistiques qui sont données à voir depuis des décennies dans tous les 
magazines sportifs; que la photographie prise au cours d'un match à l'insu des protagonistes 
n'est que le fruit du hasard qui trouve son origine dans les phases animées du jeu, dont tant 
la mise en oeuvre que le résultat échappe à la volonté du photographe qui ne fait 
qu'intercepter un instant fugace; Considérant qu'il y a donc lieu de considérer que cet 
ensemble non individualisé de photographies en ce qu'il ne révèle aucune recherche 
personnelle du photographe sur l'angle de prise de vue, le cadrage, les contrastes, la 
lumière et les physionomies n'est pas éligible à la protection du droit d'auteur » 
 
 
Chapter Three 
Note 77: TGI Paris, 11 juillet 2007, n° 05/08920. Author’s translation, original text reads : 
« En l'espèce s'agissant de la captation de jeux télévisés, le " réalisateur " est limité dans 
ses interventions qui sont contraintes par le format et le règles dudit jeux». 
Note 102: Cass, 1ère civ, 13 juin 2006, n° 02-44.718: Bull. Civ. 2006 I N° 307 p. 267; D. 
20006, act. P 1741 note Daleau ; pan. p. 2993 obs. Sirinelli. Author’s translation, original text 
reads: “Mais attendu que la fragrance d'un parfum, qui procède de la simple mise en oeuvre 
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d'un savoir-faire, ne constitue pas au sens [du code de la propriété intellectuelle], la création 
d'une forme d'expression pouvant bénéficier de la protection des oeuvres de l'esprit par le 
droit d'auteur ; d'où il suit que le moyen n'est pas fondé » 
 
Note 104 : Paris, 4ème ch., 14 février 2007, n° 06/09813, Beauté Prestige… : JCP G 2007, 
I, 176 N 4 obs. Caron. Author’s translation, original text reds: “Considérant, […] que la 
fixation de l'oeuvre ne constitue pas un critère exigé pour accéder à la protection dès lors 
que sa forme est perceptible ; qu'une fragrance, dont la composition olfactive est 
déterminable, remplit cette condition, peu important qu'elle soit différemment perçue, à 
l'instar des oeuvres littéraires, picturales ou musicales qui, elles aussi, requièrent un savoir-
faire ». 
Note 116 : Paris, 1ere ch., pole 5, 21 octobre 2009, n° 08/09096 Fresnay… : propr. Intell. 
2010N 34 p. 614 obs. Lucas. Author’s translation, the original text reads: “[le décorateur de 
théâtre] ne se contente pas de concevoir les décors, mais doit assurer le suivi de leur 
construction et de leur montage. Il est responsable, vis-à vis de la direction du théâtre, du 
respect des délais (le décor doit être prêt pour la générale) et du budget. Qu'il s'infère de ces 
informations que le décorateur de théâtre est certes astreint au suivi de la construction et du 
montage des éléments du décor, qu'il est tenu de veiller au respect de délais qui lui sont 
impartis, qu'il est encore soumis à des contraintes budgétaires qui lui sont imposées, qu'il 
n'en demeure pas moins qu'il lui appartient d'imaginer, de concevoir et de mettre en forme, 
en composant avec le metteur en scène, le décor de la pièce et qu'il lui est à ce titre 
possible, dans une mesure qu'il convient d'apprécier au cas d'espèce, de conférer à son 
ouvrage la marque de sa sensibilité personnelle » 
 
Note 130 : Paris, 17 décembre 2003, n° [XP171203X] : D. 2004 jurisp. P 1588 note Fleury ; 
D. 2005 pan. P 1485, obs. Sirinelli. This decision reaffirms a long standing principle 
expressed in previous decision such as Paris, 1ère ch., 11 mai 1965, Dali c/ Théâtre royal 
de la monnaie de Bruxelles et a. : D. 1968, 382 (in this case, the creation of additional 
costumes inspired from the initial drawings executed by Dali were considered as no 
infringement of the famous painter’s rights in his sketches). Author’s translation, original text 
reads: “[O]riginalité constitue l'apport artistique propre à l'auteur de la création quant [sic] 
bien même celui-ci s'inspire d'oeuvres préexistantes expressions du genre […]. » 
 
Note 183 : Cass, 1ère civ, 9 novembre 1993, n° 91-17.061: Bull. 1993 I N° 318 p. 221. 
Author’s translation, original text reads: “Attendu qu'à l'appui de cette appréciation, l'arrêt 
énonce que M. X... s'est borné à utiliser divers motifs de sculpture qu'il a puisés dans le 
répertoire ornemental d'une époque déterminée, sans que ce travail dépasse la simple 
répétition et l'accumulation de ces motifs et qu'il ne s'en dégage aucun des éléments 
caractéristiques d'une création ; 
Attendu qu'en se déterminant ainsi, alors qu'il n'était pas contesté que les sculptures 
litigieuses avaient été exécutées de la main de M. X..., la cour d'appel, en ne recherchant 
pas si, comme il était soutenu, cette exécution personnelle ne leur conférait pas, par elle-
même, un caractère d'originalité, n'a pas donné de base légale à sa décision ; » 
 
Note 233 : Jolibois Report No 212 (n 288) 29. Author’s translation, original text reads : 
« [Les artistes-interprètes] interviennent lorsque l’œuvre est achevée. L’interprétation 
ne peut donc être considérée ni comme une œuvre de collaboration, ni comme une 
œuvre composite – car l’interprétation ne peut se détacher de l’œuvre originale. Même si, il 
est parfois parlé d’une interprétation comme étant une œuvre, l’emploi de cette terminologie 
n’implique pas en lui-même la reconnaissance d’un droit d’auteur au profit de l’interprète. Il 
peut certes s’agir d’un droit intellectuel mais d’une autre mais d’une autre nature que le 
droit d’auteur. » (original emphasis). 
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Note 234 : ‘Documents de La Conférence de Bruxelles 5-26 Juin 1948’ (1951) 310. Author’s 
translation. The original text reads : « le Gouvernement français persiste à penser que les 
interprètes et les exécutants ne sont point des créateurs ». 
 
Note 241 : Paris, 3 mai 2006, n° 05/01400, « Ph. Chany » : D. 2007 jurispr. P 2653 note 
Edelman et Levinas ; RTCom. 2007, 104 obs. Paullaud-Dullian Author’s translation, original 
text reads: « Qu'en effet, la société intimée ne saurait, comme elle le soutient, dénaturer ce 
rapport en limitant l'apport de l'outil informatique à la seule oeuvre de création à l'exclusion 
du domaine de l'interprétation, dès lors que Gérard S. aborde ces deux domaines et, ainsi 
qu'il l'a été précédemment indiqué, a, sans ambiguïté, conclu que cet outil n'est, 
précisément, qu'un instrument, autre que ceux plus traditionels, permettant l'exécution d'une 
oeuvre préalablement créée » 
 
Note 265: Cass, 1ère civ, 24 avril 2013, n° 11-19.901: Bull. 2013, I, n° 83. Author’s 
translation, original text reads: “[A]ttendu que c'est sans se contredire que la cour d'appel a 
relevé que les participants à l'émission en cause n'avaient aucun rôle à jouer ni aucun texte 
à dire, qu'il ne leur était demandé que d'être eux-mêmes et d'exprimer leurs réactions face 
aux situations auxquelles ils étaient confrontés et que le caractère artificiel de ces situations 
et de leur enchaînement ne suffisait pas à leur donner la qualité d'acteurs ; qu'ayant ainsi fait 
ressortir que leur prestation n'impliquait aucune interprétation, elle a décidé à bon droit que 
la qualité d'artiste-interprète ne pouvait leur être reconnue » 
 
Note 266 : Author’s translation. The original text reads: « le métier d'acteur consiste à 
interpréter un personnage autre que soi-même » in Cass, 1ère civ, 24 avril 2013, n° 11-
19.901 : Bull. 2013, I, n° 83 
 
Note 268 : Cass, 1ère civ, 13 novembre 2008, n° 06-16.278, « Etre et avoir » : JCP 2009, N 
25, 30 §3 obs. Caron. Author’s translation, original text reads : « [A]ttendu que l'arrêt 
constate que M. Y... [l’instituteur] a été filmé, tout au long du documentaire, dans l'exercice 
de sa profession d'instituteur et que la scène fugace relatant la disparition d'un enfant 
s'inscrit naturellement dans le quotidien de la classe ; qu'ayant ainsi relevé que l'instituteur 
apparaissait exclusivement dans la réalité de son activité sans interpréter pour autant, au 
service de l'oeuvre, un rôle qui ne serait pas le sien, la cour d'appel a décidé à bon droit, que 
la qualité d'artiste-interprète ne pouvait lui être reconnue, s'agissant d'un simple 
documentaire excluant comme tel, toute interprétation ». 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Note 109 : Author’s translation. The decision reads : « l'exposition dénommée « Musée du 
Cinéma H. Langlois » création originale de son auteur et qui fait appel aux qualités 
intellectuelles et de sensibilité de ses visiteurs, constitue indiscutablement une oeuvre de 
l'esprit », in Paris, 1ere ch, 2 octobre 1997 : D. 1998, p. 312 note Edelman ; RIDA 1998 n 
176, p. 422. 
 
Note 123 : Brussels Conference Documents (n 118) 140. Author’s translation. The original 
text reads : « A notre Avis, cette fixation de sons [naturels ou de machine] qui ne sont pas 
produits par l’intelligence humaine n’est une activité créatrice devant être protégée par la 
législation sur le droit d’auteur ». 
Note 155 : TGI Tarascon, 21 septembre 2012, n° 09/02027 : RLDI Octobre 2013 N 
97,comm. 3213 p 18 note Amine. Author’s translation. Original text reads: “production 
intellectuelle puissante”. (the Court recognises the production as work of the mind of magical 
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performances but does not find for infringement due to the technical differences 
distinguishing the two tricks) 
Note 251: Cass, crim, 7 octobre 1998, n° 97-83.243 : Bull. Crim. 1998 N° 248 p. 717. See 
also, Cass, 1ère civ, 2 mars 1999, n° 97-10.179: inédit au bulletin, Legifrance available at : 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007400026>. 
Author’s translation, original text reads : “[l’]apport intellectuel de l'auteur caractérisant son 
originalité ». See for an appeal decision also relying on the notion of ‘intellectual input’ Paris, 
4ème Ch, sect. A, 15 janvier 1997, VF Diffusion et autres c/ Chantelle. 
Note 252: Cass, 1ère civ, 5 février 2002, « Les Muses Productions » n° 99-21.444 : Bull. 
2002 I N° 46 p. 36 ; JCP G, 2002, II, 10193, note S. Crevel ; D. 2003, p. 436, note B. 
Edelman ; D. 2002 juris. p 2253 note Edelman ; JCP E 2002, chron. 1334, n 3. Author’s 
translation. Original text reads “apport intellectual inédit”, (This particular decision refers to a 
standard of novelty or lack of anteriority which is precluded by the rest of the jurisprudence 
as entering the definition of originality) 
Note 341: Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 06/03959. Author’s 
translation, original text reads: « il n'a pas créé la voix de ce personnage qui apparaissait 
dans des films publicitaires depuis 1971 et qui avait donné lieu à des enregistrements 
sonores réalisés en langue française par plusieurs artistes depuis lors. ».  
Note 342 : Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 06/03959. Author’s 
translation, original text reads: "Sa personnalité ne transparaît pas dans sa prestation 
consistant à lire un texte, avec le timbre de voix et l'accent qui lui sont propres, même s'il 
accentue ce dernier » 
Note 354 : Trib Seine, 23 avril 1937, Rigault dit Marnay c. Chaperot et Copelier : Le Droit 
d’Auteur, No 11 p 129,130. Author’s translation, original text reads : « concevoir, realiser en 
pensee son interpretation grace a un travail prealable, souvent long et minutieux, 
l’exteriorisation qu’il en donne constitue une creation continue ». 
Note 360: Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 06/03959 (the tone of 
one’s voice is not original enough to justify the protection of performer’s rights, assessment 
which applies the same test as do dispositions pertinent to authors’ rights); Paris, 1ere Ch, 
pole5, 14 novembre 2012, SARL Acces Photo c/ Tours FC, n° 11/03286 : inédit (in this case 
pertinent to the eligibility to copyright protection of football photographs, the Court reminded 
the parties that physical traits, here ‘physionomies’ were not eligible to protection by authors’ 
rights) 
 
Note 422: Cass, crim. 13 décembre 1995 : Bull. crim., 1995 N° 379 p 1110 ; D. 1997. p.196. 
Author’s translation, original text reads : « les morceaux de trompette improvisés par Pierre 
X... portent la marque de son style propre et présentent le caractère d'une création 
originale ». 
Note 445: Paris, 18eme Ch, 18 février 1993, n° [XP180293X] : D. 1993, p 397 note 
Weksteinbeg. Author’s translation, original text reads: “Considérant que l'artiste de 
complément se distingue de l'artiste-interprète dans une oeuvre déterminée non seulement 
par le caractère complémentaire, accessoire de son rôle, mais surtout par le fait que sa 
personnalité ne transparaît pas dans sa prestation, à la différence de l'artiste-interprète qui 
s'investit plus complètement et rend ainsi son interprétation originale ». 
Note 447 : Paris, 4ème Ch, 4 juillet 2008, n° 06/21406, Universal Music… : RTDCom. 2008, 
745, obs. Pollaud-Dullian. Author’s translation, original text reads: “ [I]l convient en 
conséquence en l'absence de tout usage professionnel de rechercher la qualification de la 
prestation des intimées en fonction des éléments du dossier, étant précisé que l'artiste de 
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complément se distingue de l'artiste interprète, non seulement par le caractère 
complémentaire, accessoire de son rôle, mais surtout par le fait que sa personnalité ne 
transparaît pas dans sa prestation ».  
 
Note 449 : Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 06/03959. Author’s 
translation, original text reads: “Sa personnalité ne transparaît pas dans sa prestation 
consistant à lire un texte, avec le timbre de voix et l'accent qui lui sont propres, même s'il 
accentue ce dernier […].» 
Note 458 : TGI Paris, 4 juin 2008, n° 05/06811. Author’s translation, original text reads: “Le 
tribunal considère que c'est à juste titre que les défendeurs soutiennent que Mme X [Mia 
Frye] qui réclame également la protection de sa prestation d'artiste interprète, ne peut 
invoquer son droit à l'image, pour protéger les mêmes atteintes, les deux protections n'étant 
pas cumulables. ».  
 
Chapter Five 
Note 19 : Paris, 4ème Ch., A, 31 mars 2004, « Les Misérables » : D. 2004, jurispr. P2028 
note Edelman ; JCP E 2005 N 1216 § 1. Author’s translation. The original text reads : 
Considérant qu'interdire toute suite aux MISERABLES ne saurait constituer, ainsi que les 
intimés le soutiennent à tort, une atteinte au principe de la libre création puisque, en 
l'espèce, cette œuvre, véritable monument de la littérature mondiale, […] n'est pas un simple 
roman en ce qu'elle procède d'une démarche philosophique et politique […] Considérant 
qu'il s'ensuit qu'aucune suite ne saurait être donnée à une œuvre telle que LES 
MISERABLES, à jamais achevée, et que, la société PLON a, en éditant et publiant 
COSETTE OU LE TEMPS DES ILLUSIONS et MARIUS OU LE FUGITIF et en les faisant 
passer pour la suite des MISERABLES, porté atteinte au droit moral de VICTOR HUGO sur 
cette œuvre littéraire. 
 
Note 95: Paris, 20 février 2008, n° 06/22330, SARL Les archives to 7eme Art c/ Stéphane 
Mirkine : Propr, Intell. 2008, p. 319 note Lucas. Author’s translation. The original text reads: 
“Qu'il en résulte que la photographie reproduite en couverture de l'ouvrage CINEGUIDE 
2001 porte l'empreinte de la personnalité [du photographe] par les choix qu'il a opérés - 
position de l'actrice, cadrage, éclairage - de sorte que cette photographie présente le 
caractère d'originalité requis pour être qualifiée d'oeuvre de l'esprit et à ce titre éligible à la 
protection instituée au Livre I du Code de la propriété intellectuelle ». 
 
Note 101 : Paris, 18eme ch, 18 février 1993, n° [XP180293X] : D. 1993, p 397 note 
Weksteinbeg. Author’s translation. The original text reads: « Considérant que M. Armbruster 
tient dans ce film le rôle d'un des trois loups, lesquels ont exactement la même attitude, font 
les mêmes gestes et ne se distinguent pas les uns des autres ; que la séquence où 
apparaissent les loups n'a pas une place prépondérante dans le film ; qu'elle est plus brève 
(quelques secondes tout au plus) que celle des couples ; que le rôle des loups n'exige - pas 
plus d'ailleurs que les autres rôles - de qualités particulières de la part des exécutants de 
l'oeuvre ; qu'ils ne sauraient dès lors se voir attribuer la qualité d'artistes-interprètes, sous 
peine de vider la notion d'artiste de complément, comme l'a justement fait observer le 
ministère public, de toute signification et d'étendre le bénéfice des « droits voisins » au-delà 
de ce qu'a voulu le législateur ; que dans ces conditions c'est à juste titre que les premiers 
juges ont dénié à M. Armbruster la qualité d'artiste-interprète pour sa prestation dans le film 
publicitaire […].».  
 
Note 104 : Versailles, 9 octobre 2008, Randall G. c/ Ste First Media, n° 06/03959. Author’s 
translation. The original text reads : « L'expert a relevé dans son rapport d'étape du 30 
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novembre 2005 qu'en cas d'audition isolée des enregistrements des annonces publicitaires, 
seule une écoute attentive ou réalisée dans de bonnes conditions permettait de distinguer la 
voix [du demander] de celles des autres comédiens ayant prêté leur voix au personnage 
d'Uncle Ben lors l'enregistrements antérieurs, malgré les qualités indéniables qu'elle 
présente. Il résulte de l'ensemble de ces éléments que [le demandeur] ne peut revendiquer 
le statut d'artiste interprète mais qu'il a réalisé une prestation d'artiste de complément […] » 
 
Note 106 : Paris, 4ème ch., 4 juillet 2008, n° 06/21406, Universal Music…: RTDCom. 2008, 
745, obs. Pollaud-Dullian p 397 note Weksteinbeg. Author’s translation. The original text 
reads: « [M]algré la courte durée, [leur interprétation] n'est pas secondaire mais fait au 
contraire une rupture dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre et lui donne une coloration spécifique; 
Considérant qu'il ne peut davantage être dit que leur voix est interchangeable ; qu'en effet, 
une autre interprétation avec un autre timbre de voix donnerait nécessairement une 
coloration différente au morceau […] ». 
 
Note 170 : Paris, 4ème ch., 4 juillet 2008, n° 06/21406, Universal Music…: RTDCom. 2008, 
745, obs. Pollaud-Dullian p 397 note Weksteinbeg. Author’s translation. The original text 
reads: [M]algré la courte durée, [leur interprétation] n'est pas secondaire mais fait au 
contraire une rupture dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre et lui donne une coloration spécifique; 
Considérant qu'il ne peut davantage être dit que leur voix est interchangeable ; qu'en effet, 
une autre interprétation avec un autre timbre de voix donnerait nécessairement une 
coloration différente au morceau […]. 
 
 
Note 171 : Paris, 4ème ch., 4 juillet 2008, n° 06/21406, Universal Music…: RTDCom. 2008, 
745, obs. Pollaud-Dullian. Author’s translation, the original text reads: « Considérant qu'à 
l'écoute de ces deux oeuvres, […] la cour a relevé qu'outre le timbre de voix particulier de 
chacun des intimés, la ligne mélodique qui rompt avec le rythme tant des choeurs que de la 
partie instrumentale joue un rôle dans la composition de l'œuvre ».  
 
 
Chapter Six 
Note 156 : In 2006, the Court of Appeal of Paris concluded that perfumes could indeed be 
protected even if they were hardly ascertainable because sometimes perceived by different 
individuals. See, Paris, 25 janvier 2006, n° 04/18300: D. 2006 jurispr. P 580 obs. Daleau; 
JCP E 2006, 1386 note Caron (concluding that perfumes are protectable by copyright even 
though they may also be patented). The decision reads: Considering that the fixation of the 
work is not a requirement of legal protection so long that the work is perceptible; that a 
fragrance whose olfactory composition is determinable satisfies this condition, no matter 
whether the composition can be experienced differently by different individuals unlike 
literary, graphic or musical works which, too, demand the execution of savoir-faire” (author’s 
translation). The original decision reads: “Considérant, d'autre part, que la fixation de 
l'oeuvre ne constitue pas un critère exigé pour accéder à la protection dès lors que sa forme 
est perceptible ; qu'une fragrance, dont la composition olfactive est déterminable, remplit 
cette condition, peu important qu'elle soit différemment perçue, à l'instar des oeuvres 
littéraires, picturales ou musicales ».  
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Appendix 3: Clark’s figures 
 
Referenced in Chapter 5, text to note 192 
The following figures have been reproduced from : Erick Clarke, ‘Empirical Methods in the Study of 
Performances’ in Eric Clarke and Nicholas Cook (eds), Empirical Musicology: Aims, Methods and 
Prospects (Oxford University Press 2004). 
Figure 13:"Sample performance data (in milliseconds) for two performances of a simple rhymtic 
pattern” 8 
 
 
Figure 14: “Raw timing data for two performances of a simple rhythmic pattern” 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Erick Clarke, ‘Empirical Methods in the Study of Performances’ in Eric Clarke and Nicholas Cook (eds), 
Empirical Musicology: Aims, Methods and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2004) 82. 
9
 ibid. 
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Figure 15: “Normalised timing data for performances of a simple rhythmic pattern”
10
  
 
 
Figure 16: “Timing Data in terms of momentary tempo (in quaver beats per minute)”
11
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 ibid, 83. 
11
 Erick Clarke, ‘Empirical Methods in the Study of Performances’ in Eric Clarke and Nicholas Cook (eds), 
Empirical Musicology: Aims, Methods and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2004) 83. 
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Figure 17: “Tempo and dynamic data from expert performances of the Chopin Prelude in E minor, Op. 
28 no. 4”
12
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Erick Clarke, ‘Empirical Methods in the Study of Performances’ in Eric Clarke and Nicholas Cook (eds), 
Empirical Musicology: Aims, Methods and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2004) 87. 
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Figure 18: Crow’s Notation 
Appendix 3: Crow’s notation 
 
Referenced in Chapter 5, note 210 
Reproduction of Figure 19.1 from Keith Sawyer, Explaining Creativity The Science of Human 
Innovation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 361, with accompagnying title and note: 
‘Transcript of conversation that was performed by a theater group exactly as it was originally spoken. 
The punctuation marks indicate pitch changes, volume, emphasis, and overlapping speech, which the 
actors were required to copy exactly’ (reprinted from TDR/The Drama Review, 32:3, 23-54. Brian K. 
New York University and the Massachussets Institute of Technology. Copyright 1988.) 
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